Under Article 481(1) of the Code, a fine of EUR 30–140 is imposed for profane language in a public place, and under Article 481(4), for the offence at an event, a ban on attending events may be imposed for a period of six months to two years.
Article 524 of the Code provides for liability for the distribution or display of Nazi or communist symbols, while Article 36 of the Code establishes the aggravating circumstance of discriminatory grounds.
The detained man, who used profane language during a rally on Gedimino Avenue and violated public order, will have his liability assessed under Article 481 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania (the Code) — an administrative offence punishable by a fine of EUR 30 to 140, or EUR 140 to 240 for a repeat offence. The case of the detained woman who struck another protester is described in the brief as potentially involving criminal liability; however, the sources provided contain no Criminal Code provisions, so her liability framework is analysed here only to the extent the Code context allows. An additional practical risk in both cases arises from the fact that the acts were committed at an event taking place in a public place: under Article 481(4) of the Code, a ban on attending events held in public places may be imposed for a period of six months to two years. A separate issue concerns the symbolism visible on placards and in chants and the risk of incitement: Article 524 of the Code provides for liability for the distribution or display of Nazi or communist symbols, while Article 36 establishes an aggravating circumstance based on discriminatory grounds, which may be applied in any case.
In the man's case, the officers will apply the principles of the rule of law, justice, reasonableness and proportionality enshrined in Article 32(2) of the Code, and the penalty will be imposed by administrative order or ruling (Article 32(3) of the Code); only one penalty and one or more administrative measures may be imposed by a single ruling (Article 32(4) of the Code). If the detainee committed several offences, a penalty is imposed separately for each under Article 38(1) of the Code, and where a single act falls under several articles, the final penalty is imposed under the more serious offence (Article 38(2) of the Code). During the detention, the officers could have applied the coercive measures provided for in Article 595 of the Code — bringing the person in, administrative detention, a search, and inspection of items. The limits on fine amounts are confirmed by Article 25(2) of the Code: general fines may not be less than EUR 10 or more than EUR 6,000, while the sanctions of the Special Part set the specific amounts. If any minors were among the protesters, Article 44 of the Code provides that their fine equals half of the standard amount, but not less than EUR 5 and not more than EUR 900. As regards the assessment of the symbolism — the placard recorded in the brief reading "Yesterday – Juden Raus, today – Lithuania for Lithuanians" and the protester's claim of having seen Nazi symbolism provide grounds for assessment under Article 524 of the Code, and the aggravating circumstance of discriminatory motivation under Article 36 of the Code may increase liability in any of these cases. The holding of the rallies themselves in central Vilnius was lawful — Article 495 of the Code prohibits actions only on the territory of nuclear energy facilities, so it is the content of the two rallies, not their location, that is the object of legal assessment.
For the detained man, the most realistic scenario is an administrative offence case under Article 481 of the Code with a fine of EUR 30–140 and a possible ban on attending events for up to two years. In the woman's case, where the victim was hospitalised, the outcome will depend on the classification: if the harm is assessed as criminal, the case will pass to the prosecutor's office. For the police and the VST, it is important to document instances of the display of such symbolism under Article 524 of the Code, as this constitutes a separate line of liability independent of cases under Article 481. Pre-trial investigations into the incidents at the Kaunas mosque and the possible burning of the Quran indicate that cases of a similar nature concerning public order are already on the law enforcement priority list.
Under Article 8 of the Law on the Defence and Security Industry, industrial cooperation is applicable only where the contract value exceeds EUR 20,000,000 excluding VAT and all other conditions established by law exist.
In the standard form of the agreement, the supplier undertakes to allocate a specified percentage of the total value of the procurement contract to industrial cooperation, and the agreement is signed prior to the purchase and sale contract for military equipment.
Participants in Lithuania's defence procurement — the Defence Materiel Agency (KAM), foreign arms suppliers, and domestic industry companies — fall within the existing industrial cooperation (offset) regime, the essence of which is that a foreign supplier must "return" part of the contract value to Lithuania not in money, but through technology, investments, or orders for local businesses. Five such agreements have been concluded to date, with the value of obligations exceeding EUR 100 million; however, this sum does not constitute direct investment — different forms of benefit are valued unequally. The precise legal question is: when and under what conditions is the contracting authority obliged or permitted to apply industrial cooperation, how is it implemented, and who supervises it. The matter is resolved under the Law on the Defence and Security Industry of the Republic of Lithuania (No. XIV-2647), in particular Articles 8 and 10 thereof, and the implementing legislation.
