The specific question is not whether collective agreements are “beneficial”, but when their provisions may derogate from the rules of the Labour Code and apply not only to trade union members, but to all employees of the employer. This is particularly important because the news item relies on broad coverage - 327,000 employees, or about 26% of the country’s workforce - but the legal scope depends on the level of the agreement, the status of the party, and the application mechanism.
Article 191 of the Labour Code distinguishes between national, territorial, sectoral, employer-level and workplace-level collective agreements, meaning that the mere label “collective agreement” does not answer what scale of derogations or application is possible. Article 197(1) of the Labour Code lays down the basic rule: collective agreements apply to members of the trade unions that concluded them, while an employer-level or workplace-level agreement applies to all employees only where the trade union and the employer so agree and this is approved by a general meeting or conference of employees. Article 195 of the Labour Code further shows that a collective agreement is not merely a political or communications document: it must be concluded in writing, signed by authorised representatives, and valid agreements must be registered and publicly announced.
The article’s statement that part of the regulation of employment relations can be transferred to collective agreements is too broad unless it immediately specifies the level of the agreement and the limits within which this is done. A more precise formulation would be: national, sectoral or territorial collective agreements may derogate from mandatory rules of the Labour Code or other labour law norms, but not from rules concerning maximum working time and minimum rest time, the conclusion or termination of an employment contract, minimum wage, occupational safety and health, gender equality and non-discrimination; in addition, a balance between the interests of the employer and employees must be achieved. The rule in Article 197 of the Labour Code should also have been noted separately: extending an employer-level or workplace-level agreement to all employees is not automatic, because it requires approval by a general meeting or conference of employees.
The stronger practical point is now not “a collective agreement may agree otherwise”, but “one must first check the level of the agreement, its circle of application, and whether the derogation falls within prohibited exceptions”. It is risky for employers to rely on an employer-level collective agreement as a universal basis for applying amended conditions to all employees if there is no approval by a general meeting or conference of employees as required by Article 197 of the Labour Code. For trade unions and journalists, it is worth citing not only the coverage statistics - 376 employer-level, 15 sectoral, 5 territorial and 1 national agreement - but also the legal limit: the largest share of agreements is at employer level, while the broadest derogations from mandatory regulation under the cited rule are linked to the national, sectoral or territorial level.
Core issue. The legal issue is the conditions under which a collective agreement becomes binding on employees and employers, and the extent to which it may modify working conditions. It is governed by Articles 190, 191, 193, 195 and 197 of the Law on the Approval, Entry into Force and Implementation of the Labour Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Under Article 190 of the Labour Code, a collective agreement is a written agreement establishing labour-law rules and the mutual rights, obligations and liability of the parties, concluded by trade unions, employers and their organisations. Article 191 of the Labour Code permits the conclusion of national, territorial, sectoral, employer-level and workplace-level collective agreements. Article 165(3) of the Labour Code provides that collective bargaining and the conclusion of collective agreements are the exclusive right of trade unions. Accordingly, the expansion of collective agreements discussed in the report legally means not abstract cooperation, but an increase in the scope of normative agreements concluded by trade unions, employers and their organisations. Article 193 of the Labour Code is the principal provision defining the permissible content of such agreements and the circumstances in which they may derogate from general labour-law rules
Legal assessment. Under Article 193(1) of the Labour Code, a collective agreement may establish employees’ working, social and economic conditions and guarantees, as well as mutual rights, obligations and liability. This includes the agreement on better working conditions referred to in the report, as such conditions fall within the core content of a collective agreement. However, Article 193(2) of the Labour Code requires the parties to observe the principles of justice, reasonableness and good faith, so a collective agreement is not an instrument of unlimited discretion. Article 193(3) of the Labour Code allows national, sectoral or territorial collective agreements to derogate from mandatory rules of the Labour Code or other labour-law provisions, but not from rules concerning maximum working time and minimum rest periods, the conclusion or termination of an employment contract, minimum wage, occupational safety and health, gender equality and non-discrimination. The same provision requires a balance between the interests of the employer and employees; where a term conflicts with mandatory rules or such balance is absent, that term does not apply and is replaced by the relevant rule of the Labour Code or another labour-law provision. Under Article 197(1) of the Labour Code, employer-level and workplace-level agreements apply primarily to the members of the trade unions that concluded them. If a trade union and an employer agree that an employer-level or workplace-level agreement is to apply to all employees, it applies to all employees only if approved by a general meeting or conference of the employer’s employees. Under Article 197(2) of the Labour Code, an employer that is a party to an employer-level or workplace-level collective agreement must apply it. Under Article 197(3) of the Labour Code, national, territorial and sectoral collective agreements are binding on the relevant employers that are members of the employers’ organisation that signed the agreement, joined it after the agreement was signed, or were members and later withdrew. In the public-sector context, Article 181 of the Labour Code is important: at sectoral or national level, budgetary institutions and state- or municipality-controlled institutions are represented by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania or an institution authorised by it, and at territorial level, in certain cases, by the municipal council. Article 195 of the Labour Code establishes the procedure: agreements are concluded through collective bargaining, in writing, in at least two copies, and signed by authorised representatives. If an agreement is renewed, negotiations must begin no later than two months before its expiry. Under Article 195(5) of the Labour Code, collective agreements in force must be registered and publicly announced in accordance with the procedure established by the Minister of Social Security and Labour; if the trade union fails to register them within twenty days of signature, another party may register them. Article 175(2) of the Labour Code further distinguishes a collective agreement from an agreement between the employer and the works council, since the latter may not regulate working conditions, remuneration, working and rest time, or other matters that must be regulated in a collective agreement
Consequences. In practical terms, the increase in collective agreements means that more working conditions will be determined not only in individual employment contracts or the employer’s internal acts, but by a collective normative agreement. This matters for employees because, under Article 165 of the Labour Code, a trade union may collectively create or modify their working, social and economic rights. It matters for employers because a signed and applicable collective agreement becomes a binding source of regulation of employment relationships, particularly under Article 197(2) and (3) of the Labour Code. If an employer-level agreement is intended to apply to all employees, approval by a general meeting or conference of employees is required under Article 197(1) of the Labour Code. If the terms of an agreement exceed the limits set out in Article 193(3) of the Labour Code, the real dispute will concern not the political usefulness of the agreement, but the application of the specific term under the prescribed procedure for examining labour disputes concerning rights. Therefore, the 2026 coverage indicators referred to in the report are legally significant both for the bargaining power of trade unions and for employers’ obligation to know clearly which collective agreement, at what level and in respect of which employees, is binding
The regulation was initiated in the implementation of Lithuania’s social model reform, which sought to modernise labour relations, increase employment, and balance the interests of employees and employers. In the area of collective agreements, the aim was to define more clearly their types, application, and the role of the social partners. The main comments concerned consistency: criticism was directed at the fact that the proposed rules could unjustifiably restrict the application of several collective agreements to an employee and prevent the application of more favourable conditions to that employee.
Can an agricultural holding lawfully use third-country nationals for seasonal work through an employee leasing or foreign agency model where Article 62¹(1)(3) of the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens links a seasonal work permit to an employment contract concluded only directly with the employer?
Article 62¹(1) of the Law links a permit to perform seasonal work not merely to a shortage of workers, but to three cumulative elements: there is no suitable worker in Lithuania, the foreign national’s principal place of residence is abroad, and the employment contract may be concluded only directly with an employer in Lithuania. Accordingly, the practice mentioned in the news item, whereby it is “simpler for farmers to lease a worker”, is legally weaker specifically in the case of seasonal work permits: Article 62¹ itself does not provide that a seasonal employment relationship may be replaced by a labour-leasing chain. Article 57 of the Law separately provides for another situation in which a work permit obligation arises, namely where an employee of a third-country undertaking is posted to Lithuania for temporary work under an open-ended contract and is covered by social insurance in that state.
Consequently, the agency or foreign undertaking model must be characterised not by reference to its economic convenience for the holding, but by reference to whether the worker is a seasonal worker with a direct contract or a posted worker under Article 57(1)(2).
The stronger argument in this situation is not the administrative-simplicity argument advanced by farmers, but formal compliance of the permit basis with the specific work arrangement. If a holding in fact uses a third-country national for harvesting, weeding, or preparation for sale for one or three months, but the worker’s contract has not been concluded directly with an employer operating in Lithuania, the basis under Article 62¹ becomes vulnerable. This is particularly relevant in a sector in which, as of 1 July, 5,400 foreign nationals were working, including 4,600 third-country nationals, because the scale increases the likelihood of inspections and disputes over legal characterisation.
The Labour Inspectorate’s statement that no illegal work by foreign nationals was identified in agriculture in the first quarter of 2026 or in 2025 is not a legal safeguard for any specific model: under Article 140²⁴, the risk of unlawfulness arises from the mismatch in the legal basis for the work itself, not from whether infringements have previously been identified in the sector. In practice, holdings should separate the files in their documentation: for seasonal workers, they should have a direct contract and justification for the conditions under Article 62¹; in leasing or foreign-agency cases, they should verify whether the arrangement in substance satisfies the prerequisites for posting under Article 57.
Core issue. The legal issue is not whether agriculture has an economic need for foreigners, but under what conditions third-country nationals may lawfully perform seasonal, unskilled, or skilled work on Lithuanian farms, and when such work becomes unlawful. This issue is governed by Articles 1, 57, 62¹ and 64 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Legal Status of Foreigners, as well as Articles 1, 30¹, 57 and 8 of the Employment Law of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 57(1) of the Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners provides that a foreigner who is not exempt from the obligation to obtain a work permit must obtain one if arriving to perform seasonal work or if he or she is an employee of an undertaking of a third country posted temporarily to work in Lithuania. Article 57(3) of the same law assigns competence to issue, revoke and extend work permits to the Employment Service. Seasonal work is specifically governed by Article 62¹ of the Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners, under which a permit may be issued only where all apparent conditions are met: there is no suitable worker in Lithuania, the foreigner’s principal place of residence is abroad, the employment contract is concluded directly with the employer, and accommodation meets the established requirement of 7 square metres per adult person. The threshold for unlawful work is defined in Article 64 of the Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners: work is deemed unlawful where it is performed without a required work permit and/or without an employment contract, temporary residence permit or visa
Legal assessment. The 4.6 thousand third-country nationals working in agriculture on 1 July 2026 fall under a stricter permit and documentation regime than the 774 citizens of European states, because Article 1(2¹) of the Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners provides for different application of chapters of that law to citizens of European Union Member States and European Free Trade Association Member States. The earlier rule cited in the source, namely that citizens of European Union Member States and their family members do not need a work permit, is consistent with the fact that the main permit issue concerns third-country nationals. For farms hiring foreigners for harvesting, field maintenance or weeding for one to three months, the key provision is Article 62¹ of the Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners on seasonal work permits. Under this provision, “labour shortage” is not an abstract opinion of the employer: the permit is linked to the condition that there is no suitable worker in the Republic of Lithuania to perform seasonal work. Accordingly, Employment Service data on unfilled vacancies is practically relevant not only as a description of the market, but also as a precondition for issuing a permit under Article 62¹(1)(1) of the Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners. An employer engaging a third-country national must not only establish an employment relationship, but also maintain a proper basis for the foreigner’s stay and work, because Article 57(1)(2) of the Employment Law requires the employer, during the period of work in Lithuania, to keep copies of documents confirming the right to stay, reside and/or work, and to submit them to requesting authorities. In relation to qualified machinery mechanics, repair specialists or operators of modern machinery, Article 57(1)(1) of the Employment Law becomes particularly significant, because failure to provide documents evidencing qualification or work experience is treated as an infringement where such qualification or experience is assessed. This means that the competence to operate modern machinery referred to by grain growers must be not merely the employer’s factual belief, but also capable of being substantiated by documents, if such assessment is required in the procedure for a work permit or for determining the work’s compliance with Lithuanian labour-market needs. In the case of employee leasing, the legal risk is greater for seasonal work, because Article 62¹(1)(3) of the Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners links a seasonal work permit to an employment contract concluded only directly with the employer. Article 30¹(1) of the Employment Law also distinguishes employment mediation services for third-country nationals from cases where work is intended to be performed under a temporary employment contract. Therefore, the commercially simpler route for a farm of “leasing a worker” does not in itself resolve the requirements for a work permit and a direct seasonal employment contract where the worker is a third-country national and the work is classified as seasonal. For small farms, this regime is objectively more burdensome, because they must meet the same conditions concerning the absence of a suitable local worker, a direct contract, accommodation and document retention, despite having fewer administrative resources. The Labour Inspectorate’s statement that no unlawful work by foreigners was identified in agriculture in the first quarter of 2026 or in 2025 legally means only that no such infringements were established according to the criteria set out in Article 64 of the Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners. Nevertheless, if an inspection revealed work without a required permit, employment contract, temporary residence permit or visa, it would be unlawful under Article 64, irrespective of whether the foreigner received income
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is lawful expansion: farms that substantiate the shortage of suitable local workers and meet the conditions of Article 62¹ of the Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners will continue to hire third-country nationals for seasonal work through the Employment Service’s permit procedure. The second scenario is increased attention to documentation, because Article 57 of the Employment Law links liability risk not only to actual unlawful work, but also to failure to provide or retain documents confirming qualification, experience, and the right to work or stay in Lithuania. The third scenario is more cautious use of employee leasing, because the seasonal work permit model under Article 62¹ of the Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners is based on a direct employment contract with the employer. The fourth scenario is important for the skilled-work segment: farmers seeking foreigners capable of operating modern machinery will have to combine justification of labour-market need with documented assessment of qualification or experience under Article 57 of the Employment Law. The practical significance for farms is that cheaper or more readily available labour is legally useful only to the extent that it is employed under the regime governing permits, contracts and documents authorising stay in Lithuania. For the Employment Service, this means a central role in decisions on the issuance, extension and revocation of work permits under Article 57(3) of the Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners. For foreign workers, the most important point is that the lawfulness of their work depends on several concurrent grounds: a work permit, an employment contract and, where necessary, a temporary residence permit or visa. For small and family farms, the practical consequence is competition not through wages, but through the capacity to comply with legal requirements: those unable to administer permits, accommodation and documents will find it more difficult to access the same labour force
Can a retailer restrict the actual operation of conventional checkouts to 10:00-20:00 where, during the store’s remaining opening hours, customers are left with self-service and the right to ask an employee to open a conventional checkout, without creating an unjustified obstacle to purchasing goods?
Article 3(1)(1), (3) and (9) of the Law on Consumer Protection safeguards the consumer’s right to purchase goods at their discretion, to receive accurate and comprehensive information, and to have their economic interests protected. The stronger conclusion to be drawn from these provisions is not that a customer has an absolute right to a continuously operating conventional checkout, but rather that the payment model chosen must not, in practice, negate the ability to purchase goods. Article 8 of the Law becomes relevant insofar as the payment and assistance process is treated as an element of the service provided by the retailer: the quality of the service must correspond to what the consumer may expect having regard to the nature of the service and the retailer’s own public statements.
Accordingly, Maxima’s position is legally sustainable only if calling an employee is not a merely formal promise, but a genuinely prompt alternative available throughout opening hours.
In practice, the stronger argument at this stage is not against the 10:00-20:00 restriction itself, but against its implementation where an elderly customer, a customer with reduced mobility, or a customer unable to use self-service must look for an employee, wait for an undefined period, or, as a result, effectively abandon the purchase. It will not be sufficient for the retailer to rely on a 63% self-service usage rate, because the risk of a breach of consumer rights arises precisely in respect of the remaining group of consumers for whom self-service is not a real alternative. Under Article 12 of the Law, the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority may assess not the checkout schedule in the abstract, but the actual organisation of service: the clarity of pre-purchase information, employee availability, waiting time, and the accessibility of assistance for consumers with special needs.
For a consumer complaint under Article 20 of the Law, the most significant evidence would be the specific time, the store, the inability to find an employee or a refusal to open a checkout, the duration of the wait, and the fact that, because of the arrangement, payment was effectively impossible or involved disproportionate inconvenience.
Core issue. The legal issue is not whether the seller is required to keep a conventional checkout open throughout all working hours, but whether the payment arrangement chosen by the seller in fact restricts the consumer’s ability to purchase goods and obtain the necessary pre-contractual information. It is to be assessed under Article 3(1)(1), (3), (4), (5), (6) and (9) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Consumer Rights Protection, Article 6.2282(1), (2) and (4) of the Civil Code, paragraphs 2, 27.1, 27.6, 28 and 29 of the Retail Trade Rules, and Article 5(1) of the Law on the Prohibition of Unfair Commercial Practices towards Consumers. Paragraph 2 of the Retail Trade Rules applies to sellers selling goods to consumers; therefore, checkout arrangements are assessed as part of the consumer sales process. Article 3(1)(1) of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection protects the consumer’s right to purchase goods and choose a seller at their discretion, while point 3 protects the right to receive accurate and comprehensive information in the state language. Article 6.2282(1) of the Civil Code prohibits the direct or indirect elimination or restriction of consumer rights, and paragraph 4 prohibits a trader from engaging in unfair commercial practices towards consumers
Legal assessment. The mere fact that conventional checkouts operate from 10:00 to 20:00 is not, in itself, sufficient to establish an infringement if, at other times, the consumer is genuinely able to pay at a self-service checkout or by having an employee promptly open a conventional checkout. The decisive criterion is the practical ability to conclude and perform a consumer sales contract, because paragraph 28 of the Retail Trade Rules establishes the consumer’s obligation to pay for the goods purchased, and the seller’s arrangements must not turn that obligation into a disproportionate obstacle. If, due to age, health condition or other needs, the buyer cannot independently use a self-service checkout, the seller’s obligation arises from the general prohibition on restricting consumer rights under Article 6.2282(1) of the Civil Code and from the consumer’s right to protection of economic interests under Article 3(1)(9) of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection. Information notices are relevant because paragraph 27.1 of the Retail Trade Rules gives the consumer the right, before conclusion of the contract, to receive necessary, accurate, comprehensive and non-misleading information about the goods being sold, while Article 3(1)(3) of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection requires accurate and comprehensive information in the state language. If the notices clearly state that, after 20:00, a conventional checkout will be opened upon request to an employee, the consumer can assess the service arrangements before making a purchase. If such information were presented in a way that would lead the average consumer reasonably to believe that payment at a conventional checkout is impossible, an issue could arise under Article 5(1) of the Law on the Prohibition of Unfair Commercial Practices towards Consumers concerning misleading presentation of information about the method of sale or availability of the product. Procedurally, the consumer may first submit a claim to the seller, and paragraph 27.6 of the Retail Trade Rules provides for the right to apply to the institutions specified in the Law on Consumer Rights Protection or to a court if the seller fails to comply with lawful demands. Article 6.2282(2) of the Civil Code also establishes the right to seek protection of infringed rights before consumer rights protection authorities or a court, while paragraph 3 links the relevant authorities and remedies to statutory law. Article 7 of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection shows that protection is implemented through preventive measures, administrative, civil and criminal liability, and the defence of consumer rights both out of court and in court. The sources provided contain no case law; therefore, this analysis does not assess analogous cases
Consequences. In practical terms, the arrangement would remain lawful if the store ensured genuine payment capability throughout all working hours and clearly informed consumers how to obtain service at a conventional checkout. Risk for the seller would arise where the consumer was in fact unable to pay or had to search for an employee without justification, since such a situation could be assessed as a restriction of the consumer’s right to purchase goods and of the protection of economic interests under Article 3 of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection and Article 6.2282 of the Civil Code. Another scenario is institutional assessment of the presentation of information: if notices in the store are incomplete or misleading, the dispute could shift to the assessment of the duty to inform and misleading actions under paragraph 27.1 of the Retail Trade Rules and Article 5(1) of the Law on the Prohibition of Unfair Commercial Practices towards Consumers. For consumers, this arrangement matters because their obligation to pay under paragraph 28 of the Retail Trade Rules must be capable of being performed in practice, rather than merely formally, with the self-service checkout left as the only effective channel. For the seller, the key point is to prove not the efficiency of work organisation, but actual accessibility: the presence of an employee, a clear procedure for calling assistance, and the possibility of opening a conventional checkout without excessive obstacles. If the dispute is not resolved on site, the consumer may rely on Article 3(1)(5) and (6) of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection and Article 6.2282(2) of the Civil Code and seek protection of infringed rights
Can AI-generated recordings uploaded to Spotify at scale be classified as an infringement of copyright or related rights solely because of their AI origin, or only where the uploading, imitation, reproduction or distribution involves a protected work, performance, phonogram or database object without the rights holder’s licence.
Article 73 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Copyright and Related Rights treats as an infringement not abstract “AI content”, but the specific unauthorised use of a protected object: release, reproduction, public performance, broadcasting, other communication to the public, or distribution. The same provision also covers breach of contractual terms, meaning that a breach of platform rules or licensing terms may be legally relevant if it is linked to the use of a protected work, an object of related rights, or a sui generis database. Article 122 of the Code of Administrative Offences links administrative liability to the unlawful public performance, reproduction, making available online, or other use of an object of copyright or related rights, while a commercial purpose increases the sanction range to EUR 300-3,500.
This means that the artificial generation of streams and exploitation of the stream-remuneration model bring the situation closer to commercial use, but the mere fact of AI generation is not yet a sufficient element of infringement.
The stronger legal argument at present is not that “AI music must be removed”, but that “the platform must remove or restrict content where it is spam, manipulation, or uses protected objects without a licence”. In practice, rights holders should formulate claims not by reference to general AI origin, but by reference to the specific acts under Article 73: reproduction, making available online, use of a phonogram or performance, distribution of unlawful copies, or breach of licensing terms. The fact that Spotify has removed more than 75 million recordings shows that platform risk is shifting from individual copyright disputes to mass evidentiary assessment: it will be necessary to distinguish low-value but lawful AI content from content that infringes specific rights or manipulates the remuneration system.
As regards music files and metadata used for model training, the available evidence supports reliance only on the general logic of copyright, related-rights and sui generis protection; the precise conclusion would depend on whether protected objects or database content were reproduced and whether a licence existed.
Core issue. The precise legal question is not whether an AI-generated recording is prohibited in itself, but whether recordings uploaded to and made publicly available on Spotify amount to the unlawful reproduction, communication to the public, distribution, or alteration of rights-management information in respect of works, performances, or other protected subject matter. This should primarily be assessed under Article 15, Article 65(1)(3), Article 73, and Article 76 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Copyright and Related Rights. If such use meets the elements of an administrative offence, Article 122 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania applies. On the basis of the sources provided, the issue of mass data scraping for model training should be assessed under Article 18(1)-(5) and Article 63(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Copyright and Related Rights
Legal assessment. Article 15(1) of the Law on Copyright and Related Rights grants the author exclusive rights to authorise or prohibit the reproduction, publication, adaptation, distribution, public performance, and communication to the public of a work, including making it publicly available online. Accordingly, uploading to a streaming platform is legally relevant where the recording uses a protected work or part of it without the author’s, successor-in-title’s, or authorised person’s permission, because Article 15(2) treats such use as unlawful. Article 73(1) of the Law on Copyright and Related Rights expressly treats as an infringement the use of a work or subject matter of related rights, including reproduction, public performance, broadcasting, or other communication to the public, without a licence from the rights holder or in breach of contractual terms. If an AI-generated recording is merely generated at scale but, under the provisions provided, does not unlawfully use a protected work, performance, phonogram, or database content, its AI origin alone is not an independent element of copyright infringement under these provisions. However, if the recordings attempt to imitate well-known performers by using protected performances or phonograms, the assessment moves into the field of related rights, because Article 1(1)(2) of the Law protects the rights of performers and phonogram producers. Article 65(1)(3) of the Law on Copyright and Related Rights is also relevant to the provision of online music services, because collective administration may cover the reproduction and making available online of works and subject matter of related rights, including online music services. This means that, in practical terms, lawful use of a music catalogue on a platform must be based on licences, contracts, or collective administration mechanisms, rather than merely on the technical fact of upload. Article 15(3) of the Law on Copyright and Related Rights also establishes the author’s right to appropriate and proportionate remuneration for each mode of use of the work; therefore, manipulation of streams may be relevant to the extent that it distorts the calculation or payment of remuneration for lawfully administered rights. On the basis of the sources provided, the issue of metadata and AI labelling is directly linked to Article 76 of the Law on Copyright and Related Rights: unauthorised removal or alteration of rights-management information, and the communication to the public of such subject matter, may constitute an infringement if the person knew or ought to have known that this induces, enables, facilitates, or conceals an infringement of protected rights. As regards automated scraping of content for model training, Article 18(1) of the Law on Copyright and Related Rights permits a lawful user of a publicly available database to extract or reutilise insubstantial parts of the database contents, but Article 18(3) prohibits acts that conflict with the normal exploitation of the database or prejudice the legitimate interests of its maker. Article 18(4) of the same Law also requires that the rights of copyright and related rights holders in works and subject matter of related rights forming the contents of the database not be infringed. Under Article 63(1), use of a substantial part of a database without authorisation is permitted only in the specified cases, for example where the contents of a non-electronic database are extracted for personal use or where part is presented as an example for teaching or scientific research purposes, insofar as this is justified by a non-commercial purpose. Administrative liability under Article 122(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences arises for the unlawful use of protected subject matter for non-commercial purposes, while Article 122(3) applies to such use for commercial purposes or to the distribution, transport, or possession of unlawful copies for commercial purposes. In the case of a commercial infringement, the fine under Article 122(3) ranges from EUR 300 to EUR 3,500, and in the case of repeated infringement, under Article 122(4), from EUR 700 to EUR 4,500. Under Article 122(5), confiscation of unlawful copies is mandatory, and for the offences provided for in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, confiscation of the means or equipment used to produce them is also mandatory. Institutionally, the sources provided indicate that copyright and related rights policy and coordination, within its competence, are carried out by the Ministry of Culture, while the prosecution service, courts, police, and customs authorities are significant in the enforcement of rights and the fight against piracy
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is removal of content by the platform where the recordings, by reference to licensing, rights-management information, or indicia of unlawful use, fall within the scope of Articles 73 or 76 of the Law on Copyright and Related Rights. The second scenario is escalation into a civil or administrative dispute, where rights holders seek to stop unlawful reproduction, communication to the public, or distribution, and administrative liability is assessed under Article 122 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The third scenario concerns data collection for AI training: a lawful user may use only such publicly available database content, and only to such an extent, as falls within the limits of Articles 18 and 63 of the Law on Copyright and Related Rights. For authors and performers, this matters for the control of exclusive rights and remuneration under Article 15(3); for platforms, for the soundness of licensing, metadata, and takedown procedures; and for listeners, for whether recommendations continue to contain lawfully and clearly identified content. Thus, on the basis of the sources provided, the legal focus is not “AI music” as a category, but the lawfulness of the use of protected subject matter, the integrity of rights-management information, and liability for unlawful communication to the public online
Whether a cash register receipt or another sale and purchase document constitutes an independent basis for a consumer’s claim, or merely an evidential condition enabling the consumer to exercise rights in respect of defective goods or an improperly provided service.
Article 3(1) of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection grants consumers the right to acquire goods or services of appropriate quality, to seek protection of infringed rights, to claim compensation for damage, and to apply to dispute resolution bodies or to a court. Article 12(1)(5) of the same law explains why, in this context, the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority is not merely an informational body: it resolves disputes between consumers and sellers or service providers out of court. For services, the relevant specific rule is Article 8(3): where a service is of improper quality, the consumer may, within six months of the provision of the service, require that it be replaced free of charge with a service of appropriate quality, and, if that is not possible, require reimbursement of the amount paid.
In the case of goods, the wording of the Retail Trade Rules indicates a stricter practical consequence: if the consumer does not present the sale and purchase document for the goods, the goods are replaced, or the other claims stated in the consumer’s request are satisfied, only with the seller’s consent.
The article’s statement that, where a consumer has proof of purchase, the consumer may require defects to be remedied, the goods to be replaced, or the money to be refunded is incomplete, because the purchase document does not in itself create a right to those remedies. It would be more precise to say that the sale and purchase document enables the consumer to prove the transaction and, without the seller’s consent, to rely on the consumer rights protection mechanism where there is a lack of conformity in quality or another statutory condition is met. This is particularly apparent from the cited provision of the Retail Trade Rules: if the document is not presented, replacement of the goods or satisfaction of other claims depends on the seller’s consent.
In the case of services, it is likewise necessary to establish not only the fact of payment but also that the service was of improper quality, because Article 8(3) of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection links the claims to improper quality and to a six-month time limit.
In practice, the stronger argument is not the abstract proposition that “the consumer has a receipt”, but the combination of two elements: a specific transaction proven by the document and a specifically substantiated lack of conformity in the quality of the goods or service. In a dispute, it is risky for the seller to confine itself to a formal objection where the document has been presented, because under Article 12 the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority has competence to examine the dispute out of court, while the consumer’s rights to quality and to redress are directly enshrined in Article 3. A consumer representative should cite the wording of the Retail Trade Rules stating that, where the document is not presented, action is taken only with the seller’s consent, because it shows why retaining the receipt changes the negotiating position.
It would be an error to formulate the claim as though the receipt automatically conferred a right to recover the money: legally, it is necessary to prove separately a quality defect, an improperly provided service, or another statutory basis.
