Whether M. P.’s report to the police of an alleged shooting and assault, where he had in fact injured himself at home while intoxicated using an air gun, is to be classified under Article 236(1) of the Criminal Code as a report of a knowingly non-existent serious offence, rather than merely as a more general false statement or testimony.
Article 236(1) of the Criminal Code criminalises reporting to an institution or official empowered to initiate criminal prosecution a knowingly non-existent serious or very serious offence. In this case, the decisive point is not that M. P. lied in general, but that his account of being shot in the chest and attacked by an unknown person led to a pre-trial investigation into possible serious bodily injury, which was later discontinued after it was established that the injury was self-inflicted.
Article 235 of the Criminal Code would be a broader provision covering a false statement or witness testimony, but the wording of Article 236 more precisely captures the dangerousness of this situation: the report concerned specifically a knowingly non-existent serious offence. Article 19 of the Criminal Code is also relevant, because intoxication by alcohol does not exempt a person from liability; accordingly, here it operates not as a defence but as a circumstance linking the conduct to alcohol consumption.
The stronger prosecution argument is not merely the falsity of M. P.’s testimony, but the fact that the false version triggered the investigative regime applicable to a more serious offence: the report of a shooting and chest injury objectively directed the police towards an investigation of possible serious bodily injury. In practice, in cases of this kind it is risky for the defence to rely solely on the fact that no specific perpetrator was identified, because Article 236(1) of the Criminal Code separately covers a report of a knowingly non-existent serious or very serious offence.
The court’s six-month obligation to participate in alcoholism, drug addiction prevention or resocialisation programmes is based on the logic of Article 72(5) of the Criminal Code: it is sufficient to establish that the act was committed while intoxicated and that this influenced the criminal conduct, while the period may not exceed two years. Therefore, for a professional audience it is worth citing not only Article 236 of the Criminal Code, but also Articles 19 and 72(5): alcohol here does not reduce liability, but explains the additional penal measure.
Core issue. The legal issue is whether M. P., having reported to the police an alleged assault and gunshot, although he had injured himself at home while handling an air gun carelessly, made a false report of a knowingly non-existent criminal offence under Article 236(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, as set out in Article 91 of the amendment to the Criminal Code. This provision applies to a person who “reported a knowingly non-existent criminal offence” and provides for community service, a fine, restriction of liberty, or imprisonment for up to two years. Article 235(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania is also relevant, as it criminalises a false statement or report concerning a criminal act and false testimony when questioned as a witness or victim. For the individualisation of punishment, Article 59(1)(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania is significant: it provides that liability is mitigated where the offender confessed to committing an act provided for by criminal law and sincerely repented or assisted in its detection. The scope for imposing a penal measure is defined by Article 73 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania: the court imposes such measures in accordance with the provisions of the relevant chapter, they are not aggregated with penalties, and they are enforced separately. The procedural form is assessed under Article 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, because a court penal order must contain a decision finding the accused guilty, the type and amount of the penalty imposed, other relevant decisions, and an explanation of the accused’s right to request that the case be heard in court
Legal assessment. According to the reported facts, on 16 December 2025, after being warned of criminal liability, M. P. submitted a statement concerning an alleged assault and, during questioning as a witness, repeated that an unknown person had shot him. The core of criminal liability here is not the self-inflicted injury itself, but the deliberate direction of law enforcement toward investigating the incident as a criminal offence committed by another person, even though it was later established that no criminal offence had been committed against him. For the purposes of Article 236(1) of the Criminal Code, it is material that the addressee was the police, i.e. officials competent to initiate criminal prosecution, and that the content of the report concerned a knowingly non-existent criminal offence. The fact that the matter was initially investigated as a possible serious bodily injury explains why the false information had procedural significance and could have resulted in the actual use of pre-trial investigation resources. Article 235(1) of the Criminal Code reinforces the assessment regarding witness testimony, because M. P. did not confine himself to an informal account but repeated the false circumstances when questioned as a witness. However, the report states that he was found guilty specifically of making a false report of a knowingly non-existent criminal offence, so the principal basis for legal classification is Article 236(1) of the Criminal Code. On the facts provided, there is no need to extend the analysis to the elements of Article 236(2) of the Criminal Code, as that provision concerns the falsification of evidence in order to initiate criminal prosecution of a person, whereas the report emphasises a false account and disposal of the weapon, but not falsification of evidence. Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits participants in proceedings and other persons to submit objects and documents relevant to the investigation of a criminal act; therefore, the witness testimony, expert conclusions, and other data mentioned in the investigation constitute the procedural material by which the truthfulness of the report could be verified. Once it was established that M. P. had injured himself, the investigation into the possible serious bodily injury was discontinued, a procedural outcome consistent with the system of discontinuance of pre-trial investigations set out in Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The 8-month restriction of liberty imposed by the court falls within the sanction under Article 236(1) of the Criminal Code in its amended wording, because that sanction expressly provides for restriction of liberty. Confession and sincere remorse are legally significant not as grounds for extinguishing liability, but as a mitigating circumstance established in Article 59(1)(2) of the Criminal Code, relevant to the type and severity of the penalty. According to the sources provided, alcohol intoxication is not identified as a mitigating circumstance; accordingly, in this assessment it is relevant only insofar as the court mentioned it in the factual context of individualising the penalty. The penal measure, namely a 6-month obligation to participate in alcohol and drug addiction prevention, early intervention, resocialisation, or other programmes and courses, is enforced separately from the 8-month restriction of liberty under Article 73 of the Criminal Code. Since the case was concluded by a court penal order, Article 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires the order to contain not only the finding of guilt and penalty, but also an explanation of the accused’s right to request that the case be heard in court. Where relevant to such a request or to appeals, procedural time limits are calculated under Article 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in hours, days, and months, excluding the day on which the time limit begins; where the time limit expires on a non-working day, the final day is deemed to be the first working day thereafter
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is that the court penal order is enforced: M. P. serves the 8-month restriction of liberty and separately complies for 6 months with the imposed obligation to participate in programmes. The second scenario arises from Article 421(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure: the accused must be informed of the right to request that the case be heard in court, meaning that the penal order is not merely an administrative formality without a procedural alternative. The third practical consequence relates to the discontinued investigation into the alleged serious bodily injury: law enforcement’s focus shifts from the non-existent offence to the false report against the administration of justice itself. For the police and prosecution service, this case is significant as marking the boundary between a person’s right to report a possible criminal offence and criminal liability for a knowingly false report. For the court, it is significant for the individualisation of the sanction: Article 236(1) of the Criminal Code permits a choice among several penalties, while Article 59(1)(2) of the Criminal Code justifies a more lenient assessment where guilt is admitted and sincere remorse is shown. For M. P., the practical risk is not only the penalty imposed, but also the duty actually to comply with the separate penal measure, because Article 73(2) of the Criminal Code does not allow it to be “absorbed” into the penalty. The broader legal significance is that a false account of an assault, even where it merely conceals the circumstances of one’s own self-inflicted injury, may under Article 236(1) of the Criminal Code constitute an independent criminal offence against the administration of justice
Can the diversion of Vilnius region mixed municipal waste to the Kazokiškės landfill be based on a decision of a single municipality, where this in effect shifts the burden of waste management to another municipality and a local emergency situation due to pollution is already in force.
Article 25 of the Law on Waste Management imposes on a municipality not a declaratory function, but one in the nature of an obligation to achieve a result: it must organise the municipal waste management system and ensure its functioning for waste generated within its territory. Article 28(2) specifies this obligation through municipal plans: the system must ensure the provision, to all persons located within the municipality’s territory, of a service meeting environmental, technical-economic and hygiene requirements. Accordingly, the Minister’s position that primary responsibility lies with local self-government has a clear normative basis, but it does not mean that one municipality may unilaterally create obligations for a landfill located in the territory of another municipality.
The provisions of Article 27 concerning regional waste management plans indicate that the redistribution of flows at inter-regional or regional level is a matter of planning and coordination, not merely of an administrative instruction issued by a single municipality.
The stronger argument at present is not the operational need of Vilnius Municipality to “temporarily” divert waste, but Elektrėnai’s position that decisions of another municipality cannot, of themselves, have effect in its territory, particularly where an emergency situation due to pollution has already been declared in Kazokiškės since 24 March 2026 and the Environmental Protection Department has recorded non-compliance with an order to cease above-limit hydrogen sulphide pollution. In practice, this means that the decision should be based not merely on an internal municipal act or on the operational logic of VAATC infrastructure, but on a clear basis in the regional plan, recommendations of the competent authorities, or a special emergency regime. Otherwise, the axis of any court dispute would not be whether the waste must be transported somewhere, but whether the chosen legal instrument lawfully allocated the environmental and administrative burden to Elektrėnai.
The dispute concerning termination of the contract between VAATC and Energesman is a source of risk in this context, but the legality of that termination cannot be assessed on the basis of the provisions provided; municipalities should avoid conflating an operational crisis with a proven contractual breach.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether the disruption of mixed municipal waste management in the Vilnius region should primarily be addressed through municipal and regional system measures, or whether it already meets the threshold for a state-level emergency regime under Article 32 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Crisis Management and Civil Protection. The substantive legal basis for waste management is Article 25 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Waste Management, under which municipalities organise municipal waste management systems necessary for managing waste generated in their territories, ensure the functioning of those systems, and administer the provision of the service. The organisational basis is Article 30(1)–(3) of the Law on Waste Management, which allows several or all municipalities of a region to cooperate and establish an administrator of the municipal waste management system to which specific functions are assigned. At the level of municipal rules, Article 31 of the Law on Waste Management applies: municipal councils must approve waste management rules, and compliance with those rules is controlled by municipal institutions. The threshold for declaring an emergency must be assessed under Article 32(3) of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection: the municipal level is linked to consequences within one municipality, while the state level is linked to consequences in two or more municipalities or to the need to use the resources or forces of other municipalities
Legal assessment. The position of the Minister of Environment that waste management is primarily a municipal responsibility directly corresponds to Article 25 of the Law on Waste Management, because municipalities must ensure the functioning of the municipal waste system, not merely establish it formally. Where the disruption of mixed municipal waste acceptance affects all eight municipalities in the VAATC region, the issue is no longer, in legal terms, solely an administrative matter of Vilnius City, since under Article 30(1) of the Law on Waste Management such a system may be organised through regional cooperation. If VAATC acts as an administrator of the municipal waste management system entrusted by the municipalities, the scope of its powers does not arise automatically, but from founding documents, agreements between the municipalities and the administrator, or administrative acts, as provided in Article 30(2) of the Law on Waste Management. Such an administrator may be assigned the function of checking and supervising the performance of the waste manager’s contractual obligations under Article 30(3)(2) and (3) of the Law on Waste Management; accordingly, the dispute with Energesman is legally relevant both to service continuity and to the justification for the administrator’s control function. Responsibility for the disruption of final waste treatment cannot be shifted to residents in this relationship: the extract from the Government resolution concerning Draft Law No. XIIP-4355 amending the Law on Waste Management emphasises that residents are responsible for sorting waste at the place of generation, but cannot influence the final treatment process. Article 31(1) of the Law on Waste Management also means that municipal rules must ensure that services comply with environmental and public health safety requirements and that plans are implemented; therefore, the temporary diversion of waste to a landfill alone does not replace the obligation to maintain a system compliant with statutory requirements. The refusal of Elektrėnai Municipality to accept waste from the entire region must be assessed legally through the limits of competence: under Article 25 of the Law on Waste Management, each municipality is responsible for the system for waste generated in its territory, and a decision by one municipality does not in itself eliminate the control exercised by the institutions of another municipality under Article 31(2) of the Law on Waste Management. In matters concerning the regional plan, the amendment to Article 27(4) and (5) of the Law on Waste Management is significant: regional waste management plans are prepared and approved by regional development councils, and where a region does not coincide with administrative boundaries, the approval of the relevant municipalities is required. This means that any long-term redistribution of waste flows must be coordinated through the regional planning mechanism, not merely through operational decisions of a single municipality. Paragraph 261 of the State Strategic Waste Management Plan reinforces this conclusion, because municipalities and regional development councils must include in their plans, and implement, tasks ensuring an effectively functioning system and the availability of waste collection and sorting. The emergency regime under Article 32(1) of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection is declared and revoked in accordance with the procedure established by the Government; therefore, consideration by the NKVC is not in itself a final legal decision. If the consequences affect two or more municipalities, or if eliminating them requires the material resources or civil protection forces of other municipalities, the indicators of a state-level emergency arise under Article 32(3)(2) of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection. The management of the municipal-level emergency already declared in Elektrėnai is governed by the model set out in Article 33(1) of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection: the mayor convenes the municipal operations centre, decides on the declaration of the situation, organises warnings, and mobilises the forces and resources present in the municipality. However, if the consequences of waste flows, pollution, or service disruption in fact extend beyond the boundaries of Elektrėnai Municipality, or if their elimination requires the resources of other municipalities, a municipal-level regime alone may become insufficient under Article 32(3) of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the municipalities and VAATC stabilise waste acceptance through the regional administration mechanism, while the dispute with Energesman remains a matter of performance and control of contractual obligations under Article 30(2)–(3) of the Law on Waste Management. The second scenario is that the temporary diversion of waste to the Kazokiškės landfill remains possible only to the extent that it is compatible with municipal rules, regional planning, and the duty to ensure compliance with environmental and public health safety requirements under Article 31(1) of the Law on Waste Management. The third scenario is that, if the disruption of waste acceptance continues to affect several municipalities or requires the resources of other municipalities to resolve the problem, a state-level emergency regime may be applied under Article 32(3)(2) of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection. From a practical perspective, this is most important for residents, because they must have access to functioning municipal waste collection and sorting, but they are not the controllers of the final waste treatment process. It is also important for municipalities, because their duty under Article 25 of the Law on Waste Management to ensure the functioning of the system remains in place even where the service is in fact performed by an administrator or contractor. The outcome of the dispute between VAATC and Energesman will in practice determine whether the disruption is resolved through contractual liability and the administrator’s control measures, or becomes the basis for a broader civil protection regime. According to the sources provided, the role of the Ministry of Environment is most closely connected with the provision of information by regional development councils on the implementation of measures in regional plans under Article 27(9) of the Law on Waste Management, rather than with taking over municipal functions in the ordinary course. Therefore, the legally strongest criterion for further action is not the political characterisation of a “crisis”, but whether the factual consequences under Article 32 of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection remain at the scale of a single municipality or move into a situation involving several municipalities and a need for state-level resources
Can a section of streets in the city of Telšiai pass into municipal ownership solely on the basis of a cooperation agreement while it is still regarded as part of state-significance road No. 4636?
Article 4(2) of the Law on Roads lays down a strict rule: roads of state significance belong to the State by exclusive ownership, while the public limited liability company Lietuvos automobilių kelių direkcija manages them only under the right of trust. Accordingly, the agreement mentioned in the news report, under which “Via Lietuva” finances the design and contract works and the Municipality undertakes to take over the road within one year after completion of the project, cannot in itself displace the regime of exclusive State ownership. The decisive legal act is not completion of the works, nor the contractual undertaking, but the removal of the road from the list of roads of state significance: under Article 4(4) of the Law Amending the Law on Roads, such a road becomes a road of local significance together with all appurtenant structures and installations.
Article 3 of the Law Amending the Law on Roads further explains why the mere fact that the section runs along city streets is not sufficient to establish municipal ownership: carriageways of streets may also constitute roads of state significance.
The stronger argument here is not that “the street is in the city, therefore it must be managed by the municipality”, but that “for as long as the section remains on the list of roads of state significance, the ownership and trust-management regime remains a State one”. In practice, it is important for the Municipality to distinguish factual maintenance, which, as stated in the explanatory note, is already being carried out in the summer, from legal competence after transfer: following the change of status, it will not only maintain the pavement or cover preliminary annual winter costs of approximately EUR 17,000, but will also become the principal decision-making authority for the use of the road of local significance. This is particularly relevant for oversized and heavy goods vehicles, because under Article 20 of the Law Amending the Law on Roads, permits for public roads of local significance are issued in accordance with the procedure established by municipalities, whereas permits for roads of state significance are issued in accordance with the procedure established by the Ministry of Transport and Communications.