Under Article 8 of the Law on the Defence and Security Industry, the contracting authority may apply industrial cooperation only where all of the following conditions exist simultaneously:
For foreign suppliers that win a procurement of military equipment valued at over EUR 20 million, this practically means:
Under Article 494(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences, a violation of the Law on Assemblies carries a fine of EUR 140 to 600, while Article 494(3) allows a ban on attending events held in public places for 1 to 18 months.
Under Article 17 of the Law on Assemblies, an assembly may be terminated for a gross violation of the notified place, time or form only after a public warning to the organisers, whereas under Article 9(1) — in cases of being armed, wearing masks, or criminal acts — without such a warning.
The legal position of the participants in this story — the organisers and participants of the assemblies — is determined by the fact that all events in Vilnius have been lawfully notified under the Lithuanian Law on Assemblies, so no liability currently arises: the police have recorded no violations. Risk arises only if grounds for termination listed in Article 9(1) or Article 17 of the Law on Assemblies manifest themselves during the assembly — being armed, wearing masks, breaches of public order, or attempts to commit criminal acts. The precise legal question is twofold: first, whether the police may terminate an assembly without prior warning (Article 9) or only after a public warning to the organisers (Article 17); second, what administrative liability applies to offenders under Articles 494, 481 and 488 of the Code of Administrative Offences. A separate line of inquiry is the pre-trial investigation already opened into the 11 September incident outside the Kaunas mosque, to whose participants public order offence provisions may apply.
The regulation of assembly rights is distributed among several actors, and their obligations in this situation differ:
The most realistic scenarios depend on whether the risk of confrontation materialises. If the assemblies pass without violations, there will be no legal consequences — notified assemblies are constitutionally protected activity. If the features specified in Article 9(1) arise (mask-wearing, weapons, alcohol), the police could terminate the assembly immediately, and participants subjected to preventive measures with whom prohibited items were found would be liable under the relevant provisions of the Code of Administrative Offences. If the notified place or time is violated, the warning mechanism of Article 17 applies first, and only if that fails — termination and a fine of up to EUR 600 under Article 494 of the Code. Organisers are liable under Article 11 both for their own violations and those of participants, and under Article 10(1) must leave the site tidy. The cancelled assembly on Independence Square gives rise to no legal consequences. The pre-trial investigation into the 11 September incident outside the Kaunas mosque is a separate procedure.
Under Article 20(2) of the Criminal Code, a legal entity is liable for a criminal act committed by a natural person only where it was committed for its benefit or interests by a person entitled to represent it, to make decisions on its behalf, or to control its activities.
Article 227(3) of the Criminal Code provides that the giving of a bribe exceeding the value of 250 MGIs is punishable by imprisonment of up to seven years, while a bribe of a value below 1 MGI, under paragraph 4, is qualified as a criminal misdemeanour.
In this case, two accused subjects are submitted for judicial assessment — the natural person E. Gudynas and the legal entity UAB "Versiculus", charged with bribery of a person who, according to the prosecution's assessment, is equivalent to a public servant. In determining the company's liability, Article 20(2) and (3) of the Criminal Code are decisive: a legal entity is liable only where a criminal act committed for its benefit was carried out by a person entitled to represent it, to make decisions on its behalf, or to control its activities, or by an employee — either on the instructions of a person in a managerial position or as a result of insufficient supervision. Accordingly, the testimony of the brother P. Gudynas, which under Article 278(1)(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is given without an oath but voluntarily and with a warning of liability under Article 235 of the Criminal Code, has procedural significance as evidence of who acted on the company's behalf and in its interests. The precise legal issue: whether the bribe transferred (an approximate sum of EUR 2,000 identified by the witness) falls under Article 227(3) of the Criminal Code or remains within the basic provisions of paragraphs 1–2, and whether the link between the giving of the bribe and the company's benefit under the public procurement contract with the Ministry of National Defence, valued at more than EUR 1,287,000, has been established.
With respect to the accused E. Gudynas, Article 227(2) of the Criminal Code applies if the bribe was given for a desired unlawful act or omission, or Article 227(1) if for a lawful one.