Core issue. The precise issue is the legal significance, in a consumer dispute, of a cash register receipt, invoice, payment card statement, or other document confirming the purchase where the consumer seeks to enforce rights in respect of goods of inadequate quality or services improperly provided. This issue is resolved under Articles 1, 3, 7, 12, 21, and 42 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Consumer Rights Protection, Articles 6.3641 and 6.153 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, and points 21 and 22 of the Retail Trade Rules. In this situation, a “purchase document” is not the same as procurement documents regulated by Article 48 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Procurement Carried Out by Contracting Entities in the Water Management, Energy, Transport, or Postal Services Sectors, because, under Article 1 of that law, it applies to procurement procedures carried out by contracting entities, not to a consumer’s retail purchase in a shop. The basis of the consumer’s rights arises from Article 3(1)(2), (5), and (6) of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection: the right to goods or services of proper quality, the right to protection of infringed rights and compensation for damage, and the right to apply to dispute-resolution bodies or to a court. The practical legal function of the document is most clearly established in point 21 of the Retail Trade Rules, under which an application for replacement or return of goods must be accompanied by a cash register receipt, a purchase-sale receipt, or another document confirming the purchase from that seller
Legal assessment. A consumer who has a document confirming the purchase can identify the seller, the transaction, and the goods, and therefore the claim becomes procedurally easier to substantiate under Article 21(1) of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection. That provision establishes the mandatory first step: a consumer who considers that his or her rights or legitimate interests relating to a consumer contract have been infringed must first apply in writing to the seller or service provider, except where the consumer applies directly to a court. The deadline for such application is no later than three months from the date on which the consumer became aware, or ought to have become aware, of the infringement. Under Article 21(2) of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection, the seller or service provider must examine the application free of charge and, if it disagrees with the demands, provide a detailed, reasoned written response supported by documents within 14 days. If the demands are not satisfied, or are satisfied only in part, the response must, under Article 21(3), indicate the competent entity for out-of-court resolution of consumer disputes. In the case of goods of inadequate quality, the consumer’s substantive rights are set out in Article 6.3641 of the Civil Code: the consumer may demand that the proper quality of the goods be ensured, that the price be reduced proportionately, or that the purchase-sale contract be unilaterally terminated. Under Article 6.3641(2) of the Civil Code, the consumer may first choose a demand for repair or replacement of the goods, unless this is impossible or would impose disproportionate costs on the seller. Under Article 6.3641(3), the seller may refuse to repair or replace the goods only where this is impossible or disproportionately expensive, having regard to the value of the goods if they had no defects and to the significance of the defects. If the goods are not repaired or replaced, or if the seller justifiably refuses to ensure proper quality, Article 6.3641(4) of the Civil Code allows the consumer to proceed to a price reduction or termination of the contract. Point 21 of the Retail Trade Rules links these rights to proof: the consumer’s application for replacement or return of goods must be accompanied by a cash register receipt, purchase-sale receipt, VAT invoice, invoice, payment card account statement, payment card terminal slip, or other document. Point 22 of the Retail Trade Rules establishes a clear risk for the consumer: if the purchase-sale document is not provided, the goods are replaced or other demands are fulfilled only with the seller’s consent. This means that failure to retain the receipt does not extinguish the consumer’s right itself to goods of proper quality under Article 3 of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection, but it may weaken the enforcement of the claim in the retail procedure. If the seller were to attempt, by a term of the consumer contract, to abolish or restrict the consumer’s rights arising from the seller’s improper performance of its obligations, such a term would be assessed under Article 6.153(2)(2) of the Civil Code as potentially unfair. Institutionally, the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority is the most important body: under Article 12(1)(1), (5), (7), and (9) of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection, it supervises compliance with traders’ duties, resolves disputes out of court, applies enforcement measures, and organises consumer education. A complaint concerning a possible infringement of consumer rights is submitted in writing under Article 42(1) and (2) of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection, stating the factual circumstances and attaching the available documents. Under Article 42(3)(3), the procedure may be refused if there are no factual data giving reasonable grounds to suspect an infringement, or if the applicant, without justified reason, fails to provide documents substantiating the complaint. Under Article 42(3)(4), the time limit for submitting a complaint is three years from the possible infringement to the date of submission of the complaint to the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority. No case law is included among the sources provided; accordingly, the outcome of the dispute is assessed here on the basis of the cited statutory and regulatory provisions
Consequences. In practical terms, the safest course for the consumer is to retain the receipt or other document for the entire period during which claims concerning the quality of the goods or services may arise, because this enables the consumer to substantiate a written application and to proceed more quickly to the remedies provided for in Article 6.3641 of the Civil Code. If the document has not been retained, the consumer becomes more dependent, under point 22 of the Retail Trade Rules, on the seller’s consent to replace the goods or fulfil another request. If the seller refuses to satisfy the claim, the consumer must comply with the procedure for applying to the seller laid down in Article 21 of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection and, after a negative or partial response, may use out-of-court dispute resolution or judicial protection under Article 3(1)(6) and Article 7(3). For the seller, this is important because its response to the consumer must be reasoned, supported by documents, and provided within 14 days, while compliance with consumer rights protection requirements is supervised by the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority. For the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority, this is both a matter of prevention and dispute resolution: Article 7 of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection links consumer protection with information, market supervision, liability, and protection both out of court and in court. The real legal conclusion is therefore narrow but significant: a document confirming the purchase is not merely an accounting formality, but the principal link between the consumer’s substantive right to goods of proper quality and the procedural ability to enforce that right against the seller or before an institution
Whether the second floor of a shopping centre, accessible to customers only by stairs, constitutes the provision of a service on unequal terms where a person with a mobility disability cannot independently enter the premises and shop.
Article 5(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities expressly provides that a person with a disability has the right to an accessible environment throughout the territory of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 5(3) links that right not to abstract goodwill, but to spatial planning, the design of buildings, and the adaptation of the physical environment to the needs of persons with disabilities. Accordingly, a “green assistance button” and staff assistance are a weaker argument than the requirement of independent access: under the assessment logic cited by the Service, what matters is whether the visitor can enter the premises and obtain goods or services independently.
Article 1 of the Law on Equal Opportunities further identifies the institutional route: complaints are investigated by the Equal Opportunities Ombudsperson, and the Law is also linked to the monitoring and control of implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
In practice, the stronger argument is not one of “inconvenience”, but of unequal independent accessibility: if the second floor of the Druskininkai “Senukai” store is accessible only by stairs, the crux of the dispute will not be staff courtesy, but whether a customer with a mobility disability can use the full shopping centre service on equal terms. For businesses, relying solely on ad hoc assistance is risky, because it shifts the burden of accessibility onto the customer and makes receipt of the service dependent on staff availability, responsiveness, and physical assistance. In this case, a professional should cite specifically the relationship between Article 5(1) and 5(3) and the Service’s position on independent access, rather than relying only on the general principle of non-discrimination.
The planned refurbishment referred to by “Senukai” reduces reputational and possibly procedural risk for the future, but does not in itself answer the question whether the current situation already amounts to discrimination.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether access to the second floor of a shopping centre by stairs only constitutes a factual restriction, on the ground of disability, on the use of goods or services. This question must primarily be assessed under Article 2(1), (3) and (4) of the Law on Equal Opportunities of the Republic of Lithuania, which define discrimination, equal opportunities and indirect discrimination. Article 5 of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities of the Republic of Lithuania is also applicable: paragraph 1 establishes the right of a person with a disability to an accessible environment throughout the territory of the Republic of Lithuania, while paragraph 4(3) assigns responsibility for adapting buildings to the needs of persons with disabilities to the users of those buildings. At the level of construction regulation, paragraph 1 of STR 2.03.01:2019 “Accessibility of Buildings” is relevant, as it establishes the application of accessibility requirements when preparing projects for construction, reconstruction, renovation, major or simple repairs, and when changing the use of buildings. Paragraph 7 of STR 2.02.02:2004 is also important, as it provides that public-use buildings and premises must be adapted to the needs of persons with disabilities in accordance with the requirements of STR 2.03.01:2001
Legal assessment. Stairs as the only route to a retail area formally apply equally to all visitors; however, under Article 2(4) of the Law on Equal Opportunities, such a neutral condition may amount to indirect discrimination if its application results in a factual restriction on the exercise of rights on the ground of disability. The essential assessment criterion would be not the goodwill declared by the shop, but whether a person with a mobility disability can independently enter the premises and obtain goods or services on an equal basis with others. Staff assistance or assistance buttons may be practical measures, but they do not eliminate the accessibility issue itself if access to the second floor remains dependent on staff intervention. Article 5(1) of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities formulates the right to an accessible environment as a general right, while Article 5(4)(3) indicates that the user of a building is not a passive actor: responsibility for adapting the building rests with that user. The duties of state and municipal institutions under Article 5(2) of the same law are to coordinate the creation of an accessible environment, prepare and approve standards or guidelines, supervise and control compliance with them, and educate the public. The competence of the Ministry of Environment under Article 5(4)(1) is linked to the preparation, approval and supervision of implementation of construction normative technical documents concerning the adaptation of the physical environment. Article 1(2) of the Law on Equal Opportunities establishes the legal basis and powers of the Equal Opportunities Ombudsperson, as well as the submission and investigation of complaints; accordingly, the practical route in such a situation would be to apply to the Ombudsperson regarding possible discrimination. The assessment by that office should focus on the test under Article 2(4) of the Law on Equal Opportunities: whether there is a neutral practice, whether it causes a factual restriction on the ground of disability, whether it is justified by a legitimate aim, and whether the measures are appropriate and necessary. The application of construction technical requirements would depend on whether the projects referred to in paragraph 1 of STR 2.03.01:2019 were being prepared or whether the use of the building was being changed. Under paragraph 1 of STR 2.03.01:2019, when renovating, reconstructing or repairing the buildings listed in the annex to the regulation, the provisions of the regulation apply to the parts of the building being altered, while in the case of a change of use this exception does not apply. The excerpt from the National Programme for Social Integration of Persons with Disabilities 2013–2020 further explains the systemic problem: legislation does not require existing buildings to be adapted if there is no need to renovate the building, and it does not set deadlines by which existing public-use buildings must be adapted. Therefore, two layers of assessment differ in this situation: equal opportunities law assesses the factual accessibility of the service, while construction technical requirements are more strictly linked to design, repair, reconstruction, modernisation or change of use
Consequences. The most realistic first scenario is that the person applies to the Office of the Equal Opportunities Ombudsperson, which then investigates whether stairs as the only condition for accessing the second floor constitute indirect discrimination under Article 2(4) of the Law on Equal Opportunities. If it were recognised that visitors with mobility disabilities cannot independently obtain goods or services, the practical consequence would be pressure on the user of the building to take accessibility measures, because Article 5(4)(3) of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities links responsibility specifically to building users. The second scenario is that the shopping centre is renovated or repaired, in which case, under paragraph 1 of STR 2.03.01:2019, accessibility requirements become directly relevant to the parts of the building being altered. The third scenario is that, if a capital solution is postponed, the shop relies on staff assistance; however, such a model remains legally vulnerable if it does not in practice ensure independent and equal receipt of services. This is practically important not only for specific visitors with mobility disabilities, but also for building users, because their duty under the cited provisions is not merely to declare an accessibility objective, but to ensure such use of the building as does not create a factual restriction on rights. For municipal and state institutions, this situation is important as a matter of supervision and coordination under Article 5(2) of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. For the retail chain, the key legal risk arises not from the age of the building itself, but from whether the current arrangements for service provision comply with the equal opportunities standard on the ground of disability
The disputed issue is not merely the amount of the fines, but whether the VVTAT may rely on laboratory testing and procedural data to determine that specific electronic cigarettes or refill containers do not comply with composition, quality or labelling requirements and, on that basis, impose an economic sanction and require their removal from the market.
Article 97(1) of the Law on Tobacco Control gives the VVTAT direct competence to supervise whether the labelling, composition and quality of electronic cigarettes and refill containers comply with statutory requirements. Paragraph 3 of the same article is significant in practice: the manufacturer, importer or distributor must immediately take corrective action to bring the product into compliance with the law, or ensure that it is removed or recalled from the market. Article 26(1) provides that economic sanctions include not only a fine, but also the suspension or revocation of a licence; accordingly, a dispute concerning EUR 103,000 in unpaid fines does not exhaust the broader regulatory risk.
Article 26(11) provides that, for infringements of the composition, quality and labelling requirements for electronic cigarettes laid down in Articles 92, 93(1) and 93(2), 94, 95 and 97, legal persons and branches of foreign legal persons are subject to a fine of between EUR 1,500 and EUR 3,000.
The article’s statement that a fine of EUR 8,000 may currently be imposed for a repeated infringement is, according to the factual check provided, inconsistent with the cited source. It would be more accurate to state that the source cited indicates a maximum fine of EUR 2,896, not EUR 8,000, for a repeated breach of the prohibition on the sale of electronic cigarettes. In addition, under the wording of Article 26(11) provided, infringements of the composition, quality and labelling requirements for electronic cigarettes are linked to a sanction range of EUR 1,500 to EUR 3,000.
The news item should therefore have clearly distinguished which type of infringement and which version of the provision it was referring to.
For businesses, the stronger line of defence is not the abstract argument that “fines are not deterrent”, but a targeted challenge to the VVTAT’s evidential chain: the suitability of the laboratory method, accreditation and procedural steps, since these are precisely the points which, according to the VVTAT itself, almost all infringers raise before the courts. On the VVTAT’s side, the strongest argument is the structure of Article 97: once non-compliance is established, the obligation to take corrective action applies to the entire supply chain, not only to the direct seller. The practical risk for a seller is that, by framing the dispute solely around the amount of the fine, it may miss the more significant consequence: the obligation to remove or recall the product from the market, and the potential issue of a licence-related sanction under Article 26(1).
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the electronic cigarettes and refill containers placed on the market comply with the requirements for placing on the market, composition, quality and supervision laid down in Articles 9², 9³ and 9⁷ of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Control of Tobacco, Tobacco Products and Related Products. This issue is also linked to liability for the sale or other supply of electronic cigarettes and refill containers under Article 170¹ of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania. If the supply were directed at minors, Article 170¹ of the Code would not apply; instead, Article 77(3) and (4) of the Code would apply, because Article 170¹ itself expressly excludes such cases. The normative basis for the issue of prohibited flavours is apparent from the regulatory materials, which state that Draft Law No. XIIIP-3849 proposed prohibiting the placing on the market of electronic cigarettes and electronic cigarette refill containers where the nicotine-containing liquid contains flavourings other than tobacco flavour. Accordingly, a dispute concerning such products is not merely a matter of commercial unfairness: it is to be addressed as an issue of market surveillance, product composition, and the legality of an administrative or economic sanction
Legal assessment. Article 9³(1) of the Tobacco Control Law provides that manufacturers and importers of electronic cigarettes and refill containers must submit a notification to the Drug, Tobacco and Alcohol Control Department six months before the intended first placing on the market of each brand and type. Paragraph 2 of the same Article requires the notification to include, among other things, a list of all ingredients contained in the product and emissions resulting from its use, specifying their quantities. This means that a flavour or flavouring ingredient is legally significant not only as a characteristic visible to the consumer, but also as an element of the product’s composition, which must be traceable through the notification and supervision system. Article 9²(1) of the Tobacco Control Law lays down the general rule that electronic cigarettes and refill containers placed on the market in the Republic of Lithuania must comply with the requirements established in that Law and in other legal acts. Paragraph 2 of the same Article 9² details technical and compositional requirements, including volume limits for refill containers and tanks, the nicotine concentration limit, and the requirement that only ingredients not hazardous to human health be used in the liquid, except for nicotine in nicotine-containing liquid. The competence of the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority arises directly from Article 9⁷(1) of the Tobacco Control Law: it supervises whether the labelling, composition and quality of electronic cigarettes and refill containers comply with the requirements of legal acts. Under Article 9⁷(2), manufacturers, importers and distributors must collect and retain information on suspected adverse effects on human health, and under Article 9⁷(3) they must immediately take corrective action to bring the product into compliance with the requirements of the Law, or to withdraw or recall it from the market. The same provision requires them to immediately inform the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority and provide detailed information on the risk, the corrective measures taken and their results. If the infringement is classified as the sale or other supply of electronic cigarettes or refill containers, Article 170¹(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences provides for a fine of EUR 220 to EUR 320, while paragraph 2 provides for a fine of EUR 320 to EUR 580 for a repeated infringement. Under Article 170¹(3), confiscation of the item used as the instrument for committing the administrative offence is mandatory for these offences; therefore, the legal consequence is not limited to a monetary fine. If electronic cigarettes or refill containers are supplied to a minor, Article 77(3) of the Code provides for a fine of EUR 320 to EUR 580, while paragraph 4 provides for a fine of EUR 580 to EUR 820 for a repeated such offence. The dispute mechanism in cases involving economic sanctions is established in Article 33 of the Tobacco Control Law: a person who disagrees with a decision may appeal it to a court within one month from the date of service of the decision, in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Law on Administrative Proceedings. Article 33(2) of the Tobacco Control Law also explains the phenomenon of unpaid fines mentioned in the report: bringing proceedings before a court suspends enforcement of the decision imposing the economic sanction. Under Article 33(3), the court may impose a fine lower than the minimum fine established in Article 26 of the Law if, having assessed the nature and extent of the infringement, mitigating and other relevant circumstances, it concludes that the minimum fine would be manifestly excessive and unjust. In the context of disputes concerning laboratories and methods, the sources provided are significant in that Article 6 of the Tobacco Control Law directly links accreditation and ISO methods to the determination of tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide levels in cigarettes, while the amendment to the Government Resolution on the taking of product samples links samples of electronic cigarettes and refill containers to the procedure for taking them and transferring them to an accredited conformity assessment body
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is that the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority, relying on Article 9⁷(1) of the Tobacco Control Law, continues to inspect product labelling, composition and quality and, upon identifying non-compliance, initiates corrective action, withdrawal or recall from the market under Article 9⁷(3). The second scenario is that administrative liability is imposed on the seller or other person supplying the products under Article 170¹ of the Code of Administrative Offences, together with mandatory confiscation of the item that served as the instrument of the infringement. The third scenario is that the dispute moves to court under Article 33 of the Tobacco Control Law, and enforcement of the sanction is suspended until the outcome of the court proceedings, meaning that the decision adopted by the state authority does not immediately produce an actual recovery result. The fourth scenario is that the court upholds the sanction, reduces it on the basis of Article 33(3), or, in relation to a licence, decides under Article 33(4) not to revoke the licence where doing so would be manifestly disproportionate. This is practically important for consumers because the permissibility of a product on the market depends on composition, quality and notification requirements, not merely on the seller’s declarations. It is important for sellers and distributors because their obligations do not end with acquiring the product from a supplier: under Article 9⁷(3), they must act when non-compliance or risk becomes apparent. It is important for manufacturers and importers because Article 9³ moves their obligations to the pre-market stage by establishing a six-month notification period and a duty to disclose composition. For authorities, it is important from an evidentiary perspective: the more frequently testing methods, accreditation and procedures are challenged, the greater the significance of clear compliance with the statutory procedure for sampling, testing and reasoning of decisions
The specific question is whether the European Arrest Warrant issued on 29 June 2026 can constitute a genuine basis for the surrender of A. Kandrotas from Belarus, or whether the Lithuanian authorities must rely on a separate extradition request for the enforcement of the final custodial sentence of three and a half years. The stronger argument is the latter: the news report states that, as early as 30 June 2026, Kaunas Regional Court applied to the Ministry of Justice regarding extradition, and that the Ministry is preparing documents and translations for the Belarusian authorities.
This indicates that the European Arrest Warrant does not operate here as a sufficient mechanism for surrender from Belarus, but rather as a procedural signal within Lithuania and the EU area, which, outside Belarus, must be replaced by an extradition procedure.
Article 71-1(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the surrender of a person under a European Arrest Warrant where the person is suspected of an offence or has not served a custodial sentence in the issuing state; paragraph 2 sets a 10-day time limit where the person consents to surrender, and a 60-day time limit from arrest in other cases. However, the wording of that provision regulates surrender under a European Arrest Warrant, not extradition to Lithuania from a third state such as Belarus. Article 71 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, although in the text provided it concerns the extradition of persons from the Republic of Lithuania, clearly reflects the logic of extradition: extradition is linked to an international treaty or another international obligation, not merely to a national court warrant.
Accordingly, the success of Lithuania’s request will depend not on the time limits applicable to the European Arrest Warrant itself, but on the applicable extradition basis and the decision of the competent Belarusian authorities.
In practice, the key point is to distinguish three procedural layers: the final judgment of the Court of Appeal concerning financial offences, by which a sentence of three and a half years was imposed; proceedings that are not yet final or have not yet been completed, in which decisions are expected in September; and the issue of surrender from Belarus itself. The legally strongest basis for the extradition request is precisely the enforcement of the final sentence, because Article 16(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure classifies the accused as a convicted person after a conviction, while Article 24 shows that cassation is available in respect of final judgments, but the cassation stage itself does not render the judgment non-final. A weaker line of communication would be to link extradition to decisions expected in September that have not yet become final, since at present they cannot be presented as the final basis for enforcement of a sentence.
An additional risk is the speciality principle: under the rule laid down in Article 63(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a person is surrendered only in respect of the offence or enforcement of the sentence specified in the warrant, meaning that other proceedings and future sentences should be managed separately in procedural terms, rather than automatically “attached” to this surrender.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether Lithuanian authorities can secure the surrender of A. Kandrotas-Celofanas to Lithuania from Belarus for the enforcement of a custodial sentence imposed on him, and by what mechanism this is to be done. The issuance of a European Arrest Warrant in respect of a person who has been sentenced to a custodial penalty by a final conviction but has absconded from serving that sentence in a Member State of the European Union is governed by Article 69¹(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. Where the request is addressed to Belarus, the legal basis shifts to extradition and international treaties: under Article 71(1)-(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania and Article 9 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, as referred to in the submitted communication concerning the UN Convention against Torture, surrender is linked to an international treaty or a resolution of the United Nations Security Council. The connection with Belarus is confirmed in the sources provided by the submission for ratification of the Treaty between the Republic of Lithuania and the Republic of Belarus on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters, and by the provision that analogous extradition rules are established in bilateral legal assistance treaties, including the treaty with Belarus. Procedural status is also relevant: under Article 16(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, a person against whom a conviction has been entered becomes a convicted person. Accordingly, the object of the current request is not all of A. Kandrotas-Celofanas’s cases, but the final judgment identified in the report and the enforcement of the custodial sentence imposed by that judgment
Legal assessment. The European Arrest Warrant issued by Kaunas Regional Court on 29 June 2026 corresponds to the situation described in Article 69¹(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania insofar as it concerns a convicted person who has absconded from serving a custodial sentence. However, the request made to the Ministry of Justice on 30 June 2026 concerning extradition to the Republic of Lithuania indicates a different practical step: the documents must be transmitted to the competent authorities of Belarus not as a mutual surrender procedure within the European Union, but as an extradition request. In the sources provided, the actions of the Ministry of Justice are legally significant as the stage of preparing and translating documents and submitting the request to foreign competent authorities. The substantive objective of the Lithuanian authorities is clear: to ensure the service of the three-and-a-half-year custodial sentence imposed by a final judgment. The time limits of ten days, sixty days, and a possible thirty-day extension laid down in Article 71¹(3)-(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania apply to surrender under a European Arrest Warrant where the decision on surrender is taken by a Lithuanian court. Those time limits are not the time limit for a decision on Lithuania’s extradition request addressed to Belarus. In the context of a European Arrest Warrant, Article 63(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania establishes the rule of speciality: a person is surrendered only for the criminal prosecution or enforcement of the sentence specified in the warrant. Paragraph 6 of the same article provides that any subsequent request concerning other acts or surrender to a third state is examined, and consent is given, by the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Republic of Lithuania. These provisions do not permit a European Arrest Warrant to be automatically converted into a general instrument for all other cases involving A. Kandrotas-Celofanas. In other cases, his procedural rights are assessed under Article 16(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania: the right to have defence counsel, to submit applications, to present evidence, to participate in the examination of evidence, to give explanations, to make a final statement, and to appeal judgments and rulings. Accordingly, the decisions expected in September 2026 in the public order and Seimas riot cases are separate procedural events, not a necessary precondition for the current extradition request. The cassation stage, if it were to arise in respect of final judgments or rulings, would fall within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Lithuania under Articles 24 and 25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania and would proceed by way of a cassation appeal
Consequences. If the competent authorities of Belarus grant the extradition request, the practical consequence would be the surrender of A. Kandrotas-Celofanas to Lithuania so that enforcement of the final custodial sentence may be commenced or secured. In that event, his other cases do not merge with this request merely because they are mentioned in the report; they must continue to be examined in compliance with the rights of the accused enshrined in Article 16(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. If execution of the request is delayed or the request is refused, the final judgment in Lithuania remains enforceable, but the actual service of the sentence will depend on the person’s actual surrender or presence within Lithuanian jurisdiction. In practical terms, this is important for the Ministry of Justice, because it must prepare the extradition documents and translations; for the courts, because they enforce final decisions and continue other cases; and for the prosecution, because in separate cases it supports the charges and formulates sentencing submissions. For A. Kandrotas-Celofanas himself, the key point is that one case already gives rise to the status of a convicted person and the risk of enforcement of the sentence, while in the other cases he retains procedural rights of defence and appeal. Accordingly, the immediate legal course will depend not only on the decisions to be announced in September 2026, but primarily on whether the Belarusian authorities, on the applicable international treaty basis, execute Lithuania’s request for surrender
Can a person convicted of offences against a minor’s freedom of sexual self-determination and sexual inviolability rely on the general conditional release rule in Article 82 of the BVK if their risk is low or has been reduced?
Article 82(1) of the BVK lays down the general rule: a convicted person serving a fixed-term custodial sentence may be conditionally released if their risk of criminal behaviour is low or they have made clear progress in reducing it. Since the stated seven-year sentence exceeds four years but does not exceed ten years, under Article 82(1)(2) of the BVK the general minimum threshold of the sentence to be served would be one half of the sentence imposed. However, the text of Article 83 of the BVK cited here establishes a specific exception: conditional release does not apply to persons serving a sentence for offences against a minor’s freedom of sexual self-determination and/or sexual inviolability.
The specific prohibitory rule therefore prevails over the general enabling rule in Article 82 of the BVK.
The article’s claim that, following the Constitutional Court’s ruling, persons convicted of sexually exploiting children may be conditionally released solely on the basis of low risk and other conditions is formulated too broadly on the basis of the source provided. It would be more accurate to say that Article 82 of the BVK provides a general model of conditional release for convicted persons whose risk is low or decreasing, but Article 83 of the BVK separately excludes its application to persons serving a sentence for offences against a minor’s freedom of sexual self-determination and sexual inviolability. The news item also fails to distinguish the procedural possibility of considering conditional release from the substantive right to be conditionally released: the social inquiry report and the commission’s reasoned decision provided for in Article 85 of the BVK are relevant only where the person falls within the conditional release regime at all.
Accordingly, the wording about K. Bartoševičius’s “hope” is legally sound only if it were shown that the prohibition in Article 83 of the BVK does not apply or has been amended, which the evidence presented does not confirm.
In practice, the stronger argument is not the risk assessment but the hierarchy of norms between the general rule in Article 82 of the BVK and the specific prohibition in Article 83 of the BVK. A lawyer or journalist should first cite Article 83 of the BVK and only then explain whether that prohibition applies to the particular convicted person by reference to the offences as legally classified in the judgment. Article 87 of the BVK is relevant only at a later stage: if conditional release is lawfully applied, release is implemented by transferring data to the Probation Service and ensuring that probation or intensive supervision begins from the moment of release.
The greatest practical risk in this news item is confusing a political or public “possibility of hope” with a legally existing entitlement to seek conditional release.