The legal risk is therefore not merely the additional maintenance costs following “Via Lietuva’s” EUR 712,000 and the Municipality’s approximately EUR 700,000 in contract works; the risk lies in prematurely assuming that the Municipality already has full decision-making competence before the formal change in the status of the road of state significance has taken place.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether the section of road of national significance No. 4636 within the city of Telšiai may be removed from the system of roads of national significance and transferred into the ownership of Telšiai District Municipality as a road of local significance. This issue is to be assessed under Articles 1, 3, Article 4(2)-(4), and Article 20 of the Law on Roads of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as Articles 3, 4, and 6 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Transfer of State Property into Municipal Ownership. Article 4(2) of the Law on Roads establishes the initial rule: roads of national significance belong to the State by exclusive ownership right, and are managed in trust by the public limited liability company Lithuanian Road Administration. Article 4(3) of the Law on Roads establishes the opposite final legal regime: public roads and streets of local significance belong to municipalities by ownership right. Accordingly, the transfer is not merely a simple change of the owner of the property; a change in the road’s status under Article 4(4) of the Law on Roads is also required
Legal assessment. Under Article 3(1) of the Law on Roads, roads are classified as roads of national or local significance according to vehicle traffic capacity and their social and economic significance. Article 3(2) of the same Law links roads of national significance to international, transit, tourist, and intensive local traffic, while Article 3(3)(1) classifies as public roads of local significance, inter alia, streets in residential areas that are not classified as roads of national significance. Thus, the essence of the transfer of street sections in the city of Telšiai is their legal reclassification from the State road regime to the municipal street regime. Article 4(4) of the Law on Roads allows a road of national significance, or a section thereof, to be removed from the list of roads of national significance upon a proposal by the Ministry of Transport and Communications where, among other things, the social and economic significance of the road changes or a bypass of cities or other residential areas is constructed. The section referred to in the information consists of city streets, and the direction of Luokės Street is associated with the bypass towards Šiaulių Plentas; therefore, the legally relevant mechanism is precisely the list amendment and transfer mechanism provided for in Article 4(4) of the Law on Roads. Under the same provision, transfer into municipal ownership is carried out only upon obtaining the consent of the relevant municipal council, together with all structures belonging to the road and technical traffic regulation measures, and the road is entered in the list of roads of local significance. The provision in the cooperation agreement between the Municipality and Via Lietuva that the Municipality will take over the road no later than within one year after implementation of the project does not, in itself, replace the public-law actions prescribed in Article 4(4) of the Law on Roads. It operates as an inter partes obligation to coordinate investments and the course of the transfer, but the final change of ownership requires completion of the chain of decisions and registration by the competent entities. Article 3(1)(2) of the Law on the Transfer of State Property into Municipal Ownership directly covers streets and roads of local significance as State property to be transferred into municipal ownership. Article 4(1) of that Law provides that a municipality takes over property by a decision of the municipal council, and that the draft decision must be publicly announced on the municipality’s website no later than one month before its consideration. Under Article 4(2), such council decision constitutes the legal basis for registering the municipality’s ownership rights in the Real Property Register, and under Article 4(3), the municipality’s ownership rights arise from the date on which the council decision enters into force. Under Article 4(4), the director of the municipal administration or a person authorised by him or her must register the rights in rem in the Real Property Register. Subparagraph 20.1 of the amendment to the description approved by Government Resolution No. 16 of 5 January 2001 indicates that the transfer of State immovable property referred to in Article 4(4) of the Law on Roads is subject to a special regime, while paragraph 21 requires the transfer to be formalised by a transfer-acceptance deed. Article 20 of the Law on Roads is of practical importance after the transfer: permits to use public roads of local significance by oversized or heavy vehicles are issued in accordance with the procedure established by municipalities, whereas roads of national significance are subject to the procedure established by the Ministry of Transport and Communications. Accordingly, after the transfer, not only the organisation of maintenance will change, but also the authority competent to issue permits and approvals
Consequences. The realistic principal scenario is as follows: after completion of this year’s repair works in Q4 2026, and after completion in 2027 of the planned works from Norfa to the bypass towards Šiaulių Plentas, the removal of the urban section of road of national significance No. 4636 from the list of roads of national significance and its transfer to the Municipality will be initiated. This will require the consent and decision of the municipal council, public announcement of the draft decision at least one month in advance, a transfer-acceptance deed, and registration of the rights in rem in the Real Property Register. Until these actions have been completed, the road remains State-owned property managed in trust under the model set out in Article 4(2) of the Law on Roads. After the transfer, the Municipality assumes the role of owner of a road of local significance: it decides on maintenance, repairs, traffic organisation, and permits relating to the use of roads of local significance under Article 20 of the Law on Roads. This is of practical importance to residents, because decisions concerning the maintenance of a city street should be taken at municipal level rather than coordinated with the State road manager. It is also important for the municipal budget, because the winter maintenance costs referred to in the information become a matter for municipal planning, although they are linked to funds from the Road Maintenance and Development Programme. The practical consequence for Via Lietuva is a reduction in the scope of property managed in trust and the transfer of responsibility for the specific urban section to the Municipality after proper legal formalisation. If the council decision or the transfer procedure were not completed, the one-year term provided for in the cooperation agreement would not, by itself, create municipal ownership rights without the actions prescribed in Article 4 of the Law on the Transfer of State Property into Municipal Ownership
Is the invitation by Šiauliai City Municipality, via a form, to submit proposals concerning objects owned or maintained by the municipality merely a consultation with residents, or is it a procedure that creates an obligation to set maintenance priorities on the basis of residents’ proposals?
Article 42 of the Law Amending the Law on Local Self-Government imposes an obligation on the municipality to create conditions for local residents to participate in the management of municipal affairs: to inform, consult, assess and publish the results of consultations, and involve residents in decision-making. The strongest implication of this provision is not an obligation to implement every proposal, but an obligation to turn consultation into a traceable process: to collect proposals, assess them and publish the results. Article 42 of the Law on Local Self-Government, insofar as it concerns polling, indicates a different and more formal regime: a poll is mandatorily announced only after the required signatures have been collected or at the request of a group comprising at least one quarter of the council members, while in the case of an initiative by an elder it may be announced after assessing the procedure laid down in the regulations.
Accordingly, a simple proposal form is not, in itself, such a poll and does not create legal binding force equivalent to voting results.
In practice, the stronger argument is one of municipal discretion rather than the binding nature of residents’ proposals: residents may propose public spaces, pavements, parks, playgrounds, lighting or street furniture, but the final priority must be justified by criteria relating to municipal property, the budget and planning. The risk for the municipality arises not because it chooses an object other than the most popular one, but because it fails to publish how the proposals were assessed, or fails to distinguish between municipally owned and private objects. Article 27 of the Law on Local Self-Government is also relevant because the municipal controller assesses whether municipal property and the budget are used lawfully, efficiently, economically and effectively; therefore, subsequent maintenance decisions should have documented selection criteria.
For a professional audience, it is worth citing not the rules on the binding nature of polls, but the obligation to ensure participation and to publish consultation results: that is where the real point of dispute lies if the consultation remains merely a public relations exercise without a verifiable decision-making trail.
Core issue. The precise question arises whether the invitation by Šiauliai City Municipality for residents to propose municipality-owned or municipality-maintained objects requiring improvement constitutes a form of local residents’ participation in the management of municipal affairs, and what obligations this creates for the municipality. This question is assessed under Article 4(8) and (9) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, Article 42 of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, Article 43 of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, Article 6(3) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, and Article 17(1) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania. The basis of municipal competence is also formed by Article 3(2) and (3) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, under which local self-government is implemented through the municipal council, the executive institution and other institutions responsible for implementing functions in the interests of the community. Since the notice concerns public spaces, pavements, paths, squares, parks, playgrounds, lighting and other objects of common use, Article 6(3) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania is relevant, as it assigns to the municipality the independent function of managing, using and disposing of land and other property owned by the municipality
Legal assessment. Legally, this invitation primarily corresponds to a consultation and resident engagement mechanism, since Article 42 of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania provides that the municipality creates conditions for residents to participate in the management of municipal affairs by informing, consulting, assessing and publishing the results of consultations, and involving residents in decision-making. This invitation is not, in itself, equivalent to a formal poll of local residents, because Article 41 of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania provides for an initiative group consisting of at least 10 residents with voting rights, an application to the mayor, actions by the director of administration, and the issuance of signature collection sheets. A formal poll is also subject to Article 42 of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, under which, once the required signatures have been collected or a demand has been received from a group comprising at least one quarter of the council members, the poll must be announced no later than within one month. In the case at hand, the notice refers to an electronic form and the municipality’s request to submit proposals; therefore, the procedure appears to correspond more closely to consultation than to a mandatory procedure for announcing a poll. When organising such collection of proposals, the municipality must comply with Article 43 of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania: information must be published in such a manner that local residents have the opportunity to receive it, and groups of residents directly affected must be informed on the municipality’s initiative. The same Article 43 requires information to be published in at least two ways, one of which is the municipal website; therefore, a notice solely on a news portal or only an electronic form is not a sufficient information model if the municipality treats it as official consultation. Under Article 43, the text of the information must be understandable to persons without specialised knowledge and accessible to persons with disabilities, and the contact details of the one-stop-shop unit or responsible person must be indicated when providing information. The municipality’s request not to propose private objects is consistent with the limits of its competence, since Article 6(3) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania concerns the management, use and disposal of land and other property owned by the municipality. The exclusion of the internal premises and exterior of apartment buildings, as well as private courtyards, from the invitation also reflects the separation of competences: the source concerning the draft amendment to Article 4.84 of the Civil Code refers to the municipal function of supervising and controlling the activities of management bodies of associations, persons authorised under joint activity agreements and administrators, but this is not the same as a municipal obligation to improve private objects. The decision as to which objects should be improved first cannot be transferred automatically from residents’ proposals alone, because Article 17(1) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania assigns to the council the approval of regulations that must set out the forms and methods of communication with residents, while local self-government decisions are adopted within the limits of institutional competence. Article 4(7) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania further requires coordination between the interests of the municipal community and those of individual residents; therefore, a popular proposal cannot in itself justify a decision that infringes the rights of individual residents guaranteed by law. Article 4(5) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania establishes the principle of legality, meaning that improvement priorities must be linked to the competence of municipal institutions and legal acts, not merely to the number of opinions expressed. Article 4(9) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania requires openness and transparency; therefore, after collecting proposals, what is legally significant is not only gathering opinions, but also clearly showing how they were assessed
Consequences. The most realistic scenario is that the municipality will use residents’ proposals as consultation results, assess them and, pursuant to Article 42 of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, publish how the consultation affected priorities. If the proposals relate to municipal property or objects of common use maintained by the municipality, they may serve as a basis for planning works; however, the mere completion of the form does not create a subjective right for a resident to demand improvement of a specific object. If residents sought not consultation but a more formal verification of the local community’s will, Article 41 of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania concerning an initiative group and Article 42 concerning the announcement of a poll would apply. In that case, once the statutory preconditions had been met, the municipal council or, upon its instruction, the director of the municipal administration would have to act within a one-month period. For owners of private objects and residents of apartment buildings, the practical importance of this notice is that the municipal invitation is not a mechanism for transferring the maintenance of private property onto the municipality’s list of priorities. For the local community, the key point is that proposals must be directed at objects falling within municipal competence, because only then can they be meaningfully assessed under the rules governing municipal asset management and the administration of local affairs. For the municipality, the practical risk arises not from the invitation itself, but from the subsequent process: if the results were not assessed or published, such conduct would be inconsistent with Article 42(3) of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania and Article 4(9) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania
Can an offer of EUR 400 to a police investigator, so that the investigator would not open a pre-trial investigation into domestic violence and would allow the suspect spouse to return home, be treated as bribery where, under a special law, the officer no longer has discretion to refrain from acting on the basis of “reconciliation”?
Article 12(1) of the Law on Protection against Domestic Violence establishes a clear sequence: upon receiving a report, police officers record the incident and, where they identify indications of a criminal offence, open a pre-trial investigation. Article 12(2) of the same law is particularly relevant here, because it emphasises that protection and assistance apply regardless of whether the person who experienced violence has submitted a complaint, application or report. Accordingly, a request “not to open a pre-trial investigation” after a kick to the face is not simply an expression of the victim’s position: it targets the officer’s statutory duty to act.
Under the wording of Article 227 of the Criminal Code, the essence of bribery is the offer, promise, agreement to give, or giving of a bribe to a public servant; here, the EUR 400 amount was linked to specific procedural inaction.
The article’s wording that the woman may face liability “for bribery” is legally more precise than a possible public shorthand referring to “bribery in relation to officials”. Bribery by a private person and passive bribery by an official are not synonyms: under the wording of Article 227 of the Criminal Code, bribery covers conduct by a person who offers, promises, agrees to give or gives a bribe to a public servant. Passive bribery, by contrast, is an offence committed on the official’s side.
The correct direction of legal classification in this news item is therefore the active offer of a bribe to the investigator, not bribery committed by the official. A more precise formulation would be: “the woman may face criminal liability for bribery under Article 227 of the Criminal Code, because she is suspected of having offered EUR 400 to a public servant in exchange for the desired procedural inaction”.
The stronger argument in this situation is not that the victim “does not want a case”, but that domestic violence, by virtue of the purpose of the law, is treated as conduct of public significance, in respect of which the police response is not a matter for private agreement between the parties. In practice, it is risky for the defence to rely solely on the logic of reconciliation or the victim’s request, because Article 12 of the Law on Protection against Domestic Violence links the officer’s duty to open an investigation to the presence of indications of a criminal offence, not to the victim’s wishes. For the prosecutor or police, the key point is to record not only the fact of the EUR 400 offer, but also its purpose: not to open an investigation, not to hold the husband liable, and to allow him to return home.
It is precisely that purpose which makes the case legally sharper, because the bribe was offered not for some abstract favourable treatment, but to block the protection and criminal-procedure response defined by law.
Core issue. The legal issue is twofold: whether the offer of EUR 400 to a police investigator so that the man would not be held liable and no pre-trial investigation would be opened is to be classified as bribery under Article 227 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, and what duty was imposed on the police by the report of physical violence by a spouse under Article 12 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Protection against Domestic Violence. Spouses fall within the concept of “close environment” under Article 2(2) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Protection against Domestic Violence, and the woman against whom violence was used is to be regarded as a person who has experienced domestic violence under Article 2(4) of the same law. Pursuant to Article 12(1)(2) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Protection against Domestic Violence, police officers, upon identifying indications of a criminal act, commence a pre-trial investigation. Accordingly, the request “not to commence a pre-trial investigation” must be assessed not as a private family request, but as a request that an official refrain from performing a statutory duty. The bribery provision distinguishes between a bribe for lawful action or inaction under Article 227(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania and a bribe for unlawful action or inaction under Article 227(2). Since what was requested was not the exercise of lawful discretion, but the omission of what the police are required to do upon identifying indications of a criminal act, the principal basis for classification is Article 227(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. On the text of Article 227 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania provided, the amount of EUR 400 does not, in itself, fall within the element specified in Article 227(3), because that paragraph is linked to a bribe exceeding 250 MSLs, and it does not fall within Article 227(4), because that paragraph is linked to a value below 1 MSL
Legal assessment. The domestic violence regime under Article 1(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Protection against Domestic Violence is designed to ensure an immediate response to a threat, the application of protective measures, and the definition of institutional competence. Article 1(2) of the same law provides that the law defines domestic violence and the rights of persons who have experienced violence, while the wording of Article 1 of the amending law provided emphasises that domestic violence is a violation of human rights and freedoms. This means that a domestic violence incident is not left at the disposal of the victim in such a way that the victim could “withdraw” the State’s response by means of a bribe or a request. Article 12(2) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Protection against Domestic Violence directly obliges the police to ensure the protection of the person who has experienced violence and to inform that person of the right not to submit a complaint, application or report, and of the right to receive protection and assistance, irrespective of whether such a complaint has been submitted. This provision is particularly important here: even if the victim herself asked that the perpetrator be released, the police duty to respond to identified indications of a criminal act did not thereby cease to exist. If indications of a criminal act had not been identified, Article 12(1)(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Protection against Domestic Violence would have directed the police to decide on issuing a domestic violence protection order, which, under Article 2(1) of that law, may require the person posing a risk of violence temporarily to move out, not to approach, and not to communicate. However, the reported kick to the face is a factual circumstance by reason of which the police, upon identifying indications of a criminal act, must commence a pre-trial investigation under Article 12(1)(2). The request to the officer to “allow him to return home” is also at odds with the statutory purpose of ensuring immediate protection against a threat under Article 1(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Protection against Domestic Violence. The report provided concerning the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women states that the objective is to create legal conditions for isolating the perpetrator from the victim, and that during a pre-trial investigation the prosecutor, pre-trial investigation judge or court may impose remand measures to prevent further criminal acts. For the elements of bribery under Article 227 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, it is significant that liability is already linked to the offer, promise, agreement to give, or giving of a bribe; therefore, the mere indicated offer of a EUR 400 bribe is material from the perspective of criminal liability. The fact that the addressee was an investigator of the Response Board of the Vilnius County Police Headquarters is relevant because Article 227 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania applies where a bribe is offered to a civil servant or a person equivalent thereto for the desired action or inaction in the exercise of authority. Procedurally, the violence episode had to be recorded and, upon identification of indications of a criminal act, investigated under Article 12(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Protection against Domestic Violence, while the bribery episode constitutes a separate basis for criminal liability under Article 227 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania provides that a pre-trial investigation may be terminated, inter alia, where insufficient data are collected to substantiate the suspect’s guilt, or on other grounds specified in that article; however, this is a procedural decision made in the course of the investigation, not an official’s volition in exchange for money. If a temporary restriction of property rights were applied in the case, Article 152(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania would require the ruling to specify the prosecutor, the reasons, the basis, the property, the manner, scope and term of the restriction. No issue of covert actions or provocation under Article 158 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania arises from the facts provided, because the report describes a direct offer to the officer who arrived at the scene, not an operation by officers concealing their identity
Consequences. Realistically, the case may branch into two proceedings: one concerning the man’s alleged domestic violence and the other concerning the woman’s possible bribery. What is most relevant for the man is that the victim’s request does not remove him from the sphere of competence of the police, prosecutor or court, because Article 12 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Protection against Domestic Violence imposes an autonomous duty on the police to respond to indications of a criminal act. What is most relevant for the woman is that her status as a person who has experienced violence under Article 2(4) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Protection against Domestic Violence does not eliminate potential liability for a separate act: bribery under Article 227 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. If it is held that the bribe was offered for unlawful inaction by the official, Article 227(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania applies; that provision prescribes a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to five years. If, during the investigation, insufficient data are collected in respect of either act, Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania provides for the possibility of terminating the pre-trial investigation. If sufficient data are obtained, the bribery case will in practical terms be significant not only because of the EUR 400 amount, but also because the objective was to influence a police decision not to commence an investigation into domestic violence. Institutionally, this situation shows that the role of a police officer in such a case is not to negotiate the release of a family member, but to record the incident, commence an investigation where indications of a criminal act exist, and ensure the protection of the person who has experienced violence under Article 12 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Protection against Domestic Violence. The practical consequence for the victim is paradoxical: the law protects her against domestic violence, but her own attempt to influence the officer’s procedural decision with money may become a separate charge
The specific point in dispute is whether S. Jasaitis’s claim of 18 June 2026 for partition of property held in common partial ownership may be treated as an independent proprietary claim against his former spouse, notwithstanding the parallel proceedings brought by O. Pikul on 1 December 2025 concerning a change in the amount or form of maintenance for a minor child.