If the court assesses the totality of the evidence, including the testimony of P. Gudynas, favourably to the prosecution, E. Gudynas faces a penalty of imprisonment under the sanctions of Article 227 of the Criminal Code, while "Versiculus" faces a fine or restriction of activities for up to five years, which would in practice exclude the company from public procurement and the construction market. Should the company fail to avoid a conviction, the additional risks are confiscation of property under Article 72 of the Criminal Code and public announcement of the judgment, carrying reputational consequences for participation in future public procurements. If the link to the legal entity's benefit or the role of a person in a managerial position is not established, only the natural person will bear liability, since Article 20(5) of the Criminal Code does not exclude the liability of the natural person, and vice versa. For I. Šaudys, as a person who accepted the bribe and reported it, the direction of the assessment will depend on whether his actions are to be qualified as bribery under Article 225 of the Criminal Code or as a report of a criminal act. Point to watch: further hearings before the Kaunas District Court sitting in Kaišiadorys, at which E. Gudynas himself and company representatives, who have so far given no testimony to the court, are scheduled to be examined.
Under Article 127(4) TFEU and Article 2(1) of Council Decision 98/415/EC, consultation with the European Central Bank is mandatory for all draft legal acts falling within ECB competence.
Article 8(1)(4) of the Law on the Bank of Lithuania tasks the Bank of Lithuania with promoting the sustainable and efficient functioning of payment systems, including the development of payment infrastructures it manages.
The legal position of the individuals and companies mentioned in this story remains unchanged for now: the digital euro has not yet been regulated, and its issuance depends on EU legislative procedures that are still ongoing. At the Lithuanian level, the applicable provisions are those of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Bank of Lithuania: Articles 8, 11 and 42.
Article 8(1)(1) of the Law on the Bank of Lithuania tasks the Bank of Lithuania with issuing banknotes and carrying out related activities, while point 4 tasks it with promoting the sustainable and efficient functioning of payment systems, including the development of payment infrastructures managed by the Bank of Lithuania; it is precisely these functions that constitute the national basis for preparing for the digital euro as a means of payment. The Board, under Article 11(1)(9) of the Law, in compliance with the requirements of the TFEU, decides on the issuance and withdrawal from circulation of banknotes and coins and other related matters; accordingly, decisions on the implementation of a new means of payment in Lithuania would fall to the Board of the Bank of Lithuania. Article 11(1)(13) empowers the Board to apply enforcement measures to the supervised financial market participants listed in Article 42(1) — banks, electronic money institutions, payment institutions and others — except where, under Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, this is performed by the ECB. In practical terms, this means that commercial banks, through which digital euro accounts would be opened, would be both supervised by the Bank of Lithuania under Article 42 and subject to preparedness obligations. At EU level, the introduction of the euro is currently governed by Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 on the introduction of the euro, Regulation (EC) No 2866/98 and Regulation (EC) No 1103/97; however, the digital euro will require separate legal acts, which are being negotiated in trilogue. The experience of Lithuania's national euro changeover plan shows that currency introduction requires a preparedness structure: working groups composed of representatives of ministries, the Bank of Lithuania and government institutions, allocation of responsibilities to individual sectors, and consumer protection measures. Under point 17.1 of that plan, the Bank of Lithuania is already tasked with informing the public about the currency, promoting financial literacy and cooperating with the ECB — this area of responsibility would naturally also encompass digital euro communication. The ECB's consultation obligation is two-way: not only must EU institutions consult the ECB on acts falling within its competence, but national institutions must also do so with respect to draft laws regulating the activities of national central banks. ECB Opinion No CON/2011/46 on the restructuring of financial market supervision in Lithuania confirms that the additional functions transferred to the Bank of Lithuania must not affect its ability to perform ESCB functions and must be adequately financed — this principle of financial independence will be important if the costs of digital euro preparedness fall on the central bank. There is no case law on the digital euro in the sources consulted.
Realistic scenarios depend on the outcome of the trilogue: if the legal acts are adopted this year, the ECB envisages a preparation period of approximately two years and issuance around 2029; if decisions are delayed, all stages shift accordingly. The key officials and entities in practical terms:
The ECB has already invested EUR 1.3 billion in digital euro technology, and 36 selected payment service providers, including Revolut Bank, will participate in a pilot project in 2027–2028. Until the final features of the digital euro are determined, the cost of preparedness in Lithuania is unknown.