Core issue. The precise legal question is not whether the convicted person “has the right to be released early,” but whether conditional release may be applied under Article 82 of the Code for the Execution of Sentences of the Republic of Lithuania to a person serving a fixed-term sentence of seven years’ imprisonment for offences against a minor’s freedom of sexual self-determination and/or inviolability, where a ground for non-application established in Article 83 of the Code for the Execution of Sentences of the Republic of Lithuania also exists. The general basis for application is set out in Article 82(1) of the Code for the Execution of Sentences of the Republic of Lithuania: convicted persons serving fixed-term custodial sentences may be conditionally released if their risk of criminal conduct is low or if they have made clear progress in reducing that risk. Since the report refers to a seven-year sentence, the relevant formal threshold under Article 82(1)(2) of the Code for the Execution of Sentences of the Republic of Lithuania would be one half of the imposed sentence, because the sentence exceeds four years but does not exceed ten years. However, the specific bar is established in Article 83(3) of the Code for the Execution of Sentences of the Republic of Lithuania: conditional release does not apply to persons serving a sentence for offences against a minor’s freedom of sexual self-determination and/or inviolability. The intersection of the rules is therefore between the individual assessment of risk and of the portion of the sentence served under Article 82(1) of the Code for the Execution of Sentences of the Republic of Lithuania and the categorical non-application rule established in Article 83(3) of that Code
Legal assessment. Under the cited rules, a low risk of criminal conduct alone does not create an obligation to release the convicted person conditionally, because Article 82(1) of the Code for the Execution of Sentences of the Republic of Lithuania uses the formulation “may be conditionally released.” This construction is also confirmed by the position on draft Law No. XP-792(2) amending Article 157 of the Code for the Execution of Sentences of the Republic of Lithuania: it emphasised that persons may, but need not, be conditionally released from correctional institutions, and that a decision requires both a formal basis and a substantive assessment of whether the convicted person may continue to be corrected while not isolated from society, but under supervision. Accordingly, if Article 82 of the Code for the Execution of Sentences of the Republic of Lithuania were applicable, a person serving a seven-year sentence would first have to have served one half of the imposed sentence, after which his risk or progress in reducing it would be assessed. Nevertheless, Article 83(3) of the Code for the Execution of Sentences of the Republic of Lithuania halts such an analysis if the person is serving a sentence specifically for offences against a minor falling within the stated category. The earlier wording of Article 158 of the Code for the Execution of Sentences of the Republic of Lithuania similarly provided that persons convicted of offences against a minor’s freedom of sexual self-determination and/or inviolability were not to be conditionally released from correctional institutions. The assessment of draft Law No. XIP-1446 noted that such non-application would also cover less serious offences provided for in Articles 151¹ and 153 of the Criminal Code, and that this was regarded as inconsistent with the previous logic of Article 158 of the Code for the Execution of Sentences of the Republic of Lithuania, under which non-application was linked to very serious offences or to the convicted person’s conduct in the place of imprisonment. The same assessment of draft Law No. XIP-1446 also stressed the importance of probation: a conditionally released person is supervised, receives social assistance, and is subject to resocialisation measures, whereas, if conditional release were refused, such persons would have to integrate into society independently after serving their sentence. Procedurally, implementation of the decision is described in Article 87 of the Code for the Execution of Sentences of the Republic of Lithuania: upon receiving a copy of the decision of the conditional release commission or a court order together with a copy of the court ruling, the custodial institution releases the convicted person. Under Article 87(2) of the Code for the Execution of Sentences of the Republic of Lithuania, these documents are submitted to the Probation Service, and under Article 87(4), intensive supervision and probation must begin from the moment of release. This means that conditional release is not an uncontrolled departure into liberty, but a continuation of sentence enforcement under the supervision of the Probation Service. If a dispute arises concerning the actions of sentence-enforcement institutions or officials, Article 183(1) of the Code for the Execution of Sentences of the Republic of Lithuania provides for a one-month period to challenge actions or decisions before the head of the relevant institution or establishment, who must examine the complaint within twenty working days. Under Article 183(2) of the Code for the Execution of Sentences of the Republic of Lithuania, the actions and decisions of such heads may be appealed within one month to the Director of the Prison Department, and under Article 183(3), the actions and decisions of the Director of the Probation Service and the Director of the Prison Department may be appealed to the regional administrative court. Article 352(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania allows a court, during enforcement of a judgment, to resolve doubts arising from the judgment only where the substance of the judgment is not altered; therefore, on the basis of these sources, the issue of conditional release is to be regarded as a matter of sentence enforcement, not as a review of the substance of the conviction
Consequences. The first practical scenario is this: if the rule in Article 83(3) of the Code for the Execution of Sentences of the Republic of Lithuania applies, a person convicted of offences against a minor’s freedom of sexual self-determination and/or inviolability falls outside the scope of conditional release, even if his risk is low. The second scenario is this: if, in a specific case, the logic of Article 82 of the Code for the Execution of Sentences of the Republic of Lithuania begins to be applied, the decision would still depend on the portion of the sentence served, the risk of criminal conduct or progress in reducing it, and an institutional decision, rather than on a statement by the convicted person himself or by his defence counsel. The third scenario concerns enforcement: in the event of a favourable decision or court ruling, the custodial institution would have to release the convicted person, transmit the documents to the Probation Service, and ensure that supervision begins from the moment of release in accordance with Article 87 of the Code for the Execution of Sentences of the Republic of Lithuania. The fourth scenario is the dispute pathway: adverse decisions of the sentence-enforcement institution, its head, the Director of the Prison Department, or the Director of the Probation Service may be reviewed under the appeal procedure and within the time limits established in Article 183 of the Code for the Execution of Sentences of the Republic of Lithuania. The practical significance for the convicted person is that conditional release could shorten the actual time spent in a place of imprisonment, but would not eliminate the supervision and probation regime. The practical significance for the State is that a decision concerning this category of convicted persons must reconcile the objective of public safety, individual risk assessment, and resocialisation measures, which the cited sources treat as an important component of conditional release. The practical significance for public debate concerning a possible return to politics is narrower: the cited sources allow assessment only of sentence enforcement and conditional release, not of electoral rights or the conditions for holding political office
The specific issue is not whether driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 2.89 per mille constitutes “intoxication”, but whether that fact alone is sufficient for criminal liability under Article 281-1 of the Criminal Code, where the news report does not refer to a traffic accident, bodily injury, or substantial property damage.
Article 281-1(1) of the Criminal Code criminalises the driving of a motor vehicle where the driver is found to have a blood alcohol concentration of 1.51 per mille or more, and provides for a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. Accordingly, the 2.89 per mille recorded for the man born in 1972 who was driving a Škoda Octavia in Rokiškis on 20 July 2026 at 13:55 in itself exceeds the threshold for criminal liability, provided that the fact of driving is proven. By contrast, Article 281 of the Criminal Code links liability to a traffic accident and its consequences, such as minor bodily injury or substantial property damage, none of which is mentioned in the news report.
Article 72 of the Criminal Code is additionally relevant in relation to the vehicle: if the Škoda Octavia belongs to the offender and is regarded as an instrumentality of the criminal offence, confiscation under Article 72(3) becomes mandatory.
The news report’s reference to Article 281 of the Criminal Code is legally too broad and, on the facts presented, weaker than a qualification under Article 281-1, because Article 281 requires a traffic accident and specific consequences, which are not indicated. The statement that drivers are considered intoxicated above 0.4 per mille is incomplete: the cited wording of the Law on Road Traffic Safety establishes a general threshold of 0.4 per mille, but also identifies special categories of drivers subject to a stricter regime. The statement concerning a fine and disqualification from driving is also insufficiently precise, because the type of sanction depends on the specific level of intoxication and on whether the administrative or criminal liability regime applies.
The statement about 1.51 per mille should be formulated as follows: criminal liability under Article 281-1 of the Criminal Code arises not for drunkenness as such, but for driving or providing practical driving instruction while having a blood alcohol concentration of 1.51 per mille or more.
In practice, the stronger basis for prosecution on the facts presented is Article 281-1, not Article 281, because a level of 2.89 per mille allows reliance on the formal threshold of the offence without the need to prove the consequences of a traffic accident. For the defence, the most important issues are not the abstract fact of “intoxication”, but the lawfulness of the measurement, the evidence of driving, and ownership of the vehicle, since the consequences of confiscation under Article 72 may depend precisely on that ownership. Journalists and lawyers should avoid automatically repeating “under Article 281 of the Criminal Code” where the news report describes only driving with 1.51+ per mille and no traffic accident, because this changes both the subject matter of proof and the practical risks regarding sanctions.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the person who drove a Škoda Octavia in Rokiškis on 20 July 2026, and whose blood alcohol level was determined to be 2.89 per mille, is subject to criminal liability for driving a vehicle while intoxicated. This issue is primarily to be assessed under Article 281^1(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, which penalizes a person who drove a motor vehicle where a blood alcohol level of 1.51 per mille or higher has been established. Article 281(1)–(4) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania is relevant only insofar as it links a breach of road traffic safety rules or vehicle operation rules with a traffic accident and consequences for human health or substantial property damage. Since the report refers to the act of driving itself while having a blood alcohol level of 2.89 per mille, the principal provision for legal classification, based on the sources provided, is Article 281^1(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 19(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania further provides that a person who commits a criminal offence while intoxicated by alcohol is not exempt from criminal liability
Legal assessment. The established blood alcohol level of 2.89 per mille substantially exceeds the 1.51 per mille threshold set out in Article 281^1(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania; therefore, the mere fact of driving constitutes grounds for criminal liability under that provision. The same paragraph provides for alternative penalties for this offence: a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. Article 281^1(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania means that liability may also arise where the offence provided for in paragraph 1 of that article is committed through negligence. Article 281(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania would cover a breach of road traffic safety rules or vehicle operation rules committed by an intoxicated driver if it resulted in a traffic accident, minor impairment of another person’s health, or substantial property damage. Article 281(3) and (4) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania apply in cases involving more serious consequences related to serious impairment of health, while paragraph 4 separately identifies an offence committed while intoxicated by alcohol or other substances. The report states that a pre-trial investigation has been commenced; procedurally, Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania is therefore relevant, as it allows participants in the proceedings and other persons to submit objects and documents relevant to the investigation and examination of a criminal offence. Article 99 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that procedural time limits define the time for the commencement, performance, or completion of procedural acts, while Article 100 regulates their calculation in hours, days, and months. For the intoxication determination procedure, paragraph 2.3 of the Rules for Determining Intoxication by Alcohol or Other Substances of Drivers and Other Persons is relevant: testing is carried out using metrologically verified special technical devices by reference to the concentration of ethyl alcohol in exhaled air. Paragraph 3 of the same Rules provides that police officers test a vehicle driver suspected of being intoxicated and, where an ethyl alcohol concentration exceeding 1.5 per mille is established in exhaled air, the person is taken to a personal healthcare institution for a medical examination. Coercive measures may be considered under Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if they are necessary to ensure the suspect’s participation in the proceedings, the unobstructed conduct of the investigation, the hearing of the case, the enforcement of the judgment, or the prevention of new criminal offences. Article 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lists, among coercive measures, detention, intensive supervision, house arrest, bail, seizure of documents, an obligation to register with a police authority, and a written undertaking not to leave. Article 427(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences describes liability for repeated driving while intoxicated within the range of 0.41 to 1.5 per mille; therefore, under the provisions provided, a case involving 2.89 per mille falls within the scope of criminal rather than that administrative liability. Article 427(2) of the Code of Administrative Offences provides for mandatory deprivation of the right to drive vehicles for a period of three to five years for the administrative offence provided for in that article, but this provision is relevant as a comparison between the administrative liability regime and the threshold for criminal liability
Consequences. The most realistic course, based on the sources provided, is the continuation of the pre-trial investigation into driving with a blood alcohol level of 1.51 per mille or higher, collecting and verifying evidence concerning the determination of intoxication, the fact of driving, and control of the vehicle. If the evidence gathered in the investigation substantiates that the man drove a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol level of 2.89 per mille, he may face the fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year provided for in Article 281^1(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. If circumstances relating to a traffic accident and the consequences specified in Article 281 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania were to emerge, the legal classification could be assessed under the relevant paragraphs of that article. If grounds specified in Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were to arise during the pre-trial investigation, the pre-trial investigation could be discontinued, for example where insufficient evidence is collected to substantiate the suspect’s guilt. In practical terms, this situation is important for the driver because, under the provisions provided, the 2.89 per mille reading brings the case within the sphere of criminal liability. It is also important for the police and the prosecutor’s office because the intoxication testing and medical examination procedure becomes a central issue for the reliability of the evidence. For other road users, the case is relevant insofar as coercive measures under Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may be applied in order to prevent new criminal offences
Can a joint investment by residents in a solar or wind power plant lawfully be qualified as a citizens energy community if a cooperative company, small partnership or another legal form is chosen, but the project documents do not establish non-profit status and electricity-sharing status.
Article 222(1) of the Law on Electricity defines a citizens energy community not as any “energy cooperative”, but as a legal person which is non-profit, may consume or share electricity under its founding documents, may carry out generation, supply, storage or other energy activities, except distribution, and has acquired the legal status of a citizens energy community. This means that the decisive criterion is not merely joint financing or democratic voting, but the compliance of the legal form and founding documents with the statutory status. Article 41 further indicates that a citizens energy community is an independent source of electricity acquisition for a consumer, alongside suppliers, producers, active consumers and renewable energy communities.
Article 461 is relevant to an alternative model: where a producer of electricity from renewable sources supplies electricity to consumers under a sale-purchase agreement, at the consumer’s request the draft agreement must be provided within 10 days or the consumer must be informed that the agreement cannot be concluded, while standard terms apply to household contracts.
The stronger argument now is not that “the community may choose any convenient form”, but that “the chosen form must be capable of carrying the status under Article 222”. Accordingly, the small partnership or cooperative company mentioned in the news item is not in itself a sufficient solution if, under the specific legal form and documents, the entity is not treated as non-profit and has not acquired the status of a citizens energy community. In practice, the greatest risk is selling membership to residents as an energy-sharing model even though, legally, the project will operate only as a contractual relationship between a producer and consumers under Article 461.
When structuring such projects, a lawyer should first examine not the contribution schedule or voting formula, but the articles of association: whether they expressly provide for electricity consumption and sharing, permitted energy activities, the absence of distribution activity, and the basis for acquiring the status of a citizens energy community.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not whether a residents’ association is called an energy cooperative, but whether, under Article 222 of the Law on Electricity of the Republic of Lithuania, it may acquire the status of a citizens energy community, or, under Article 202 of the Law on Energy from Renewable Sources of the Republic of Lithuania, the status of a renewable energy community. Article 222(1) of the Law on Electricity links a citizens energy community to a non-profit legal person that may consume and share electricity, generate electricity from renewable sources, supply electricity, aggregate demand, store energy, and provide other services related to electricity activities, excluding distribution. Article 202(1) of the Law on Energy from Renewable Sources likewise links the status of a renewable energy community to a non-profit legal person and to open and voluntary participation by its participants. Accordingly, the joint investment by residents described in the report must legally be qualified by reference to the community’s status, its founding documents, its purpose of activity, and the relevant permitting or declaration procedures, rather than solely by reference to the form of financial participation. Article 461 of the Law on Electricity and the definition of a renewable electricity purchase and sale agreement set out in Article 2(1) apply to individual electricity purchase and sale situations
Legal assessment. In the case of a citizens energy community, the legal person’s founding documents must permit the consumption or sharing of electricity and the performance of the activities listed in the law, because Article 222(1) of the Law on Electricity links the status not merely to an agreement among members, but also to the legal capacity to operate in the electricity sector. Paragraph 2 of the same article requires voluntary and open participation by stakeholders, members, or participants; therefore, a closed investment scheme in which participation would in practice depend on selection by the organiser without clear rules would be difficult to reconcile with this principle. The version of Article 222 set out in Article 16 of the Law Amending the Law on Electricity additionally expressly establishes that the principal purpose of such a community is to provide environmental, economic, or social community benefits to its stakeholders or members, or to the locations in which it operates, rather than to seek profit. This directly qualifies the idea referred to in the report as “not profit from energy trading, but energy benefits for members”: that idea is legally relevant insofar as it is reflected in the legal person’s documents and actual activities. In the case of a renewable energy community, Article 202(1) of the Law on Energy from Renewable Sources provides that the status is acquired upon the issuance of a permit to develop electricity generation capacity or a permit to generate electricity, or, where no permit is required, in accordance with the procedure established by the National Energy Regulatory Council. If a legal person seeks the status while already holding a permit to develop or generate electricity, it must submit to the Council a declaration of compliance with the requirements of Article 202(2), where it plans to carry out activities in the electricity sector. The earlier version introducing Article 202 of the Law on Energy from Renewable Sources provided that the stakeholders of a public institution could be natural persons, small or medium-sized enterprises, and municipalities, and that at least 51 percent of the votes had to belong to local natural persons according to their declared place of residence. This indicates that the core of community energy lies in the participants’ connection to the place and the openness of participation, rather than merely in pooling capital to build a power plant. The sale of electricity under a renewable electricity purchase and sale agreement is subject to the 10-day period in Article 461(1) of the Law on Electricity: upon receiving a consumer’s request, the producer must, within that period, prepare a draft agreement or inform the consumer that the agreement cannot be concluded. Under Article 461(2), the terms of the agreement are negotiated by agreement between the producer and the consumer, but, in the case of household consumers, they must comply with the standard terms approved by the Ministry of Energy. The same provision permits the producer to refuse to conclude the agreement or to supply electricity if the consumer does not agree to the supply terms specified by the producer. As regards electricity sharing, the position presented concerning Article 202 of the Law on Energy from Renewable Sources and Article 222 of the Law on Electricity is significant: electricity consumers may establish a REC or a CEC, and electricity generated in generation facilities owned by them may be sold at a price established in the agreements, including a zero price, or the capacity of the power plant may be allocated among the community’s participants. The issue of grid connection is not merely technical, because Article 1 of the Law Amending Article 20 of Law No XIV-627 Amending the Law on Electricity states that the Description of the Procedure for Using Electricity Networks establishes the procedure for reserving capacity in accordance with the principles and criteria set by the Council. In the context of priority for distribution network capacity, the legislative sources cited indicate that a REC or CEC may have priority where municipal institutions or bodies hold more than 51 percent of the votes and at least 40 percent of the installed capacity of the power plants will, within 6 months from receipt of the generation permit, be allocated to reducing energy poverty or to vulnerable consumers. Accordingly, municipal participation is not merely a reputational or organisational advantage: within a certain capacity reservation framework, it may determine legal priority. The Council’s competence is also relevant for supervision, because Article 241(1) of the Law on Energy gives it the right to inspect the activities of energy undertakings, energy facilities, installations, and consumers’ energy installations, and to obtain the documents, data, and explanations necessary for the inspection
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is the establishment of a non-profit legal person, with its founding documents clearly providing for electricity consumption, sharing, generation, and member benefits, followed by seeking CEC or REC status under Article 222 of the Law on Electricity or Article 202 of the Law on Energy from Renewable Sources. The second scenario is that the community not only shares the power plant’s capacity among participants, but also enters into renewable electricity purchase and sale agreements, to which the 10-day period under Article 461 of the Law on Electricity for submitting a draft agreement or notifying refusal applies. The third scenario concerns network capacity: the project may be implemented under the ordinary procedure or, if it meets the conditions relating to municipal control and reduction of energy poverty, may seek priority in accordance with the indicated direction of application of Article 39(21) of the Law on Electricity. The fourth scenario is an inspection by the Council, where the community or the energy installations it controls must substantiate compliance with activity, permitting, declaration, or technical supervision requirements under Article 241 of the Law on Energy. For residents, this is practically important because of the rules on openness of membership, voting, and allocation of benefits, since their rights will depend on the legal person’s documents and the chosen community status. For municipalities, it is important because of the possibility of participating in projects that not only generate electricity from renewable sources, but may also be linked to objectives concerning vulnerable consumers and the reduction of energy poverty. For project organisers, the main risk is that joint financing alone, or the use of the term cooperative, does not create the rights of an energy community: those rights arise only upon satisfying the specific conditions of Article 222 of the Law on Electricity or Article 202 of the Law on Energy from Renewable Sources
Whether the actions of R. M. and S. M. should be classified under Article 260 of the Criminal Code as distribution or possession of a very large quantity, while the actions of L.
S. and R. Š. should be classified only under Article 259 of the Criminal Code as acquisition for personal use.
Article 260(1) of the Criminal Code criminalises not only possession with intent to sell or otherwise distribute, but also the act of sale or other distribution itself. Accordingly, in R. M.’s case, the sale of 0.000265 g of carfentanil to L.
S. and the sale of 0.000514 g to R. Š. provide a stronger basis for legal classification than an inference of intent to distribute drawn solely from the quantity. Article 260(3) of the Criminal Code provides for liability for a very large quantity of narcotic or psychotropic substances and carries a sentence of imprisonment from ten to fifteen years.
According to the expert findings provided, the 0.0653 g of carfentanil found at S. M.’s residence is regarded as a very large quantity. Article 259 of the Criminal Code applies where a person unlawfully acquired or possessed narcotic substances without intent to distribute them; therefore, the classification of L.
S.’s and R. Š.’s conduct depends on the fact that they acquired the carfentanil for their own use.
In practical terms, the decisive threshold in this case is not merely the “very small” physical quantity, because in the case of carfentanil the legally determinative factors may be the quantity status established by experts and the actual act of transfer. The prosecution’s strongest argument against R. M. is not an abstract intent to distribute, but two specific sale episodes and the repeated acquisition from S.
M. on the same date, 5 February 2026. For the defence, the most rational approach is to distinguish between the episodes: to challenge intent to distribute where the substances were seized before any sale, while recognising that such a challenge is weaker in respect of the sale episodes. In S.
M.’s case, the greatest procedural risk arises from the recognition of 0.0653 g of carfentanil as a very large quantity, because that places the case within the sentencing range of Article 260(3) of the Criminal Code, which extends up to 15 years.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the actions of R. M. and S. M. should be classified as unlawful possession of narcotic substances with intent to distribute them, or as unlawful possession of a very large quantity thereof, under Article 260 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. In respect of the episodes involving R. M., Article 260(1) of the Criminal Code is of primary importance, as it covers the unlawful acquisition, possession, transportation or sending of narcotic or psychotropic substances with intent to sell or otherwise distribute them, as well as their sale or other distribution. In the case of S. M., Article 260(3) of the Criminal Code is also legally relevant, as it provides for liability for the unlawful production, acquisition, possession, transportation, sending, sale or other distribution of a very large quantity of narcotic or psychotropic substances. The issue of the legal classification of the acts of L. S. and R. Š. is to be resolved under Article 259(1) or 259(2) of the Criminal Code, since they are charged with the unlawful acquisition and possession of carfentanil without intent to distribute it. The legal significance of quantity is determined under Article 269(2) of the Criminal Code, which provides that small, large and very large quantities are established by reference to recommendations approved by the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Lithuania. Procedurally, it is important that, under Article 23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the indictment is the prosecutor’s document by which the pre-trial investigation is completed, the act is described, the evidence supporting the charge is identified, and the applicable criminal law is specified
Legal assessment. The four episodes specified in respect of R. M., from October 2025 to February 2026, have different significance: the transportation of 0.00296 g of carfentanil on 22 October 2025 is assessed through the lens of the alleged intent to distribute, whereas the subsequent sale of 0.000265 g to L. S. already satisfies the element of sale under Article 260(1) of the Criminal Code. The 0.000514 g of carfentanil acquired by R. M. on 5 February 2026 and its sale to R. Š. are likewise directly connected with the element of sale established in Article 260(1) of the Criminal Code. The quantity of 0.000618 g of carfentanil and 0.000532 g of methadone repeatedly acquired on the same day, if intended for distribution, falls within the chain of acts covered by Article 260(1) of the Criminal Code: acquisition, possession or transportation with intent to sell or otherwise distribute. This provision does not require that the narcotic substance actually be sold where the intent to sell or otherwise distribute it has been proven; accordingly, apprehension before the sale does not in itself preclude classification under Article 260(1) of the Criminal Code. The position of S. M. is more serious in that 0.0653 g of carfentanil was found at her residence, and according to expert findings such a quantity is deemed very large. If the court relies on this assessment of quantity, the act of S. M. may be linked to Article 260(3) of the Criminal Code, under which proof of intent to distribute is not formulated as a necessary element where possession of a very large quantity is concerned. As regards R. M., the application of Article 260(3) of the Criminal Code would depend on whether possession of a very large quantity is attributed to him, since the small-scale sale episodes, on the data presented, primarily satisfy the elements of Article 260(1) of the Criminal Code. In the cases of L. S. and R. Š., the axis of classification is the opposite: according to the investigation data, they acquired carfentanil for personal use, and therefore their conduct is linked not to Article 260 of the Criminal Code but to Article 259. Article 259(1) of the Criminal Code provides for liability for the unlawful production, processing, acquisition, possession, transportation or sending of narcotic or psychotropic substances without intent to sell or otherwise distribute them. Article 259(2) separately distinguishes possession of a small quantity without intent to distribute as a criminal misdemeanour, and therefore the determination of quantity may have direct significance for the severity of liability for these accused persons. The exemption from criminal liability provided for in Article 259(3) of the Criminal Code is linked to voluntarily approaching a healthcare institution for medical assistance or approaching a state institution with the aim of surrendering the substances; the facts presented concern acquisition from R. M., not voluntary surrender. The packages seized during the search and the expert findings are significant case data, and Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits participants in the proceedings and other persons to submit objects and documents relevant to the investigation and examination of a criminal act. Under Article 99 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, time limits define the time for the commencement, performance or completion of procedural acts, and under Article 100 they are calculated in hours, days and months. Since the case has been referred to court, the procedural rights of the accused are engaged under the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure stating that the accused has the right to know the charge against him or her, receive a copy of the indictment, examine the case file in court, have defence counsel, submit evidence, participate in its examination, provide explanations, and appeal the court’s judgment and rulings
Consequences. Realistically, the principal dispute in court should revolve around two elements: whether R. M. had intent to distribute in those episodes where no sale occurred, and whether the quantity of carfentanil found in relation to S. M. justifies the application of Article 260(3) of the Criminal Code. If the court were to find R. M. guilty under Article 260(1) of the Criminal Code, the sentencing range would be imprisonment for a term of two to eight years. If Article 260(3) of the Criminal Code were applied on the basis of a very large quantity, the sentence would be imprisonment for a term of ten to fifteen years. On the data presented, the practical risk for S. M. is primarily linked to Article 260(3) of the Criminal Code, because the expert finding concerning a very large quantity of carfentanil is directly connected with the disposition of that paragraph. The practical interest of L. S. and R. Š. is that their conduct not be reclassified as distribution: where possession is without intent to distribute, Article 259 of the Criminal Code applies, and its sanctions are substantially milder than those under Article 260. The case is also important procedurally, because the indictment under Article 23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines the scope of the charge to be examined in court, and the accused have the right to contest the facts, the quantity, the intent to distribute and other data underlying the charge by exercising the defence rights established in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The final course of the case will depend on how the court assesses the sale episodes, the substances found at the time of apprehension, the search results, and the significance of the expert findings for the application of Articles 259, 260 and 269 of the Criminal Code
Does the prosecutor still have grounds to pursue a civil claim in the public interest concerning municipal funds where a council member repays the amount claimed before the case is heard and the evidence submitted regarding her activities reduces the initial claim?
Article 19(1) of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office links prosecutorial intervention not to any political or reputational dispute, but to an established breach of law that infringes the rights or legitimate interests of an individual, society or the State, and which has not been remedied by the competent municipal authority. In this situation, the legal basis weakens not because the expenses automatically become lawful, but because the subject matter of the prosecutor’s civil claim was the amount to be returned to the budget, which, according to the report, has been repaid. Article 19(3) also explains why the prosecutor was able to adjust his position: he has the right to request documents, information and explanations, so the evidence submitted regarding the council member’s activities is not a collateral public-relations argument but procedurally relevant material for determining the amount of the claim.
The stronger argument after 14 July 2026 is not that “there was no breach”, but that “the basis for the restitutionary claim brought by the prosecutor no longer exists”. The discontinuance of the case therefore follows logically from repayment of the amount and withdrawal of the claim. In practice, in “receipt” cases, it is worth arguing not in the abstract about the nature of political activity, but about the connection between specific expenses and the activities of a council member, and about the calculation of the amount, because it was precisely the evidence submitted regarding those activities that, according to the report, reduced the prosecutor’s initial position.
Municipalities remain exposed to a separate risk under Article 19(2): even if a specific claim is withdrawn, the prosecutor’s application may indicate that the institutions themselves failed properly to remedy the breach or insufficiently controlled the payments.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether the prosecutor had grounds to defend the public interest in civil proceedings concerning municipal budget funds, and what procedural significance attaches to the fact that the amount claimed was repaid before the case was heard. This question is determined under Article 19(1) of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Lithuania, Article 49(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, and Article 50(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Article 19(1) of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office permits a prosecutor to defend the public interest only where a violation of a legal act is established that is to be regarded as a violation of the public interest, and the competent state or municipal institution has failed to take measures to remedy it, or no such institution exists. Article 49(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure grants the prosecutor the right to bring an action or application for the protection of the public interest in cases provided for by law. Article 50(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a prosecutor who has brought an action to protect the public interest has all the procedural rights and duties of a claimant, subject to the exceptions established by law. Accordingly, the core of the dispute is not merely a political assessment of “receipt” cases, but a procedural and substantive question of whether the repayment of municipal funds eliminated the need to defend the public interest
Legal assessment. According to the reported information, the prosecutor initially assessed that the council member’s expenses may have involved a violation of the public interest related to the municipal budget. Article 19(3) of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office provides investigative measures for such an assessment: requesting documents and information, seeking inspections or audits, summoning persons to provide explanations, and involving specialists. The former and current council member’s assertion that the amount was reduced after evidence of activity was submitted is legally consistent with the logic of evidence-gathering provided for in Article 19(3) of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office. The prosecutor’s independence in decision-making at this stage is defined by Article 3(2) of the Law Amending the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Lithuania: the prosecutor takes decisions independently and individually, guided by law and the principle of reasonableness, while respecting individual rights and the presumption of innocence. In civil proceedings, the prosecutor acts not as a political evaluator of the municipality, but as an entity charged with defending the public interest, because Article 49(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure links the prosecutor’s right to apply to a court with statutory cases of public-interest protection. This is also confirmed by the ruling of the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania of 4 January 2017 in administrative case No. eAS-65-492/2017, which stated that an applicant seeking protection of the public interest defends not his or her own subjective right, but an interest protected by the Constitution that belongs to society or a part of it. Although that case was administrative, its concept of public interest is relevant in explaining why a prosecutor’s claim concerning municipal funds is not identical to a private creditor’s claim. Once the amount claimed was repaid into the municipal budget, the prosecutor could conclude that the judicial measure for defending the public interest no longer had a practical basis. The report states that on 14 July 2026 a court notice was received regarding the termination of the civil case, meaning that the significant procedural event occurred before the prosecutor’s office press release of 15 July 2026. The prosecutor’s right to adjust his or her procedural position arises from the procedural rights and duties of a claimant granted under Article 50(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. At the same time, the prosecutor’s actions are not beyond review: Article 3(4) of the Law Amending the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office provides that a prosecutor’s actions and decisions may be appealed, in accordance with the procedure established by law, to a higher-ranking prosecutor and to a court. If, after bringing the action, the prosecutor had grounds to believe that municipal institutions had improperly performed their duties, Article 19(2) of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office requires the prosecutor to inform the institution exercising the owner’s rights and duties and/or to take other measures provided for by law. Article 49(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure is also relevant, because an action for the protection of the public interest that concerns the rights of a natural person entails the inclusion of that person in the proceedings as a third party or co-claimant in accordance with the procedure laid down in that article. Article 96¹(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, concerning litigation costs, becomes relevant only where the prosecutor’s claim is dismissed in whole or in part; the report refers not to dismissal, but to withdrawal of the claim and termination of the case
Consequences. In practical terms, the most immediate scenario is that the civil proceedings against L. Meilutė-Datkūnienė concerning the amount claimed by the prosecutor will not continue, because the amount relevant to the municipal budget has already been repaid. This does not mean that the prosecutor’s public-interest protection function ends altogether in all “receipt” situations, since Article 19(1) and (3) of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office allow each potential violation to be assessed separately on the basis of documents, explanations, and institutional actions. For the municipality, this course of events is significant both for the recovery of budget funds and for the possible assessment of institutional duties under Article 19(2) of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office. For the politician, the practical significance is that, according to the report, the proceedings concerning the pecuniary claim brought on the basis of the civil action have been terminated in her respect, although the prosecutor’s public-interest investigative actions have not, as a matter of law, thereby been recognised as unlawful. For public communication, it is significant that the dispute over the wording concerning petrol or diesel is not an independent issue regulated by the cited provisions, unless it is linked to a challenge to the lawfulness of the prosecutor’s actions under Article 3(4) of the Law Amending the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office. Further developments will depend on whether there remain other persons, other amounts, or other aspects of inaction by municipal institutions to which the measures under Article 19 of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office and Article 49 of the Code of Civil Procedure may still apply
Does the temporary removal of an electronic monitoring ankle tag with the prosecutor’s authorisation, and permission to leave Lithuania, amount to a modification of the remand measure, or merely an exception to its mode of enforcement?