The public assertion that he is “asking me to pay him money” does not, as a matter of law, necessarily amount to a claim for spousal maintenance by a former spouse; on the stated subject matter of the case, it is primarily a question of partition of property, not of child maintenance, alimony, or moral conduct.
Article 3.2 of the Civil Code provides that property acquired after the conclusion of marriage in the name of both spouses or either of them, as well as income from the activities of one spouse, dividends, pensions, benefits and other payments, except for payments of a designated purpose, is recognised as joint community property of the spouses. It follows from this rule that the decisive question in a partition case should not be which former spouse currently “earns more”, but whether the specific property, or the increase in its value, became part of the spouses’ common property mass. Article 3.67 of the Civil Code is additionally relevant as regards the temporal cut-off: divorce produces consequences for property rights from the date on which the divorce proceedings are instituted before the court, although in certain cases the court may set an earlier date when the spouses in fact ceased to live together.
Accordingly, the practical focus of proof should be the dates of acquisition of the property, receipt of income, and actual separation, rather than public statements concerning child maintenance alone.
At present, the stronger legal argument for S. Jasaitis would not be a need to receive money from his former spouse, but the identification of specific common property or a share of its value under Article 3.2 of the Civil Code, and the point at which property consequences arise under Article 3.67. For O.
Pikul, the stronger line of defence would be to separate the child maintenance dispute from the partition of property and to require precise identification of what property was acquired, when, and from what sources. The professional risk in commenting on this case is to conflate three distinct legal institutions: variation of child maintenance, mutual maintenance between former spouses under Article 3.72 of the Civil Code, and partition of property held in common partial ownership. On the facts provided, S.
Jasaitis’s claim is not described as a maintenance claim brought under Article 3.72 of the Civil Code; therefore, the public narrative that he “wants his former wife to maintain him” would be legally too weak unless and until it is shown that precisely such a claim has been brought in the proceedings.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is twofold: first, how the court should assess the issue of maintenance for a minor child under Articles 3.30 and 3.203 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania; second, whether a former spouse’s monetary claim may be linked to the matrimonial property regime under Article 3.2(1)–(2) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 3.1 of the Civil Code provides that the rules of Book Three regulate spouses’ property rights and the mutual rights and duties of children and parents; accordingly, both identified matters fall within the scope of family law. In the child-related case, the principal provision is Article 3.30 of the Civil Code, under which spouses are obliged to maintain and raise their minor children and to care for their education, health and other rights. Article 3.203(1) of the Civil Code further provides that maintenance awarded for a child must be used solely in the child’s interests. In the property case, the presumption established in Article 3.2(2) of the Civil Code is significant: property is presumed to be the spouses’ joint community property until it is proved to be the personal property of one spouse. Therefore, the publicly discussed “request for money” is not, as a matter of law, automatically equivalent to maintenance for a former spouse: according to the information provided, S. Jasaitis’s case is described as a case concerning partition from common partial ownership
Legal assessment. In the case initiated by O. Pikul and received by the court on 1 December 2025, the court should assess not the emotional conflict between the former spouses, but the amount and form of child maintenance through the parental duty established in Article 3.30 of the Civil Code. If maintenance is awarded for the child, Article 3.203 of the Civil Code requires that it be used solely in the child’s interests; accordingly, the recipient of the funds may not convert them into an independent proprietary interest of their own. If maintenance intended for the child were used other than in the child’s interests, Article 3.203(2) of the Civil Code permits its recovery from the assets of the person who misused it, upon a claim brought by the child’s representatives, the state child rights protection authority or the prosecutor. Article 3.204 of the Civil Code is relevant in that it recognises a situation in which a child does not receive maintenance from the father or mother for more than one month; however, the information provided contains no data on the specific procedure under that provision being applicable to this case. S. Jasaitis’s claim, which reached the court on 18 June 2026, is, according to the information provided, a claim concerning partition from common partial ownership; therefore, the central issue is not the child’s needs, but what property belongs to the parties and in what shares. Under Article 3.2(1) of the Civil Code, property acquired after the conclusion of marriage, income, income from activities, dividends, pensions, benefits and other payments may be treated as the spouses’ joint community property, except for payments of a designated purpose. Under paragraph 2 of the same article, the party disputing the presumption of common ownership must prove that the specific property is personal property. If the dispute were to become a monetary claim, Article 4.178 of the Civil Code provides that, once a claim for recovery of money is upheld, a mortgage over the debtor’s item may be registered at the creditor’s request. Article 4.178 of the Civil Code also requires the court judgment to specify the amount secured by the mortgage, the term, the item and its owner; therefore, a public statement about a “request for money” alone does not create such security. Article 3.72 of the Civil Code would be relevant only if the former spouse brought a claim for spousal maintenance: in that event, the court would assess the need for maintenance, the financial position of both parties, their health, age, capacity for work and other material circumstances. However, according to the information provided, S. Jasaitis’s case is characterised as a property partition case and therefore should not be equated with the institution of maintenance between former spouses under Article 3.72 of the Civil Code. Article 3.105(8) of the Civil Code is important in the broader context: even the terms of a marriage contract cannot restrict or deprive a spouse of the right to apply to a court; accordingly, the act of bringing proceedings is not unlawful merely because the other party considers it unfounded. Article 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure indicates that, in family cases, procedural documents must include information on children, their maintenance, the spouses’ joint property and claims concerning its division where such issues are decided in divorce or related proceedings
Consequences. In practical terms, the first case may result in a change to the amount or form of child maintenance if, on the basis of the evidence presented, the court finds grounds to adjust the maintenance already awarded. The outcome of such a case is primarily important for the child, because Articles 3.30 and 3.203 of the Civil Code link maintenance to the child’s needs, not to public controversy between the parents. The second case may result in partition of property, an award of compensation or dismissal of the claim, depending on whether the claimant proves his rights to a specific object of common ownership. If a monetary sum were awarded, Article 4.178 of the Civil Code would make it possible to secure it by a mortgage over the debtor’s item, but only where the particulars required by that provision are specified in the court judgment. Public statements about who “failed to pay” or who “is asking for money” do not, on the basis of the sources provided, alter either the duty to maintain the child or the presumption of common ownership. What will be legally material is not comments made on a programme, but the claims asserted, the evidence concerning the child’s needs, the parties’ property and the origin of ownership. The real substance of the dispute is therefore the separation of two distinct interests: in the child maintenance case, the issue is the financing of the child’s welfare; in the partition case, it is the former spouses’ property shares and possible compensation
Would grabbing a dog by the neck, throwing it over a fence nearly two metres high, failing to provide veterinary care, and causing emaciation be sufficient for criminal liability under Article 310 of the Lithuanian Criminal Code if it is not clearly established that the animal died or was maimed?
Article 310 of the Criminal Code criminalises cruelty to an animal or torture of an animal only where, as a result, the animal dies or is maimed. This means that pain, severe stress, and inhumane treatment recorded by a veterinarian, although plainly significant, are not in themselves sufficient for criminal liability under this provision without the required consequence element. Article 4 of the Law on Animal Welfare and Protection provides a broader basis: cruel treatment includes failure to provide veterinary assistance where it is necessary, as well as frightening or injuring animals.
From this perspective, the facts concerning the dog’s fall onto paving, the failure to take it to a veterinarian after the incident, and its weight of approximately 2 kg correspond much more directly to the elements of an animal welfare offence than to the elements of Article 310 of the Criminal Code.
In Lithuanian proceedings, the stronger argument under the provisions cited would not be abstract “cruelty”, but a specific breach of Article 4(2)(2) and (3): failure to provide necessary veterinary assistance and injuring or frightening the animal. Application of Article 310 of the Criminal Code would be risky if the case lacks a veterinary finding that Boomer was maimed, since the news report states that, in the care of the RSPCA, he quickly regained weight and found a new home after about a month. The key issue for the prosecution strategy would therefore not be the video recording alone, but the medical consequence: whether the fall and neglect caused a qualifying maiming, rather than merely pain, stress, or emaciation.
For the defence, the strongest point would be precisely the result element under Article 310; for the prosecution, the strongest point would be breach of the welfare duty and failure to provide veterinary assistance after an obviously dangerous incident.
Core issue. The legal issue is whether taking a dog by the neck, throwing it over an almost two-metre fence, failing to provide veterinary assistance, and neglect resulting in emaciation would constitute cruel treatment of an animal, animal torture, and improper keeping under Lithuanian law. The assessment would primarily be based on Article 4(1) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Animal Welfare and Protection, which prohibits cruel treatment of animals and their torture. Specifically relevant are Article 4(2)(2) of the same law, concerning failure to provide veterinary assistance where necessary, and Article 4(2)(3), concerning frightening, injuring, or killing animals. The content of the duties of keeping would be determined under Article 6(1) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Animal Welfare and Protection, pursuant to which an animal must be cared for in conditions appropriate to its species, age, physiology, and behaviour, without causing it pain or suffering. The threshold of liability would be determined under Article 346(16) and (18) of the Republic of Lithuania Code of Administrative Offences and Article 310(1) of the Republic of Lithuania Criminal Code. Under Article 310(1) of the Criminal Code, criminal liability arises where cruel treatment or torture results in the animal’s death or maiming
Legal assessment. The described grabbing of the dog by the neck, carrying it, and throwing it over a fence would directly fall within the frightening or injuring of an animal referred to in Article 4(2)(3) of the Law on Animal Welfare and Protection if such conduct caused the animal pain, stress, or physical injury. The circumstance noted by the veterinarian, namely that the dog experienced pain and significant stress merely from being lifted by the neck, would legally reinforce the conclusion that there was a breach not only of the prohibition on cruel treatment, but also of the keeper’s duty under Article 6(1) of the Law on Animal Welfare and Protection to prevent pain or suffering. The fact that, after falling onto the paving, the dog was not taken to a veterinarian falls within Article 4(2)(2) of the Law on Animal Welfare and Protection, because failure to provide veterinary assistance is independently identified as cruel treatment or torture. The dog’s weight of approximately 2 kilograms and severe emaciation would be relevant in assessing a breach of the ongoing duty of care under Article 20(2)(1) of the Law Amending the Law on the Care, Keeping, and Use of Animals, which requires keepers to continuously care for animal welfare and protection. A person who lived in the same house and failed to ensure proper nutrition could, under these provisions, be assessed separately from the person who physically threw the dog, because the keeper’s duty comprises not only refraining from active violence but also caring for the animal’s condition. Administrative liability under Article 346(16) of the Code of Administrative Offences applies for cruel treatment of an animal or animal torture, while Article 346(18) applies where such conduct places animals at risk of death or maiming. Under Article 1(6) of the Law Amending Article 346 of the Code of Administrative Offences, confiscation of animals is mandatory for the offences provided for in Article 346(16)–(19). If it were established that the conduct caused the dog’s death or maiming, the classification of liability would shift to Article 310(1) of the Criminal Code, which provides for community service, a fine, restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. The cited source of the Government Resolution also clearly draws the distinction: Article 346(16)–(19) of the Code of Administrative Offences covers administrative liability, while Article 310 of the Criminal Code applies where the animal has died or been maimed. From an institutional perspective, under Article 21(2) of the Law Amending the Law on the Care, Keeping, and Use of Animals, officials of supervisory institutions may request documents, information, or explanations, submit reports to law enforcement authorities, apply administrative measures, and transfer animals into temporary care. The neighbours’ report of the incident corresponds to the duty of a person, established in Article 20(1) of the same law, to notify competent authorities of known cases of cruel treatment of animals or their torture
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario would be an administrative case under Article 346(16) or (18) of the Code of Administrative Offences if cruel treatment or torture is established but there is no death or maiming of the animal. In that case, under Article 1 of the Law Amending Article 346 of the Code of Administrative Offences, the fine could range from EUR 150 to EUR 2,000 under paragraph 16, or from EUR 900 to EUR 3,200 under paragraph 18, and confiscation of the animal would be mandatory under paragraph 20. The second scenario would be criminal liability under Article 310(1) of the Criminal Code if the cruel treatment or torture were linked to the dog’s death or maiming. In that case, the consequence under Article 6(2)(3) of the Law on Animal Welfare and Protection would be significant: a person convicted under Article 310 of the Criminal Code, or released from such liability on the grounds specified in that provision, may not be an animal keeper during enforcement of the court judgment and for 10 years after its enforcement. Under Article 6(3), this prohibition applies in respect of all animal species, so the practical consequence would be broader than merely a prohibition on keeping a dog. If the case remained administrative, Article 6(2)(1) and (2) of the Law on Animal Welfare and Protection provide for two-year or four-year prohibitions on being a keeper where a person has been sanctioned under the relevant paragraphs of Article 346 of the Code of Administrative Offences and all animals have been confiscated from that person. This outcome is practically important not only for the perpetrator but also for the cohabiting keeper, because each person’s duties may be assessed according to their individual conduct: active violence, failure to provide veterinary assistance, or failure to ensure nutrition and care. The transfer of the animal into temporary care and the subsequent determination of the keeping issue would be based on Article 21(2)(5), meaning that institutional action would not end solely with the imposition of a fine or the adoption of a court decision. More broadly, this situation demonstrates that, under the Lithuanian provisions cited, the decisive factor is not only the violent act itself but the entire chain of the keeper’s conduct: causing suffering, failing to provide necessary assistance, neglect, and failure to ensure conditions corresponding to the animal’s physiology
The specific dispute is not only about the amount of the EUR 24,200 fine, but about whether the use, in advertising for healthcare services, of influencer content featuring patients’ likenesses, names, experiences and depictions of IV drip infusion procedures falls within the prohibition in Article 15 of the Law on Advertising, and whether ceasing such an infringement only after the SCRPA resolution may defeat a request to reduce the fine to EUR 5,000.
The wording of Article 15 of the Law on Advertising cited here prohibits, in advertising for healthcare services and medical devices, the use of a patient’s name, surname and likeness, and reliance on recommendations by healthcare institutions, specialists or their professional organisations. The essential rule arising from this provision is that the object of the prohibition is not limited to misleading or unethical advertising: the commercial use of patient identification or of a patient role in advertising healthcare services is independently risky. The basis for the SCRPA’s competence derives from Article 12 of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection, under which the authority supervises compliance with consumer protection requirements and applies the enforcement measures established by law.
Article 46 of the same law indicates that the resolution must state the factual circumstances of the infringement, the evidence confirming the infringement, the article establishing liability, and an assessment of the service provider’s explanations. Accordingly, the clinic’s argument concerning “unassessed circumstances” is legally strong only to the extent that it demonstrates a deficiency in those elements of the resolution, not merely disagreement with the sanction.
On 8 July 2026, the Regional Administrative Court upheld the EUR 24,000 fine imposed by the SCRPA in November 2025 and expressly endorsed the position that patients’ likenesses, experiences, reviews, names and surnames in advertisements for healthcare services are contrary to law. An important practical point is that the court did not attach decisive weight to the asserted fact that this was a first infringement or to the clinic’s difficult financial position, because the advertising was discontinued not voluntarily, but only after the authority’s resolution imposing the fine. In February, the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania temporarily suspended payment of the fine due to the potential disruption of the clinic’s operations, but that was an interim protective measure, not a finding that there had been no infringement or that the fine was disproportionate.
The statement reported in the article that “the law prohibits not the image of a specific patient, but the patient image itself, if used for advertising” is too absolute if it refers to the use of a person’s image generally: the wording cited from Article 13 of the Law on the Provision of Information to the Public prohibits filming or photographing a person and using that person’s images for advertising in public information media without that person’s consent. It would be more precise to say that general protection of a person’s image is linked to the absence of consent, while advertising for healthcare services is additionally subject to the special prohibition in Article 15 of the Law on Advertising on using a patient’s name, surname and likeness. It is also inaccurate to state without qualification that patient experiences and reviews in advertisements are always, by themselves, contrary to law: under the wording of Article 15 of the Law on Advertising cited here, the direct prohibition concerns the use of a patient’s name, surname and likeness, so anonymous reviews without patient identification are not, on the evidence provided, prohibited with the same clarity.
Following this ruling, the stronger argument is the position of the SCRPA and the court that influencer-format advertising in the healthcare sector is not a “lighter” form of advertising: if the content encourages the use of procedures and relies on a patient persona, experience or identification, it is assessed under the prohibition in Article 15 of the Law on Advertising. In practice, clinics and advertising agencies should distinguish the general issue of consent to use an image from the special prohibition applicable to advertising healthcare services, because the mere consent of a patient or model does not necessarily eliminate the risk under Article 15 of the Law on Advertising. When challenging a fine, it would be more promising not to rely abstractly on a first infringement or financial difficulties, but to examine whether the SCRPA resolution precisely identifies, in accordance with Article 46 of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection, the advertising items, the evidence of the infringement, the liability provision applied, and the assessment of the service provider’s explanations.
A practical mistake that is now easy to make is to assume that, in advertising IV drip infusions or other procedures, it is enough to omit the surname: under the logic of this case, risk also arises from the commercial use of the patient’s likeness and experience.
Core issue. The legal issue is not only whether the patient image used in the advertising of “P9 klinikos” was prohibited, but whether the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority had competence to investigate it, order the discontinuation of the advertising, and impose a proportionate fine. This is determined under Article 18(1) of the Law on Advertising of the Republic of Lithuania, which grants the Authority the right to obtain information, documents and explanations, and to require the discontinuation of advertising that does not comply with the applicable requirements. The amount of the sanction is assessed under the system of Article 24 of the Law on Advertising, insofar as it applies through paragraphs 1, 3, 5, 7.2, 7.3, 8–10 and 13 of the Description of the Procedure for Issuing Warnings and Imposing Fines for Infringements of the Law on Advertising of the Republic of Lithuania. The issue of appeal and enforcement of the fine is governed by Article 25(1)–(2) of the Law on Advertising: an advertising activity operator may appeal the Authority’s resolution to a court within 20 days of receipt, and the appeal does not automatically suspend enforcement unless the court decides otherwise. Article 49 of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection provides for a 30-calendar-day appeal period and automatic suspension of enforcement of the fine; however, in this notice the dispute is described as a case concerning infringements of advertising law, and therefore the special procedure under Article 25 of the Law on Advertising applies directly
Legal assessment. The Authority’s competence in this situation arises from Article 18(1) of the Law on Advertising, because the advertising supervisory authority may collect material necessary for the investigation, require explanations, and order an advertising activity operator to discontinue unlawful advertising. The clinic, as an advertising activity operator, was obliged to provide the information and documents necessary for the investigation, while the Authority was entitled to assess not only the text of the advertisement but also its visual content and manner of use. According to the facts reported, the court agreed with the Authority’s position that the use in the advertisements of patients’ names, surnames, images, experiences and testimonials concerning procedures was contrary to advertising law. This conclusion is important because the advertising prohibition is linked not only to proof of the identity of a specific real patient, but also to the use of a patient image to promote a service. The logic for calculating the fine must follow three stages: under paragraph 5 of the Description, the initial, base and final amounts of the fine are determined. Under paragraph 7.2 of the Description, duration may justify a reduction or increase of up to 30 per cent, while under paragraph 7.3 the scale is assessed by reference to benefit, geographical scope, the number of means of transmitting information, the effect on consumers’ economic behaviour, and other relevant circumstances. Since the advertising was associated with influencers and the clinic’s activities in Vilnius and Klaipėda, at least the methods of transmitting information and the geographical scope of the activities are relevant to the assessment of scale. Under paragraphs 8–10 of the Description, once the base amount has been determined, the fine may be reduced by up to 40 per cent due to mitigating circumstances or increased by up to 40 per cent due to aggravating circumstances. The clinic’s arguments concerning a first infringement, partial acceptance and a difficult financial position could legally be considered only insofar as they fell within the assessment of mitigating circumstances under paragraphs 8–9 of the Description. What was significant for the court was that the advertising was discontinued not on the clinic’s own initiative, but only after receipt of the Authority’s resolution imposing the fine; accordingly, that circumstance did not strengthen the request to reduce the fine to EUR 5,000. A warning instead of a fine under paragraph 13 of the Description is possible only where the infringement does not cause material harm to the interests protected by the Law on Advertising, and the presumption requires low dangerousness, short duration, limited scale and the absence of aggravating circumstances. The court’s conclusion that the EUR 24,000 fine was proportionate means that, based on the available sources, there was no basis either to issue only a warning or to reduce the fine to the EUR 5,000 requested by the clinic. The temporary suspension of payment of the fine by the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania is consistent with Article 25(2) of the Law on Advertising, because an appeal does not automatically suspend enforcement, but the court may decide otherwise. The cited case law is limited to this case: on 8 July 2026, the Regional Administrative Court dismissed the complaint of “P9 klinikos”, while in February 2026 the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania temporarily suspended payment of the fine
Consequences. Since the judgment of the Regional Administrative Court may still be appealed, the next realistic scenario is appellate proceedings concerning the classification of the infringement, the proportionality of the fine, and the possible continuation of the suspension of enforcement. If the higher court were to uphold the judgment unchanged, the Authority’s resolution imposing the EUR 24,000 fine would remain enforceable under the logic of Article 25 of the Law on Advertising. If the court were to find that the criteria in paragraphs 7.2, 7.3 or 8–10 of the Description were improperly assessed in calculating the fine, the sanction could be reduced; however, financial difficulties alone do not change the nature of the advertising infringement. The practical significance for the clinic is both financial and reputational: the dispute concerns not only payment of the fine, but also the abandonment of an advertising model based on patients’ images, experiences and testimonials. For other undertakings advertising healthcare services, this case is important as a signal that influencer content may be treated as advertising, and that the use of a patient image in such advertising creates a risk of infringement of the Law on Advertising. For the Authority, the case practically confirms its competence under Article 18 of the Law on Advertising to investigate advertising of this nature and to apply the fine-calculation mechanism established in the Description
Could the Chancellor of the Ministry be regarded as the person “substituting for” the Minister of the Interior at a Government meeting during the Minister’s business trip, where the Law on the Government links temporary substitution for a minister only to the appointment of another member of the Government?
Article 26(2) of the Law on the Government lays down a clear rule: a minister may be temporarily substituted for only by another member of the Government appointed by the Prime Minister. This means that the Chancellor of the Ministry, even if attending the meeting because the Minister was on a business trip to Dublin, cannot, under the cited provision, assume the status of substituting for the Minister as a member of the Government. The distinction is legally significant: administrative attendance or the provision of information is not the same as the temporary performance of a minister’s functions.
Article 26(3)(1) of the Law on the Government also directly assigns to the Minister responsibility for work under the Government Programme and its implementation plan in the areas of governance entrusted to him or her; that responsibility therefore does not transfer to the Chancellor merely because the Minister did not attend the meeting.
The stronger argument is a formal one: if, in the meeting documents or in the decision-making process, the Chancellor were treated as an entity substituting for the Minister, this would create a competence risk under Article 26(2) of the Law on the Government. In practice, the safer formulation would be that the Chancellor attended or presented information, but did not substitute for the Minister in the legal sense, unless substitution had separately been assigned to another member of the Government. The same point is important when planning legislative initiatives for the autumn 2026 session: under Article 20(2) of the Law on the Government, the Government is represented in the Seimas by the Prime Minister, an authorised minister, or, where that minister is unable to do so, an authorised vice-minister.
The Chancellor’s role therefore cannot be mechanically expanded into political representation or the performance of ministerial functions. For a lawyer, the relevant task here is not to rely on a political statement about “substitution”, but to examine the specific orders, the minutes of the meeting, and who formally presented, coordinated, or signed the decisions.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the newly inaugurated Government is lawfully organising its first meeting, setting the agenda and commencing implementation of the Government Programme where one minister is not physically present and the Chancellor participates in the meeting. This is assessed under Article 1, Article 22 points 3 and 6, Article 24 paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 point 7, Article 37 paragraphs 1-4, Article 40 paragraphs 1-4, Article 45 paragraphs 1-2 and Article 46 paragraph 1 of the Law on the Government of the Republic of Lithuania. The Rules of Procedure of the Government are also relevant: point 77 of the amendment to Resolution No. 728 and the other submitted versions of the Rules, in particular points 86 and 44. Under Article 1 of the Law on the Government, the Government consists of the Prime Minister and ministers; therefore, a broader circle of meeting participants does not in itself alter the composition of the Government. Under Article 24 paragraph 1 of the Law on the Government, the Prime Minister represents the Government and directs its activities, so the political and procedural conduct of the first meeting falls within his competence. Under Article 24 paragraph 2 point 7 of the Law on the Government, the Prime Minister submits the Government Programme to the Seimas for consideration, while under Article 22 point 3 the Government itself implements the Programme and approves the plan for implementing its provisions
Legal assessment. The report states that the Seimas approved the Government Programme; therefore, the legally most important next step is not merely the political announcement of ministers’ work, but the preparation and approval of the plan for implementing the provisions of the Government Programme under Article 22 point 3 of the Law on the Government. The Prime Minister’s instruction to ministers to review legislative initiatives by the autumn session is consistent with Article 22 point 6 of the Law on the Government, under which the Government prepares and submits draft laws and other legal acts to the Seimas for consideration. From the perspective of organising meetings, point 86 of the Rules of Procedure of the Government provides that Government meetings are convened by the Prime Minister and are normally held once a week, on Wednesdays, at a time designated by the Prime Minister. Article 37 paragraph 1 of the Law on the Government provides that matters of state administration are decided at meetings by adopting resolutions by a majority vote of all members of the Government. Accordingly, the business trip of the Minister of the Interior does not remove the requirement that resolutions be adopted by a majority vote of all members of the Government, rather than merely by a majority of the persons present. The Chancellor’s participation in the meeting should be assessed through Article 37 paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Law on the Government and point 77 of the Rules of Procedure, as these provisions allow not only members of the Government, but also other persons entitled to participate or included on the agenda, to take part in Government meetings. Nevertheless, under Article 1 of the Law on the Government, the Chancellor is not a member of the Government, and therefore his participation does not substitute for a minister’s membership of the Government for voting purposes. The role of the Chancellor of the Government is administrative and coordinating: under Article 45 paragraph 1 of the Law on the Government, he is the head of the Office of the Government and is subordinate to the Prime Minister. Under Article 45 paragraph 2 point 1 of the Law on the Government, the Chancellor assists the Prime Minister in implementing the provisions of the Government Programme and participates in formulating and implementing the Prime Minister’s priorities. Under Article 45 paragraph 2 point 2, he organises the analysis of draft legal acts submitted to the Government and the Prime Minister and, where necessary, their coordination. Under Article 45 paragraph 2 point 5, the Chancellor assists the Government in coordinating the activities of ministries and other state institutions in implementing the Government Programme and other planning documents. The preparation of the agenda is governed by Article 40 of the Law on the Government: the Chancellor submits proposals to the Prime Minister regarding the agenda of the meeting, and the Prime Minister may propose the inclusion of new items during the meeting. If a new item is proposed during the meeting, Article 40 paragraph 3 of the Law on the Government requires a vote on its inclusion; if no positive decision is adopted, the item is submitted for consideration in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Rules of Procedure. The results of Government meetings must be documented: under Article 46 paragraph 1 of the Law on the Government, signed resolutions, decisions, resolutions of instruction, Prime Minister’s ordinances and minutes of meetings are kept at the Office of the Government
Consequences. In practical terms, the immediate legal scenario is the preparation of the plan for implementing the provisions of the Government Programme, its coordination through the mechanism of the Office of the Government and the ministries, and its approval by Government resolution under Article 22 point 3 of the Law on the Government. For ministers, this means an obligation to translate their political priorities into draft legal acts, programme measures and planning documents, because the mere public identification of priorities does not, within the meaning of the Law on the Government, constitute approval of the Programme implementation plan. For the Seimas, Article 22 point 6 of the Law on the Government is important, because the legislative initiatives promised for the autumn session will have to be submitted as draft laws or other legal acts. For the Office of the Government and the Chancellor, this situation is practically significant in relation to the agenda, analysis and coordination of drafts, and coordination of Programme implementation under Articles 40 and 45 of the Law on the Government. If resolutions were to be adopted at the meeting, the essential condition of legality would be the majority vote of all members of the Government prescribed in Article 37 paragraph 1 of the Law on the Government. If items have not yet been prepared or coordinated, they must proceed in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Government and Article 40 of the Law on the Government, rather than solely on the basis of political expectations expressed at the meeting. Therefore, the legal significance of this report lies not primarily in the symbolism of the first meeting, but in the fact that, from this point onward, the Government Programme moves into the stage of execution, planning, legislation and documented Government decisions
The specific question is whether “Go Vilnius” payments made in 2023 under invoices without acceptance-transfer acts, with insufficiently itemised services or with procurement objects that did not correspond, can be classified as fraudulent management of financial accounting under Article 222(2) of the Criminal Code, where very large pecuniary damage to the State, a municipality or another person has not been proven. In this situation, documentation deficiencies alone in relation to payments of EUR 1,834,357.81, EUR 1,127,499.51 and EUR 2,627,477.70 are not the same as the qualifying consequence required for criminal liability. The stronger legal point of contention is not “whether the documents were poorly handled”, but whether such accounting caused provable very large pecuniary damage.
The wording of the proposed amendment to Article 222 of the Criminal Code states that the qualified offence under paragraph 2 provides for stricter liability where “fraudulent management of financial accounting causes very large pecuniary damage to the State or to a natural or legal person”. This wording entails a rule of causation: it is not enough to show that acceptance-transfer acts were missing or that the objects stated in invoices did not correspond to the technical specifications; the fraudulent management of accounting itself must be linked to very large pecuniary damage. The cited extracts from Articles 14, 27 and 28 of the Law on the Management of State and Municipal Assets regulate the loan for use of assets, the use of unnecessary or unsuitable assets, write-off, and transfer under the right of trust, and therefore do not directly resolve the justification for paying invoices for procured services.
Accordingly, for this news item, the axis of criminal-law assessment is the consequence required under Article 222(2) of the Criminal Code, not the general regime governing disposal of municipal assets.
The article’s wording that the investigation was opened under Article 222(2) of the Criminal Code for fraudulent management of financial accounting “causing very large pecuniary damage to the State” is too narrow and may be misleading if understood as an automatic conclusion drawn from the documentation deficiencies identified by the audit. The source provided on the amendments to Articles 222 and 223 of the Criminal Code confirms only that the qualified offence is linked to very large pecuniary damage to the State or to a natural or legal person. It would be more precise to say that, for pre-trial investigation qualification under Article 222(2) of the Criminal Code, it was necessary to examine whether fraudulent management of financial accounting caused very large pecuniary damage, not merely whether acceptance-transfer acts or invoices were irregular.
What matters legally is not the general scale of “multi-million” amounts, but proven damage and its causal link with the manner in which accounting was managed.
In practice, the stronger argument for terminating the investigation is that the formal and substantive deficiencies identified by the audit do not, of themselves, bring the case within Article 222(2) of the Criminal Code if very large pecuniary damage has not been proven. However, for the municipality and the public institution, this does not remove administrative, civil or internal-control risks: the auditor’s testimony stated that, under the contracts, acts had to be drawn up before invoices, and that, due to the lack of documents, the auditors could not in all cases assess whether the services had in fact been provided under the procurement contracts. For a professional audience, it is worth citing not the abstract claim that “millions were spent mysteriously”, but the specific chain: the contract’s technical specification, the acceptance-transfer act, the invoice, correspondence between procurement objects, and proof of damage.
The greatest mistake would be to base the criminal-law qualification solely on the absence of documents, without providing proof of what specific amount became pecuniary damage and why that damage arose specifically from fraudulent management of accounting.
Core issue. The precise legal question is not whether the documentation deficiencies identified by the auditors appear politically or managerially justified, but whether it was lawful to terminate the pre-trial investigation initiated under Article 222(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, where the investigation did not gather sufficient data to substantiate a criminal offence. This question is primarily assessed under Article 212(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, which provides for termination of a pre-trial investigation where “sufficient data substantiating the suspect’s guilt is not collected.” The procedure is governed by Article 214 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania: under paragraph 1, in such cases the prosecutor may terminate the investigation by a ruling, while under paragraphs 4 and 5 that ruling may be appealed to a higher prosecutor within twenty days of receipt of a copy. Article 216(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania is relevant to the content of the ruling, requiring the essence of the criminal offence, the grounds for termination and the reasons to be set out. The standard for examining a complaint is supplemented by Article 64(2) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, under which the prosecutor or pre-trial investigation judge examining the complaint must assess the material, request explanations if necessary, and provide reasons as to why the complaint is upheld or dismissed
Legal assessment. According to the situation presented, the focus of the investigation was the documents substantiating financial accounting and payments: the absence or insufficient detail of acceptance-transfer acts, discrepancies between invoices and the subject matter of contracts, undisclosed rates and administrative mark-ups. The logic of the prosecution’s decision, as described in the report, corresponds to the model under Article 212(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania: the identified non-compliance with the requirements of the Law on Financial Accounting was not, in itself, equated with sufficient data concerning a criminal offence under Article 222(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. The essential reasoning of the prosecution was that, following an examination of the economic and financial activities of the public institution “Go Vilnius”, the identified discrepancies did not prevent the determination of the institution’s activities, assets, equity and liabilities for 2023. This means that the prosecutor distinguished accounting irregularities from the threshold for criminal liability, which, as stated in the decision, requires intentional violations and the consequences defined by law. On the other hand, the circumstances mentioned in the auditors’ testimony are relevant to a complaint: they stated that they were not always able to assess whether payments for the services provided were justified, which directly concerns the sufficiency of the reasons for the ruling under Article 216(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. The submission made by the public institution “Go Vilnius” to the Financial Crime Investigation Service by cover letter of 11 August 2025 and the written confirmation of 6 October 2025 are also procedurally significant, since the prosecution relied on the fact that primary documents, a summary table, estimates, correspondence and evidence confirming the fact of services provided had been submitted. If the complainant were to challenge the termination, the argument should not be limited to general dissatisfaction with the use of almost EUR 3 million in public funds, but should specifically criticise why those documents do not negate the basis for applying Article 212(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 214(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania establishes a clear institutional sequence: first, the higher prosecutor, who must examine the complaint no later than within twenty days of receipt, and only after refusal to uphold the complaint does the matter proceed to the pre-trial investigation judge. Article 64(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania permits the body examining the complaint to review the pre-trial investigation documents and request explanations, meaning that at the complaint stage not only the conclusion but also its factual basis may be reviewed. The submitted overview of case law on failure to perform official duties indicates that improper performance of duties may consist of negligent, poor-quality, perfunctory or insufficiently effective performance of duties that fails to ensure the interests of the service, relying on cassation rulings in criminal cases Nos. 2K-150-303/2020, 2K-7-25-495/2020, 2K-329-976/2017, 2K-42-942/2016 and 2K-P-1/2014. However, that case law concerns criminal offences against the civil service and public interests, and therefore in this situation it may be relevant only insofar as it distinguishes disorderly or negligent performance of duties from the specific accounting-related criminal offence under investigation. Administrative case No. A469–719/2005, referred to in the summary of the case law of the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania, demonstrates another important boundary: termination of a pre-trial investigation due to insufficient data to substantiate criminal guilt does not in itself eliminate the possibility of imposing disciplinary liability, where there is a separate legal basis for doing so
Consequences. The most realistic immediate scenario is that A. Nemunaitis, if he has procedural standing and has not missed the deadline, appeals the prosecutor’s ruling within the twenty days from receipt of a copy of the ruling established in Article 214(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. Under Article 214(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, the higher prosecutor may uphold or dismiss the complaint, and in the event of dismissal the matter may proceed to the pre-trial investigation judge. If the complaint were upheld, the decision would have to specify the violations pursuant to Article 64(2) and (5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania and would be sent for execution to the officer or prosecutor conducting the pre-trial investigation. If the complaint were dismissed, the ruling terminating the investigation would remain in force, and the key conclusion from the perspective of criminal procedure would be that, on the basis of the material collected, the threshold under Article 212(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania had not been met. The practical significance for the public institution “Go Vilnius” is that termination of the criminal investigation does not close the issue of assessing documentation, contract performance and internal controls, since case No. A469–719/2005 discussed in the summary of the case law of the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania confirms that another type of liability may be assessed independently. The practical significance for the municipality and council members is procedural: the dispute concerning payments of almost EUR 3 million must be framed through the lens of the reasons for the ruling, the sufficiency of the data and the thoroughness of the investigative actions, rather than solely through the amount of public funds involved. The practical significance for the prosecution is the obligation to demonstrate that the ruling clearly links, in accordance with Article 216 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, the identified accounting discrepancies, the additional documents submitted and the conclusion that criminal liability is absent
The specific point of dispute is whether the EU Artificial Intelligence Act and the Lithuanian legislative amendments implementing it create a basis for mandatorily restricting the use of generative AI in schools, or whether such restrictions remain a matter for national education policy and schools’ internal rules.