The provisions of Article 25 of the Law on Probation that have been cited apply directly to a person subject to probation, i.e. a convicted person, and not to a suspect in a pre-trial investigation. They therefore do not constitute the direct legal basis for the remand measure imposed on S. Skvernelis.
Nevertheless, the provision illustrates an important rule: the physical removal of an electronic monitoring device and the continuing legal validity of the supervision itself are not the same thing. Article 25(2) of the Law on Probation permits removal of the device only in specific circumstances, while Article 27 prohibits the person from removing it themselves. The decisive criterion is therefore institutional authorisation, not merely the fact that the person was without the device for a period of time.
This is precisely what the prosecution service emphasises in the news report: the remand measure was not changed, but the prosecutor, having assessed the request, the arguments submitted and the material from the pre-trial investigation, authorised temporary departure and brief removal of the device.
The stronger argument in this situation is not that being at Nice airport without an ankle tag in itself negates the remand measure, but that the limits of the authorisation must be examined: the period covered, the purpose of the travel, the territory permitted and the conditions for return. What is professionally significant is the prosecution service’s wording that the request was granted “having assessed the arguments set out in it and the material from the pre-trial investigation”. This indicates an individualised risk assessment, not an automatic privilege for a member of parliament.
The critical practical risk would not be the removal of the device as such, but a breach of the conditions of the authorisation, or a situation in which authorisation was granted without sufficient reasoning in a serious corruption investigation involving 15 suspects, more than 100 searches and high-value assets. Accordingly, in any dispute over such a decision, what should be cited is not only a photograph or an observation at the airport, but the institutional authorisation and the sufficiency of its reasoning.
Core issue. The legal issue is not whether the preventive measure imposed on a Member of the Seimas has been “changed”, but whether the temporary removal of an electronic monitoring device and permission to leave Lithuania may be regarded as a relaxation of the conditions for applying intensive supervision, without revoking the preventive measure itself. This is to be assessed primarily under Article 120(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, which identifies intensive supervision as a preventive measure, and under Article 1311(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which defines intensive supervision as control of the suspect by electronic monitoring measures. Issues of imposition and duration are governed by Article 1311(2) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure: during the pre-trial investigation, intensive supervision is imposed by a pre-trial investigation judge at the request of the prosecutor, and the initial term may not exceed six months. The obligation to wear the device and comply with the daily schedule arises from Article 1311(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, while the prohibition on removing, damaging or destroying the device oneself arises from Article 1311(7). The revocation, replacement or relaxation of conditions of a preventive measure is regulated by Article 139(1) and (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
Legal assessment. According to the information provided, the person is subject neither to probation nor to the execution of a sentence of restriction of liberty, but rather to a preventive measure in a pre-trial investigation. Accordingly, the direct basis for assessment is the Code of Criminal Procedure, in particular Articles 120, 1311 and 139. Article 2(5) and (7) of the Law on Probation of the Republic of Lithuania links probation to the suspension of execution of an imposed sentence or part thereof and to the status of a probationer, whereas the report concerns a suspect. Therefore, the rules in Articles 25 and 27 of the Law on Probation define a different regime, namely supervision of convicted persons. For the same reason, Article 21 of the Code for the Execution of Sentences of the Republic of Lithuania and Article 12 of the Law Amending the Code for the Execution of Sentences, which regulate intensive supervision of a convicted person, are not the primary legal provisions for assessing the issue of an ankle monitor worn by a suspect. Article 1311(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes the suspect’s obligation to wear an electronic monitoring device; therefore, being without it on an unauthorised basis would be assessed as a breach of the conditions of intensive supervision. However, the report states that the device was removed with the prosecutor’s permission, which is legally significant because Article 1311(7) of the Code of Criminal Procedure specifically prohibits the suspect from removing, damaging or destroying the device. The prosecution service’s explanation that the preventive measure has not been changed is consistent with the structure of Article 139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: the measure itself may remain in force even though the conditions of its application are relaxed for a specific period. At the pre-trial investigation stage, under Article 139(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the prosecutor has competence to revoke intensive supervision or relax the conditions of its application where the relevant grounds or conditions cease to exist. If the matter involved not merely a relaxation of conditions, but replacement of the preventive measure with another measure or its revocation, this would be decided under Article 139(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure by a prosecutor’s decision or a court ruling. It is also significant that, under Article 1311(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the imposition of intensive supervision falls within the competence of the pre-trial investigation judge; therefore, a subsequent permission granted by the prosecutor cannot be interpreted as a new imposition of the measure. If execution of the preventive measure were to be transferred to another Member State of the European Union, Article 44 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Mutual Recognition and Execution of Decisions in Criminal Matters by Member States of the European Union would apply; under that provision, during the pre-trial investigation such a decision is adopted by the prosecutor by way of a decision. However, the temporary permission to leave and temporary removal of the device described in the report are not, in themselves, equivalent to transferring execution of the preventive measure to another Member State. Article 1311(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is also relevant: the suspect must be warned that, in the event of a breach of the conditions of intensive supervision, detention may be imposed if there are grounds for doing so
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is the simplest: after the period authorised by the prosecutor expires, the suspect returns to the conditions of intensive supervision, and the preventive measure remains in force until the term set in the ruling. The second scenario is that the prosecutor, after assessing the circumstances of the case, may further relax the conditions under Article 139(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure or, if the grounds cease to exist, revoke intensive supervision. The third scenario is that, if the limits of the permission, the daily schedule or the obligation to wear the device are breached, Article 1311(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure opens the possibility of considering a stricter measure, including detention, if there are grounds for doing so. The fourth scenario is that, if the case is transferred to court, under Article 1311(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure the court hearing the case would decide on the imposition of intensive supervision or extension of its term. This is practically important for the suspect, because temporary removal of the device does not extinguish the obligation to comply with the conditions of the preventive measure. It is also important for the prosecution service, because its permission must be compatible with the purpose of intensive supervision: control of the suspect by electronic monitoring measures under Article 1311(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. For public assessment, the essential dividing line is this: being without an ankle monitor does not in itself amount to a breach if it occurred pursuant to permission granted by a competent authority, whereas unauthorised removal of the device by the suspect would be directly prohibited by Article 1311(7) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
Whether a patient co-payment in an LNSS institution is a lawful payment for an additional choice, or an unlawful payment for a service that should already be financed from the PSDF or other funds allocated for state-guaranteed healthcare.
Article 47 of the Law on the Health System provides that state-guaranteed free healthcare services are paid for from the PSDF, state or municipal budgets, and other public sources. Article 49 formulates the rule on emergency care even more strictly: emergency medical assistance and essential services in LNSS institutions are provided free of charge to all permanent residents, irrespective of their PSD status, number of visits, or place of residence. Accordingly, the legally decisive issue is not the fact of payment itself, but the object of the payment: if the payment is made for a state-guaranteed or PSDF-reimbursed service, the co-payment conflicts with the rule of free provision; if the payment is made for separate non-reimbursed comfort or an additional choice, the position that it is permissible becomes stronger.
Article 43 of the Law on the Health System indicates that the state may regulate health-related relations by economic measures, including pricing, licences, and economic sanctions; therefore, the regulation of co-payments is not merely a matter of political compromise, but a legitimate field for regulatory measures.
The article’s statement that healthcare services financed from PSDF funds are provided to all insured persons according to health need is too broad. Under the wording of Article 9 of the Law on Health Insurance as presented, PSDF funds reimburse not all healthcare in general, but the healthcare specified in the law, including where an insured event occurs. A more precise formulation would be: insured persons are reimbursed from the PSDF budget for healthcare services defined by law, not for any service desired by the patient or any chosen model of service provision.
The second inaccuracy concerns the description of the solidarity principle: the statement that access should be determined by state of health rather than financial means is, under the wording of Article 31 of the Law on Health Insurance as presented, more accurately linked to the principle of equity, as that principle entails financing according to ability and ensuring care of equal quality for all insured persons.
In practice, the stronger argument at present is not the abstract proposition that “co-payments are permitted” or “co-payments are prohibited”, but the requirement to distinguish, in documentary terms, what the patient is paying for. For a healthcare institution, the riskiest approach is to link a co-payment to faster access to the same state-guaranteed or PSDF-reimbursed service, because that appears to be a payment for access to a free service rather than for an additional choice. When assessing a dispute, a lawyer should first cite Articles 47 and 49 of the Law on the Health System, and only then address the patient’s freedom of choice or the role of the private sector.
From a regulatory perspective, future amendments should define not only the limits of co-payments, but also their object: an additional service, comfort, an alternative provider, and the same state-funded treatment are distinct legal categories.
Core issue. The precise legal question is not whether co-payments are generally “good”, but whether, in an LNSS institution or in an institution that has concluded a contract with a territorial health insurance fund, the patient may be made responsible for paying for a service which, under law, must be guaranteed by the State or financed from public funds. This question is to be assessed under Articles 3, 11, 17, 43, 47 and 49 of the Law on the Health System of the Republic of Lithuania, Article 66 of the Law on Health Care Institutions of the Republic of Lithuania and, insofar as the patient’s will to receive a service is concerned, Article 14 of the Law Amending the Law on Patients’ Rights and Compensation for Damage to Health of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 3 of the Law on the Health System means that the fundamentals of financing health activities, the rights and duties of residents, the rights and duties of institutions, and the fundamentals of control must be established by law; accordingly, the boundary for co-payments cannot be left solely to institutional practice. Article 47 of the Law on the Health System provides that State-guaranteed health care services are paid for from the Compulsory Health Insurance Fund, the State or municipal budgets, and other specified public funds. Article 49 of the Law on the Health System and Article 66 of the Law on Health Care Institutions establish the right to free services and emergency medical assistance, while Article 11 of the Law on the Health System distinguishes services for which recipients do not pay directly from paid services
Legal assessment. The issue described in the report arises legally when the patient’s actual payment no longer corresponds to the financing scheme established by law. If a service falls within the scope of State-guaranteed care or services paid for from the Compulsory Health Insurance Fund or the State or municipal budgets, under Article 47 and Article 11(2)(1) of the Law on the Health System the recipient does not pay the institution directly. If the service is a paid personal or public health care service, Article 11(2)(2) of the Law on the Health System applies, and the methodology for calculating prices and the procedure for providing such services are established by the Minister of Health. Thus, the lawfulness of payment depends not on whether the patient agrees to pay, but on the legal classification of the service and the basis for its financing. The patient’s consent under Article 14 of the Law Amending the Law on Patients’ Rights and Compensation for Damage to Health is necessary for the provision of a health care service, but that provision does not, in itself, convert a State-guaranteed service into a paid service. Emergency medical assistance under Article 49 of the Law on the Health System and Article 66 of the Law on Health Care Institutions is provided free of charge to all residents of the Republic of Lithuania, irrespective of insurance status, number of visits, or place of residence. The right of insured persons to free services in other institutions that have concluded contracts with a territorial health insurance fund is expressly stated in Article 66 of the Law on Health Care Institutions. The conditions set out in paragraph 3 of the same article are important for the procedure for receiving free services: contacting primary health care physicians or submitting a referral or substantiated need for secondary or tertiary care. In the Government’s assessment of Draft Law No. XIIP-2258, it was emphasised that where a condition requires emergency medical assistance, no referral is required under the regulation laid down in Article 49 of the Law on the Health System. In its ruling of 16 May 2013 in case No. 47/2009-131/2010, as referred to in the Government’s conclusion on Draft Laws Nos. XIIP-19 to XIIP-22, the Constitutional Court explained that the scope of free medical assistance financed from the State budget must be determined by the legislature. This means that the core of the public debate should properly have been not only institutional competition or patient choice, but the statutory boundary between free and paid care. The Government’s conclusion on Draft Laws Nos. XIIP-19 to XIIP-22 expressly identified the regulatory objective: to define and distinguish the grounds for providing paid and free personal health care services and to establish liability for the collection of unlawful payments. The same material also identified a specific legislative risk: the provisions of the drafts concerning possible payment for certain services had to be reconciled with the prohibition on requiring additional co-payments and charges for primary outpatient personal health care services and primary outpatient mental health care services. Article 43 of the Law on the Health System shows that the State may regulate health relations through economic measures, including compulsory health insurance funds, pricing policy, licences, and economic sanctions. Therefore, as a matter of law, the issue of co-payments is simultaneously an issue of financing, pricing, licensed activity, and liability
Consequences. The Law Amending Articles 8, 11, 13 and 76 of the Law on the Health System No. I-552, which entered into force on 1 July 2025, means that, as of 22 July 2026, the distinction between paid and free services must be assessed under the version of Article 11 of the Law on the Health System already in force. Under Article 5 of that amending law, the Minister of Health was required to adopt implementing legislation by 30 June 2025; therefore, the practical field of dispute shifts to how institutions apply the methodology and service provision procedure established by the Minister. For patients, the most practically important question is whether the amount requested from them is a charge for a lawfully paid service or an additional payment for a service which, under Articles 47 and 49 of the Law on the Health System and Article 66 of the Law on Health Care Institutions, must be free of charge. For health care institutions, it is important to have clearly separated lists of services, a pricing basis, and a procedure for informing patients, because the collection of unlawful payments is identified in legislative documents as an area of liability requiring regulation. For the State and the Ministry of Health, the most important task is to ensure that the regulation of paid services does not negate the substance of State-guaranteed care and is aligned with the legislature’s responsibility, identified in the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 16 May 2013, to determine the scope of free assistance. The realistic next step is not merely to permit or prohibit co-payments, but to consistently refine the boundaries between paid services, free services, emergency assistance, referral requirements, and institutional pricing. The practical significance of this discussion is that it determines whether the patient’s payment will be clearly linked to an additional, lawfully paid choice, or whether it will become an undefined condition of access to State-guaranteed health care
The specific issue is not merely whether A. Kandrotas struck V. Bartkevičius, but whether, if guilt is established, the court may add the 7 months proposed by the prosecutor to the already final custodial sentence of 3 years and 6 months.
According to the chronology in the news report, the alleged blow occurred during last December’s protest outside the Seimas, whereas the 3-year-and-6-month sentence in the financial crimes case became final only in June. Accordingly, the strongest technical dispute at the sentencing stage will concern whether the aggregation of multiple offences under Article 63 of the Criminal Code applies, or whether Article 64, governing the commission of a new offence before completion of a sentence, is engaged.
Article 63(1) of the Criminal Code provides that where several criminal offences have been committed, the court first imposes a sentence for each offence separately and then determines the final aggregate sentence, either by absorption or by full or partial accumulation. Article 64(1) applies to a narrower situation: where a convicted person commits a new criminal offence before serving the imposed sentence, the court aggregates the newly imposed sentence with the unserved part of the earlier sentence. The facts provided indicate that the prosecutor is proposing a real partial addition to the 3-year-and-6-month custodial sentence.
However, the mere fact that this sentence is currently unserved does not in itself satisfy the premise of Article 64 if the alleged blow was committed before that sentence was imposed or became final. Article 42 of the Criminal Code further explains why aggregation is being discussed at all in this situation: as a rule, one sentence is imposed for one offence, while two sentences are possible in the cases provided for in Articles 63 and 64.
For the defence, the stronger argument is not one based on political motivation, but a chronological challenge to the application of Article 64: it is necessary to establish precisely when the alleged public order offence was committed and when the earlier sentence was imposed and became enforceable. If, in temporal terms, the new offence preceded the financial crimes sentence that became final in June, it would be safer for the court to proceed under the logic of Article 63, which allows both absorption and partial accumulation of sentences, rather than automatically treating the case as a new offence committed before completion of a sentence under Article 64. For the prosecution, it is important to justify not only the relevance of recidivism and the six prior convictions, but also the specific basis for adding 7 months, since Article 63(4) requires reasons to be given for the selection of each part of the sentence being added.
The practical risk for the judgment is that a decision sufficiently well-founded on guilt may nevertheless be vulnerable on appeal precisely because the wrong regime for aggregating sentences was selected.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether a blow to the facial area during a public protest near the Seimas, if found proved by the court, constitutes a breach of public order under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, rather than merely causing physical pain under Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code requires not only conduct in a public place, but also brazen acts demonstrating disrespect for those present or for the surroundings and disturbing public peace or order. Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code applies where physical pain or minor impairment of health is caused by beating or other violent conduct; the sanction under that article includes community service, restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. The sanction under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code is broader and more severe: community service, a fine, restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment for up to two years. The types of penalties and the limits on their combination must be assessed under Article 42 of the Criminal Code, while the question of adding an additional 7 months to the previous sentence of 3 years and 6 months’ imprisonment must be resolved under the rules on imposing and aggregating penalties for multiple criminal offences set out in Article 63(1)-(5) of the Criminal Code
Legal assessment. For the prosecution’s case, the essential circumstance is not merely physical contact, but its public nature and its effect on public peace or order, because Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code links criminal liability specifically to brazen acts committed in a public place and to consequences for public order. The source provided in relation to Article 284 of the Criminal Code states that criminal liability under this provision is justified where unlawful conduct causes dangerous consequences, namely a disturbance of public peace or order. Accordingly, in seeking a conviction for breach of public order, the prosecutor must establish not only that there was a blow, but also that, in the circumstances of a public protest, it demonstrated disrespect for those present or for the surroundings and disturbed public peace or order. The defence argument concerning provocation and the assertion that the hand merely caught the hood are legally directed at the factual mechanism of the act, the assessment of culpability, and whether there were, at all, brazen acts and consequences relevant to Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code. If only the causing of physical pain or minor impairment of health were established, without the element of disturbance of public order, Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code would be relevant within the system of provisions provided. The source concerning Article 140 of the Criminal Code explains that causing physical pain is associated with intentional beating or other violent conduct, and that a forensic medical conclusion regarding physical pain is made on the basis of case materials confirming the fact of beating or other violent conduct. However, the charge, as described in the report, is directed at Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code, and therefore the extent of impairment to health is not the sole criterion for legal classification. Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits the accused, defence counsel, the victim and other participants in the proceedings to submit, on their own initiative, items and documents relevant to the investigation and examination of a criminal offence; therefore, the information relied on by the defence concerning provocation, location, or video recordings may procedurally be submitted and assessed in court. Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that remand measures may be imposed, among other purposes, to secure the participation of the accused or convicted person in the proceedings and the enforcement of the judgment, while Article 120(1) lists measures such as detention, house arrest, bail, seizure of documents, registration with the police, and a written undertaking not to leave. This is practically significant because the report states that a final custodial sentence is already to be enforced, but the person has not entered a custodial institution. At this stage, the court’s competence is to determine the issue of guilt and, in the event of a conviction, to impose a penalty under the sanction in Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code and, if aggregation of penalties applies, to proceed under Article 63 of the Criminal Code. Under Article 63(1) of the Criminal Code, the court imposes a penalty separately for each criminal offence and then imposes the final aggregate penalty. Under Article 63(3) and (4) of the Criminal Code, penalties may be added in full or in part, and in the case of partial addition the reasons for selecting each part of the penalty to be added must be stated. Article 55 of the Criminal Code, concerning the penalties not involving deprivation of liberty that are usually imposed, applies to a person being tried for the first time; therefore, given the context of previous convictions indicated in the report, it is not the principal rule for selecting a more lenient penalty. Article 58 of the Criminal Code, concerning accomplices, has no independent significance in this situation, because the report describes an individual charge rather than complicity
Consequences. First scenario: on 21 September 2026, the court finds A. Kandrotas guilty under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code and imposes imprisonment, while forming the final sentence under the rules on addition or absorption of penalties in Article 63 of the Criminal Code. In that case, the 7 months proposed by the prosecutor would not be an automatic consequence, but the result of a penalty imposed by the court with reasons and of its aggregation. Second scenario: the court finds that the element of disturbance of public order has not been proved, but that the elements of violent conduct correspond to Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code; in that case, the maximum term of imprisonment would be up to one year. Third scenario: the court acquits if it rejects the prosecution’s assertions concerning the blow, brazen acts, or disturbance of public peace or order. For the victim, the practical significance is that a finding of guilt may affect issues of compensation for damage, while Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that, in cases established by law, damage may be compensated from state funds if the accused or materially liable persons lack the means to compensate the damage. For the accused, the most important consequence is the risk of a possible additional term of imprisonment and the fact that the final sentence will depend on the method of aggregation under Article 63 of the Criminal Code chosen by the court. For the court, the practical significance of this case is that it will have to distinguish a breach of public order from an ordinary violent conflict and clearly state reasons as to which facts establish the consequences required under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code. For participants in a public protest and for a defence relying on the status of a media representative, it is significant that the sources provided do not confer immunity from the application of Article 284 of the Criminal Code: the decisive factors remain the specific acts, their public nature, and their effect on public peace or order
Does the Vilnius City Municipality Administration, by identifying itself in the vilnius.lt privacy policy as the sole controller of Website visitors’ data, sufficiently define responsibility in cases where surveys, public consultations, votes or projects conducted through the Website may also involve other entities determining the purposes and means of data processing?
Article 4(7) GDPR defines a controller as an entity which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of processing; therefore, the mere formal designation of the municipal administration in the privacy policy is not decisive if the actual purpose or means are determined by several entities. In such a case, Article 26(1) GDPR requires joint controllers to determine their respective responsibilities in a transparent manner by arrangement, in particular as regards the exercise of data subjects’ rights and the provision of the information referred to in Articles 13 and 14. Article 26(2) further requires that the data subject be made able to access the essence of such an arrangement, while Article 26(3) means that even an arrangement between controllers cannot restrict an individual’s right to address each of them.
Recital 45 GDPR is important in the context of public administration: where data are processed in the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority, the basis and purpose must be laid down in law, so general formulations about “improving service quality” or “public consultations” do not in themselves replace a specific legal basis.
The stronger argument here is not that a privacy policy exists, but whether it is sufficiently specific in light of the actual data-processing model: if other entities participate in the presentation, consultations or voting process relating to the Wooden Šnipiškės urban study, it is necessary to assess whether they are joint controllers under Article 26 GDPR. The practical risk for the municipality is that additional information provided in relation to specific projects cannot remain merely declaratory: it must explain what data are collected, for what purpose, on what legal basis, for how long they are retained, and who is in fact responsible for data-subject rights. For a professional audience, it is worth citing Article 4(7) GDPR together with Article 26, because it is precisely this combination that enables a formal “single controller” model to be challenged where the actual decision-making on data processing is shared.
Core issue. The legal issue is not the conclusion of the Wooden Šnipiškės urban study itself, but how the Vilnius City Municipal Administration, when presenting the results on vilnius.lt and allowing visitors to register, submit questions, participate in surveys, consultations or voting, must process the personal data of website visitors. This issue is assessed under Articles 1, 3, points 7 and 8 of Article 4, Article 5(2), Article 6(3), Article 13(2), Article 14(2), and Articles 24, 25, 26, 29, 32 and 38 of the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679. Article 1 GDPR defines the subject matter and objective of the Regulation: the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of their personal data and the free movement of such data. Article 3(1) GDPR means that the Regulation applies to processing carried out by the Administration, because the controller is established in the Union and the data are processed in the context of its activities. Under point 7 of Article 4 GDPR, the Administration is to be regarded as the data controller, because the privacy policy itself identifies it as the entity determining the purposes and means of processing website visitors’ data. Under point 8 of Article 4 GDPR, information technology, data storage, telecommunications and other service providers, where they process data on behalf of the Administration, are to be regarded as processors
Legal assessment. The Administration’s primary obligation is accountability: under Article 5(2) GDPR, it is responsible for compliance with the principles relating to processing of personal data and must be able to demonstrate such compliance. Article 24(1) GDPR particularises that obligation: the Administration must implement appropriate technical and organisational measures, taking into account the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing, as well as the risks to the rights and freedoms of natural persons. The categories of data specified in the privacy policy are broad: cookies may collect the IP address, browser type, number of visits, pages viewed, time spent on the website and demographic data, while data submitted by the visitor may include name, age, gender, education, email address and the content of a message. This means that, in the context of publicising the results of the urban study, the legally relevant matter is not only the publication of information, but also every visitor action by which the visitor is identified or may be identifiable. Under Article 25(2) GDPR, the Administration must, by default, process only such personal data as are necessary for each specific purpose, including as regards the amount of data, the extent of processing, the storage period and accessibility. Accordingly, for example, the purposes of administering enquiries, improving the quality of public administration services and direct marketing cannot lawfully be conflated into one undifferentiated collection of data. Where processing is linked to public administration functions, Article 6(3) GDPR is relevant: the basis referred to in points c and e of Article 6(1) must be laid down by Union law or Member State law to which the controller is subject, and the purpose of the processing must be determined in that legal basis or be necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller. Recital 10 GDPR confirms that Member States may specify more precisely the conditions for such processing relating to a legal obligation, the public interest or the exercise of official authority. The duty to provide information arises at the time the data are obtained: Article 13(2) GDPR requires information to be provided on the storage period or the criteria used to determine it, the rights of access, rectification, erasure, restriction of processing, objection to processing, data portability, withdrawal of consent and lodging a complaint with a supervisory authority. Where data are not obtained from the visitor, Article 14(2) GDPR additionally requires the source from which the personal data originate to be specified and, where applicable, whether they came from publicly accessible sources. The storage model described in the privacy policy is consistent with the approach that data are retained no longer than required by the purposes or by law and, for direct marketing purposes, until objection or withdrawal of consent, but no longer than is necessary to achieve the purpose. If the Administration engages processors, Article 29 and Article 32(4) GDPR mean that subordinate persons or persons with access may not process data without instructions from the controller, unless required to do so by Union or Member State law. If two or more entities jointly determine the purposes and means of processing data collected during the presentation of the urban study results, Article 26 GDPR on joint controllers applies, including the obligation to determine responsibilities transparently and to make the essence of the arrangement available to the data subject. Notwithstanding such an arrangement, Article 26(3) GDPR preserves the data subject’s right to exercise his or her rights in respect of each of the joint controllers. The role of the data protection officer is also procedurally significant here: under Article 38(4) GDPR, data subjects may contact the officer on all matters relating to the processing of their personal data and the exercise of their rights. Under Article 38(3) and (5) GDPR, the officer must not receive instructions regarding the performance of his or her tasks, must report directly to the highest management level and must ensure secrecy or confidentiality. The procedure specified in the privacy policy, namely contacting the Administration in person, by post or by email with an electronic signature, is a practical channel for exercising data subject rights vis-à-vis the Administration. If the visitor disagrees with the response of the Administration or the data protection officer, the privacy policy itself provides that the visitor may contact the State Data Protection Inspectorate, while point d of Article 13(2) and point e of Article 14(2) GDPR establish the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is the ordinary lawful presentation of results, where the Administration collects only data necessary for a specific purpose, clearly informs visitors, limits the storage period and controls processors’ access in accordance with Articles 24, 25, 29 and 32 GDPR. The second scenario concerns the data subject’s active exercise of rights: the visitor may request information, access data, rectify or erase them, restrict processing, object to processing, request portability, withdraw consent or lodge a complaint with the State Data Protection Inspectorate. The third scenario is relevant where external service providers or other entities are used for the presentation process of the urban study: in that case it is important to distinguish processors under point 8 of Article 4 GDPR from potential joint controllers under Article 26 GDPR. If data were transferred outside the European Union or the European Economic Area, practical significance would attach to the commitment stated in the privacy policy to apply the measures provided for by law, while Article 47(2) GDPR visibly emphasises the elements of purpose limitation, data minimisation, limited storage periods and data subject rights. This matters for three groups: the Administration as controller, because it must demonstrate compliance; website visitors and consultation participants, because data enabling their identification become a legally protected object; and engaged service providers, because their authority to act derives only from the Administration’s instructions or from a legal requirement. Accordingly, from a data protection perspective, the notice concerning the presentation of the urban study results entails a managed process of public information and participation, in which each additional collection channel, whether cookies, registration, survey, voting, enquiry or marketing communication, must be linked to a specific purpose, legal basis, retention period and procedure for the exercise of data subject rights
Whether the use of EUR 108,500 from the Kaunas mayor’s reserve to eliminate the consequences of a fire falls within the statutory purpose of the mayor’s reserve, and whether a mayoral decision and a budget adjustment approved by the municipal council are sufficient for that purpose.
The amended provisions of the Law on the Budget Structure concerning the mayor’s reserve establish two separate rules: the specific amount of the reserve is determined annually by the municipal council when approving the budget, while the funds of the mayor’s reserve are allocated by the mayor. The same provision permits the use of mayor’s reserve funds for “eliminating the consequences of fires, natural disasters and other events” and for partially covering or compensating the losses caused by them, in accordance with the procedure established by the municipal council. Accordingly, the purpose of eliminating the consequences of a fire is itself a strong legal basis for using the reserve, provided that the expenditure is genuinely connected with remedying those consequences and is not merely an additional allocation to a general programme.
Separately, Article 13 of the Law on the Budget Structure, concerning municipal budget appropriations, permits appropriations to be used for the performance of municipal functions through programmes administered by appropriation managers. A council decision increasing the appropriation plan of a specific programme is therefore a budgetary act, but it does not displace the restrictions on the purpose for which mayor’s reserve funds may be used.
The stronger argument here is not that the “mayor’s reserve” may serve as a politically flexible budgetary source, but that the law assigns it a narrow earmarked purpose which, in this case, directly covers the consequences of a fire. In practice, the relevant assessment should concern not only the amount of EUR 108,500, but also the documentary link between the specific fire, the specific remediation works or losses, and the use of the reserve in accordance with the procedure established by the council. A risk for the municipality would arise if the same amount were only formally “linked” to the fire but in fact used as a general increase in appropriations for the “Sustainability and Green Deal” programme, without an individualised basis for eliminating the consequences of the fire.
For a professional audience, the provision to cite is specifically the rule on the mayor’s reserve concerning the elimination of the consequences of fires, rather than the general provisions on budget revenue or appropriation planning, because the core of any dispute would be compliance with the special-purpose nature of the reserve.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the allocation of EUR 108.5 thousand from the mayor’s reserve for eliminating the consequences of a fire, and the inclusion of the same amount in the appropriations plan of a municipal programme, comply with the purpose of the mayor’s reserve, the municipal council’s budgetary competence, and civil protection procedures. It is to be assessed under Article 15(1) of the Law Amending the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Budget Structure No. I-430, pursuant to which the mayor’s reserve is formed by the municipality, its specific amount is set annually by the municipal council, and the funds are allocated by the mayor. The key substantive provision is Article 15(2)(2) of the same law: funds from the mayor’s reserve may, in accordance with the procedure established by the municipal council, be used to eliminate the consequences of fires, natural disasters, and other events and to partially compensate for the losses caused by them. The budgetary aspect should be assessed under Article 13 of the Law Amending the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Budget Structure No. I-430, which provides that appropriations from municipal budgets are used to perform autonomous municipal functions and state functions delegated to municipalities through programmes of appropriation managers
Legal assessment. If the funds are allocated specifically for eliminating the consequences of a fire, the purpose of the expenditure falls directly within the purpose specified in Article 15(2)(2) of the Law Amending the Law on the Budget Structure No. I-430. The mayor’s power in this context is not an independent and unlimited discretion: under Article 15(1), the mayor allocates the mayor’s reserve funds, but under Article 15(2), those funds are used in accordance with the procedure established by the municipal council. The municipal council’s approval of an increase in the appropriations plan of the budget programme “A City Sustainably Managed in Accordance with the Principles of Sustainability and the Green Deal” does not constitute a change in the allocation of the mayor’s reserve funds, but rather an adjustment of the municipal budget’s programme-based plan within the council’s budgetary competence. Legally, such a structure separates two actions: the mayor allocates reserve funds for the specific purpose of eliminating the consequences of the fire, while the council decides on increasing the appropriations plan within the municipal programme. Since, under Article 13 of the Law Amending the Law on the Budget Structure No. I-430, municipal appropriations are used to perform functions through programmes, the recording of fire-consequence elimination expenditure under a specific programme must be linked to the functional content of that programme. As regards the amount of the mayor’s reserve, Article 15(1) is relevant: the reserve must be not less than 0.25 per cent and not more than 1 per cent of the approved municipal budget revenue, excluding state grants to municipal budgets. The report states that EUR 1 million 118.2 thousand remains in the mayor’s reserve; therefore, the practical legality review should be carried out by reference to the municipal budget revenue approved by the council, excluding state grants, and the reserve amount set by the council. If the fire were classified as an emergency event or a municipal-level emergency situation, Article 33(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Crisis Management and Civil Protection would additionally apply. Under that provision, where a municipal-level emergency situation is imminent or has occurred, the mayor immediately convenes the municipal operations centre, decides on the declaration of an emergency situation, and mobilises civil protection forces and material resources. The implementing regulation of Government Resolution No. 1317 of 29 December 2022 provides that, upon receiving a proposal, the municipal mayor must, no later than the following day, adopt an order declaring a municipal-level emergency situation and appointing an operations commander. The same regulation also establishes the procedure for providing material resources: upon receiving information from the rescue operations commander or operations commander regarding the need for resources, the mayor must immediately, but no later than the following day, issue a requirement to entities with which contracts for the provision of material resources have been concluded. This means that the use of reserve funds and the mobilisation of civil protection resources are related but distinct legal mechanisms: the former finances the elimination of consequences, while the latter organises the response and the provision of resources. Article 15 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Budget Structure concerning the Government reserve does not apply directly to this municipal situation, because it concerns the Government reserve formed in the state budget and the allocation of funds by Government resolution. Nevertheless, the example in the sources of a Government decision allocating funds shows that state reserve funds may be used to partially compensate damage caused by a municipal-level emergency situation where such a situation has been declared by mayoral order. As regards municipal council meetings, the relevant provision is the provision of the Law on Local Self-Government cited in the submitted Government conclusion source: the council exercises its powers collegially at council meetings, and the mayor convenes meetings as necessary, but at least once every three months
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the decision remains valid as an ordinary use of the mayor’s reserve funds to eliminate the consequences of a fire, while the council-approved increase in the appropriations plan enables the expenditure to be accounted for and executed through the municipal programme. The second scenario is that, if the scale of the fire meets the criteria of an emergency situation, the mayor would have to act under Article 33 of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection and the implementing procedure of Government Resolution No. 1317, including the mechanisms relating to the operations centre, the operations commander, and the mobilisation of material resources. The third scenario is that, if the scale of the losses exceeded the capacity of the municipal reserve, the Government reserve mechanism under Article 15 of the Law on the Budget Structure could become practically relevant for the municipality, but only within the limits of the Government’s competence and by Government resolution. The postponement of the council meeting to 15 September 2026 does not in itself preclude the use of the mayor’s reserve, because under the submitted provision on the mayor’s reserve, the funds are allocated by the mayor, while the council establishes the procedure for their use and approves budgetary decisions. In practical terms, this situation is important for three groups: affected persons or entities, because reserve funds may cover only part of the losses; the municipal administration, because the expenditure must be linked to the procedure and programme established by the council; and the council, because it is responsible for approving the budget structure and appropriations plan. The legal core of the dispute would not be whether the mayor’s reserve may be used for fire consequences at all, but whether the specific use of EUR 108.5 thousand complied with the procedure established by the council, the limits of the approved reserve, and the selected programme purpose
Does the registration of the draft Government Programme in the Seimas on 3 July 2026, where the Presidential decree on the composition of the 21st Government was signed only on 6 July 2026, amount merely to a technical registration defect, or to a procedural breach capable of raising a risk as to the legality of the Government?
The provisions provided do not directly regulate the sequencing of the submission of the Government Programme to the Seimas, and therefore no specific constitutional provision cited here can be relied upon on this issue. Nevertheless, Article 22(3) of the Law on the Government indicates that the Government Programme is not an abstract political document: the Government implements it and approves a plan for implementing its provisions. This strengthens the argument that, in legal terms, the Programme is meaningfully submitted by an already formed Government, rather than by an entity that exists, or is merely presumed to exist, before the ministerial composition has been approved.
Article 38(1) of the Law on the Government, concerning the submission of draft acts to the Government, emphasises the importance of the competence of the relevant actors: draft legal acts may be submitted only by entities entitled to do so, and drafts submitted by the Prime Minister must bear his or her approval. Accordingly, the essence of the dispute is not merely the content of the document, but the competence of the submitting entity at the specific procedural moment.
At present, the stronger argument for the opposition is not that the Programme was presented at a sitting of the Seimas before the decree, since the Prime Minister maintains that the presentation took place after the Presidential decree, but rather that the draft itself was registered in the Seimas on 3 July 2026, when the composition of the Government had not yet been approved. For the governing majority’s defence, it would be essential to distinguish registration from constitutionally significant submission, and to argue that legal significance attached not to the technical date of registration but to the later presentation in the Seimas after the decree of 6 July 2026. The practical risk is that the Constitutional Court may assess not only the formal moment of voting, but the entire procedural chain by which the Government Programme was submitted, including the competence of the relevant actor within that chain.
The earlier, similar sequencing in the registration of the Šimonytė Government Programme politically weakens the argument of selective criticism, but it does not legally eliminate a possible breach if the Constitutional Court were to decide that such practice was itself defective.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not an abstract review of the “legality of the Government”, but whether the procedure for adopting the specific legal act concerning the Government Programme complied with the constitutional and statutory model for the formation of the Government and the submission of its Programme. This issue must be assessed under Article 24(2)(1), (2) and (7) of the Law on the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, Article 19(1) of the Law Amending the Law on Strategic Management of the Republic of Lithuania No. XIII-3096, and Articles 95 and 106 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. Under Article 24(2)(1) of the Law on the Government, the Prime Minister forms the Government and submits its composition to the President of the Republic for approval; under point 2, the Prime Minister submits proposals concerning the appointment and dismissal of ministers; and under point 7, the Prime Minister submits the Government Programme to the Seimas for consideration. The dispute therefore concerns whether the registration of the draft Programme on 3 July 2026, where the decree of the President of the Republic on the composition of the Government was signed on 6 July 2026, may be regarded as proper submission of the Government Programme under Article 24 of the Law on the Government. Article 19(1) of the Law on Strategic Management directs this issue to the Law on the Government, because it provides that the Government Programme is prepared and approved in accordance with that law. The procedural route to the Constitutional Court would be based on Article 106 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania
Legal assessment. Article 24 of the Law on the Government distinguishes several actions of the Prime Minister: formation of the Government, submission of its composition to the President of the Republic, proposals concerning ministers, and submission of the Government Programme to the Seimas. The legal sequence of these actions is significant because, under Article 24(2)(7), the Programme is submitted by the Prime Minister as the subject representing the Government and directing its activities under Article 24(1). If registration of the Programme is treated merely as the submission of a preparatory document within the Seimas information procedure, its date would not necessarily coincide with the final consideration of the Programme in the Seimas. However, if registration is treated as the actual submission of the Government Programme to the Seimas, the issue arises whether such submission could have taken place before the act of the President of the Republic concerning the composition of the Government. The visible text of the rules clearly states that the Prime Minister first forms the Government and submits its composition to the President of the Republic for approval, while submission of the Programme to the Seimas is a separate part of the Prime Minister’s competence. Article 95 of the Constitution is also relevant, because the Government resolves matters of state administration at its sittings by adopting resolutions by a majority vote of all members of the Government, and Government resolutions are signed by the Prime Minister and the minister for the relevant area. Article 22(3) of the Law on the Government provides that the Government implements the Government Programme and approves the plan for implementing its provisions; accordingly, the Programme is not merely a political text: it is the basis for the future activities of the Government. This significance is also confirmed by the submitted material concerning draft Law on the Government No. XIIP-1155, which states that the Seimas considers the Government Programme submitted by the Prime Minister and decides whether to approve it, while the Government is collectively responsible to the Seimas for the general activities of the Government under the first paragraph of Article 96 of the Constitution. In its ruling of 10 January 1998, “On the compliance of the Resolution of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania of 10 December 1996 ‘On the Programme of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania’ with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania”, the Constitutional Court noted that the Government is a collegial institution of general competence, composed of the Prime Minister and ministers. This case law is directly relevant to the present dispute because it permits an assessment of whether, at the moment of submission of the Programme, there existed a collegial composition of the Government to which collective responsibility for general activities is attached. If an application were made to the Constitutional Court, the petitioner would, under Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, have to specify the exact title, number, date of adoption, and adopting institution of the contested legal act, as well as the specific grounds for hearing the case and the legal reasoning. Article 106 of the Constitution permits not less than one fifth of all members of the Seimas to apply in respect of the acts referred to in the first paragraph of Article 105 of the Constitution, as well as in respect of the compliance of acts of the President of the Republic with the Constitution and laws. The same provision of Article 106 of the Constitution provides that a submission by the President of the Republic or a resolution of the Seimas requesting an examination of whether an act complies with the Constitution suspends the validity of that act. Examples of applications by the Government to the Constitutional Court are set out in Government Resolution No. 421 of 29 May 2024, Government Resolution No. 121 of 14 February 2024, and Government Resolution No. 1429 of 18 December 1997, by which an examination was requested of the Seimas Resolution of 10 December 1996 concerning the Government Programme. This shows that the act approving the Programme may be an object of constitutional review where the request is framed as an examination of the compliance of a legal act with the Constitution, rather than as an assessment of a political situation
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is that not less than one fifth of all members of the Seimas prepare, before the prescribed deadline, an application precisely identifying the contested act and the procedural breach under Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court. The second scenario is that the application is not accepted, or the case is not prepared, if under Article 106 of the Constitution it is based on non-legal grounds. The third scenario is that the Constitutional Court accepts the case for examination and assesses whether the procedure for submitting and approving the Government Programme is consistent with the sequence of the Prime Minister’s competences established in Article 24 of the Law on the Government and with the concept of a collegial Government emphasised in the ruling of 10 January 1998. The fourth scenario is that the significance of the dispute is limited to procedural risk if it is established that, before consideration by the Seimas, the Programme had already been presented by the proper subject after the signing of the decree of the President of the Republic. The further course of events is particularly important for members of the Seimas, because it is their group that may initiate review under Article 106 of the Constitution, and for the Government, because under Article 22(3) of the Law on the Government it implements the Programme and approves its implementation plan. It is also important for the Office of the Government, because Article 19(2), (3) and (7) of the Law on Strategic Management assigns to it functions relating to monitoring implementation of the Programme, preparing reports, and organising the preparation of the implementation plan. The legally most significant outcome would not be a political allocation of blame, but a clear rule for future Governments as to when a Government Programme may be registered, submitted, and considered in the Seimas
Whether the collapse of a fountain during a public victory celebration, resulting in the death of a thirteen-year-old and injuries to others, is legally classifiable as compensable damage for loss of life and personal injury, even where the damage arose from large numbers of people climbing onto the structure.
Under Article 6.299 of the Civil Code, “damage” includes damage arising from loss of life or personal injury, including non-pecuniary damage. Article 6.250 of the Civil Code further provides that non-pecuniary damage is compensable in all cases where it is caused to a person’s health or by the loss of a person’s life, with the amount assessed by reference to the consequences, degree of fault, financial situation, and the criteria of justice, reasonableness and good faith. On the evidence provided, these provisions support a firm conclusion as to the type of damage and the possibility of compensation, but not as to the specific liable party, since the news report contains no information on who controlled the fountain, who organised the celebration, or whether safety restrictions were in place.
The stronger argument in this factual situation is not the sporting-event or FIFA context, but the safety of infrastructure and public space: the damage occurred not in a stadium during a match, but at an urban celebration site when the fountain collapsed after midnight. In practice, evidence should first be gathered regarding the fountain’s intended use, warning signs, physical barriers, prior condition, and the control exercised by the municipality or organisers, because the mere fact that people climbed onto the fountain does not automatically exclude potential liability for failing to manage a dangerous location. If reliance were placed on any terms applicable to visitors or event participants, an attempt to limit liability in advance for loss of life or personal injury would be weak under the logic of Article 6.153 of the Civil Code, as such consumer terms are regarded as unfair.
Core issue. The legal issue is who should compensate the damage caused by the collapse of the fountain, as a structure or installation, and on what basis, where a thirteen-year-old was killed and other persons were injured. It should primarily be assessed under Article 6.266(1)-(2) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania concerning the liability of the owner or possessor of structures, Article 6.696(1)-(4) of the Civil Code concerning liability for the collapse of a structure, Article 6.245(1) and (4) of the Civil Code concerning non-contractual civil liability, and Article 6.283(1)-(4) of the Civil Code concerning compensation for damage in the event of injury to health. Procedurally, paragraphs 18.4.2-18.4.5 of STR 1.03.01:2016 are also relevant, because in the event of a structural accident the municipal mayor or an authorised civil servant, the public administration entity supervising the use of the structure, and, where persons have been injured, the law enforcement authority must be informed. If unlawful acts of municipal authorities were established, Article 6.271 of the Civil Code, as reflected in the sources, and Article 6.273(2) of the Civil Code concerning municipal representation in a damages case would be relevant
Legal assessment. Under Article 6.266(1) of the Civil Code, damage caused by the collapse or defects of buildings, structures, installations or other constructions is borne by the owner or possessor of those objects, unless that person proves the circumstances specified in Article 6.270(1) of the Civil Code. Accordingly, the owner or possessor of the fountain would be the primary addressee of liability, and under Article 6.266(2) of the Civil Code the person indicated in the public register is presumed to be such person. Article 6.696(1) of the Civil Code also permits liability to be directed against the contractor, designer, contractor for expert examination of the structural design, or technical construction supervisor, if the collapse was caused by defects in design, structures, construction works, or unsuitable ground conditions. Paragraphs 2-3 of that article set out the logic for exemption from liability: the designer, expert examination contractor or technical supervisor may defend themselves by proving that the collapse resulted from culpable acts of the contractor or client, while the contractor may do so by proving that the cause was the fault of the designer, expert examination contractor or technical supervisor chosen by the client, or the client’s culpable acts. If it were impossible to determine which of those persons’ fault caused the collapse, they would be jointly and severally liable under Article 6.696(4) of the Civil Code. The claims of the deceased person and the injured persons would be delictual, because Article 6.245(4) of the Civil Code defines delictual liability as an obligation arising from damage unrelated to contractual relations. The injured persons could claim all losses incurred and non-pecuniary damage under Article 6.283(1) of the Civil Code, while under paragraph 2 losses would include lost income and expenses for restoration of health. If health deteriorated after the court judgment, Article 6.283(3) of the Civil Code would confer the right to bring a claim for additional expenses, except where the damage had already been compensated by a specified lump sum. As regards non-pecuniary damage, the sources refer to the rule in Article 6.250 of the Civil Code that such damage is compensated in cases established by law and always where it is caused by a criminal offence against a person’s health or by deprivation of life. The ruling of the Supreme Court of Lithuania of 23 February 2018 in civil case No. 3K-3-55-248/2018, as indicated in the source, emphasises that non-pecuniary damage must have actually been suffered and cannot be equated with the slightest short-term adverse effect. The ruling of the Supreme Court of Lithuania of 24 October 2024 in civil case No. e3K-3-200-1120/2024 stresses that pecuniary damage must be real and proven by objective data. The ruling of the Supreme Court of Lithuania of 24 April 2024 in criminal case No. 2K-85-594/2024 and the ruling of 5 June 2025 in civil case No. e3K-3-89-381/2025, as presented in the sources, are relevant to the requirement to individualise non-pecuniary damage so that fair monetary satisfaction is awarded. If the incident were examined as a criminal offence, the rule in Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would allow a person who has suffered pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage to bring a civil claim in the criminal proceedings against the accused or against persons materially liable for the acts of the accused
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario would be to bring claims against the owner or possessor of the fountain under Article 6.266 of the Civil Code, because that provision directly covers damage caused by the collapse of a structure or installation. The second scenario would be to extend liability to the contractor, designer, contractor for expert examination of the design, or technical construction supervisor under Article 6.696 of the Civil Code, if the cause of the collapse were linked to defects or improper supervision. The third scenario would be municipal liability under the logic of Article 6.271 of the Civil Code and representation under Article 6.273(2) of the Civil Code, if the damage were linked not only to the condition of the object but also to unlawful acts or omissions of municipal authorities. For the injured persons, the most important point would be to document treatment, care and other health restoration expenses, because Article 6.283 of the Civil Code links such expenses to compensable losses. For the relatives of the deceased child, it is legally significant that the sources indicate a basis for compensation of non-pecuniary damage in the event of deprivation of life, and that the amount of such damage should be individualised according to the specific consequences. For the institutions, it is important to comply with the notification model established in paragraph 18 of STR 1.03.01:2016, because the recording of the circumstances of the accident will determine whether liability remains with the owner or possessor or is also directed towards participants in the construction process. The final dispute would most likely concern not the fact of damage itself, since the report refers to death and injuries, but the circle of liable persons, causation, and substantiation of the amount of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage
Does a civil award of EUR 574 in unjustifiably received municipal council member activity allowances, where criminal liability was not imposed in respect of 2019-2022 expenses, in itself trigger the consequences concerning impeccable reputation provided for in Article 11 of the Law on Local Self-Government?
Article 11 of the Law on Local Self-Government links the loss of impeccable reputation not to any unlawful or unjustified receipt of funds, but to specific statuses: a gross violation of the Law on the Adjustment of Public and Private Interests established within the past three years, or guilt established in accordance with law for the specified criminal offences, where the conviction has not expired or the period of release on surety has not ended. The news item indicates the opposite premise as regards criminal liability: after assessing the expense reports and supporting documents, the prosecutor’s office concluded that there were no grounds for criminal liability. The civil award of EUR 574 in favour of the municipal administration proves unjustified receipt of funds, but under the text of Article 11 provided, it is not equivalent either to guilt for an intentional or corruption-related offence, or an offence attributed to the civil service and public interests, or to a gross conflict-of-interest violation.
Moreover, the provision cited expressly concerns a council member seeking to become chair of committees or commissions, so its application cannot automatically be extended to all political offices without a separate legal provision.
The stronger argument in this situation is one of distinction: a civil restitutionary judgment concerning EUR 574 is not a substitute for criminal guilt or for a reputational disqualification specified by statute. In practice, this means that when citing this case as an example of the “receipt scandal” cases, three layers should be carefully distinguished: criminal liability, civil recovery of unjustifiably received funds, and the special reputational rule in Article 11 of the Law on Local Self-Government. It would be erroneous to infer from the civil award itself a conviction, a corruption-related offence, or an automatic loss of impeccable reputation under the provision provided.
Nevertheless, political and administrative risk remains: a civil court judgment is a sufficient factual basis for the municipality to demand repayment of the specific amount and to assess publicly the control mechanism for allowances, even if the criminal case no longer has prospects.
Core issue. The legal issue is whether the funds allocated for the activities of a council member in 2019-2022 and received by T. Budrikis had a legal basis and, in the absence of such a basis, whether they must be returned to the municipal administration. This issue is to be resolved under Article 6.242 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, which establishes the obligation to compensate unjust enrichment, and Articles 10 and 12 of the Law Amending the Republic of Lithuania Law on Local Self-Government No. I-533, which define the duties of a council member and remuneration for council-member activities. Article 10 of the Law on Local Self-Government imposes on a council member duties to attend meetings of the council, committees and commissions, declare conflicts of interest, receive residents and report to them. Article 12 of the Law on Local Self-Government provides that a council member is remunerated for working time spent performing the duties of a council member, and that remuneration is calculated according to the time actually worked and the calculation procedure established in the rules of procedure. Accordingly, the precise civil-law issue is not whether a criminal offence was committed, but whether the specific payments were linked to council-member activities provided for in legal acts and had a sufficient legal basis
Legal assessment. According to the information provided, the prosecutor’s office, having assessed the expense reports and the supporting documents, found no basis for applying criminal liability. However, the civil court separately assessed the issue of unjustifiably received payments and awarded EUR 574 to the municipal administration. That outcome is consistent with Article 6.242(1) of the Civil Code: a person who has been enriched at another person’s expense without a legal basis must compensate losses in the amount of the unjust enrichment. In this case, the amount awarded in favour of the municipal administration is the amount of unjust receipt established by a civil judgment. Article 12 of the Law on Local Self-Government links remuneration of a council member to the performance of council-member duties, time actually worked and the municipal rules of procedure; therefore, the lawfulness of the payments depends on their compliance with those conditions. Article 10 of the Law on Local Self-Government is relevant because it defines the duties that constitute the substance of council-member activities. If the payments did not correspond to such activities or were not properly substantiated, they could, from a civil-law perspective, be regarded as having been received without a sufficient legal basis. Part of the municipal council’s competence is apparent from Article 12 of the Law on Local Self-Government, because the amount of council members’ remuneration is set by council decision within the limits of the law, while the rules of procedure establish the method for calculating the duration of time actually worked. In addition, Article 3(2) of the Law Amending Articles 13 and 15 of the Law on Local Self-Government No. I-533 and Article 5(2) of the Law Amending Articles 11, 13, 20 and 29 of the Law on Local Self-Government No. I-533 indicate the duty of municipal councils to adopt implementing legal acts in a timely manner. This means that the procedure for council-member payments cannot be merely an administrative practice in fact: it must be based on the law, a council decision and the procedure established in the rules of procedure. Article 6.242(2) of the Civil Code would permit account to be taken of a reduction in enrichment only to the extent arising from the applicable provision and connected with reasons for which the person is not responsible. Article 6.242(3) of the Civil Code also defines the boundary at which enrichment is not regarded as unjust and unfair if the party that suffered losses failed, through its own fault, to exercise its rights and another person was enriched as a result of that party’s actions, performed exclusively in that party’s interests and at its risk. Nevertheless, the civil judgment that was adopted means that, in respect of the specific amount of EUR 574, the court recognised a basis for repayment in favour of the municipal administration
Consequences. The practical consequence for T. Budrikis is the obligation to return EUR 574, because that amount was recognised in civil proceedings as funds received without justification. For the municipal administration, this means the right to receive the awarded amount as a civil-law claim under Article 6.242 of the Civil Code. The absence of criminal liability does not eliminate civil restitution, because, on the facts provided, these issues were resolved on different legal bases. The most important practical course going forward is enforcement of the civil judgment and application of the municipality’s internal procedures so that remuneration for council-member activities is linked to the duties specified in Articles 10 and 12 of the Law on Local Self-Government and to time actually worked. For the municipal council and administration, this situation is significant because of the importance of the rules of procedure, implementing legal acts and documents substantiating expenses. For council members, it is significant because, even in the absence of criminal liability, there remains a civil risk of having to return funds if their receipt does not comply with the established legal basis. For residents and the municipal budget, it is significant as a mechanism for recovering municipal funds where a court establishes unjust receipt of payments
Can Alytus City Municipality, as the manager of a local street, confine itself to police enforcement where speeding, noise violations and reportable traffic accidents are being recorded systematically on Naujoji Street?
Article 11(1) of the Law on Road Traffic Safety provides that municipalities, as owners or managers of local roads and streets, “ensure safe traffic conditions on local roads and streets by implementing traffic safety measures thereon”. Paragraph 2 of the same article links this duty not only to enforcement, but also to road design, reconstruction, repair, maintenance and traffic management measures. The purpose of Article 1(1) of the Law is also directed at protecting the life, health and property of road users and other persons.
Accordingly, recurring facts concerning 19 traffic accidents, 3 reportable accidents, 110 speeding offences within six months and a fatal accident in 2022 are legally relevant as indicators of a known risk. The cited provisions do not create a duty necessarily to install a speed camera or speed sensor, but they do create a duty to select real traffic safety measures, rather than merely state that fixed speed cameras are expensive or that street racing would move elsewhere.
In practice, the stronger argument is not that “the municipality must install speed cameras specifically”, but that “the municipality’s discretion in choosing a measure is limited by the duty under Article 11 of the Law to ensure safe conditions”. Therefore, in a dispute or journalistic investigation, one should cite not general road safety rhetoric, but specifically Article 11(1) and (2), and link them to the concrete risk history: driving at 150 km/h on an urban street, a speed of 128 km/h in the fatal accident case, 110 speeding offences and 11 noise violations within six months. It is risky for the municipality to rely on budgetary arguments alone if it has not shown what alternative traffic safety measures were chosen instead of speed cameras or sensors, and why those measures are sufficient.