Article 8 of the submitted amendment to the Law on Technology and Innovation merely adds Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 to the annex of EU legal acts being implemented, while Article 1 provides that the provisions of the law are aligned with the EU act specified in that annex. The amendment to Article 2 further narrows the conclusion: other concepts used in this law are to be understood as defined in Regulation (EU) 2024/1689. The provision therefore primarily imports a conceptual and harmonisation link, rather than establishing a regime for the use of AI in schools.
Similarly, the amendment to the annex to the Law on Information Society Services merely includes Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 in the list of acts being implemented. Accordingly, the submitted provisions do not give rise to a direct rule requiring Lithuania to follow the Norwegian model, under which AI is no longer used in education for pupils aged 6-13, is permitted for those aged 14-16 only exceptionally and under supervision, and pupils aged 17-19 are encouraged to use it.
The stronger argument at present is not that “the EU AI Act requires AI to be banned in schools”, but that “the EU AI Act leaves the limits of school use to national regulation, while at the same time pushing the system towards an obligation of AI literacy”, as the news item itself indicates. In Lithuanian practice, this means that a strict prohibition for pupils should be based on a clear act of the Minister of Education, a municipality, or a school’s internal rules, rather than on a merely abstract reference to Regulation (EU) 2024/1689. The professional risk is to conflate two distinct categories: the obligations of providers or deployers of AI systems under horizontal AI regulation, and the pedagogical decision as to whether pupils of a particular age may use generative AI for written assignments, assessments, or in lessons.
If Lithuania were to choose the Norwegian direction, the legally most important issue would not be the slogan of prohibition itself, but the mechanics of implementation: age thresholds, the standard of teacher supervision, exceptions for senior classes, and alignment with the development of AI literacy from 2 August 2026 in the context of the relevant provisions of the EU AI Act.
Core issue. The legal issue is not whether the Norwegian decision is directly applicable in Lithuania, but whether Lithuanian law provides a competence-based ground for restricting or differentiating the use of generative artificial intelligence in the general education process. It should primarily be assessed under Article 30(1) of the Law Amending the Law on Education of the Republic of Lithuania, under which educational institutions operate in accordance with teaching plans and general curricula approved by the Ministry of Education and Science or coordinated in accordance with the procedure established by it. The same provision sets out a substantive criterion: the content and methods of teaching must correspond to the objectives assigned to the educational institution and to the needs of society. In assessing the objective of education, Article 1 of the Law Amending the Law on Education of the Republic of Lithuania is relevant, as it provides that the education system must develop intellect, create conditions for the development of individuality, and provide the younger generation with education corresponding to the current level of science and culture. At the level of competence, the position set out in the document “Regarding Draft Law No. XVP-1216 Amending Article 27 of the Law on Education of the Republic of Lithuania No. I-1489” is also significant: under Article 9(2), Article 10(3), and Article 11(3) of the Law on Education, descriptions of primary, lower secondary, and upper secondary education programmes, general curricula, and general education plans are approved by the Minister of Education, Science and Sport. Therefore, in the context of these sources, the question of the use of generative AI in schools would be a matter of educational content, methodology, and process organisation, rather than an independent technological freedom of the pupil or teacher
Legal assessment. If a model similar to Norway’s were to be considered in Lithuania, its core should be established through general curricula, education plans, or other documents governing the educational process approved by the Minister, because this is precisely the regulatory route indicated in Article 30(1) of the Law on Education and in the document concerning Draft Law No. XVP-1216 amending Article 27 of the Law on Education. Under the cited provisions, schools would not be entitled independently to disregard state-approved educational content or methods, since their work is linked to teaching plans and general curricula approved or coordinated by the Ministry. At the same time, this competence is not solely a competence to prohibit: Article 1 of the Law on Education requires both the development of intellect and education corresponding to the current level of science and culture, meaning that a complete exclusion of technology from education would have to be reconciled with the duty not to distance teaching from the current level of science. The wording of Article 30(1) of the Law on Education allows methods to be differentiated according to the objectives of the school and the needs of society; therefore, age-group differentiation, as described in the report, would legally be assessed through the lens of proportionate organisation of the educational process. In primary classes, the argument for restriction would be based on the objective, visible in the cited sources, of developing intellect and providing basic education, rather than on a specific rule prohibiting AI, since no such rule is provided in the sources. In higher grades, permitting the use of AI under teacher supervision is more consistent with the requirement in Article 1 of the Law on Education to correspond to the current level of science and with the regulation of teaching methods permitted under Article 30(1). The teacher’s role here would be not only technological but also qualification-based: under Article 25(1) of the Law Amending the Law on Education of the Republic of Lithuania, pedagogical work may be carried out by persons who have the relevant pedagogical education or the teacher qualification established by the State. This means that supervision of the use of AI in the educational process, if established, should be linked to qualified pedagogical judgment, and not merely to technical access to the tool. As regards remuneration, the cited sources do not directly provide for additional pay for AI supervision; however, Article 2 of the Law Amending Annex 5 to the Law on Remuneration of Employees of State and Municipal Institutions of the Republic of Lithuania No. XIII-198 and Article 8 of the same amending law reflect a model under which teachers’ salary coefficients and increases are linked to qualification, length of service, and the complexity of activities. Accordingly, the practical introduction of AI supervision in schools could raise issues of workload and complexity of activities, but the cited provisions allow only an analysis of existing coefficients and complexity criteria, not a specific AI allowance. From the perspective of technological infrastructure, the Rules for the Development of the Network of Schools Implementing Formal Education Programmes are relevant: point 1.2 provides that one network-connected computer used in the educational process must be available for no more than four pupils. This provision shows that Lithuanian regulation already treats network-connected computers as an element of educational process infrastructure; therefore, any restriction of AI should be aligned with existing digital infrastructure policy. Point 11 of the Programme for Creating Social and Pedagogical Conditions for Children’s Learning and the Programme for the Modernisation of General Education is also relevant, as it criticises the orientation of the educational process more towards knowledge than towards its application and the formation of abilities and value-based attitudes. Point 12 of the same programme notes that the overly slow introduction of new technologies and teaching methods affects educational outcomes; therefore, on the basis of the cited sources, a purely prohibitive model would not be the only obvious direction. In the field of copyright, the use of AI for teaching could intersect with the use of databases: Article 32(4) of the Law on Copyright and Related Rights of the Republic of Lithuania permits a published or publicly disclosed database to be used as an example for teaching or scientific research purposes, provided that the source is indicated and the use is justified by a non-commercial purpose. Article 63(1)(5) of the same law permits educational institutions to transfer or reuse a database for the purpose of using a digital copy solely for illustration in teaching, where the use takes place under the responsibility of the educational institution, on its premises or in other locations, or through a secure electronic network accessible only to teachers, lecturers, and learners. Thus, even if AI tools are permitted in schools, the use of database content could not be regarded as unrestricted, because the cited exceptions are linked to illustration in teaching, indication of the source, a non-commercial purpose, and restricted access. At the level of public administration, the document “Regarding Draft Law No. XVP-925 Amending Articles 3, 9-1, and 9-2 of the Law on Public Administration of the Republic of Lithuania No. VIII-1234” states that the use of specific information technologies, including AI, in the public sector should be regulated in the Law on the Management of State Information Resources, rather than in the Law on Public Administration. The same document states that a separate draft law is being prepared which will establish the competence of Lithuanian state institutions implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 and the rights and obligations of other entities, while the harmonised standards provided for in Article 40 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 may create a need to amend the regulation of state information resources
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is the continuation of recommendatory or methodological regulation through educational content and plans, because the cited sources clearly indicate the Minister’s competence to approve descriptions of general education programmes, general curricula, and general education plans. The second scenario is regulation differentiated by age group: primary education could be more protected from AI as a method, while in lower and upper secondary education AI could be permitted as a supervised teaching method, if this were established in competent educational documents. The third scenario is broader regulation of AI in the public sector, under which rules relevant to schools would arise not only in education documents but also through amendments to the Law on the Management of State Information Resources or a special law implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1689. For schools, this is practically important because of the duty to act in accordance with approved plans and curricula; for teachers, because of qualified supervision and the possible assessment of workload; and for pupils, because of different conditions for AI use depending on the stage of education. For the administrations of educational institutions, the three most important implementation issues would be how to incorporate AI use into the educational process, how to ensure access through school infrastructure, and how to comply with the limits on copyright and database use. For parents and pupils, the consequence of such regulation would not be an abstract prohibition of technology, but a specifically defined learning environment in which AI is used or restricted according to state-approved educational content, teacher supervision, and the educational objective
Does an employer, when introducing a four-day week, a shortened working day or a flexible schedule, change only the working time regime, or also the working time norm, which must be clearly set out in the employment contract?
Article 113 of the Labour Code defines the working time regime as the distribution of the working time norm across a day, week, month or other reference period. Accordingly, a four-day week is not in itself a “less work” model if the same norm is merely distributed differently. Article 116 of the Labour Code links a flexible schedule not to the employer’s right to require availability at any time, but to the employee’s right to determine the start and end of working time around the fixed hours set by the employer.
Article 52 of the Labour Code defines remote work as a form of work organisation applied at the employee’s request or by agreement between the parties; therefore, a hybrid remote-working arrangement cannot be unilaterally imposed as a substitute for changing employment conditions.
The article’s statement that all deviations from the standard model must be reflected in employment contracts, internal rules or collective agreements is too broad because of the word “or”. Under the wording of Article 112 of the Labour Code cited, the working time norm must be set in the employment contract; therefore, a shortened working week with a lower norm cannot be left solely to internal rules. A more precise formulation would be: the working time norm is set in the employment contract, while the regime for distributing that norm, the fixed hours under a flexible schedule, the remote-working procedure and procedural rules may be detailed in the employment contract, internal rules or a collective agreement, depending on the relevant model.
The stronger argument for an employer is not “the company provided flexibility”, but “the company clearly distinguished between the working time norm, its distribution and the rules on availability”. If the same working time norm is retained under a four-day week, the documents must show that this is a change in the working time regime under Article 113 of the Labour Code, not an informal intensification of work. If the norm is in fact reduced, it must be amended in the employment contract, because internal rules alone do not replace that requirement.
The greatest practical risk is “hidden” overtime: where, after the introduction of a shortened schedule, the employee in practice continues working by email or internal messages, in a dispute the employer will find it harder to rely on a flexibility policy than on a specifically described norm, fixed hours and protection of rest time.
Core issue. The legal issue is not whether an employer may offer a four-day week, a shorter working day, flexible working hours, or hybrid remote work, but how such a model must be formalised as a working time norm, a working time regime, and the place where the work function is performed. It is governed by Article 44 of the Labour Code of the Republic of Lithuania on notification of working conditions, Article 52 on remote work, Article 112 on the working time norm, Article 113 on the working time regime, and Article 116 on flexible working schedules. Since Article 1(2) of the Labour Code also covers relationships connected with compliance with and supervision of labour law norms, the implementation of these models is not merely an internal management matter. Lithuanian labour law norms apply to employment relationships carried out in the territory of the Republic of Lithuania under Article 8(1) of the Labour Code. Accordingly, when introducing a new model for employees working in Lithuania, the employer must first distinguish three matters: whether the working time norm is being reduced, whether the same norm is merely being distributed differently, and whether the work is performed away from the workplace
Legal assessment. Article 112(1) of the Labour Code requires the working time norm to be established in the employment contract, while Article 112(3) sets the general norm at forty hours per week, unless labour law norms establish a reduced norm or the parties agree on part-time work. Thus, a four-day week may entail different legal regimes: distribution of the forty-hour norm over four days, or a lower weekly norm if the parties so agree. Article 113(1) of the Labour Code defines the working time regime as the distribution of the working time norm over a day, week, month, or another reference period, which may not exceed three consecutive months. Under Article 113(2), unless labour law norms or the employment contract provide otherwise, the regime for one employee, a group of employees, or all employees is set by the employer. The same article expressly permits the use of a fixed working day duration and number of working days per week, aggregated working time recording, or a flexible working schedule. In the case of a flexible schedule, Article 116(1) of the Labour Code allows the employee to determine the beginning and end of the working day, but only in accordance with Article 116(2). Under Article 116(2), the employer sets fixed hours during which the employee must work at the workplace, and those hours may be changed by notifying the employee no later than two of the employee’s working days in advance. Non-fixed hours are worked at the employee’s discretion before or after the fixed hours, and, under Article 116(3), non-fixed hours not worked may, with the employer’s consent, be carried over to another working day, without breaching maximum working time and minimum rest time requirements. This means that the “core” hours indicated by the employer must be not only a managerial arrangement, but also a legally clear part of the working time regime. Article 44(1)(10) of the Labour Code obliges the employer, before work begins, to provide information on the established duration of the working day or working week, the procedure for ordering and paying for overtime, and, where applicable, the procedure for changing work shifts. Therefore, a practice whereby a shorter week is announced but work is in fact expected after the established hours conflicts with the obligation to define clearly the duration of work and the overtime procedure. Under Article 52(1) of the Labour Code, remote work is a form of work organisation or a method of performing work whereby all or part of the functions are regularly performed at another place agreed with the employer, using information and electronic communications technologies. Under Article 52(2), remote work is assigned at the employee’s request or by agreement of the parties, and an employee’s refusal to work remotely cannot constitute a lawful reason to terminate the employment contract or change working conditions. The same provision affords enhanced protection to pregnant employees, employees who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding, employees raising a child under the age of eight, employees raising alone a child under the age of fourteen or a disabled child under the age of eighteen, as well as employees whose request is based on health condition, disability, or the need to nurse or care for a close person. The employer must grant such a request unless it proves that, due to production necessity or the particularities of work organisation, doing so would entail excessive costs. A similar obligation concerning the preferred working time regime is established in Article 113(1) of the Labour Code, meaning that flexibility for certain employees is not merely a matter of the employer’s goodwill. For small employers, the exception in Article 110(4) of the Labour Code is important: employers with fewer than ten employees must notify shift schedules not seven days in advance, but no later than three working days in advance, unless otherwise agreed. Nevertheless, this exception does not remove the obligation to comply with the rules on the working time norm, working time regime, rest periods, and notification of essential working conditions. If a job-sharing logic is applied, Article 94(4) of the Labour Code requires employees to substitute for one another in such a way that performance of the work function is not impaired. For project work, Article 90(1) of the Labour Code is relevant: a project work contract must establish the average weekly working hours norm, while Article 90(2) allows the employee to distribute working time at their own discretion, but only in compliance with rest time and maximum working time limits
Consequences. In practice, the safest scenario is one in which, before launching the model, the employer updates the working conditions information under Article 44 of the Labour Code, clearly distinguishes in the employment contract between the working time norm under Article 112 and the working time regime under Article 113, and aligns the flexible schedule rules with Article 116. If a four-day week means the same weekly norm, the key point is to ensure that its distribution does not breach maximum working time and minimum rest requirements. If a four-day week means a lower weekly norm, this must be reflected in the employment contract as a change to the working time norm, because under Article 112(1) the norm is a contractual condition. In the case of hybrid work, the key point is not to describe remote work as a unilateral decision of the employer where, under Article 52(2), it is based on the employee’s request or agreement of the parties. For employers with fewer than ten employees, the shorter notice period for shift schedules under Article 110 has practical significance, but it does not grant a right to leave the schedule or working time undefined. These rules matter for employees because they make it possible to distinguish genuine flexibility from a situation in which working time is formally reduced, while the workload and the duty to be reachable are in fact shifted into rest time. For the State Labour Inspectorate, these issues are of practical significance because, under Article 6(12) of the Law on the Approval, Entry into Force and Implementation of the Labour Code, its monitoring covers, among other things, breaches of rules on working time recording, information and consultation, and remuneration. Accordingly, the actual course of further developments will depend on whether employers formalise new models as a clear system governing the working time norm, working time regime, remote work, and overtime procedure, or leave them at the level of undefined expectations
Could the draft Government Programme registered in the Seimas on 3 July be regarded as a proper submission of the Government Programme if the President of the Republic approved the composition of the 21st Government only on 6 July?
Article 6 of the Law on the Government establishes the sequence: the Prime Minister “presents to the Seimas the Government formed by him or her and approved by the President of the Republic, and submits its programme for consideration.” This means that what is formally submitted is not merely the political declaration of the Prime Minister-designate, but the programme of an already formed Government, which, under Article 1, consists of the Prime Minister and ministers. This conclusion is reinforced by Article 24, under which the Prime Minister forms the Government and submits its composition to the President for approval; thus, until presidential approval, the legal fact to which Article 6 links submission of the programme has not yet been completed. On the other hand, if the act of 3 July was only the technical registration of a draft, while the formal presentation and consideration took place after the President’s decree of 6 July, the stronger practical argument would not be absolute invalidity of the procedure, but the need to clearly distinguish registration of the draft from the statutory submission of the programme for consideration.
The news report inaccurately stated that, if the Seimas did not approve the Government Programme, a new version would have to be submitted within 10 days. Article 6 of the Law on the Government sets a different deadline: where the Seimas, by a reasoned resolution, does not approve the programme, the Prime Minister must submit a new programme for consideration no later than within 15 days from the date of non-approval. It would therefore be more accurate to state that a 15-day deadline, not a 10-day deadline, applies to resubmission.
This distinction is not merely technical, because the deadline defines how much time the Prime Minister has to prepare a new programme following formal non-approval by the Seimas.
In practice, the weakest point is not the content of the programme, but its procedural classification: whether the registration on 3 July was treated as the submission provided for in Article 6 of the Law on the Government. In a dispute over procedure, the stronger argument now would be that, before 6 July, the programme of a “Government approved by the President of the Republic” could not have been formally submitted, because the composition itself had not yet been approved. However, if the Seimas documents and the parliamentary sitting procedure clearly show that the actual presentation, consideration and approval took place after the President’s decree, the procedural risk narrows to early registration, rather than necessarily rendering the entire approval unlawful.
For a lawyer, the key point is to cite the wording of Article 6 of the Law on the Government concerning a “formed Government approved by the President of the Republic” and the 15-day deadline for a resubmitted programme, because these two details are what alter the legal assessment of the news report.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether the Prime Minister could submit the Government Programme to the Seimas on 3 July 2026, when the President of the Republic approved the composition of the Government only on 6 July 2026. It must be resolved under Article 6 of the Law on the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, which provides that the Prime Minister “presents to the Seimas the Government formed by him and approved by the President of the Republic and submits its Programme for consideration.” Article 1 of the Law on the Government of the Republic of Lithuania is also relevant, as it provides that the Government consists of the Prime Minister and ministers. The consequences of conferral of powers must be assessed under Article 101 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and Article 6 of the Law on the Government: a new Government receives powers to act only after the Seimas approves its Programme. The subsequent implementation of the Government Programme is linked to Article 19 of the Law on Strategic Management of the Republic of Lithuania and Article 1 of the Law Amending Article 6 of the Law on the Government, concerning approval of an implementation plan within three months
Legal assessment. According to the factual sequence provided, the draft Programme was registered on 3 July, while the Presidential decree on the composition of the Twenty-First Government was signed on 6 July; therefore, the core procedural issue is not one of political content but of the proper legal subject. The wording of Article 6 of the Law on the Government combines two acts: the Government approved by the President is presented to the Seimas, and its Programme is submitted for consideration. Since, under Article 1 of the Law on the Government, the Government consists not only of the Prime Minister but also of ministers, the phrase “the Government formed by him and approved by the President of the Republic” legally presupposes an already approved cabinet of ministers. Accordingly, submission of the Programme before the Presidential decree on the Government’s composition creates a risk that what was submitted to the Seimas was not the Programme of a Government approved by the President, but rather a draft Programme of a cabinet still in the process of formation. The Prime Minister’s right to lead preparation of the Programme is recognised in paragraph 37 of the Rules of Procedure of the Government; however, preparation and submission for consideration are not identical procedural stages. Under Article 6 of the Law on the Government, ministries and other state institutions must provide the newly appointed ministers with materials for preparation of the Programme, which also indicates that the mechanism for preparing the Programme is linked to the participation of appointed ministers. The competence of the Seimas at this stage is to consider the Government Programme submitted by the Prime Minister and decide whether to approve it; this is expressly stated in the source concerning draft Law No. XIIP-1155, by reference to Article 67 of the Constitution. If the Seimas were to approve the Programme, under Article 6 of the Law on the Government the new Government would receive powers to act by a majority vote of the Seimas members participating in the sitting. If the Seimas were to reject the Programme by a reasoned resolution, under Article 6 of the Law on the Government the Prime Minister would have to submit a new Programme no later than within 15 days from the date of rejection. The 10-day period mentioned in the report does not correspond to the provided text of Article 6 of the Law on the Government, which is the provision that must be applied here. Article 101 of the Constitution establishes a stricter consequence: if the Seimas twice in succession rejects the Programme of a newly formed Government, the Government must resign. The oath issue is relevant under the rule in Article 93 of the Constitution referred to in source No. 16, namely that, upon taking office, the Prime Minister and ministers swear in the Seimas to be faithful to the Republic of Lithuania and to observe the Constitution and laws. After the Government receives its powers, the substance of its work would be collegial: under Article 95 of the Constitution, matters of state administration are decided at Government meetings by adopting resolutions by a majority vote of all members of the Government. The rule set out in Bulletin No. 35 of the administrative law practice of the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania concerning Article 22(9) of the Law on the Government relates to the procedure for approving the structure of institutions and therefore does not formulate an analogous rule for this procedure of submitting the Government Programme
Consequences. The first practical scenario is approval of the Programme by the Seimas after the cabinet has already been approved and the ministers have taken the oath; in that case, the political and administrative significance would be that the Government receives powers to act under Article 6 of the Law on the Government. In such a case, within three months of approval the Government would have to approve a plan for implementing the provisions of the Government Programme under Article 1 of the Law Amending Article 6 of the Law on the Government and Article 19 of the Law on Strategic Management. The second scenario is a reasoned rejection by the Seimas, which would trigger the 15-day period for submitting a new Programme under Article 6 of the Law on the Government. The third scenario would be a repeated rejection of the Programme of the newly formed Government; under Article 101 of the Constitution, in that case the Government would be required to resign. Procedural accuracy is practically important for the Seimas, because its approval is not a formality but a constitutional stage in conferring powers on the Government to act. It is also important for the President and the Prime Minister, because the sequence of appointing ministers and submitting the Programme determines whether what is submitted to the Seimas is indeed the Programme of the Government approved by the President. It is important for ministers because of their joint and several responsibility to the Seimas for the overall activities of the Government, as indicated in the source concerning draft Law No. XIIP-1155 and in the general provisions of the Rules of Procedure of the Government. Finally, it is important for public administration institutions because only after approval of the Programme and adoption of the implementation plan do specific deadlines for implementing priorities, responsible institutions, and monitoring coordinated by the Office of the Government arise under Article 19 of the Law on Strategic Management
Does the chosen form, date and place of marriage in Panevėžys alter the moment at which the legal consequences of marriage arise, or does the decisive factor remain registration of the civil status act and verification of the mandatory conditions?
Article 3.18 of the Civil Code links the conclusion of marriage not to a celebration or the place of the ceremony, but to the filing of an application to register the marriage and its registration under the procedure for registering civil status acts, or under the procedure set out in Article 3.24 of the Civil Code. Article 3.280 of the Civil Code assigns competence to register marriages to municipal and district civil registry offices. Accordingly, the Panevėžys practice of accepting applications for Fridays, working days or off-site ceremonies is a matter of administrative organisation, not a separate form of marriage.
Article 3.303 of the Civil Code further establishes a substantive safeguard: both persons intending to marry and two witnesses must be present at registration, and the official must, before registration, re-check compliance with the conditions laid down in Articles 3.12-3.17 of the Civil Code. A church marriage under Article 3.24 of the Civil Code produces the same legal consequences only where it has been concluded in accordance with the canons of a state-recognised religious organisation, without breaching the conditions in Articles 3.12-3.17 of the Civil Code, and has been entered into the records of the civil registry office.
The stronger practical argument is that the legal quality of a marriage does not depend on an “attractive” date, a Friday or an off-site ceremony, but on the registration procedure and the official’s verification of the conditions. Therefore, when planning for 2026-08-08, 2026-09-26, 2026-10-10 or 2026-12-12, the key issue is not the symbolism of the booking, but whether the application has been submitted on time, whether the presence of both persons and two witnesses is ensured, and, in a public urban space, whether municipal permission has also been obtained. For church marriages, of which there were about 50 in Panevėžys last year, the risk concerns proof and entry into the records, rather than rhetoric about the validity of the ceremony: entry into the civil records is necessary for legal consequences to arise.
As regards marriages between two foreign nationals, this development indicates a change in practice, but the stated legal basis allows one to say with confidence only that the civil registry official’s verification under Article 3.303 of the Civil Code becomes the main procedural filter in such cases.
Core issue. The legal issue is not whether Friday or weekday weddings represent a change in “fashion”, but under what conditions a civil registry office may register the chosen time, place and form of a marriage. It is determined under Articles 3.18, 3.301, 3.303, 3.24 and 3.304 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as Articles 3, 6 and 19 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Registration of Civil Status Acts. Article 3.18 of the Civil Code establishes the basic rule: a marriage is concluded by submitting an application for marriage registration and by registering the marriage in accordance with the procedure laid down by the law governing the registration of civil status acts or by Article 3.24 of the Civil Code. Accordingly, the chosen date or day of the week does not in itself create a right to marriage registration if the registration conditions and procedure have not been fulfilled. Article 19(1) of the Law on the Registration of Civil Status Acts requires the civil registry office, before registration, to verify whether the conditions for contracting marriage set out in Articles 3.12-3.17 of the Civil Code have been met. Under Article 19(2)-(3) of the same law, a marriage is registered in the presence of both persons wishing to marry and two witnesses, by making a marriage record
Legal assessment. From a legal perspective, the choice of couples in Panevezys to marry on Fridays or other working days is possible to the extent that the civil registry office can organise the ceremony in accordance with the procedure established in the Rules for the Registration of Civil Status Acts, since Article 3.281 of the Civil Code assigns those rules to the registration procedure approved by the Minister of Justice. Filing an application is a necessary initial step, because Article 3.18 of the Civil Code links the conclusion of marriage to the submission of an application and registration. Article 3.301(1) of the Civil Code establishes a mandatory time limit: a marriage is registered no earlier than one month after the date on which the application for marriage registration is filed. Therefore, an application filed on 16 July 2026 would not, under the ordinary procedure, permit registration of the marriage on 8 August 2026, because the one-month period would not have expired; that date would be possible only by applying Article 3.301(2) of the Civil Code, if the head of the civil registry office, for important reasons, allowed the marriage to be registered earlier. To marry under the ordinary procedure on 26 September 2026, the application would have to be filed no later than 26 August 2026; for 10 October 2026, no later than 10 September 2026; and for 12 December 2026, no later than 12 November 2026. Article 3.303(1) of the Civil Code and Article 19(2) of the Law on the Registration of Civil Status Acts mean that, even if a convenient time has been reserved, the ceremony cannot take place without the participation of the persons intending to marry and two witnesses. Before making the record, the civil registry officer again verifies the conditions for contracting marriage under Article 3.303(2) of the Civil Code; therefore, registration is not merely a technical confirmation of a date. Once the marriage record has been made, under Article 3.303(3) of the Civil Code a marriage certificate is issued to the spouses, and under Article 6(4) of the Law on the Registration of Civil Status Acts, the civil status act record constitutes evidence of the civil status act. In the sources provided, Article 3.298 of the Civil Code links the place of marriage registration to the civil registry offices of the place of residence of one of the persons marrying or of their parents, and to consular institutions of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 3(3) of the Law on the Registration of Civil Status Acts also states that civil status acts are registered by civil registry offices and, in cases provided for by law, by consular institutions. Church marriages mentioned in the report should be assessed under Articles 3.24 and 3.304 of the Civil Code: they produce the same legal consequences as a marriage contracted at a civil registry office, provided that the conditions set out in Articles 3.12-3.17 of the Civil Code have not been breached, the marriage has been contracted in accordance with the canons of a state-recognised religious organisation, and it has been recorded at a civil registry office. Under Article 3.24(3) of the Civil Code, a religious community or association, and under Article 3.304(1) of the Civil Code, a person authorised by the relevant religious organisation, must submit a notice in the prescribed form to the civil registry office of the place where the marriage was contracted within ten days after the church marriage. If the notice is submitted on time, Article 3.24(3) and Article 3.304(2) of the Civil Code link the moment of contracting the marriage to the date on which it was contracted in accordance with the procedure established by the church. If the ten-day time limit is missed, under Article 3.24(4) and Article 3.304(3) of the Civil Code, the marriage is deemed to have been contracted from the date on which it is recorded at the civil registry office. Article 3(4) of the Law on the Registration of Civil Status Acts provides a basis for a reasoned refusal to register a civil status act if the registration would not comply with the requirements of the law or the rules, or would be contrary to public order; such refusal may be appealed in accordance with the procedure established by the Code of Civil Procedure
Consequences. In practical terms, the most important point for couples is that a popular date is not a legal guarantee: it depends on the timely filing of an application, compliance with the one-month period, the participation of both persons and two witnesses, and verification of the conditions for marriage. For the civil registry office, it is important that increased demand for weekday and off-site ceremonies does not alter its duty to register only those civil status acts that comply with statutory requirements. If an application for the desired date is filed too late, the realistic scenario is to choose a later date or to apply for the exception provided for in Article 3.301(2) of the Civil Code, stating important reasons. If, before the ceremony, it becomes clear that the conditions in Articles 3.12-3.17 of the Civil Code have not been met, the civil registry office cannot rely solely on the fact of reservation and must act in accordance with the registration requirements. For couples choosing a church marriage, the ten-day notice period is significant because it determines whether, from the perspective of civil law, the moment of contracting the marriage will be linked to the date of the church ceremony or to the later date of recording. This procedure is therefore important not only for organising the celebration, but also for the spouses’ legal status, proof of civil status, and subsequent family-law and property-law consequences, which begin from a lawfully contracted and registered marriage or a marriage entered into the records
Do Lithuanian authorities, relying on the EU AI Act and the amendments to the Law on Technology and Innovation implementing it, already have a legal basis to impose mandatory restrictions on the use of generative AI in schools according to pupils’ age?
The proposed amendments to the Law on Technology and Innovation indicate not a special AI regime for schools, but the alignment of Lithuanian law with Regulation (EU) 2024/1689: Article 1 of the law is supplemented by a provision stating that it is harmonised with the EU act listed in the annex, and the AI Act is expressly included in that annex. The amendment to Article 2 provides that other concepts used in the law are to be understood as defined in Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, meaning that the terminology of the AI Act becomes a reference point for national technology and innovation regulation. However, the functions of the implementing institution listed in Article 14 relate to technology programmes, promotion of innovation, financing, innovative public procurement, and assessment of economic operators, rather than to setting rules for the pedagogical process in schools.
Accordingly, the stronger conclusion from the provisions provided is that, by themselves, they do not create a basis for a Norway-type prohibition in Lithuanian schools.
In practice, this means that a strict restriction on AI in Lithuanian schools would need to be based on a separate education-sector decision or special rules, rather than merely on a reference to the AI Act or to amendments to the Law on Technology and Innovation. The stronger argument at present is not that “the EU requires AI to be banned in schools”, but that “the EU AI Act harmonises AI regulatory terminology and obligations, while the state must determine for itself the model for use in schools”. For professionals, it is important not to transpose the Norwegian decision into Lithuanian law as an automatic consequence: the evidence provided supports the emergence of regulatory infrastructure, but not a specific prohibition for pupils aged 6–13 or 14–16.
The greatest practical risk would be for educational institutions to treat non-binding guidelines as a mandatory prohibition, because in the event of a dispute they would need to demonstrate a clear basis in competence and law.