For a professional audience, the key conclusion is this: the legal issue shifts from punishing offenders to the content of the street manager’s duty, because recurring statistics may turn inaction from a political choice of priorities into insufficient performance of the statutory duty to ensure safe traffic conditions.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the speed of 150 km/h recorded on Naujoji Street, possible street racing, and repeated reportable traffic accidents should be classified as administrative offences or, where injury to health or death occurs, give rise to criminal liability. The principal provisions are Article 416 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania concerning exceeding the prescribed speed limit, Article 420 of the CAO concerning dangerous and disorderly driving and driving in unlawfully organised vehicle races, Article 459(2) and (3) of the CAO concerning road safety requirements and technical traffic control measures, and Article 281 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania concerning breaches of road traffic safety rules or rules on the operation of vehicles. The limits of administrative liability are defined by Article 2(1), (3), and (4) of the CAO: the act must be prohibited by a legal act in force, the person must be at fault, and the act must correspond to the elements of a specific administrative offence. Paragraph 1 of the Road Traffic Rules establishes the rules of road traffic throughout the territory of the Republic of Lithuania, while paragraph 2 provides that other legal acts regulating road traffic may not contradict the Road Traffic Rules. Article 251 of the Criminal Code is not the principal provision in this situation, because the information provided concerns not the hijacking of a public or freight transport vehicle, but breaches of road traffic safety. From the perspective of criminal procedure, Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania concerning the submission of objects and documents, Articles 99–100 of the CCP concerning procedural time limits, and Article 212 of the CCP concerning grounds for discontinuing a pre-trial investigation are also relevant
Legal assessment. If the permitted speed on Naujoji Street is 50 km/h, driving at 150 km/h would constitute exceeding the prescribed speed limit by more than 50 km/h. Accordingly, under Article 416(6) of the CAO, a driver would be subject to a fine of EUR 450–550, while a person without the right to drive would be subject to a fine of EUR 450–700. If such driving was not merely speeding but participation in unlawfully organised vehicle races or a sequence of Road Traffic Rules breaches posing a threat to traffic safety, Article 420(1) of the CAO is additionally relevant; it provides for a fine of EUR 170–230 for drivers and EUR 450–600 for persons without the right to drive. Where the breach is committed for disorderly motives and endangers traffic safety or the safety of persons, Article 420(2) of the CAO applies, under which drivers are fined EUR 450–550 and persons without the right to drive are fined EUR 750–1,000. Administrative liability cannot be based solely on the general reputation of the street or residents’ complaints: under Article 2(4) of the CAO, liability attaches only to a person whose specific conduct corresponds to the elements established in the Code. Therefore, the 110 speeding cases recorded by the police during the first half of 2026 are legally relevant as separate individual offences, not as a collective problem of Naujoji Street. If speeding or another breach of the Road Traffic Rules causes a traffic accident and another person suffers a minor impairment of health, the model under Article 281(1) of the Criminal Code applies. If such a breach causes serious impairment of another person’s health, the classification shifts to Article 281(3) of the Criminal Code, which provides for a fine, restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment for up to five years. If the driver was intoxicated by alcohol or under the influence of other substances, Article 281(2) and (4) of the Criminal Code provide for a stricter structure of liability, depending on the consequences. The 2022 case mentioned in the report, in which a BMW was travelling at 128 km/h and a taxi driver was killed, should, under the provisions cited, primarily be assessed through the lens of Article 281 of the Criminal Code, because the essential distinguishing element is the causal link between the breach of traffic safety rules and the consequences suffered by a person. The traffic noise identified by residents of Naujoji Street is not, within the system of sources provided, independently developed as a specific noise-related rule; however, as a factual circumstance relating to vehicle operation and control, it may be relevant where it is linked to a specific driver’s breach. The technical measures considered by the municipality, such as speed cameras, speed sensors before intersections, or traffic-light control based on speed, fall within the field of installation of technical traffic control measures, for which Article 459(3) of the CAO is relevant regarding the coordination of the installation or removal of such measures with the police and other institutions specified in legal acts. Article 459(2) of the CAO is also important, as it establishes liability for breaching requirements to maintain roads and road facilities so that they are safe for traffic, or for failing to take timely measures to prohibit or restrict traffic on sections whose use poses a threat to traffic safety. This means that police competence is primarily related to recording specific breaches by drivers and initiating liability, while municipal decisions on infrastructure must be assessed under the regime governing road safety and technical traffic control measures. If criminal proceedings are initiated after a traffic accident, participants in the proceedings and other natural or legal persons may, under Article 98 of the CCP, submit objects and documents relevant to the investigation, such as speed data, video recordings, or other recorded data. Articles 99–100 of the CCP are relevant for determining the time for carrying out procedural actions and calculating time limits, while Article 212 of the CCP defines when a pre-trial investigation may be discontinued
Consequences. The first practical scenario is the continued application of administrative control: sanctions provided for in Article 416 of the CAO are imposed for speeding, while Article 420 of the CAO applies in cases of racing or dangerous driving. The second scenario is that, if a traffic accident involving impairment of health occurs, liability moves into the field of Article 281 of the Criminal Code, making the nature of the breach, the driver’s condition, and the consequences for the victim decisive. The third scenario is that the municipality chooses technical measures for speed limitation or enforcement, but their installation must be coordinated under the regime for technical traffic control measures referred to in Article 459(3) of the CAO. The fourth scenario is that, if the use of a road section poses a threat to traffic safety due to factual circumstances, institutional inaction may be assessed under Article 459(2) of the CAO. For drivers, the practical significance of this situation is that a single instance of driving at 150 km/h on an urban street may entail not only a fine for speeding, but also the risk of classification as dangerous or disorderly driving. For residents, the key point is that their complaints and submitted data may become factual material for investigating specific breaches, particularly where they are linked to an identifiable vehicle or incident. For the municipality and the police, the legal significance is that additional operations alone are insufficient to alter the legal assessment: liability of specific drivers is applied individually, while infrastructure measures must be implemented in compliance with road safety and coordination requirements
Whether the complex Riflemen’s exercises taking place in Visaginas on 24-26 July 2026 are merely an organisational event of the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union, or a civil protection preparedness measure giving rise to coordination and public-information duties for the municipality and the participating institutions.
Article 2(3) of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection defines civil protection as the preparedness of state and municipal institutions, other bodies, economic operators and residents for emergencies, actions when emergencies are threatened or occur, their management and the elimination of their consequences. Article 21(3) links emergency preparedness to the preparation of management plans, the readiness of the warning system, training, public education and the performance of state preparedness tasks. Article 25(1) expressly permits civil protection training to include content on preparedness for military and hybrid threats; accordingly, exercise elements such as armed participants, simulated gunfire and smoke, and inter-institutional interaction do not, in themselves, fall outside the scope of civil protection.
Article 13(1) assigns to the mayor the organisation and coordination of emergency preparedness within the municipality, meaning that the role of Visaginas Municipality here is not limited to publishing an informational notice.
The stronger argument is that these exercises should be assessed as a civil protection preparedness and public-education measure, rather than as an ordinary public-order event. In practice, this means that the key issue is not merely the formality of permits, but evidence of coordination: who coordinated the simulated gunfire and smoke, the movement of transport on land, in the air and on water, fire safety, environmental protection and compliance with road traffic rules. Since the notice states that the State Border Guard Service, the Public Security Service, the police, the Fire and Rescue Department, the Lithuanian Armed Forces, the municipality and the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant / Altra will participate, while residents’ daily activities “should not be disrupted”, the risk arises precisely from the discrepancy between the publicly declared absence of disruption and the actual impact on residents.
For a professional audience, Articles 21 and 25 are worth citing because they substantiate the lawful purpose of the exercises, while Article 13 is relevant when assessing whether the municipality properly performed its coordination function.
Core issue. The legal issue is whether the complex riflemen’s exercises planned in Visaginas on 24–26 July 2026 are to be classified as a measure of preparedness for crises and emergencies, civil protection training and exercises, and what obligations they impose on the organisers, the municipality, participating institutions, and residents. This issue is assessed under Article 2(3), Article 4(1)–(3), Article 13(1), Article 19, Article 21, Article 25, Article 26, Article 33, and Article 36 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Crisis Management and Civil Protection. Under Article 2(3) of that Law, civil protection includes the preparedness of institutions, bodies, economic operators, and residents for emergencies, actions in the event of a threat or occurrence of such emergencies, their liquidation, and the elimination of their consequences. Accordingly, the exercises described in the notice are legally relevant not merely as a public event, but as a practical test of preparedness and interoperability, during which sound signals, gunfire, smoke, and the movement of armed participants and vehicles may be simulated in the city
Legal assessment. Article 21(1) of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection provides that preparedness for crises and emergencies is undertaken in order to ensure the liquidation of incidents and emergency events, the management of crises and emergencies, the elimination of consequences, search, rescue, and urgent works, and the performance of vital state functions. Article 21(2)(3) and Article 21(3)(3) of the same Law treat crisis management and civil protection training, as well as public education, as part of preparedness. Article 25(1) of the Law links such training to preparedness for the liquidation of incidents and emergency events, the management of crises and emergencies, the elimination of consequences, and search, rescue, and urgent works, and also provides that content relating to preparedness for military and hybrid threats is integrated into the training. This directly corresponds to the nature of the “Safe Chain 3” exercises, since the notice refers to riflemen, the police, the State Border Guard Service, the Public Security Service, the Fire and Rescue Department, the Lithuanian Armed Forces, the municipality, and an infrastructure entity. Article 26(1) of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection provides that crisis management and civil protection exercises form part of such training, while Article 26(2) defines their purpose: to test, under simulated emergency or crisis conditions, the actions and procedures provided for in plans, to improve decision-making, and to practise organising crisis management, rescue, and urgent works. Therefore, the legal axis of the exercises is not the declaration of an actual emergency, but the testing of preparedness under simulated conditions. Paragraphs 4.4–4.6 of the amendment to Government Resolution No. 1317 of 29 December 2022 distinguish state-level, municipal-level, and ministry or other state-institution civil protection exercises according to their purpose; accordingly, the specific type of exercise would depend on whose preparedness is being tested and at what level emergency management is being assessed. The notice states that the exercises are organised by the 9th Riflemen’s Unit named after Col. Pranas Saladžius of the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union, but that the municipality and state institutions also participate; therefore, under the cited provisions, the key issue is the interoperability of those entities and compliance with the limits of their respective competences. The municipality’s role is based on Article 13(1)(1) of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection, under which the mayor organises preparedness for emergencies within the municipality and the coordination of that activity. At the same time, Article 26(4)(1) assigns the organisation of municipal-level civil protection exercises to the director of the municipal administration, while Article 26(4)(2) assigns to that director the duty to ensure, within the limits of competence, the participation of municipal institutions, municipal public institutions, and municipally controlled enterprises in state-level exercises. Under Article 26(3), participating state institutions organise civil protection exercises within the limits of their competence and participate in relevant exercises. For residents, these exercises do not in themselves create an obligation to suspend ordinary activities, since the notice clearly states that everyday activities should not be disrupted and that fire safety, environmental protection, and road traffic rules will be observed during the exercises. Nevertheless, under Article 19(2)(1) of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection, residents must not, by their actions, endanger life, health, property, or the environment or disturb public order, and under Article 19(2)(2), they must report an incident, emergency event, or threatened or existing emergency by calling 112. This obligation is important precisely because the exercise simulations may resemble signs of real danger, while prior public notice enables residents to distinguish planned training from an unexpected incident. Article 19(1)(1) of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection gives residents the right to be warned of a threatened or existing crisis or emergency and to receive recommendations on how to act; however, in the present case, the notice constitutes information about planned exercises, not a warning of an already threatened or declared emergency. The immediate warning provided for in Article 36(1) applies to a threatened, existing, or declared emergency; during the exercises, it would therefore become relevant only if the simulated activity were replaced by a real danger. Article 33(1) defines the mayor’s actions in the event of a threatened or existing municipal-level emergency: convening the operations centre, deciding on the declaration of an emergency, organising warnings, mobilising civil protection forces, and, where grounds exist, deciding on evacuation. However, the notice indicates planned exercises from 12:00 on 24 July 2026 until 19:00 on 26 July 2026; therefore, the mechanism under Article 33 is, in this case, a background limit of competence rather than a procedure triggered automatically. Article 4(1) of the Law establishes the principle of prevention and preparedness, Article 4(2) establishes the principle of safety and support, and Article 4(3) establishes the territorial principle, under which preparedness covers all residents according to the administrative division. For that reason, the municipality’s public notice regarding the time, area, possible sounds, smoke, armed participants, and vehicle movement connected with the exercises is a legally significant preventive measure, reducing the risk of erroneous interpretations of danger and disturbances of public order
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the exercises take place at the scheduled time, the participating institutions test their interoperability, and the practical consequence for residents is limited to increased visible movement, sound elements, and smoke simulation. The second scenario is that shortcomings in organisational procedures or information provision become apparent during the exercises and, in line with the logic of Articles 21, 25, and 26, should be used to improve preparedness plans, training, and the coordination of institutional actions. The third scenario is that a real incident or threat of an emergency arises during or in the vicinity of the exercises; in that event, Article 19(2)(2) and (4), Article 33(1), and Article 36(1) become relevant in relation to reporting, compliance with lawful decisions, the operations centre, warning, and possible mobilisation of forces. In practical terms, this is important for residents and visitors to the city because they know in advance that the visible signs of the exercises on 24–26 July 2026 do not in themselves constitute an emergency, but that any real danger must still be assessed according to the factual circumstances and reported by calling 112. For the municipality, this is important as the implementation of its duties to coordinate preparedness and provide information under Articles 13, 21, 25, 26, and 36 of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection. For the participating institutions and bodies, this is a test of competences, procedures, decision-making, and mutual interoperability under simulated crisis or emergency conditions. Since, under the amendments that entered into force on 15 November 2024, the concept of civil protection also includes the preparedness of entities of particular importance to ensure resilience, and implementing acts concerning such entities and positions were required to be adopted by 16 January 2026, 16 May 2026, and 16 July 2026, the inclusion of infrastructure participants in such exercises may also have practical significance for ensuring essential services
Would the publication of the “Kimi K3” weights and deployment of the model on a Lithuanian organisation’s infrastructure reduce regulatory responsibility, or would it instead shift AI and data protection compliance risk from the cloud service provider to the deployer itself?
The amendment to the Law on Information Society Services, effective from 1 April 2025, expressly incorporates Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 into the Lithuanian legal system, as the annex to the law has been supplemented by a reference to the “Artificial Intelligence Act”, while Article 2(12) provides that the terms used in that law are to be understood as defined, inter alia, in Regulation (EU) 2024/1689. A narrower but important conclusion follows from this provision: under Lithuanian law, the qualification of AI is no longer merely a technical or contractual matter, since national regulation of information society services relies on the terminology of the EU AI Act. Article 62 GDPR further indicates that where processing operations may significantly affect data subjects in more than one Member State, supervisory authorities may conduct joint operations, including joint investigations and enforcement measures.
The stronger argument now is not that a downloadable model “solves” the compliance problem, but that it changes the centre of responsibility: an organisation that itself adapts and operates a 2.8 trillion-parameter model with a 1 million-token context window will find it harder to rely on the position of a passive API client. In practice, for the public sector, banks and healthcare institutions, local deployment may reduce the risk of sending sensitive data to foreign cloud infrastructure, but it also increases the obligation to justify the model’s purpose, data use, security controls and oversight of outputs. It would be particularly mistaken to equate “open weights” with full transparency: the report emphasises that weights do not disclose the entire training process, dataset composition or filtering rules, so a licence or access to the weights alone will not suffice to reduce legal risk.
If such a model were used in relation to clients or data subjects in several EU Member States, Article 62 GDPR suggests that one should expect not only a local response, but a coordinated reaction from supervisory authorities.
Core issue. The precise legal question is not whether “Kimi K3” is technologically equivalent to closed models, but what obligations arise for Lithuanian entities when a powerful artificial intelligence model begins to be deployed independently and used with an organization’s data. This question is assessed under Article 1(3), Article 2(17), and Article 14(2) of the Law on Technology and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as the Annex to that Law, which refers to Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, the Artificial Intelligence Act. The institutional axis is Article 14(2)(122) of the Law on Technology and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania, under which the institution implementing state technology and innovation policy performs the functions of the national competent authority and notifying authority pursuant to Articles 28(1) and 70(1) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689. Where the use of the model involves personal data, Articles 1, 5(f), 24, and 32 of the General Data Protection Regulation apply. Accordingly, the legal analysis is directed first to the deployer’s responsibility for data security, demonstrable compliance, institutional competence, and organizational control over the use of the model
Legal assessment. The transition described in the report from a cloud service to a downloadable and independently managed model means, in legal terms, that the center of responsibility may shift to the organization deploying the model. Under Article 24(1) GDPR, the controller must implement appropriate technical and organizational measures and be able to demonstrate that processing is performed in compliance with the Regulation. This is particularly important where the model is used in the processes of a bank, healthcare institution, public-sector body, or another organization, because downloading the model itself does not remove the obligation to assess the nature, scope, context, purposes, and risks of the processing to the rights and freedoms of natural persons. Article 5(f) GDPR establishes the principle of integrity and confidentiality; therefore, the organization must ensure protection against unauthorized processing, unlawful processing, accidental loss, destruction, or damage. Article 32(1) GDPR particularizes this obligation: encryption, pseudonymization, ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, availability, and resilience of systems, restoration capability, and regular assessment of the effectiveness of security measures may be required. Consequently, a Lithuanian company deploying such a model in its own infrastructure must have not only the technical capacity to run it, but also a governance system enabling it to justify why the selected measures correspond to the level of risk. Article 2(17) of the Law on Technology and Innovation further means that the concepts used in that Law are to be understood as defined in Regulation (EU) 2024/1689; therefore, the national framework must be read together with the Artificial Intelligence Act. Under Article 14(2)(3) of the same Law, the institution implementing state technology and innovation policy implements measures related to innovative public procurement and pre-commercial procurement and provides methodological assistance. This is practically significant for the public sector wishing to purchase or test artificial intelligence solutions, because the procurement procedure cannot assess only the model’s capability or price. Under Article 14(2)(4), (5), and (6), the same institution finances applied research, experimental development, and innovation activities, implements measures for cooperation between economic operators and research and higher education institutions, and coordinates participation in European Union and international programs. Accordingly, national competence includes not only oversight, but also the development of an innovation ecosystem in which models are adapted to the Lithuanian language, public-sector processes, or organizational data. By point 1 of Government Resolution No. 982, the Agency for Science, Innovation and Technology is authorized to perform the functions of the institution referred to in Article 14 of the Law on Technology and Innovation, except for the specified exception; therefore, that institution is the practical contact point for the functions set out in the Law. Where model deployment is linked to state support, Article 14(2)(121) of the Law on Technology and Innovation permits an assessment of whether an economic operator’s activities have significant innovation-based business development potential. If deployment is connected with employee information procedures in a multinational undertaking, Article 11(1) of the Law on European Works Councils requires central management or another level of management to provide information in a timely manner and to be responsible for its accuracy. Article 11(2) to (4) of the same Law permits access to commercial or professional secrets where necessary for the performance of duties, but also establishes a non-disclosure obligation and the possibility of refusing in writing to provide information where its disclosure could seriously harm the undertaking or its activities. Under Article 11(5) of the Law on European Works Councils, such a refusal may be challenged before a court within one month
Consequences. Realistically, the first scenario is a cautious pilot deployment, in which the organization limits the scope of data, documents governance measures, and tests the effectiveness of security measures under Articles 24 and 32 GDPR. The second scenario is the route of public-sector or state-supported innovation projects, in which the financing, assessment, consultation, and cooperation functions set out in Article 14(2)(3), (4), (5), (6), (8), and (121) of the Law on Technology and Innovation become significant. The third scenario is the strengthening of regulatory infrastructure, because by Government Resolution No. 395 of 27 May 2026, draft laws on the implementation of the European Union Artificial Intelligence Act and related legislative amendments were submitted to the Seimas. In practical terms, this matters for company executives because the decision to download and manage a model in their own infrastructure also entails an obligation to allocate responsibility, manage personal data security, and be prepared to demonstrate compliance. It matters for the public sector because innovative procurement and pre-commercial procurement must be coordinated with methodological assistance, risk assessment, and the competence of national institutions. It matters for employee representatives in multinational undertakings because model deployment may become a matter for information, while at the same time it may be restricted by the protection of commercial or professional secrets under Article 11 of the Law on European Works Councils. Accordingly, the legal significance in Lithuania of a “Kimi K3”-type model lies not merely in its availability, but in whether the organization is capable of integrating its use into the implementation framework of the GDPR, the Law on Technology and Innovation, and the Artificial Intelligence Act
Whether, following the indicated amendments to Resolution No. 526, an employer may unilaterally reduce per diems by relying solely on a percentage threshold, or whether it must still establish lower specific rates differentiated by objective criteria.
The wording of the resolution provided states that “lower specific rates, differentiated by objective criteria” are to be established in a collective agreement or, in the absence of such an agreement, in a local normative act or an internal administrative legal act. The same wording also sets a uniform lower limit: both under a collective agreement and under a local normative legal act, per diem rates may not be lower than 50 per cent of the maximum rates approved by the Government. Article 190 of the Labour Code is relevant because a collective agreement is not a unilateral document of the employer, but a written agreement concluded by trade unions, employers and their organisations; accordingly, its regulatory weight differs from that of a local normative act.
Article 5(2) of the Labour Code means that the concept of “objective criteria” must be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning, unless a special meaning is apparent from the context; therefore, criteria based solely on the employer’s convenience or business model do not, in themselves, become objective.
In its judgment of 10 December 2024 in case No. e2A-2941-1097/2024, Vilnius Regional Court adopted a strict compensatory logic: the criteria for reducing per diems must be linked to an actual reduction in business travel expenses, so criteria relating to the nature of the work, such as the age of the truck, the length of the vehicle combination or an EU route, are insufficient. By contrast, in its ruling of 16 September 2025 in case No. e2A-2200-945/2025, Kaunas Regional Court opened the door to the opposite argument: if per diems are in fact also paid as additional remuneration, criteria relating to the nature and complexity of the work may be objective. Klaipeda Regional Court’s case No. e2A-1429-513/2025 of 13 November 2025 and Panevezys Regional Court’s case No. e2A-331-1059/2026 of 17 June 2026 confirm that the case law is not uniform.
Until there is a clear interpretation from a higher court or a genuinely amended rule, the stronger and procedurally more cautious argument is not that “objective criteria are no longer required”, but that the criteria must be clearly identified and substantiated according to the chosen model of the function of per diems.
The news report’s statement that, from 1 October 2026, the requirement to differentiate per diems by objective criteria is being abolished is, according to the verification provided, inconsistent with the source. More precisely, it should be stated that the wording of the amendment retains the requirement to establish “lower specific rates, differentiated by objective criteria”. It is also inaccurate to state that a collective agreement may reduce rates down to 50 per cent, while a local normative act may reduce them only down to 65 per cent and only for business trips lasting at least seven days.
According to the wording of the source provided, both in a collective agreement and in a local normative legal act, the same minimum threshold applies: 50 per cent of the maximum per diem rates approved by the Government.
The practical risk is that employers, relying on the news summary, may rewrite their policies as a simple percentage table and abandon the substantiation of criteria, although the wording of the rule provided does not allow this. In a dispute, the employee’s side should cite not only the Vilnius case concerning the compensatory function, but also the wording of the resolution itself referring to objective criteria, because, according to the verification, that wording does not disappear. For the employer’s side, the stronger argument after the Kaunas ruling is not that criteria are unnecessary, but that objectivity need not necessarily be narrowly linked only to actually reduced expenses, provided the documents consistently demonstrate the logic of per diems as additional remuneration.
Therefore, in practice, the key point is not to declare a “50 per cent threshold”, but to clearly link each lower rate in the document to a specific, pre-established and verifiable criterion.
Core issue. The legal issue is the conditions under which an employer may pay per diem allowances lower than the maximum amounts approved by the Government, and the form in which such amounts must be established. This issue is governed by paragraph 2 of the Description of the Procedure for Payment of Per Diem Allowances, approved by Resolution No. 526 of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania of 29 April 2004, the versions provided of which state that per diem allowances are calculated according to the maximum amounts or lower specific amounts established in a collective agreement or, in the absence of such agreement, in a local regulatory act or an internal administrative legal act. The essential limit under these versions is that per diem allowances established in a collective agreement or a local regulatory act may not be less than 50 percent of the maximum per diem amounts approved by the Government. Also significant is the provision of paragraph 2 of the Description of the Procedure for Payment of Per Diem Allowances that lower specific amounts must be differentiated according to objective criteria, as this condition determines whether the reduction procedure chosen by the employer is lawful. From a procedural perspective, it is important that, before establishing per diem amounts and the procedure for their payment in a local regulatory act or an internal administrative legal act, information and consultation procedures must be carried out in accordance with the procedure laid down in Section Three of Chapter III of Part III of the Labour Code, and employees must be informed in writing, as provided in Article 25(2) of the Labour Code
Legal assessment. Under the regulation provided, the starting rule is payment of the maximum per diem amounts approved by the Government, while lower per diem allowances constitute a permitted exception that must be clearly established in a legal source connected with employment relations. A collective agreement is the primary instrument for establishing lower amounts, while a local regulatory act or internal administrative act applies where there is no collective agreement. The employer may not confine itself to an individual decision concerning a specific business trip if the lower amounts have not been established in advance in the indicated act or agreement. Three conditions are necessary for the reduction to be lawful: specific lower amounts, their differentiation according to objective criteria, and a threshold of not less than 50 percent of the maximum amount. Where lower amounts are established in a local regulatory act or internal administrative act, the employer’s obligation is not limited to adopting the act; information and consultation must first be carried out, and after adoption employees must be informed in writing. This means that an employee has the right to know in advance the established amount according to which per diem allowances will be calculated, and the employer has a duty to formulate this procedure with sufficient specificity. In the provided version of paragraph 2 of the Description of the Procedure for Payment of Per Diem Allowances, the content of “objective criteria” is not specified in detail; therefore, the focus of application of the rule is not only the percentage threshold, but also the connection between the selected criteria and the differentiation of per diem allowances. The earlier version provided in the sources, under which lower amounts could be established in a collective agreement or employment contract, likewise not lower than 50 percent of the maximum amounts, shows a regulatory shift from contractual reduction to a regulatory or collective model. Where per diem allowances are paid by the event organiser, the per diem allowances paid by the employer together with those paid by the organiser may not be lower than the per diem allowances calculated for the specific business trip according to the established amounts. If the event organiser pays all per diem allowances calculated for the specific business trip according to the established amounts, the employer, under the regulation in paragraph 2 of the Description as provided, is not required to pay per diem allowances. Article 108 of the Labour Code, insofar as provided, separately regulates the posting of an employee of a foreign employer to the territory of the Republic of Lithuania to provide services and establishes the application of Lithuanian employment-law rules to certain working conditions; however, that provision does not in itself alter the reduction conditions laid down in paragraph 2 of the Description of the Procedure for Payment of Per Diem Allowances
Consequences. In practical terms, until 30 September 2026, disputes concerning reductions of per diem allowances will primarily turn on whether the lower specific amounts established by the employer comply with the requirement of objective criteria set out in paragraph 2 of the Description of the Procedure for Payment of Per Diem Allowances, the 50 percent threshold, and the procedural requirements of information, consultation, and written notification. If at least one of these conditions is not met, the practically significant claim for the employee is a claim for the difference in per diem allowances, because the lower payment lacks a regulatory basis. The principal risk for the employer is that a formally established reduction procedure may be found insufficient if it does not contain specific amounts or criteria, or if the information and consultation procedures with employee representatives have not been carried out. From 1 October 2026, based on the information provided, the significance of the regulation shifts from an evaluative review of “objective criteria” to compliance with specific thresholds and formal conditions for prior establishment. For employers, this practically means the need to review collective agreements, local regulatory acts, and internal administrative acts by that date so that lower per diem amounts are established in the source and to the extent permitted by the new procedure. For employees, this is important for predictability: the per diem amount must be established in advance and not left to a unilateral decision after or during the business trip. There are three realistic scenarios: the employer retains the maximum Government amounts; the employer reduces per diem allowances through a collective agreement; or the employer does so through a local regulatory act or internal administrative act, while complying with the relevant thresholds and procedures. For disputes arising in respect of the period before 1 October 2026, the version of paragraph 2 of the Description of the Procedure for Payment of Per Diem Allowances then in force, with the requirement of objective criteria, remains relevant, while the later procedure applies only in accordance with its entry into force and the conditions established therein
Can a constitutional amendment be applied in such a way as to immediately alter the composition of a constitutional review body and forcibly terminate an official’s term of office before the amendment itself can potentially be reviewed for constitutionality?
The evidence provided concerns Lithuanian law, not Hungarian law, and therefore does not directly prove the invalidity of the Hungarian amendment. It does, however, clearly illustrates the principle of stability of a constitutional review body. Article 4 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania establishes a fixed nine-year, single-term model, periodic renewal of one third of the Court every three years, and a rule that, where no new judge has been appointed, the judge whose term has expired continues to perform the duties of office.
Article 11 links the end of judicial powers to an exhaustive list of grounds: expiry of the term, death, resignation, state of health, or impeachment. Article 10 shows even more strictly that even a temporary suspension of a judge’s powers is possible only by decision of the Constitutional Court and only on specifically stated grounds. The strongest rule arising from this structure is not that age limits or term limits are inherently impermissible, but that they may not be used as an ad hoc mechanism to remove a particular composition before it has performed its review function.
In practice, the stronger argument would not be an abstract right to “freely elect and be elected”, but an argument based on institutional independence and irreversible effect: an amendment that first eliminates the very composition capable of reviewing it changes the arbiter of the dispute before the dispute has been resolved. Articles 4, 10, and 11 should be cited specifically as a comparative model showing that the composition of constitutional justice is protected through fixed terms, limited grounds for termination, and continuity of decision-making. The professional risk is to accept too quickly the news claim that the president’s victory in the Constitutional Court was “legally guaranteed”: the evidence provided shows only a strong structural argument, not a specific Hungarian constitutional provision or practice.