Core issue. The precise legal question is not whether the Norwegian model is automatically applicable to Lithuania, but whether Lithuanian institutions, under national education and child rights protection law, may establish mandatory limits on the use of generative AI in schools. This question must primarily be assessed under Articles 2, 25 and 30 of the Law Amending the Law on Education of the Republic of Lithuania, Articles 5 and 30 of the Law Amending the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child of the Republic of Lithuania No. I-1234, and Articles 52 and 571 of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child of the Republic of Lithuania. The AI regulatory layer derives from Articles 2, 4 and 5 of the Law Amending Articles 1, 2 and 23 of, and the Annex to, the Law on Information Society Services of the Republic of Lithuania No. X-614, as those provisions link national law to Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, i.e. the Artificial Intelligence Act. Article 2 of that law provides that other concepts used in the Law on Information Society Services are to be understood as defined in Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, while Article 4 includes that Regulation in the annex to the law. Since, pursuant to Article 5, the amending law entered into force on 1 April 2025, by 16 July 2026 the conceptual and implementation context of the AI Act has already been embedded in Lithuanian law
Legal assessment. Article 30(1) of the Law Amending the Law on Education provides a basis for regulating the educational process through curricula and general programmes approved by the Ministry of Education and Science or coordinated in accordance with the procedure established by it. The same provision requires educational content and methods to correspond to the objectives assigned to the educational institution and to the needs of society; accordingly, restrictions on AI use could be framed as rules governing an educational method, tool, or the organisation of teaching content. Article 2 of the Law Amending the Law on Education defines the Lithuanian education system as including, inter alia, pre-school education, general education of children and young people, vocational training, and non-formal education; therefore, the addressees of any restrictions should be clearly linked to a specific type or level of educational institution. Article 25 of the Law Amending the Law on Education is relevant to the role of teachers, as pedagogical work may be performed by persons holding the requisite qualifications, which permits differentiation between pupils’ and teachers’ rights to use AI in the educational process. Article 5(1) of the Law Amending the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child No. I-1234 provides that, where other legal acts regulate relations concerning the rights of the child and their protection differently, the provisions of that law apply, except for ratified international treaties and European Union legal acts insofar as they do not conflict with the Constitution. This means that school-level AI regulation could not be merely a technology deployment policy: it would have to be aligned with the child rights protection regime. Article 52 of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child is significant for municipal competence, as municipalities organise and finance access to education and other necessary services for children and families, analyse the state of child welfare, and ensure the implementation of measures. Therefore, a national restriction on AI in schools would, in practice, be implemented not only at ministerial level, but also through municipal planning, family support, and the organisation of services. Article 6 of the Law on Minimum and Medium Care of the Child is not a general legal basis for prohibiting AI, but it shows that individual measures related to a child’s learning and behaviour may be imposed for a fixed period, for example up to one year or up to 20 hours, depending on the type of measure. The amendments to the Law on Information Society Services do not themselves establish a specific AI prohibition for schools, but they introduce into national law the concepts and implementation context of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689. The source concerning draft Law No. XVP-925 amending the Law on Public Administration states that the Ministry of the Economy and Innovation is preparing a separate draft law that will define the competence of Lithuanian institutions implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, as well as the rights and obligations of other entities. The same source indicates that merely declaratory provisions on AI use are considered inappropriate where they do not establish specific rights and obligations of public administration entities. This is especially important for schools, because an effective restriction should clearly answer who sets the rules, who supervises compliance, in which cases AI is permitted, and what consequences apply for infringements. Article 14(2) of the Law on Technology and Innovation shows that the institution implementing state technology and innovation policy carries out programmes, provides funding, methodological support for innovative procurement, and advisory services; therefore, its role is more closely related to supporting technology deployment and competence-building than to directly regulating pupil conduct. The Constitutional Court aspect is presented in the sources only through a reference to the assessment of draft Law No. XVP-48 amending Article 67 of the Law on Education: it is stated that, under Article 40(2) of the Constitution, non-state teaching and educational institutions may be established in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. Accordingly, AI restrictions should be formulated so as not to distort without justification the operating conditions of state, municipal, and private schools
Consequences. The most realistic near-term scenario in Lithuania would not be a direct transposition of the Norwegian prohibition, but a clarification of curricula, general programmes, or methodological rules under Article 30(1) of the Law Amending the Law on Education. A stricter scenario would involve special legal regulation which, following the implementation logic of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, would define institutional competence, school obligations, and limits on pupils’ use of AI. Such regulation would have practical significance for school heads, as they would have to organise the educational process in accordance with mandatory rules, not merely recommendations. For teachers, this would mean a duty to distinguish supervised AI use consistent with educational objectives from the independent completion of assignments with the aid of technology. For pupils and parents, the key issue would be clarity as to the age groups, lessons, or forms of assessment in which AI tools are permitted, restricted, or prohibited. For municipalities, consequences would arise under Article 52 of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child, as they would have to ensure the availability of assistance, counselling, and other services for the child and the family. If the restrictions were linked to the protection of children from harmful information or content, the logic identified in the source concerning the report on implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child would be relevant: criteria, labelling, procedures for publication and dissemination, and liability for non-compliance. However, according to the sources provided, the mere presence of AI in schools has not itself been classified as a prohibited phenomenon; the legal issue arises where it is necessary to reconcile the choice of educational methods, protection of the rights of the child, and clear institutional competence. Therefore, the most important practical question for Lithuania would not be a symbolic ban, but the precision of the rules: age limits, permitted exceptions, the scope of teacher supervision, assessment procedures, and responsible institutions
Whether an electronic ankle monitor imposed on a Member of the Seimas is a form of restriction of liberty within the meaning of Article 62 of the Constitution, requiring the consent of the Seimas, and whether its proportionality must be assessed by reference to its actual impact on parliamentary duties.
Article 62 of the Constitution establishes not only a prohibition on arresting a Member of the Seimas or bringing him to criminal liability without the consent of the Seimas, but also a broader formula: his liberty may not be “otherwise restricted”. An electronic monitoring device, under Article 17 of the cited Law on the Prevention of Organised Crime, constitutes intensive supervision, namely the control of a person’s movements by electronic monitoring means, with an obligation to wear the device and comply with specified conditions. The stronger argument, therefore, is that an ankle monitor is not merely a technical control measure: it directly restricts movement and falls within the scope of “otherwise restricted liberty” under Article 62 of the Constitution.
Article 60 of the Constitution is also relevant insofar as the rights and guarantees of activity of a Member of the Seimas must enable the effective performance of duties, including work in the Committee on National Security and Defence, where electronic devices may not be brought into classified sittings.
In practical terms, the dispute should not be framed solely around whether S. Skvernelis formally breached the earlier prohibition on communicating with certain persons, for example former adviser Agne Silickiene. The stronger procedural argument is twofold: first, whether there was consent of the Seimas, compliant with Article 62 of the Constitution, specifically for this restriction of liberty; second, whether the ankle-monitor regime is proportionately reconciled with the functions of a Member of the Seimas, where the device interferes with voting and may prevent access to classified committee sittings.
It is risky for law enforcement to rely solely on an “established breach”, because a measure that de facto impedes the exercise of a parliamentary mandate must be justified not by political inconvenience or reputational pressure, but by a concrete procedural need. For the defence, it is practically worth emphasising not only the argument of humiliation, but also the constitutional functional test: whether the same risk arising from the suspected EUR 51,000 bribe could have been managed by a measure less restrictive of parliamentary work.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether an electronic monitoring bracelet imposed on a Member of the Seimas, together with the related conduct requirements, constitutes “any other restriction of his liberty” for which the consent of the Seimas is required under Article 62 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. This question is to be resolved primarily under Article 62 of the Constitution, which provides that a Member of the Seimas may not, without the consent of the Seimas, be held criminally liable, arrested, or otherwise have his liberty restricted. Article 60 of the Constitution is also relevant, as it provides that the duties, rights, and guarantees of activity of a Member of the Seimas are established by law, as is Article 76 of the Constitution, under which the structure and procedure of work of the Seimas are established by the Statute of the Seimas, which has the force of law. The legal analysis also relies on the concept of immunity set out in the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 8 May 2000, as cited in the sources: immunity consists of additional guarantees of personal inviolability that are necessary and indispensable for the proper performance of duties. Accordingly, the core of the dispute is not merely the technical functioning of the bracelet, but its relationship with the constitutional inviolability of a Member of the Seimas and the practical ability to perform parliamentary duties
Legal assessment. Under Article 62 of the Constitution, the inviolability of a Member of the Seimas covers not only arrest but also any other restriction of liberty. Therefore, an electronic monitoring bracelet, if it restricts movement, imposes obligations concerning whereabouts, or requires the Member to leave the premises of the Seimas, falls within the scope of assessment under that provision. The facts indicated in the report show that the measure does not operate merely in the abstract: it interferes during voting and may impede access to closed meetings of the Committee on National Security and Defence. This is directly connected with the guarantees of activity of a Member of the Seimas protected by Article 60 of the Constitution, because in this case the Member’s rights are inseparable from the duty to participate in the work of the Seimas. The source concerning the draft code of professional ethics for politicians emphasizes that restricting a politician’s rights raises doubts as to compatibility with the constitutionally established status, inviolability, and guarantees of activity, because politicians’ rights are inseparable from their duties. The same source notes that the Constitution contains no provisions on the temporary restriction of the powers of Members of the Seimas. This means that a preventive measure cannot de facto become a temporary restriction of parliamentary powers where there is no clear constitutional and statutory basis for it. Article 76 of the Constitution is relevant insofar as the internal procedure of work of the Seimas, including the work of committees and the organization of confidential meetings, falls within the regulatory sphere of the Statute of the Seimas. However, the organization of the work of the Seimas itself does not remove the requirement under Article 62 of the Constitution where a measure in criminal proceedings restricts the liberty of a Member of the Seimas. The source concerning the draft Electoral Code also states that the Constitution sets out expressis verbis the persons who enjoy immunity and the institutions entitled to give consent to their being held criminally liable, arrested, or otherwise having their liberty restricted. In the case of a Member of the Seimas, that institution under Article 62 of the Constitution is the Seimas. Accordingly, law enforcement actions must be assessed by reference to whether the necessary consent of the Seimas was obtained before the measure was imposed or continued, and whether the measure exceeds the limits of such consent. If the bracelet was imposed as a reaction to a breach of the conditions of an earlier preventive measure, that may explain the procedural logic of the measure, but it does not in itself answer the constitutional question concerning the restriction of the liberty of a Member of the Seimas. Article 42 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Mutual Recognition and Execution of Decisions in Criminal Matters by Member States of the European Union shows that the execution of a preventive measure may be discontinued, inter alia, upon expiry of its term, where intensive supervision is not extended, or where the person breaches the conditions at least twice in the circumstances specified in that article. That provision applies directly to the execution of decisions in the Republic of Lithuania under the mutual recognition mechanism; therefore, it may be relied upon only for the general apparent principle that the execution of preventive measures is linked to time limits, review, and compliance with conditions. The purpose of immunity formulated in the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 8 May 2000 means in this case that the inviolability of a Member of the Seimas is not a privilege to avoid proceedings, but a guarantee that procedural measures do not become an obstacle to the performance of the functions of a representative of the Nation. For that reason, S. Skvernelis’s complaint concerning the measure should be assessed not only by reference to whether he breached earlier obligations, but also by reference to the measure’s impact on voting, access to the premises of the Seimas, and work in committee. Article 47 of the Law on Courts, concerning judicial immunity, does not apply directly to this situation, but it confirms the same constitutional logic: restrictions on the liberty of certain officials are linked to special consent and additional guarantees
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the court or competent authority leaves the measure in force, but its application must be coordinated so that it does not prevent the Member of the Seimas from attending sittings, voting, and performing committee functions. The second scenario is that the measure is replaced with a less restrictive one if it is established that its impact on parliamentary activity is disproportionate from the perspective of Articles 62 and 60 of the Constitution. The third scenario is that, if it is established that the measure was applied as a restriction on the liberty of a Member of the Seimas without the necessary consent of the Seimas, the principal dispute shifts to the issue of a breach of constitutional competence. The practical significance lies first and foremost with the Member of the Seimas himself, because his ability to vote and participate in committee work depends on the conditions of the measure. It is also important for the Seimas as an institution, because Article 76 of the Constitution entrusts regulation of the procedure of work of the Seimas to the Statute of the Seimas, not to the technical regime of measures in criminal proceedings. For law enforcement, this situation is important because procedural measures against a Member of the Seimas must be reconciled with the inviolability established in Article 62 of the Constitution. The broader consequence is a clear boundary: criminal proceedings may continue, but the immunity of a Member of the Seimas requires a special procedure where a measure restricts his liberty or practically impedes the performance of parliamentary duties
The specific issue is whether the claims of the owners of 150,000 EA189 diesel vehicles sold in Norway for a reduction in price may be heard collectively, where the defendants contest the admissibility of such proceedings and the EEA law principle of effectiveness requires a genuine opportunity for consumers to enforce their rights. This is not merely a technical question of “Dieselgate” facts: following the Borgarting Court of Appeal’s rulings of 3 and 6 July 2026, the procedural barrier has become the defendants’ central, and weakening, argument. The practical core of the case now turns on whether compensatory consumer redress may be blocked by national admissibility rules where, according to the report, the CJEU has already held that the software update did not cure the “illegality” of the vehicles, and that consumers are entitled to compensation from the manufacturer for unlawful defeat devices.
Article 30(1) of the Lithuanian Law on Consumer Protection expresses a comparable logic of collective redress: the public interest of consumers is protected by an action concerning a trader’s infringement of consumer protection legislation which causes or may cause harm to the collective interests of consumers. Paragraph 2 of the same article expressly covers infringements of EU consumer protection law and the application of consumer redress measures, meaning that the relevant dimension is not only cessation of unlawful conduct but also an effective consumer remedy. Article 20 of the Law further safeguards the individual consumer’s right to bring proceedings before a court and provides that the availability of an out-of-court route does not deprive the consumer of that right.
Accordingly, assessed against the stated regulatory framework, the stronger argument is that a collective procedure cannot be interpreted so narrowly that the enforcement of mass, homogeneous consumer claims arising from the same EA189 software infringement becomes practically ineffective.
The available information indicates that, on 3 and 6 July 2026, the Borgarting Court of Appeal unanimously admitted two class actions and rejected all objections raised by Volkswagen AG and Harald A. Møller AS. This procedural outcome followed the decision of the Appeals Selection Committee of the Norwegian Supreme Court of 12 May 2026, which set aside the earlier dismissal of the case and remitted it for reconsideration, emphasising the EEA law principle of effectiveness.
The report also refers to the CJEU’s position in 2022 and 2023: the software update did not render the vehicles lawful, and consumers are entitled to compensation from the manufacturer for unlawful defeat devices. This suggests that, at the present practical stage of the litigation, it is more difficult for the defendants to rely on purely formalistic procedural objections than to contest individual issues of loss, price reduction or causation.
What matters most professionally is not that the “Dieselgate” case has returned, but that the procedural threshold for collective redress appears to have been crossed following these rulings: if appeals do not alter the outcome by around mid-September 2026, a six-week official registration window will open. On the consumer side, the strongest argument is now the effectiveness of EEA law, combined with the CJEU’s conclusion on compensation for unlawful defeat devices; on the defendants’ side, the more rational strategy is not to focus on blocking the case altogether, but on differentiating the claims by reference to purchasers of new and used vehicles, continuing ownership, the amount of any price reduction, and causation. For Lithuanian lawyers, this case is worth citing as a signal that, in mass consumer disputes, admissibility rules for collective proceedings will be pressed to be interpreted through the lens of effective judicial protection, particularly where the infringement is standardised, involves a single technical solution, and affects a large group of consumers.
Core issue. The legal issue is not only whether the owners of vehicles equipped with EA189 engines suffered pecuniary loss, but whether such a claim may be examined collectively and what remedy may be applied. Under Article 4413 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, a group action is possible where the court establishes the prerequisites for a group action, compliance with the mandatory pre-litigation dispute resolution procedure, an appropriate group representative, at least twenty group members, and group counsel. In cases concerning the protection of consumers’ collective interests, Article 3124 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Implementation of European Union and International Legal Acts Regulating Civil Procedure applies; under that provision, actions concerning infringements of European Union legal acts committed by traders may include payment of compensation, repair, replacement of goods, price reduction, termination of the contract, or reimbursement of the price paid. Article 3125 of the same law provides that such an action may be brought by a qualified entity, and that qualified entities from several European Union Member States may act jointly if the infringement causes or may cause harm to the collective interests of consumers in different Member States. If the dispute were characterised through the lens of damage caused by an unsafe product, Article 21 of the Law Amending the Product Safety Law of the Republic of Lithuania provides that damage to consumers is compensated in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Civil Code, and that agreements releasing a manufacturer or distributor from liability are invalid. The environmental aspect could be assessed under Article 33 of the Law on Environmental Protection of the Republic of Lithuania, as it grants the right to bring claims to persons whose property or interests have been damaged and to institutions where damage has been caused to state interests
Legal assessment. The situation described in the article corresponds to the logic of a collective dispute: many vehicle owners are connected by similar factual circumstances, the same EA189 engine, and claims for a reduction in price after the purchase of the vehicle. Under Article 4413(2)(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, a merely asserted large number of affected persons is not sufficient in itself, because there must be at least twenty persons who have expressed in writing their intention to be group members and to bring an action before the court. This rule is important for the pre-registration mentioned in the article, because the essence of the participation model is active opt-in to the group, not merely belonging to an abstract category of affected persons. Article 4413(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure would require the claim to describe the group, identify the identical or similar circumstances common to all members, and, where individual pecuniary claims are brought, set out the circumstances relevant to those claims. Therefore, the different groups mentioned in the article - persons who purchased new vehicles and persons who purchased used vehicles and remain their owners - are procedurally significant, because their purchase circumstances and individual pecuniary claims may differ. Paragraph 10.2 of the Group Action Concept specifically provides that group actions protect the rights and legitimate interests of persons in a specific group whose claims and rights are identical, and that such actions may include claims for damages. Paragraph 15 of the Group Action Concept identifies consumer protection and environmental protection as areas in which group actions are appropriate, because a weaker party is often involved. Under the regime for the protection of consumers’ collective interests, Article 3124(2) of the Law on the Implementation of European Union and International Legal Acts Regulating Civil Procedure allows remedies to be applied even where the infringement has ceased before the action is brought or before the proceedings end. This is important in the “Dieselgate” context, because the software update referred to in the article would not in itself eliminate the possibility of seeking consumer remedies if the dispute is characterised under that provision. Under Article 21 of the Law Amending the Product Safety Law, liability cannot be excluded in advance by agreement, and therefore clauses limiting the liability of the manufacturer or distributor would not be decisive vis-a-vis consumers. Article 33 of the Law on Environmental Protection also distinguishes claims brought by private persons for damage to their health, property, or interests from institutional claims for damage to the environment or state interests; accordingly, a vehicle owner’s claim for a price reduction is not identical to an environmental claim brought by a state authority. The second paragraph of that article establishes a five-year limitation period for institutional claims concerning environmental damage, running from the latest occurrence of the specified circumstances, but the provisions cited do not provide a basis for mechanically applying that period to consumer claims for a price reduction. Article 1104 of the Law on Environmental Protection is not directly connected with this situation, because it regulates the liability of legal persons for infringements of the requirements of Regulation (EU) 2023/1805 in the maritime sector
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is the admission of the group action and its further examination, provided the court maintains its conclusion that the structure of the group, representatives, and claims satisfies the conditions for collective proceedings. The second scenario is an amicable settlement, which, on the basis of the sources provided, should be assessed through the lens of specific remedies - compensation, price reduction, repair, replacement, or reimbursement of the price - and not merely as a declaratory end to the dispute. The third scenario is a procedural dispute concerning the boundaries of the group, the opt-in of members, the suitability of the representative, or the substantiation of individual pecuniary claims, because these are precisely the elements that Article 4413 of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes as special conditions for a group action. For vehicle owners, the most important practical point is whether they express their intention to participate in the group in a timely and clear manner, because the participation model under Paragraph 15 of the Group Action Concept is linked to active opt-in. For the manufacturer and distributor, the most important point is that the collective procedure consolidates many similar claims and may lead to a uniform legal assessment of the basis of liability and the applicable remedies. For consumer protection authorities and associations, this case is significant as an example of how a large-scale consumer dispute may be transferred from individual claims into a structured collective process under Articles 3124 and 3125 of the Law on the Implementation of European Union and International Legal Acts Regulating Civil Procedure. Taking into account today’s date, 16 July 2026, the expiry of the appeal period around mid-September mentioned in the article would constitute the next procedural turning point, after which the formal six-week period for opting in to the group could begin
Does the wording of Article 28(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which recognises only a natural person as a victim, constitutionally justify excluding a legal person from victim status where a company has suffered pecuniary, reputational or commercial harm as a result of a criminal offence.