The safest formulation for the analysis is therefore as follows: if Hungarian law contains a similar model of stability of constitutional court terms, the most vulnerable aspect of the amendment is its immediate and personalised application, rather than the institution of future term or age limits as such.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether the powers of the Head of State may terminate solely by virtue of an amendment adopted by Parliament and the President’s signature, or whether one of the grounds for termination of powers expressly established in the Constitution, together with due procedure, is required. Under Article 88 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, the powers of the President of the Republic terminate only on the following grounds: expiry of the term of office, early elections, resignation, death, removal from office through impeachment proceedings, or a determination by the Seimas, by a three-fifths majority of all its members and having regard to a conclusion of the Constitutional Court, that a health condition prevents the President from holding office. In its ruling of 19 June 2002 in case No. 29/2000, the Constitutional Court stated that each of the circumstances referred to in points 3-6 of Article 88 of the Constitution is a legal fact that must be established in accordance with due legal procedure. The termination of the powers of a Member of the Seimas is regulated separately in Article 63 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, while the termination of the powers of a judge of the Constitutional Court is regulated in Article 108 of the Constitution and Article 11 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. Accordingly, the axis of the analysis is not the political victor in the conflict, but whether the termination of powers complies with the exhaustive constitutional grounds, institutional competence, and procedure
Legal assessment. If, according to the description of the situation, the President’s signature amounted to resignation, its legal significance would be assessed under Article 88(3) of the Constitution and the above-mentioned Constitutional Court ruling of 19 June 2002: what is required is not merely a political statement, but an effective act of the President of the Republic declaring resignation. If the signature meant only the promulgation of the amendment, such an act alone, under the cited provisions, does not in itself fall within any of the grounds for termination of presidential powers listed in Article 88 of the Constitution. The impeachment route would be separate: Article 88(5) of the Constitution links the termination of powers to removal from office by the Seimas through impeachment proceedings. The health-related ground is likewise procedurally closed: under Article 88(6) of the Constitution, a conclusion of the Constitutional Court and a three-fifths majority vote of all Members of the Seimas are required. The interpretation of the regulation concerning the draft Electoral Code states that, in such cases, a decision of the Central Electoral Commission recognising the powers of the President of the Republic as terminated is not required; competence is therefore concentrated in constitutional actors rather than in electoral administration. In the case of judges of the Constitutional Court, any issue of age limits or limits on terms of office must be tested against the grounds established in Article 108 of the Constitution and Article 11 of the Law on the Constitutional Court: expiry of the term of office, death, resignation, health condition, or removal from office through impeachment proceedings. Article 11 of the Law on the Constitutional Court further provides that, in the event of resignation, the decision to terminate powers is adopted by the Seimas on the proposal of the Speaker of the Seimas, while in the case of health grounds, a decision of the Constitutional Court and the conclusion of a medical commission formed by the Minister of Health are required. Suspension of the powers of a Constitutional Court judge under Article 10 of the Law on the Constitutional Court is possible only by decision of the Constitutional Court and only on the grounds specified there, including the initiation of impeachment proceedings in the Seimas following the conclusion of a special investigation commission. Once a judge’s powers are suspended, the judge loses the rights set out in Articles 9 and 15 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, including participation in hearings with a deliberative vote and the right to participate in meetings of state institutions. According to the sources provided, limits on parliamentary terms must be distinguished from termination of the powers of a Member of the Seimas: Article 63 of the Constitution lists specific grounds for the expiry of an existing mandate, including expiry of the term, death, resignation, incapacity, impeachment, invalidity of elections or a gross violation of electoral law, incompatible employment, and loss of citizenship. Therefore, the automatic removal of sitting parliamentarians solely on the basis of a new abstract limitation on terms of office, under the cited provisions, should be distinguished from a restriction on the right to stand as a candidate in the future, which these sources do not regulate in detail. The interpretation of Article 5(2) of the Constitution, as based on the Constitutional Court ruling of 11 July 2002, means that governmental powers are limited by the Constitution, and one institution of state authority may not take over another institution’s constitutional powers or restrict them by law. The provisions of the Constitutional Court rulings of 14 January 2002 and 11 July 2002 also link the principle of the rule of law to the duty of state institutions to act in accordance with the Constitution and not to exceed the powers established therein. If a parliamentary amendment were in substance to abolish the constitutional guarantees of the President or of judges of the Constitutional Court without observing the special grounds for termination of powers, this interpretation would raise an issue under the separation of powers and the rule of law. Article 26 of the Law on the Constitutional Court also indicates a procedural safeguard: upon receipt of a resolution of the Seimas requesting an examination of whether a law or another act of the Seimas conforms to the Constitution, a preliminary examination is carried out within three days, and once the petition is accepted for consideration, the validity of the contested act is suspended from the date of official publication of the notice in the Register of Legal Acts until publication of the Constitutional Court’s ruling
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is a procedurally proper resignation: the President’s act of resignation enters into force, and the termination of powers is based on Article 88(3) of the Constitution, not merely on a political ultimatum. The second scenario is constitutional review of the contested act under Article 26 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, whereby, once the petition is accepted for consideration, the validity of the contested act would be suspended in the prescribed manner. The third scenario is impeachment proceedings, which, in the case of the President, would be based on Article 88(5) of the Constitution, and, in the case of a judge of the Constitutional Court, on Article 108(5) of the Constitution and Articles 10-11 of the Law on the Constitutional Court. The fourth scenario, applicable to parliamentarians, would be the individual establishment of a ground for termination of mandate under Article 63 of the Constitution, rather than a general political decision by the majority to remove an undesirable group of deputies. This is practically significant for the President because the legal basis determines whether his departure is regarded as resignation, removal from office through impeachment, or another constitutional event. It is significant for judges of the Constitutional Court because their status is protected by separate grounds for suspension and termination of powers. It is significant for Parliament because its political majority may act only to the extent that its powers are not limited by the Constitution and the principle of the separation of powers. Finally, it is significant for voters because, according to the sources provided, the termination of a Member of the Seimas’s mandate and the termination of the powers of the Head of State are not merely matters of political will: their consequences arise only upon the establishment of a specific legal fact through due procedure
Whether specific threats against executives of AI companies, employees’ children and premises should be treated merely as a reputational security issue, or whether they give rise to consequences under criminal law and the employer’s duty to ensure safe working conditions.
Article 145(1) of the Criminal Code applies to threats to kill or seriously impair health where there are sufficient grounds to believe that the threat may be carried out. The facts described in the news report - an intrusion into Anthropic’s building, a statement about killing the CEO, an alleged attempt to blow up Sam Altman’s home, and a manifesto calling for attacks on AI leaders and investors - reinforce the element of realistic possibility rather than mere rhetoric. Article 145(2) of the Criminal Code additionally covers terrorising a person by threatening to cause an explosion, commit arson or carry out another dangerous act, as well as systematic intimidation through psychological coercion; accordingly, repeated threats, doxxing and coordinated campaigns legally move closer to the classification of systematic intimidation.
Under Article 145(3) of the Criminal Code, liability is generally linked to a complaint by the victim, a statement by the victim’s representative or a prosecutor’s request, meaning that formalising incidents is not merely a procedural detail. Article 11 of the Law on Safety and Health at Work imposes on the employer a duty to provide safe conditions in all work-related aspects and to finance preventive measures at the employer’s expense; once specific threats have been received, security, access control and threat-management procedures cease to be merely discretionary management tools.
The stronger argument in this situation is not “social dissatisfaction with AI”, but the specific shift from expression of opinion to realistically foreseeable violent acts: an attempt to blow up a home, threats against children and an intrusion into a building allow reliance on the elements of realism and terrorising under Article 145 of the Criminal Code. For Lithuanian companies in an analogous situation, it would be risky to confine the response to communications or private security, because documented threats also activate the employer’s occupational safety and health duty under Article 11 of the Law. In practice, evidence of threats should be collected, a victim’s complaint should be initiated or a prosecutorial response sought, and the workplace risk assessment should be updated, since any subsequent incident could be assessed through the lens of Article 176 of the Criminal Code as a breach of safety requirements if inaction could have led to serious consequences.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is how, under the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, public and individualized threats against executives, employees, and their families at artificial intelligence companies should be classified where they move from online statements to actual physical proximity and risks of arson or bombing. The principal provision would be Article 145 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania: Article 145(1) applies to a threat to kill or cause serious bodily harm where there is sufficient basis to believe that the threat may be carried out, while Article 145(2) applies to terrorizing a person by threatening to blow up, set fire to, or commit another act dangerous to life, health, or property, or by systematic intimidation through psychological coercion. Where the threat is to commit a terrorist offence, Article 250-3 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania is relevant, read together with the act of terrorism referred to in Article 250, including bombing, arson, large-scale destruction of property, or endangering the lives or health of many people for terrorist purposes. If the threats were to materialize into actual serious bodily harm, Article 135 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania would apply, and in cases of negligence, Article 137. Repeated surveillance of targets, contacting them, submitting applications with the aim of intimidation, or exerting other pressure on specific persons may also be assessed under Article 148-1 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania concerning unlawful stalking of a person
Legal assessment. Under Article 145(1) of the Criminal Code, aggressive rhetoric alone is not sufficient: it is necessary to establish the content of a threat to kill or cause serious bodily harm and a sufficient basis to believe that it may be carried out. The report’s reference to a person entering the “Anthropic” building and stating that the chief executive officer would be killed would, under the cited provisions, be assessed as an individualized threat, the seriousness of which is reinforced by physical proximity to a protected space. Threats against employees’ children also fall within the logic of Article 145 of the Criminal Code if they are directed at specific persons and create a basis to believe that they may be carried out. Where the threat concerns bombing or arson, the centre of classification may shift to Article 145(2) of the Criminal Code, because that provision directly covers terrorizing by threatening to blow up, set fire to, or commit another dangerous act. The source provided concerning the supplementation of the Criminal Code with Article 167-1 refers to the case law of the Supreme Court of Lithuania in cases No. 2K-269-895/2018, 2K-341/2010, 2K-542/2011, 2K-198/2013, and 2K-347/2014, confirming that Article 145(2) of the Criminal Code applies not only to systematic threats to take life or cause serious bodily harm, but also to lower-intensity acts of stalking where a real threat and a sense of insecurity are created. Accordingly, coordinated harassment campaigns, doxxing, and repeated intimidation would be legally significant not merely as background, but as indicators of systematic conduct and psychological coercion. Article 148-1 of the Criminal Code requires that the stalking occur against the clearly expressed will of the person, without lawful basis, and cause adverse effects on social life or emotional state; it would therefore be relevant where the target of threats is forced to change employment, place of residence, security arrangements, or daily conduct. An attempt to blow up a residence, if linked to terrorist purposes, may be assessed under Article 250(2) of the Criminal Code as an act of terrorism, because that provision covers bombing, arson, or large-scale damage to property where serious consequences arose or could have arisen. Separately, Article 250-3 of the Criminal Code provides for liability for threatening to commit a terrorist offence referred to in Article 250 of the Criminal Code where there was sufficient basis to believe that the threat could be carried out. From a procedural standpoint, it is important that, under Article 145(3) and Article 148-1(2) of the Criminal Code, liability may arise upon a complaint by the victim, a statement by the victim’s legal representative, or a prosecutor’s demand. Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits the victim, a legal person, or any natural person to submit objects and documents relevant to the investigation; therefore, threatening messages, applications, manifestos, camera recordings, and security incident documents would become procedural material. Under Articles 119 and 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, coercive measures may be imposed on a suspect, including detention, intensive supervision, house arrest, an obligation to live separately from the victim, bail, seizure of documents, registration at a police institution, or a written undertaking not to leave, where necessary to secure the proceedings or prevent new offences. In terms of employers’ duties, Article 176 of the Criminal Code and the wording set out in Article 56 of the amending law are relevant: the criminal liability of an employer or a person authorized by the employer is linked to a breach of occupational safety and health requirements and a serious or fatal accident at work, or other serious consequences. This means that corporate decisions concerning security staff, cameras, and safety procedures are not merely a commercial risk management measure, because physical threats to employees may also acquire criminal-law significance. Liability of a legal person under Article 20 of the Criminal Code is possible only in cases where it is provided for in the Special Part, and among the provisions cited it is expressly provided for in Article 137(4), Article 170-2(2), and Article 250-3(2) of the Criminal Code
Consequences. Realistically, the first scenario is a pre-trial investigation under Article 145(1) or 145(2) of the Criminal Code where the incident is limited to a threat, systematic intimidation, or terrorizing, and the victim’s complaint, a statement by the legal representative, or a prosecutor’s demand is significant for opening the investigation. The second scenario is classification under Article 250-3 of the Criminal Code if the threats are connected with a terrorist offence and there is sufficient basis to believe that they may be carried out. The third scenario is the application of Article 250 of the Criminal Code where the threat escalates into bombing, arson, bodily harm, or danger to many people for terrorist purposes. The fourth scenario is the application of Article 148-1 of the Criminal Code where an executive or employee does not merely receive an isolated threat but is systematically stalked and, as a result, suffers adverse effects on social life or emotional state. The fifth scenario concerns the company’s internal duties: if an employer or a person authorized by the employer were to breach occupational safety and health requirements and the consequences defined in Article 176 of the Criminal Code or its amended wording were to arise, the direction of liability could also turn toward the persons managing the organization itself. The practical significance for executives and employees is that they have a procedural ability to submit evidence of threats under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and to seek the application of coercive measures under Articles 119-120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The practical significance for companies is that decisions on physical security, incident logging, and employee protection become relevant not only to reputation or business continuity, but also to potential criminal proceedings. The practical significance for law enforcement is a clear classification boundary: an isolated credible threat, systematic intimidation, unlawful stalking, a threat to commit a terrorist offence, and the act of terrorism itself are, under the cited provisions, distinct legal regimes with different sanctions
Whether, at the extraordinary meeting of the Judicial Council on 24 July 2026, held at the National Courts Administration in hybrid format via Zoom, resolutions of the Judicial Council may lawfully be adopted if the requirements laid down in Article 121 of the Law on Courts concerning convening the meeting, provision of materials, quorum and voting are met.
Article 121 of the Law on Courts provides that a meeting of the Judicial Council is the principal form of activity of that institution, and that meetings usually take place on the premises of the Supreme Court or the National Courts Administration. Accordingly, the stated venue at L. Sapiegos g.
15 corresponds to the ordinary meeting venue provided for by law. The same article permits meetings to be convened as necessary on the initiative of the Chair of the Judicial Council or one third of its members, while in the event of a request by the President concerning the appointment, promotion, transfer or dismissal of judges, the meeting must be convened no later than within 14 days. The essential condition for legality is not merely public notice of the broadcast, but whether all members of the Judicial Council were provided with the materials no later than three working days before the meeting, whether more than half of the members participate, and whether more than half of all members of the Judicial Council vote in favour of the resolution.
Since, under the text of the amendment to Article 119 provided, the Judicial Council consists of 15 members, the practical threshold is participation by 8 members for a quorum and 8 votes in favour for adoption of a resolution.
The stronger argument regarding the form of the meeting would be that hybrid participation does not in itself negate the legality of the meeting, because Article 121 requires a meeting venue and a participation quorum, but the provision supplied does not indicate any prohibition on using a videoconferencing platform. The weaker point in any potential dispute would not be the use of Zoom or the broadcast channel, but the procedural time limits and the counting of votes: for the meeting of 24 July 2026, the three-working-day deadline for providing materials in practical terms directs attention to whether the members received them no later than 21 July 2026. A lawyer assessing a resolution subsequently adopted by the Judicial Council would need to verify not only the content of the agenda, but also the minutes and records concerning the initiator, the number of members present, the open vote, and whether the specific resolution received the votes of more than half of all 15 members, rather than merely of those participating.
Core issue. The legal issue is whether the extraordinary meeting of the Judicial Council on 24 July 2026 may be lawfully convened, held at the National Courts Administration, and serve as a basis for adopting valid resolutions of the Judicial Council. It is to be assessed under Articles 119, 120 and 121 of the Law on Courts of the Republic of Lithuania. Under Article 119(1) of the Law on Courts, the Judicial Council is the executive body of judicial self-government ensuring the independence of courts and judges. Under Article 119(2) of the same law, it consists of 15 members; accordingly, the total number of all members, and not merely the number of those attending, is relevant to the lawfulness of the meeting and the calculation of votes. Article 121(1) of the Law on Courts provides that a meeting of the Judicial Council is its principal form of activity and that meetings are normally held on the premises of the Supreme Court or the National Courts Administration. The basis for convening an extraordinary meeting is assessed under Article 121(2) of the Law on Courts, which permits meetings to be convened, where necessary, on the initiative of the Chair of the Judicial Council or one-third of the members of the Judicial Council
Legal assessment. The venue specified in the notice, the National Courts Administration, L. Sapiegos g. 15, Vilnius, corresponds to the usual venue for meetings of the Judicial Council referred to in Article 121(1) of the Law on Courts. The fact that the meeting is described as extraordinary is, in itself, consistent with Article 121(2) of the Law on Courts, since that provision permits meetings to be convened where necessary in addition to the regular monthly meeting schedule. If the meeting were connected with a decree of the President of the Republic requesting advice on the appointment, promotion, transfer or dismissal of judges, Article 121(2) of the Law on Courts would establish a special time limit: the meeting must be convened no later than fourteen days after the decree enters into force. Article 120(3)-(5) of the Law on Courts defines one of the most important areas of competence of the Judicial Council: it provides reasoned advice to the President of the Republic on the appointment, promotion, transfer and dismissal of judges and court presidents, and on the number of judges in courts. However, the agenda is not specified in the information provided, and therefore only the organisational framework of the meeting, rather than the lawfulness of any specific decision, can be assessed legally. The materials must be submitted to all members of the Judicial Council no later than three working days before the meeting, pursuant to Article 121(4) of the Law on Courts. Since the meeting is announced for 24 July 2026, the three working days preceding it are 21, 22 and 23 July 2026; accordingly, the deadline for submitting the materials under the visible provision is linked to 21 July 2026. The meeting will be lawful only if more than half of the members of the Judicial Council attend, as required by Article 121(3) of the Law on Courts. Since the Judicial Council consists of 15 members, more than half means at least 8 members attending. Resolutions may be adopted only in compliance with Article 121(5) of the Law on Courts: as a rule, they are adopted by open vote, are deemed adopted only if approved by more than half of all members of the Judicial Council, and are signed by the Chair and the Secretary. Given a composition of 15 members, at least 8 votes in favour are required for a resolution, even if only the minimum number of members necessary for a lawful meeting is present. If advice to the President of the Republic on the appointment, promotion, transfer or dismissal of judges were being decided, Article 121(5), as laid down in Article 3 of the Law amending Article 121 of the Law on Courts, requires only an open vote. Other matters within the competence of the Judicial Council under Article 120 of the Law on Courts may include approval of the rules of procedure, formation of commissions, and matters relating to the Judicial Ethics and Discipline Commission and the Judicial Court of Honour; accordingly, a meeting is not solely a form for providing personnel-related advice to the President of the Republic. Article 44¹(2) of the Law on Courts demonstrates a practical link with the organisation of judges’ work: participation in the activities of judicial self-government bodies may constitute a basis for temporarily reducing a judge’s caseload, in accordance with the procedure and scope established by the Judicial Council
Consequences. If at least 8 members of the Judicial Council attend the meeting on 24 July 2026, the deadline for submitting materials is complied with, and the resolutions receive at least 8 votes of all members, the resolutions adopted must, under the provisions cited, be regarded as procedurally sound. Under Article 121(5) of the Law on Courts, such resolutions must be published on the website of the National Courts Administration no later than within three days. Calculated from 24 July 2026, the practical publication deadline under that provision is 27 July 2026. If the meeting adopts reasoned advice to the President of the Republic under Article 120(3) or (4) of the Law on Courts, the subsequent process would be significant for the specific judges, candidates or court presidents concerned, since Article 33 of the Law on Courts links appointment to a decision of the President of the Republic and the advice of the Judicial Council. If matters concerning commissions, discipline or the Judicial Court of Honour are considered, their practical significance would primarily concern the composition of judicial self-government bodies and their subsequent operation under Article 120(8)-(13) and Article 122(2) of the Law on Courts. If there is no quorum, or if a resolution is not approved by more than half of all members of the Judicial Council, then under Article 121(3) and (5) of the Law on Courts such a meeting, or the specific resolution concerned, could not produce the intended legal effects. The live broadcast, in itself, does not alter the quorum, voting or publication requirements for resolutions under the cited provisions of the Law on Courts. Legally, the decisive issue will not be the form of the notice, but whether the meeting on 24 July 2026 complies with the conditions for convening, attendance, voting and publication laid down in Article 121 of the Law on Courts
Should the deployment of Lithuanian LERT and EMT teams, 40 specialists and approximately six tonnes of equipment to Venezuela be regarded as the provision of international civil protection assistance under Article 51 of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection, rather than merely as a political or humanitarian gesture?
Article 51(1) of the Law expressly provides that international civil protection assistance is provided by dispatching an international assistance team, experts and/or assistance resources. The reported facts fall within all categories covered by this provision: civil protection, medical and rescue specialists were deployed, including LERT and EMT teams, together with specialised search, rescue and medical equipment. Article 51(2) and (3) are significant because they shift the legality of the decision to the procedural level: the procedure for forming and equipping the team is approved by the Minister of the Interior, while the procedure for requesting, accepting and providing assistance is approved by the Government.
Article 7 further indicates that such a mission must be based not merely on an operational arrangement between institutions, but on the legal bases provided within the hierarchy of legal acts, including Government resolutions, orders of the Minister of the Interior and international treaties.
The stronger argument is that the mission has an independent national legal basis in Article 51, since that provision specifically covers assistance to foreign states through teams, experts and resources. Accordingly, in practice the issue in dispute would not be Lithuania’s ability as such to send rescuers to Venezuela, but whether the procedures approved by the Government and the Minister of the Interior were followed in relation to the request, team formation, equipment, accounting for resources and institutional responsibility. The President’s expression of gratitude does not legally alter the status of the mission: it is a political acknowledgement, not the act which, under Article 51, establishes the procedure for providing assistance.
For a professional audience, Article 51 is the provision worth citing, because it avoids reliance on abstract rhetoric about “humanitarian assistance” and shows precisely that 40 specialists, a mobile field hospital and six tonnes of equipment constitute the substance of international civil protection assistance.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether the deployment of Lithuanian rescuers and medical personnel to Venezuela following the earthquakes constitutes the provision of humanitarian assistance and international civil protection assistance, and under what procedure such assistance must be decided upon, financed, and coordinated. Under Article 2(5) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance, humanitarian assistance includes measures and actions aimed at saving lives, alleviating suffering, and preserving dignity during natural disasters and their consequences. The substance of this type of assistance is further specified in Article 10(1), (2), and (4) of that Law: urgent humanitarian assistance may be provided, it is provided in prompt response to immediate needs, and its forms may include healthcare and other services, supplies, international civil protection assistance, and actions aimed at reducing disaster risks and supporting recovery. The basis for decision-making and financing follows from Article 11(1) and (2) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance. The civil protection component is governed by Article 51(1)-(3) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Crisis Management and Civil Protection, under which international assistance is provided by dispatching a team, experts and/or assistance supplies; the procedure for forming and equipping the team is approved by the Minister of the Interior, while the procedure for requesting, receiving, and providing assistance is approved by the Government
Legal assessment. On the facts presented, the deployment of 40 civil protection, medical, and rescue specialists, a mobile field hospital, search and rescue equipment, and canine capabilities amounts not to abstract support but to specific humanitarian assistance measures aimed at addressing the consequences of a natural disaster. The earthquakes and collapsed structures constitute precisely the type of situation covered by Article 2(5) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance, because the assistance is directed at saving lives, reducing suffering, and preserving dignity. Since the mission was decided upon in late June after the earthquakes of 24 June, and the team returned last week before 22 July 2026, it is legally classifiable under Article 10(2) of the Law as urgent humanitarian assistance, rather than long-term assistance. Article 10(4) permits such assistance to be provided not only in money or goods but also through healthcare services, other measures, and international civil protection assistance; accordingly, the deployment of medical personnel, rescuers, and equipment falls within the permitted forms of assistance. Under Article 11(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance, the institutions involved in the mission were required to adopt or initiate decisions on the provision of assistance within their respective competence and in accordance with the procedure established by the Government. Under Article 11(2), such assistance is financed from the budget appropriations approved for the relevant institutions, meaning that the use of equipment, personnel, and other resources must be linked to those institutions’ budgetary authority. If state- or municipal-owned property is transferred for humanitarian assistance purposes, Article 11(2) permits its transfer free of charge to the specified foreign or international entities in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Law on the Management, Use, and Disposal of State and Municipal Property. From the perspective of civil protection, Article 51(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Crisis Management and Civil Protection directly provides the legal basis for the provision of international assistance by dispatching an international assistance team, experts, and assistance supplies. The role of the Fire and Rescue Department is particularly significant, because Article 50(2) of the Law Amending the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Civil Protection No. VIII-971 assigns to it the coordination of international cooperation in the field of civil protection and representation of Lithuania’s interests in specialised international institutions and organisations. Under Article 50(3) of the same Law, the Department cooperates with the disaster response monitoring and coordination centres of the European Commission, NATO, and the United Nations; therefore, such a mission should be assessed as part of a coordinated international response chain, rather than merely as a separate national initiative. The competence of the National Crisis Management Centre under Article 50(4) includes international cooperation in the field of crisis management, advising the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and assisting the diplomatic service. Under Article 50(5), that Centre, together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defence, supervises the compliance of national crisis management procedures with NATO and European Union procedures. Under Article 5(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance, assistance must comply with the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence; therefore, the legally most important issue is not the political assessment of the mission, but the connection between the assistance and the needs of the affected persons. Under Article 5(2), Lithuania coordinates humanitarian assistance activities with the EU, the UN, and other humanitarian actors, so the legality and effectiveness of such a mission also depend on the applicable coordination framework. The sources provided contain no case law; accordingly, rules derived from analogous cases are not applicable to this situation
Consequences. The immediate legal follow-up is institutional accountability for the decisions adopted, the budget appropriations used, the equipment dispatched, and the services provided, in line with the logic of Article 11(1) and (2) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance. If part of the state property was not only used but also transferred to aid recipients or international entities, the free-of-charge transfer regime provided for in Article 11(2) must apply. From the perspective of the civil protection system, this mission may be assessed as a practical instance of the use of an international assistance team, experts, and assistance supplies under Article 51(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Crisis Management and Civil Protection. This is important for the Fire and Rescue Department, the National Crisis Management Centre, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, healthcare capabilities, and other participating services, because their actions fall within a clearly regulated field of international cooperation and humanitarian assistance. One practical scenario is continued participation in international response operations if the assistance remains urgent or becomes long-term within the meaning of Article 10(1)-(3) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance. Another scenario is the use of the mission’s experience to strengthen the preparedness of Lithuania’s civil protection system, because Article 2(3) and (4) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Crisis Management and Civil Protection links civil protection to preparedness for emergencies and the capacity to respond to them
Can legislation establish, in substance, an automatic ban on entry into Lithuania for foreign nationals solely because they have performed concerts in Russia or Belarus, without proving a threat to national security or public order based on the specific individual’s conduct?
Article 133 of the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens formulates an entry ban as a measure based on an individual decision: a foreign national “may be prohibited” from entering where specifically identified circumstances exist, for example where a visa has been refused, a residence permit has been revoked, the person has been denied entry, returned, or has failed to comply with specific financial obligations. This is not a normative model that allows a single biographical fact automatically to be converted into a ban applicable to an entire category of persons. For EU citizens and their family members, Article 98¹ sets an even clearer limit: the assessment of a threat in each individual case must be based exclusively on the conduct of the person concerned, and that conduct must constitute a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat.
Accordingly, the legal core of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ criticism is not that performing concerts in Russia or Belarus can never be a relevant fact, but that it cannot be the sole and automatically determinative criterion.
At present, the stronger argument is against an automatic ban, particularly where it would affect persons exercising EU free movement rights. In legislative terms, the safer approach in practice would be not a categorical formula that “a person who has performed a concert may not enter”, but rather a basis for individual assessment in which performing in an aggressor state would be one item of objective evidence when assessing support for propaganda, links with the regime, or a threat to public order. It would be risky for decision-makers to rely solely on the venue or date of an event: under the text of Article 98¹ provided, it would be necessary to demonstrate the person’s own conduct and the genuine and sufficiently serious threat arising from it.
The point to cite in the dispute is therefore not abstract “EU law”, but its specific national projection in Articles 1 and 98¹ of the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether a draft law before the Seimas may establish a general prohibition on entry into Lithuania for foreign nationals solely because they have performed in Russia or Belarus, where the legislation currently in force links an entry ban to specific grounds set out in law and to a decision by the competent authority. This question must first be assessed under Article 1(1) and (2), Article 8(1) and (2), Article 113(1), and Article 133 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Legal Status of Aliens. Article 1(1) of the Law provides that this Law specifically governs the procedure for the entry, departure, stay, residence, and appeal of decisions concerning the legal status of aliens. Article 1(2) of the same Law is important because it states that the Law has been harmonised with European Union legal acts, meaning that the national entry-ban mechanism cannot be assessed in isolation from that harmonisation rule. Article 8(1) of the Law links the conditions for refusal of entry to the Schengen Borders Code, while Article 8(2) assigns the decision to refuse entry to the State Border Guard Service. The principal provision governing entry bans is Article 133 of the Law, under which an alien may be prohibited from entering, inter alia, following a refusal to issue a visa or residence permit, refusal of entry, an obligation to depart, return, unlawful departure, or other circumstances specified by law
Legal assessment. Under the wording of Article 133 provided, the mere fact of a cultural performance in Russia or Belarus is not, in itself, expressly identified as an independent ground for an entry ban. Accordingly, a draft law that would construct the prohibition automatically by reference to the place of performance would have to be aligned with the logic of Article 133: an entry ban is an administrative decision concerning a specific alien, not merely an abstract category of persons. This is particularly apparent from the phrase “may be prohibited” used in Article 133(1), which denotes a discretionary decision linked to a statutory ground and to the facts of an individual case. If reliance were placed on a threat to state security or public order, the excerpt from Article 132, read together with Article 133(1), indicates that such a ground is linked to the threat posed by the alien’s entry into and presence in Lithuania, not solely to a prior public performance in a foreign state. Article 113(1)(7) of the Law uses the same risk category in the context of detention: an alien may be detained where his or her presence poses a threat to state security, public order, or public health. This confirms that, in the sources provided, the concept of threat operates as a factual and legal conclusion concerning a specific person, not as a formal attribute arising automatically from the location of professional activity. Paragraph 1 of the Rules on the Management of the National List provides that the list is intended for aliens who are prohibited from entering and includes the provision of data to the central Schengen Information System. Under Article 133(3) of the Law, this national list is compiled and managed, and data are provided to the central Schengen Information System, by the Migration Department in accordance with the procedure established by the Government. Paragraph 5 of the Rules further provides that data are entered on the list on the basis of decisions prohibiting entry adopted by the entities referred to in Article 133(8) of the Law. Paragraph 101 of the Rules establishes a significant procedural time limit: the Migration Department adopts a decision to prohibit or not to prohibit entry, on the basis of a submission by a state institution or agency, within 5 working days of receiving the necessary data, documents, and reasoned conclusions. Where the entry ban is linked to a decision by the Migration Department refusing to issue a visa or residence permit, expelling an alien, or returning an alien, the same Paragraph 101 calculates the time limit from the adoption of the relevant decision. In the sources provided, the role of the Minister of Foreign Affairs is not an independent final entry ban: under the excerpt from the Rules, in the case referred to in Article 133(8) of the Law, the Minister submits a proposal to the Minister of the Interior, together with data, information, or documents and the proposed period of the ban. Thus, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ criticism of the draft law is consistent with the regulatory framework provided insofar as the draft would bypass the chain comprising an individual ground, reasons, a competent decision, and the list procedure. The provisions of the Rules on removal from the list also show that an entry ban is not an immutable status: where the ban is based on a possible threat to state security or public order, the Migration Department or the State Border Guard Service contacts the institution that provided the information to determine whether the threat still persists. That procedure is difficult to reconcile with a model in which the reason for the ban would be solely a past concert, without assessing whether, today, 22 July 2026, the person’s entry into and presence in Lithuania would still pose the threat referred to in the Law
Consequences. In practical terms, the draft law may proceed in three directions: it may be improved into an individual-assessment procedure, remain a political declaration without a clear mechanism of application, or be rejected as inconsistent with the model set out in Article 133 of the Law and in the Rules provided. If the Seimas were to choose the first path, the Law would have to clearly link the circumstance of performing in Russia or Belarus to a specific ground under Article 133, a competent entity, evidence, a reasoned assessment, and the duration of the ban. In that case, the practical burden would fall not only on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also on the Migration Department, the State Border Guard Service, and those institutions that would provide documents or conclusions concerning a threat to state security or public order. If the draft law remained in the form of an automatic prohibition, its application would conflict with the institutional structure of Articles 8 and 133, because refusal of entry, an entry ban, and inclusion on the national list are, in the sources provided, decision-making procedures rather than the mechanical consequence of attributes listed in an annex to a law. For foreign nationals, this would mean in practical terms that what matters would not be only the geography of their performances, but also whether the competent authority has data, documents, or reasoned conclusions concerning a statutory ground for an entry ban. For organisers and the events market, the most important consequence would be legal uncertainty until the draft law is rewritten so as to comply with the decision-making system under Article 133 and the rules governing the national list. For the state, the key point is that any political objective should be implemented through the administrative chain already established: submission, documents, reasoned decision, time limit, list, and transmission of data to the Schengen Information System. Accordingly, on the basis of the sources provided, the legally soundest course is not a general prohibition on all persons who have performed, but an individually reasoned entry ban where the entry or presence of a specific alien falls within the grounds set out in Article 133 of the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens
The specific question is whether the replacement of the commander-in-chief after a political conflict and protests can be treated solely as a decision by the head of state in exercising command over the armed forces, or rather as a procedurally constrained dismissal from service requiring additional constitutional and parliamentary safeguards.
The Lithuanian regulatory framework provided does not indicate a one-person decision-making model: Article 13(1) of the Law on the Organisation of the National Defence System and Military Service provides that the commander-in-chief is appointed by the President of the Republic in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Constitution, whereas Article 53 of the Disciplinary Statute links dismissal from service to a submission by the Minister of National Defence and the approval of the Seimas. This means that the power of appointment does not in itself imply an equivalent freedom to remove the commander-in-chief from service. The excerpt from Article 1 of the Law on the Fundamentals of National Security reinforces this logic: the Seimas not only exercises political oversight over the defence sector, but also establishes by law the structure of the national defence system and the legal framework for the activities of national security institutions.
For a professional audience, the stronger argument here is not that “the protests forced the president to replace the commander,” but that, in a state governed by the rule of law, a change in the commander-in-chief must be assessed through the lens of competence and procedure. If an analogous situation were analysed under the Lithuanian model provided, the first step would be to determine whether it concerns the appointment of a new commander or the dismissal of the previous commander from service, because in the latter case a political decision by the president alone would not suffice. In the case of O.
Syrskyi, the news report does not identify any legal violation or disciplinary ground; therefore, relying on the logic of Article 65 of the Statute concerning breaches of restrictions applicable to military service would be weak. The practical risk for a journalist or lawyer is to conflate political confidence in military command with a legally formalised dismissal from service: the former explains the motive, but the latter determines the legality of the decision.
Core issue. The precise legal question is what institutional sequence and substantive conditions apply to the dismissal of the Commander of the Armed Forces and the appointment of a new commander under Lithuanian law, if an analogous change in political and military leadership were assessed within the Lithuanian system. The principal provisions are Article 13 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Organisation of the National Defence System and Military Service, Article 53 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania Approving the Disciplinary Statute of the Lithuanian Armed Forces, and Article 53 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania Amending the Disciplinary Statute of the Armed Forces. Also relevant to the status of the Commander of the Armed Forces is the responsibility of the Minister of National Defence, established in Article 10 of the Law on the Organisation of the National Defence System and Military Service, for the implementation of defence policy and the activities of the entire national defence system. The systemic context is supplemented by Article 1 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Fundamentals of National Security, which provides that the Seimas regulates the national defence system by law and annually determines the principal structure of the Armed Forces
Legal assessment. Under Article 13(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Organisation of the National Defence System and Military Service, the Commander of the Armed Forces is appointed by the President of the Republic in accordance with the procedure established by the Constitution; however, only an officer holding a rank not lower than brigadier general or flotilla admiral may be appointed Commander of the Armed Forces. The same article also provides that the appointed Commander of the Armed Forces holds office for no longer than five years and, upon assuming office, takes an oath and signs the oath document. Accordingly, a purely political decision to replace the commander would not be sufficient under Lithuanian law: the appointed person must meet the statutory rank requirement and assume office through the oath procedure. The wording of the Commander’s oath under Article 13 of the same law links the office to faithful service to the Republic of Lithuania, compliance with the Constitution and laws, strengthening the Armed Forces, and defending the State. On the dismissal side, Article 53 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania Approving the Disciplinary Statute of the Lithuanian Armed Forces provides that the President of the Republic, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, dismisses the Commander of the Armed Forces from service upon the submission of the Minister of National Defence and with the approval of the Seimas. The same rule is repeated in Article 53 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania Amending the Disciplinary Statute of the Armed Forces. Thus, the Lithuanian model is not a unilateral presidential act: a submission by the Minister of National Defence and the approval of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania are required. The role of the Minister of National Defence is consistent with Article 10 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Organisation of the National Defence System and Military Service, under which the Minister directs the activities of the Ministry of National Defence and of the entire national defence system and is responsible for the implementation of defence policy. The Minister’s competence in personnel matters is further supplemented by points 11.25, 11.26, 13.29 and 13.30 of the Regulations of the Ministry of National Defence, which refer to the appointment, dismissal and transfer of commanders and the submission of proposals concerning candidates for Commander of the Armed Forces. If the replacement of the Commander of the Armed Forces is linked to disciplinary liability, the provisions of the Disciplinary Statute concerning abuse of official authority and breaches of restrictions applicable to military service are also relevant. Article 77 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania Approving the Disciplinary Statute of the Lithuanian Armed Forces provides for liability for abuse of official authority, and, in aggravating circumstances, a professional military servicemember is dismissed from service. Article 65 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania Amending the Disciplinary Statute of the Armed Forces provides that a professional military servicemember is dismissed from service for breaching service restrictions established by the Law on the Organisation of the National Defence System and Military Service. However, the protests, public accusations and political crisis referred to in the information provided are not, in themselves, identical to these disciplinary offences under the cited provisions. Articles 3 and 8 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania are relevant in this analysis only as boundaries: no one may usurp the sovereign powers belonging to the Nation, and the seizure of State power or its institutions by force is unconstitutional, unlawful and void
Consequences. In practical terms, an analogous replacement of a commander in Lithuania would require several mandatory stages: a ministerial submission for dismissal, approval by the Seimas, a decision by the President, and the appointment of a new commander in accordance with the requirements of Article 13 of the Law on the Organisation of the National Defence System and Military Service. If there is no Commander of the Armed Forces or if the Commander is temporarily unable to perform the duties of office, the Commander is substituted, under the amendment provision to Article 13 of the same law, by the Chief of the Defence Staff or by another officer appointed by order of the Minister of National Defence who holds a rank not lower than brigadier general or flotilla admiral. This means that, even in circumstances of political tension, continuity of military command must be ensured through the substitute-officer mechanism defined in advance by law. For the Seimas, this is practically significant because its approval is a condition for dismissal from service, while at the broader level the Seimas, under Article 1 of the Law on the Fundamentals of National Security, shapes the legal foundation of the national defence system. For the President of the Republic, this is significant as the constitutional and statutory authority for appointment and dismissal, although in the case of dismissal the President’s decision is linked to the ministerial submission and the approval of the Seimas. For the Minister of National Defence, this is significant because the Minister’s responsibility for the implementation of defence policy and the operation of the system makes the Minister the central initiator of the procedure. For the Armed Forces, the most important consequence is the legality of command: a new commander may perform the duties of office only if he or she meets the statutory requirements, has taken the oath, and has entered the established chain of command
Whether the five exceedances of pollution permit limits identified this year at the Žiežmariai wastewater treatment plant constitute a sufficient basis under Article 18 of the Law on State Environmental Protection Control to suspend the operation of the entire plant or of the specific activity causing those exceedances.
Article 6 of the Law on State Environmental Protection Control provides that control is exercised by the Environmental Protection Department; accordingly, it is that authority which has the institutional basis to assess infringements at the treatment plant operated by UAB Kaišiadorių vandenys. Article 2 of the same law defines control not only as the identification of infringements, but also as their prevention, termination, and the bringing of responsible persons to liability. The key provision is Article 18(1): the operation of an installation, or part of it, may be suspended where non-compliance with pollution permit conditions gives rise to a real threat of significant adverse environmental impact or a danger to human health or life, and where there is no possibility of avoiding that threat by other means.
The same provision also permits the suspension of a specific activity where unlawful emission of pollutants has been established, environmental damage is being caused, and the activity increases the scale of the infringement.
At present, the Department’s stronger argument is not the abstract “dangerousness” of the treatment plant, but repeated non-compliance with pollution permit conditions: six enforcement responses in a year, five confirmed exceedances of pollutant concentrations, and damage of EUR 1,349.22 already calculated and compensated for the infringement of 7 May. However, a temporary suspension of the entire plant under Article 18(1)(1) requires a higher threshold: it must be shown not only that there has been a series of infringements, but also that there are no other means of avoiding significant environmental impact. In practical terms, the safer course for the authority is therefore to rely on the logic of Article 18 and first prove which specific part of the operation is increasing the scale of the infringement: the ingress of surface wastewater into domestic wastewater networks, hydraulic overload during heavy rainfall, or disruption of the biological treatment process.
The operator and the municipality should not build their defence solely on the argument of heavy rainfall, because the facts presented indicate a recurring and foreseeable inability of the system to operate in accordance with the pollution permit, which turns “heavy rain” from an isolated incident into a manageable infrastructure risk.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether, due to repeated exceedances of permissible pollutant concentrations in 2026, the operation of the Žiežmariai municipal wastewater treatment plant may or must be temporarily suspended, and whether less restrictive measures would be sufficient. This issue is to be assessed primarily under Article 18(1)(1)–(3), Article 34, Article 35, and the control principles set out in Article 4(1)–(4) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on State Environmental Protection Control. The legal nature of control is defined in Article 2(1) of that Law: it is an activity aimed at preventing and terminating infringements, identifying responsible persons, and holding them liable. Competence for the control of wastewater treatment facilities is specifically assigned to the Environmental Protection Department under point 20 of the Description of the Procedure for the Installation, Operation and Control of Wastewater Holding Tanks and Septic Tanks. If it is established that the measures applied in the economic activity are insufficient and environmental protection standards are exceeded, or significant adverse effects on the environment are being caused, Article 15-1 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Environmental Protection is also applicable
Legal assessment. Under Article 18(1)(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on State Environmental Protection Control, the operation of an installation or part thereof may be suspended where non-compliance with the conditions of a pollution permit gives rise to a real threat of direct significant adverse effects on the environment and there is no possibility of preventing this by other means. The five confirmed instances of exceedance of permissible limits out of six reports in 2026 are legally significant because they indicate not an isolated accident, but a recurring pattern of non-compliance with permit requirements. Article 18(1)(2) of the same Law is important because it permits the suspension of the specific activity that causes unlawful pollutant discharges or increases the scale of the infringement. Accordingly, the commission must assess not an abstract “deficiency of the treatment plant”, but the causal link between the specific operating regime, the ingress of surface wastewater into domestic sewerage networks, the washout of activated sludge, and the entry of pollutants into the Strėva River. Article 18(1)(3) may be relevant if the actual wastewater flow altered during intense rainfall is regarded as a change in the operating conditions of the installation as a result of which compliance with the conditions of the pollution permit is no longer possible. However, suspension is not an automatic sanction for every exceedance, because the principle of a minimal and proportionate control burden established in Article 4(2) of the Law requires that officials’ actions be appropriate to the objective and disrupt the activity as little as possible. For that reason, the task of the commission established by the Department to assess both alternatives, continuing the activity or suspending it, is consistent with the logic of proportionality, since municipal wastewater management is an infrastructure service whose suspension may cause other environmental and social consequences. The prevention principle under Article 4(1) of the Law permits the Department to act without waiting for another confirmed pollutant exceedance, provided that the risk is substantiated by previous investigations and data on the operation of the installation. The principle of inevitability of liability under Article 4(4) of the same Law means that the compensation already paid, EUR 1,349.22, for the infringement of 7 May does not conclude the legal assessment: liability and the elimination of adverse consequences must also be addressed. Point 6 of the Regulation on the Application of Wastewater Treatment Facilities requires conditions to be created for state environmental protection control; therefore, UAB “Kaišiadorių vandenys” must ensure control points, equipment, and unrestricted access for sampling and inspections. If control establishes that the measures to prevent or reduce environmental impact are insufficient, Article 15-1 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Environmental Protection imposes an obligation to apply measures, agreed with the institution authorised by the Minister of Environment, to prevent, reduce or compensate for significant adverse effects, or to restore what has been damaged. Point 72.13 of the Rules on the Issuance, Amendment and Revocation of Pollution Permits supplements this framework: environmental monitoring or state control data showing exceedances of standards and significant adverse effects constitute grounds for considering the need to revise permit conditions. The request by Kaišiadorys District Municipality to provide data on network inspections, the ingress of surface wastewater into domestic sewerage networks, disconnected facilities, and preventive measures is legally connected with identifying the cause, not solely with the liability of the treatment plant operator. Points 12.2 and 12.3 of the Surface Wastewater Management Regulation indicate that pollution risk, design flows, and preventive measures are significant elements in assessing surface wastewater management; therefore, the municipality’s action plan must be specific as to works, deadlines, and expected effectiveness. If the suspension procedure were initiated, under Article 34 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on State Environmental Protection Control, upon expiry of the time limit for preparing to suspend environmentally harmful activity, a decision is adopted and immediately served against signature or sent by registered mail. Under Article 35(1) of the same Law, the decision would be executed by the head of the legal person whose activity is suspended, and under Article 35(2), the official could, where necessary, seal premises or installations. If the decision were not complied with, Article 35(3) of the Law establishes a three-working-day time limit for submitting information to the institution entitled to revoke the validity of the pollution permit, as well as to the supervisory institution
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the commission finds that the real threat of significant adverse effects on the environment can be managed by other measures, and therefore continuity of operations is chosen together with mandatory network inspections, elimination of surface wastewater ingress, and revision of permit conditions. The second scenario is that it is established that, without the temporary suspension of the entire installation or part thereof, it is impossible to prevent further pollutants from entering the environment, in which case the mandatory instruction provided for in Article 18(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on State Environmental Protection Control is applied, followed by the procedure under Articles 34–35. The third scenario is that suspension is not applied to the entire treatment plant, but a specific activity or technical operating regime that increases the scale of the infringement is identified, and only that part is suspended under Article 18(1)(2) of the Law. The practical significance for UAB “Kaišiadorių vandenys” is direct: the company must not only compensate the established damage, but also demonstrate that its operation can comply with the requirements of the pollution permit during heavy rainfall. For the municipality, the important point is that the cause of pollution may be linked to the condition of the networks and the ingress of surface wastewater into the domestic wastewater system, meaning that the actions of the treatment plant operator alone may be insufficient. For residents, the most important legal consequence is not the strictness of control as such, but whether the chosen measure will simultaneously protect the Strėva River and avoid disruption to centralised wastewater collection and treatment in Kaišiadorys District
The specific question is not whether persons convicted of sexual offences against children “must be released”, but whether, following the removal of the absolute prohibition, they may be categorically excluded from parole assessment without an individual assessment of their risk of criminal conduct and progress.
Article 82(1) of the Code of Execution of Sentences links parole to two cumulative criteria: service of the prescribed portion of the sentence and the fact that the convicted person’s risk of criminal conduct is low or that he or she has made clear progress in reducing it. The same provision differentiates time thresholds according to the length of the sentence imposed: where the sentence exceeds 4 years but does not exceed 10 years, one half of the sentence is specified; where it exceeds 10 years but does not exceed 25 years, the excerpt of Article 82(1) provided refers to two thirds. Article 87 of the Code of Execution of Sentences shows that parole is not freedom without supervision: the institution forwards the documents to the Probation Service, and intensive supervision and probation must begin from the moment of release.
The article’s wording that a person sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment could be considered after serving two thirds of the sentence is, according to the fact-checking note provided, incomplete. Article 84 of the amending law to the Code of Execution of Sentences states that, for convicted persons whose sentence exceeds 15 years but does not exceed 25 years, the applicable criterion is three quarters of the sentence imposed. A more precise formulation would therefore be as follows: in the case of a 7-year sentence, one half of the sentence may be relevant; however, in the case of a 20-year sentence, on the basis of the noted amending provision, the threshold to be checked is three quarters, not two thirds.
In addition, “good behaviour” is not a sufficient legal category: Article 82 refers to a low risk of criminal conduct or clear progress in reducing that risk.
In practice, the stronger argument now is not the denial of public safety concerns and not an automatic “right to leave” on the part of the convicted person, but an individualised risk assessment instead of an absolute prohibition. In disputes concerning such releases, the risk and progress criteria in Article 82 of the Code of Execution of Sentences should be cited, rather than relying solely on the category of the offence or prison discipline records. For journalists and lawyers, an important error is the absolutisation of time thresholds: when specific cases are discussed publicly, especially a 20-year sentence, it is essential to verify whether the applicable threshold is two thirds or three quarters.
The greatest practical risk for decision-makers is replacing reasoning with an emotional reference to the nature of the offence: after this constitutional shift, it will not be enough to say “sexual offence against a child”; it will be necessary to demonstrate a specific risk of reoffending or insufficient reduction of that risk.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not whether persons convicted of sexual offences against children “must be released”, but whether they may be subject to an individual parole procedure when they meet the conditions laid down in the Code on the Execution of Sentences. This issue is determined under Article 85 of the Code on the Execution of Sentences of the Republic of Lithuania, concerning the procedure for applying parole; Article 87, concerning the enforcement of decisions; Article 94, concerning the moment of release; and the previous regulation in Articles 157-158, concerning the conditions for parole and its non-application. The purpose of the Code on the Execution of Sentences, as established in Article 1 of the Law Amending the Code on the Execution of Sentences of the Republic of Lithuania, is also relevant: the procedure for executing sentences must be such that, after serving their sentence, convicted persons pursue their life goals by lawful means and methods. The constitutional dimension arises from the interpretation of Article 29 of the Constitution, set out in the source concerning the referral to the Constitutional Court: equality of persons before the law permits different regulation only where differences in legal status objectively justify unequal treatment. Accordingly, an absolute prohibition based solely on the category of offence is to be assessed not as a procedural risk-screening mechanism, but as the prior exclusion of an entire group of convicted persons from the institution of parole
Legal assessment. Under Article 85(1) of the Code on the Execution of Sentences, twenty working days before the possible date of parole, the custodial institution must submit a social inquiry report to the parole commission. That report must contain data on the resocialisation measures applied to the convicted person, their results, the risk of criminal behaviour, and changes in that risk during the serving of the sentence. This means that good behaviour is not, in itself, a sufficient legal basis for releasing a person: the core of the commission’s assessment is the results of resocialisation and the risk of criminal behaviour. Under Article 85(2) of the Code on the Execution of Sentences, within twenty working days of receiving the social inquiry report, the commission adopts a reasoned decision to grant or refuse parole. Thus, following the Constitutional Court’s decision, the legal position of the 174 convicted persons does not mean automatic release, but the right to enter an individual assessment procedure. Article 157(1) of the previous Code on the Execution of Sentences linked parole to a low risk of criminal behaviour or clear progress in reducing that risk, and to the portion of the sentence already served: one-third, one-half, or two-thirds, depending on the length of the sentence. The amendment to Article 158 of the same Code provided that parole would not apply to persons convicted of offences against the sexual self-determination or inviolability of a minor. The source concerning draft amendment No. XIP-1446 to Article 158 of the Code on the Execution of Sentences emphasised that such a prohibition would also cover offences for which comparatively short maximum terms of imprisonment were prescribed, and would therefore be inconsistent with the logic that non-application of parole should be linked to particularly serious cases or to the convicted person’s conduct in the custodial institution. In its ruling of 9 December 1998 on the compatibility with the Constitution of the death penalty provided for in the sanction under Article 105 of the Criminal Code, the Constitutional Court cited the purpose of punishment as being that the person should reform and not reoffend in the future. In its ruling of 8 June 2009 on the compatibility of provisions of Articles 20 and 43 of the Criminal Code with the Constitution, the Constitutional Court stated that manifestly inadequate penalties and penalty levels may not be established. Taken together, these doctrines mean that the State may take a strict approach to dangerous offences, but the measure chosen must preserve proportionality and must not exclude an assessment of rehabilitation solely because of the name of the offence. Under Article 87(1) of the Code on the Execution of Sentences, a convicted person is released only upon receipt of a copy of the commission’s decision or a court order together with a copy of the court ruling. Under Article 87(2) and (4), the documents are submitted to the Probation Service, and intensive supervision and probation must begin from the moment of release. Under Article 94(1) and (3) of the Code on the Execution of Sentences, the day of release is linked to the expiry of the sentence term or parole term and to receipt of the required documents; if the term expires on a day of rest or a public holiday, release takes place on the preceding day. Article 183 of the Code on the Execution of Sentences ensures a route of appeal: actions and decisions of officials may be appealed within one month to the head of the institution; decisions of heads of institutions to the Director of the Prison Department; and actions and decisions of the Director of the Probation Service and the Director of the Prison Department to the regional administrative court
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is a favourable decision by the commission, after which the custodial institution releases the convicted person and transfers the documents to the Probation Service in accordance with Article 87 of the Code on the Execution of Sentences. The second scenario is a negative reasoned decision, where the social inquiry report does not confirm low risk, clear progress, or appropriate resocialisation results. The third scenario is deferral of the decision if, during consideration of the matter, the circumstances referred to in Article 82(5) of the Code on the Execution of Sentences become apparent, since Article 85(2) expressly provides for deferral of the adoption of such a decision. The practical significance for convicted persons is that their position is no longer foreclosed by an absolute prohibition, but their right is limited by an individual assessment of risk and progress. The practical significance for society is that protection is shifted from categorical non-release to assessment, supervision, and probation from the moment of release. The practical significance for the Prison Service and parole commissions is an increased duty to prepare and assess social inquiry reports with reasons, because the decision must be based on specific data and not solely on the type of criminal offence. The practical significance for the Probation Service is that persons released on parole are not left to reintegrate on their own: according to the source concerning draft No. XIP-1446, they are subject to supervision, social assistance, and resocialisation measures. Accordingly, the report concerning 174 persons does not legally mean mass release, but rather that a procedure must be carried out in respect of each of them, the outcome of which may be release, refusal of release, or deferral of the decision
The specific question is whether a European social network’s servers in Europe and its identity verification model, in themselves, alter its legal risk under Lithuania’s cybersecurity and personal data protection regime. The stronger argument is not “European platform = lower risk”, but rather “lower jurisdictional and enforcement risk only where the platform’s establishment, data storage and data processing model fall within specific EU and Lithuanian rules”.
Article 12 of the Law on Cybersecurity brings providers of social networking service platforms within Lithuanian jurisdiction only where their main establishment is in the Republic of Lithuania. This means that users in Lithuania, or servers in Europe, do not by themselves create Lithuanian cybersecurity jurisdiction over such a provider if its main establishment, as the article states in the case of “W Social”, is in another EU Member State. Article 38 of the amendment to the Law on Cybersecurity is relevant in another respect: institutions included in the list of Secure Network users must store their state information resources in state-owned data centres or in data centres located in Lithuania, the EU, the EEA or NATO countries.
European servers are therefore a legally relevant compliance element for the public sector, but they do not resolve either the platform’s liability for content or the proportionality of personal data collected during identity verification.
In practice, the weak point for the public sector and regulators is the promotional argument of “digital sovereignty” if it is not substantiated by a specific establishment, data centre and data processing structure. The stronger basis to cite is not a general claim about a European alternative, but the jurisdictional rule in Article 12 of the Law on Cybersecurity and the data centre requirement for institutions in Article 38. An identity verification model may reduce the risk of anonymous harmful content, but it also increases GDPR supervisory risk, because under Article 9 the State Data Protection Inspectorate performs the tasks of the supervisory authority in the field of personal data protection.
For a professional, the key point is therefore to verify not the platform’s origin, but three documentable facts: where its main establishment is, where institutional data are stored, and on what legal basis verified identity information is collected.
Core issue. The precise legal question is not whether Europe should have its own social network, but which rules under the GDPR and the Digital Services Act must constrain the collection, storage, transfer and use of personal data by a social network, including identity verification and institutional communication on such a platform. This issue must primarily be assessed under Articles 1, 2, Article 4(9)–(10), Article 5(f), Article 6(3), and Articles 34, 40, 48, 50, 70, 89 and 98 of the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679. Article 1 GDPR establishes a dual framework: the protection of natural persons in relation to the processing of their personal data and the free movement of personal data within the Union. Accordingly, “digital sovereignty” cannot legally be understood as the simple confinement of data within national or European borders. Article 2(1) GDPR covers automated processing of personal data, meaning that social-network registration, account administration, content dissemination and the accumulation of user data fall within the scope of the Regulation. Recital 18 GDPR distinguishes a user’s personal activity on a social network from the platform that provides the means for such processing; therefore, the relevant obligations fall not on the ordinary user, but on the controller or processor
Legal assessment. If “W Social” permits registration only by persons whose identity has been verified, the legal significance lies not only in the objective of transparency, but also in whether such processing of personal data has the legal basis required by Article 6(3) GDPR where reliance is placed on a legal obligation or a task carried out in the public interest. That provision requires the purpose to be laid down in Union or Member State law, and the legal basis to meet an objective of public interest and be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The platform’s declared aim of reducing anonymity therefore does not, in itself, resolve the question of what categories of data are collected, how long they are retained, to whom they are disclosed and which procedures apply. Article 5(f) GDPR requires appropriate security, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage; consequently, the location of servers in Europe is merely a factual circumstance, not independent proof of compliance. If a breach were likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, Article 34 GDPR would require the controller to communicate the breach to the data subject without undue delay and to describe the nature of the breach in clear and plain language. The use of data accumulated by platforms for the development of artificial intelligence must be assessed under the same GDPR regime of purposes, legal basis and safeguards; where scientific or historical research or statistical purposes are concerned, Article 89 GDPR permits derogations from certain rights only subject to specified conditions and safeguards. Article 4(9) GDPR is important in determining to whom data are disclosed, because a recipient is the person or body to which personal data are disclosed, while Article 4(10) defines a third party. If data from the social network were requested by a court or administrative authority of a third country, Article 48 GDPR permits such a judgment or decision to be recognised or enforceable only on the basis of an international agreement, such as a mutual legal assistance treaty. Article 50 GDPR shows that enforcement of data protection vis-à-vis third countries is not left solely to platforms: the Commission and supervisory authorities must develop cooperation mechanisms, provide mutual assistance, support investigations and exchange information. Article 70 GDPR complements this framework, as the European Data Protection Board promotes cooperation among supervisory authorities and the exchange of practices and knowledge with supervisory authorities worldwide. At the level of Lithuanian institutions, the sources indicate that the Communications Regulatory Authority, on the basis of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, may take targeted, transparent, proportionate and non-discriminatory measures: conduct investigations, impose obligations, examine disputes and complaints, issue recommendations and apply sanctions. This means that questions concerning social networks’ responsibility for content, algorithms and user protection cannot be reduced to privacy policies alone, since the Digital Services Act referred to in the sources also links the operation of platforms to public oversight. From a data-protection perspective, the Commission’s June 2026 decision to begin communicating on the “W Social” platform is likewise not a neutral fact, because Article 2(3) GDPR and Recital 17 separately address processing carried out by Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and its alignment with GDPR principles. Article 98 GDPR confirms that the purpose of reviewing other Union data-protection legislation is the uniform and consistent protection of natural persons, including processing carried out by Union institutions
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is regulatory: a European platform may operate as a model with lower jurisdictional friction if its identity-verification, data-retention, recipient and security procedures are aligned in advance with the logic of Articles 1, 2, 5, 6 and 34 GDPR. The second scenario concerns supervision: if the platform, notwithstanding its European origin, were to process data improperly or insufficiently manage service risks, the competent authorities could conduct investigations, impose obligations, examine disputes and complaints, and apply sanctions under the competence of the Communications Regulatory Authority and Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 as identified in the sources. The third scenario concerns third countries: requirements to transfer or disclose data from outside the Union would have to be assessed under Article 48 GDPR, while enforcement cooperation would fall under Articles 50 and 70 GDPR. For users, this matters because a European platform does not mean weaker use of data, but should mean a clearer legal basis, security obligations and notification of significant security breaches. For platforms, this matters because competitive advantage cannot rest solely on European origin or server location: under the cited provisions, they must demonstrate a lawful, proportionate and secure data-processing model. For institutions, this matters because their communication choices in the digital space create not only a political signal, but also a chain of data-processing and supervisory obligations