Article 28(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines a victim as a natural person who has suffered physical, pecuniary or non-pecuniary harm as a result of a criminal offence. Accordingly, on the literal construction of the provision, a legal person does not fall within this procedural status even where its financial loss is direct. What matters is not only the term used, but also the bundle of rights listed in Article 28(2) of the Code: a victim may submit evidence and applications, access the case file, participate in the hearing of the case, challenge procedural acts, the judgment or ruling, and make closing submissions.
It follows from this provision that the dispute is not merely one of nomenclature, since the status of a civil claimant, as noted in the news report, is more closely linked to a claim for compensation than to broader influence over the classification of the offence, discontinuance of the case, or the direction of the evidentiary process. A further argument based on inconsistency is provided by Article 388 of the Code: where a legal person is prosecuted, its representative enjoys all the rights conferred by the Code on a suspect and an accused. Thus the same Code recognises a legal person as a procedural participant on the side of liability, but not on the side of having suffered harm.
The stronger argument before the Constitutional Court is likely to be not an abstract “equality” of companies with natural persons, but a disproportion in procedural functionality: in economic crime cases, a company may hold essential documents and data concerning internal processes and commercial relationships, yet under the current Article 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure it does not have the full set of victim’s rights needed to turn that information into an active procedural position. In practice, business representatives should for now avoid framing their procedural strategy as if a legal person could already be recognised as a victim, since the current wording of Article 28 of the Code is clearly confined to natural persons. Pending the Constitutional Court’s ruling, companies should make maximum use of civil claimant status, while also recording in procedural applications that the issue of compensation is inseparable from the classification of the offence, the refusal to discontinue the case, and the establishment of the facts.
If the Constitutional Court finds the regulation unconstitutional, the practical shift will be not only an additional right to claim damages, but also a stronger ability for companies to challenge procedural decisions that until now may have been treated as matters “not theirs”.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether a legal person that has suffered pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage as a result of a criminal offence may have only the status of a civil claimant in criminal proceedings, or must be recognised as a victim under Article 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. Under Article 28(1) of the CCP, a victim is a natural person who has suffered physical, pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage as a result of a criminal offence; therefore, a legal person does not fall within that concept. An alternative procedural route is established in Article 109 and Article 110(1) of the CCP: a natural or legal person who has suffered damage as a result of a criminal offence may bring a civil claim and be recognised as a civil claimant. The issue must also be assessed systemically, because Articles 388 and 389 of the CCP show that a legal person may be an independent procedural subject in criminal proceedings where it is subject to criminal liability
Legal assessment. Article 28(2) of the CCP grants the victim broad rights: to receive information on the status of the proceedings, submit evidence, file applications, challenge participants, access the case file, participate in court, appeal actions of officers, the prosecutor, the pre-trial investigation judge and the court, as well as appeal a judgment or ruling and deliver a closing statement. The rights of a civil claimant under Article 110(2) of the CCP are formulated more narrowly and are more closely connected with the civil claim: the civil claimant gives explanations concerning the substance of the claim, submits evidence, applications and challenges, accesses the material, participates in the court of first instance, appeals decisions only insofar as they relate to the civil claim, and participates at appellate instance. Accordingly, for a legal person that has suffered damage as a result of a criminal offence, Articles 109 and 110 of the CCP secure a procedure for compensation, but do not confer the full procedural arsenal of a victim established in Article 28(2) of the CCP. Procedurally, recognition as a victim under Article 28(1) of the CCP is effected by a decision of a pre-trial investigation officer or prosecutor, or by a court ruling, whereas recognition as a civil claimant under Article 110(1) of the CCP is effected by a prosecutor’s decision or a court ruling. Article 24 of the CCP defines the Supreme Court of Lithuania as the cassation instance hearing cases on appeals against final judgments or rulings; therefore, the procedural role of the Supreme Court in this situation is linked to its cassation function. The systemic problem arises because Article 388(4) of the CCP grants the representative of a legal person, where the legal person is subject to criminal liability, all the rights and duties of a suspect and an accused, while Article 21(3) of the CCP grants the accused broad defence rights, including the right to submit evidence, participate in its examination, and appeal judgments and rulings. Thus, a legal person is broadly recognised in criminal proceedings as a potential subject of liability, but, as a subject that has suffered damage, is not recognised as a victim under Article 28 of the CCP. The review of case law on the application of criminal liability to legal persons states that criminal liability applies not only to natural persons but also to legal persons, and that the criminal liability of a legal person is established in view of the specific nature of that subject under Article 20 of the Criminal Code. The same review notes that, following the 2016 amendments to the criminal law and the CCP, the concept of criminal liability of legal persons in Lithuania changed, but cassation case law had not yet addressed issues concerning the application and interpretation of the provisions that entered into force after those amendments. The assessment materials for Draft Law No. XIIP-3455 show that including a legal person in Article 28 of the CCP is not merely a technical amendment: it would have required a systemic review of the CCP provisions related to victim status. The materials specifically state that, if victim status were granted to a legal person, issues would need to be resolved concerning the application of the oath, questioning, compelled appearance, procedural costs, anonymity, special protection needs and other legal institutions. The same materials also note the problem of the duty to testify, because Article 28(3) of the CCP establishes the victim’s duty to testify and liability for false testimony as a witness, while the assessment of the draft in question identified a regulatory gap concerning criminal liability of a legal person for false testimony. In addition, the assessment of Draft Law No. XIIP-3455 emphasised that, if victim status were granted to a legal person, it would be necessary to determine clearly in which cases it could apply by way of private prosecution under the related provisions of the CCP
Consequences. In practical terms, the current model means that a company may seek compensation in a criminal case under Articles 109 and 110 of the CCP, but the limits of its appeals, participation and procedural influence are narrower than the victim’s rights established in Article 28(2) of the CCP. If the regulation in Article 28 of the CCP were amended so that a legal person could also be a victim, amending that concept alone would not suffice, because the assessment materials for Draft Law No. XIIP-3455 require systemic coordination of the entire set of rights and duties attached to victim status. Such an amendment would be important for legal persons that have suffered damage as a result of criminal offences, because their interest would not be limited solely to the amount of the civil claim and the appeal of decisions related to it. At the same time, it would be important for pre-trial investigation officers, prosecutors and courts, because they would need to apply a clear procedure for recognising a legal person as a victim, its representation, testimony, applications, appeals and participation in court. As long as Article 28(1) of the CCP defines a victim as a natural person, the principal procedural status of a legal person in respect of damage suffered remains that of a civil claimant under Article 110 of the CCP
Whether the driver of the Toyota, who was found to have a blood alcohol concentration of 2.73 per mille after a collision at a Klaipeda intersection at 00:35 on 14 July, incurs liability solely for drink-driving under Article 2811 of the Criminal Code, or already under Article 281 because of the consequences of the road traffic accident.
Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code criminalises the act of driving a motor vehicle where a blood alcohol concentration of 1.51 per mille or more is established, and provides for a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. At 2.73 per mille, the threshold is plainly exceeded, so the fact of driving itself is sufficient to initiate a pre-trial investigation, irrespective of the initial information that no persons were injured. Article 281(2) of the Criminal Code would become relevant only if it were established that the intoxicated driver breached road safety rules and that this caused minor bodily harm to another person or substantial property damage.
Article 72 of the Criminal Code additionally creates a risk of confiscation of the vehicle: if the car is treated as an instrumentality of the prohibited act and belongs to the offender, it must be confiscated.
It is inaccurate to state that criminal liability for drink-driving arises from “1.50+ per mille”. Article 2811 of the Criminal Code sets a precise threshold of 1.51 per mille or more, meaning that 1.50 per mille does not, in itself, fall within the disposition of this provision. In this news item, the error does not affect the outcome, because the driver was found to have 2.73 per mille, but in a legal text the threshold must be stated precisely.
The stronger initial classification at this stage is Article 2811 of the Criminal Code, not Article 281(2), because the report states that no persons were injured and substantial property damage has not yet been established. In practice, the defence should focus primarily on scrutinising the procedure for establishing intoxication and the fact of driving, rather than disputing the consequences of the accident unless and until those consequences bring the case within the regime of Article 281. For the prosecution and the police, the key further issue will be not only the traffic-light phase at the intersection or fault for the collision, but also whether the consequence required for Article 281(2) has arisen.
The ownership of the Toyota must be assessed separately: if the vehicle belongs to the driver, the confiscation argument under Article 72 is strong; if it belongs to a third party, the conditions set out in paragraph 4 of that Article would need to be proved.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not the collision at the intersection itself, but whether the conduct of the 55-year-old Toyota driver falls within Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania: driving a motor vehicle where intoxication of 1.51 per mille or more has been established. The reported 2.73 per mille clearly exceeds this threshold for criminal liability; accordingly, the conduct is to be assessed under Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, which provides for a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. The issue of culpability is assessed in conjunction with Article 2(3) and (4) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania: a person is liable only if guilty and only where his conduct corresponds to the elements of an offence provided for by criminal law. Article 281¹(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania is additionally relevant in that liability under this article may also arise where the act was committed through negligence. Article 281 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania would be independently relevant only if it were established that a violation of road traffic safety rules or rules on the operation of a vehicle caused the consequences specified in that article, for example, minor or serious impairment of another person’s health, or substantial property damage. According to the reported information, no persons were injured; therefore, on the apparent facts, the principal provision is Article 281¹ of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, rather than Article 281(1)–(4) of that Code
Legal assessment. The driver’s obligation in this situation is to refrain from driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated at a level of 1.51 per mille or more, because such conduct is directly criminalised by Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. The intoxication level of 2.73 per mille established by the police is the central fact to be proved, because it is precisely this fact that distinguishes criminal liability from administrative liability. The regulation in Article 427(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences, as set out in the sources, concerns intoxication from more than 0.4, or not less than 0.41, per mille up to 1.5 per mille; accordingly, in this situation it is relevant only as a threshold demonstrating why the case falls within the criminal rather than the administrative regime. Since it has been reported that a pre-trial investigation has been opened, the proceedings will continue under the rules of the Code of Criminal Procedure: objects and documents relevant to the investigation and examination of the act may be submitted under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. This may be relevant to both drivers, the owners of the vehicles, or other persons who hold information about the circumstances of the incident, because Article 98 permits such information to be submitted on one’s own initiative. The commencement, running, and expiry of procedural time limits must be calculated under Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, and detention periods under Article 100(5) are calculated from the moment of actual detention. Coercive measures may be applied only for their intended purposes: to secure the suspect’s participation in the proceedings, an unhindered investigation, the hearing of the case, the execution of the judgment, or to prevent new criminal offences, as provided in Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. The list of possible coercive measures is set out in Article 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania: detention, intensive supervision, house arrest, bail, seizure of documents, an obligation to register with the police, or a written undertaking not to leave. If the investigation were to address the vehicle, Article 72(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania permits property subject to confiscation to include an instrument or means of a prohibited act, while Article 72(3) provides that property subject to confiscation belonging to the offender must be confiscated in all cases. If the vehicle belonged to another person, Article 72(4) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania would require assessment of the conditions listed therein, including whether the owner knew, or should and could have known, about the use of the property for a prohibited act. If property damage were established, the issue of compensation would primarily be linked to the accused or to persons materially liable for his actions, while Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania provides for the possibility, in cases prescribed by law, of compensating damage from state funds where such persons lack the means to compensate the damage
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is the maintenance of a charge under Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, because the reported facts directly indicate driving while intoxicated at 2.73 per mille. In that case, the driver would face one of the penalties specified in that article: a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. The second scenario would depend on the investigation of the consequences of the accident: if the consequences provided for in Article 281 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania were established, the legal assessment could expand to the application of that article. The third scenario is termination of the pre-trial investigation on the grounds provided in Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, for example, where insufficient data are collected to substantiate the suspect’s guilt in the commission of a criminal offence. The practical significance for the driver is the risk of criminal liability, possible coercive measures, punishment, and confiscation of property. The practical significance for the driver or owner of the other vehicle is the possibility of submitting objects and documents relevant to the investigation under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania and raising the issue of compensation for damage. The practical significance for the owner of the vehicle is the application of Article 72 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, because the vehicle may be assessed as a means of committing a prohibited act. The practical significance in the context of the issuance or recovery of a driving licence is apparent from paragraph 17.7.2 of the Rules on the Issuance of Driving Licences for Drivers of Motor Vehicles, under which it is verified whether the applicant has unpaid fines for criminal offences against road traffic safety provided for in Articles 281 and 281¹ of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania
Can a pharmaceutical company be penalised as a legal person for managers’ payments to doctors where payments of EUR 15-102 for each recommended and administered product were systematic, incorporated into the product price, and operated in the company’s commercial interest?
Article 227 of the Criminal Code treats as bribery the direct or indirect giving, offering, promising, or agreeing to give a bribe to a civil servant or a person equivalent to a civil servant in return for desired action or inaction in the exercise of their powers. The legally decisive point is therefore not that the payments were small and repeated, but that they were linked to the performance of doctors’ professional duties: recommending and using products for patients. Article 20(3) of the Criminal Code also permits liability of a legal person where an employee or authorised representative commits the act for the benefit of the legal person as a result of an instruction, permission, or insufficient supervision or control by a person in a managerial position.
Accordingly, the core of Valentis Pharma’s liability lies not only in the acts of the individual managers, but in the proven connection between a pre-arranged scheme, the company’s benefit, and a lack of organisational control or tolerance of the conduct.
The article’s statement that the ruling of the Court of Appeal of Lithuania “may be appealed on points of law to the Supreme Court of Lithuania” is too broad without a procedural qualification. The source provided for factual verification shows the opposite risk of such general wording: paragraph 8 of the relevant draft provided that the ruling of the Court of Appeal of Lithuania was final and not subject to cassation appeal. It would be more accurate not to state this categorically, but as follows: the possibility of cassation appeal against a ruling depends on the specific applicable procedural rule and the type of ruling.
This correction matters because the publication presents the procedural sentence as universal, whereas the sources provided confirm that cassation appeal against appellate rulings is not automatically presumed in all cases.
In practice, the stronger argument in this case is not the unlawfulness of “pharmaceutical activity” under Article 275 of the Criminal Code, but the construction of bribery and liability of a legal person under Articles 227 and 20 of the Criminal Code. For the defence, it is no longer sufficient merely to fragment the payments into small sums of EUR 15-102 if the prosecution shows a system operating in 2013-2015, involving 80 doctors, a possible amount of more than EUR 74,000 allocated for bribes, and the inclusion of the payments in the product price. For professionals, the key provision to cite is Article 20(3) of the Criminal Code: a legal person’s risk also arises from insufficient control over employees, meaning that anti-corruption procedures must be shown to have operated in practice, not merely to have been formally approved.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether payments made by employees of a pharmaceutical company to physicians for recommending and using products distributed by the company constitute bribery under Article 227 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, and whether a legal person may be held liable for such conduct under Article 20 of the Criminal Code. The elements of bribery under Article 227(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code include the direct or indirect offering, promising, agreeing to give, or giving of a bribe to a civil servant or a person equivalent thereto, or to a third person, in return for the desired action or omission in the exercise of powers. Article 2(2) of the Law on the Prevention of Corruption defines corruption as the abuse of powers for the purpose of obtaining a benefit for oneself or another person, while Article 2(9)(1) classifies bribery as a criminal act of a corrupt nature. The liability of a legal person is assessed under Article 20(2) and (3) of the Criminal Code: it is necessary to establish that a natural person committed the act for the benefit or in the interests of the legal person and, in the case of an employee or authorised representative, that there was an instruction, permission, insufficient supervision, or insufficient control. Article 20(5) of the Criminal Code is significant because the company’s liability does not exclude the criminal liability of its former representatives
Legal assessment. On the facts presented, the court established a pre-arranged scheme under which monetary payments were made to physicians for recommending and using the company’s products; accordingly, the legally material issue is the link between the remuneration and the performance of the physicians’ professional duties. If the physicians in this case were regarded as persons equivalent to civil servants, payments made in return for their desired action or omission fall within the scope of Article 227 of the Criminal Code. The specified payments of EUR 15 to EUR 102 for each recommended and administered product indicate not merely incidental remuneration, but a recurring economic mechanism intended to influence professional judgment. The circumstance that more than EUR 74,000 may have been used is legally relevant in assessing not an isolated gift, but a systematic practice of giving bribes. Article 227(3) of the Criminal Code separately provides for liability where the bribe exceeds 250 MSLs; however, on the material presented, one may rely only on the stated overall scale of the payments and the court-confirmed scheme, without going beyond the available data. The basis for the legal person’s liability is linked to the fact that the conduct was carried out for the benefit or in the interests of the company, namely to promote the recommendation and use of the medical products it distributed. If such conduct was committed by employees or representatives, Article 20(3) of the Criminal Code permits the liability of the legal person to be based on an instruction or permission from a person in a managerial position, or on insufficient supervision or control. The final fine of EUR 54,600 imposed on the company is therefore consistent with the principle that a legal person bears independent liability, while the fines of almost EUR 49,000 imposed on the three former representatives are consistent with Article 20(5) of the Criminal Code. From a procedural perspective, it is important that, under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, items and documents relevant to the investigation and examination of a criminal act may be submitted by participants in the proceedings and by any natural or legal person; therefore, the analysis of financial and medical documents is a significant part of the evidentiary process. Article 99 of the Code of Criminal Procedure links time limits to the commencement, performance, or completion of acts having procedural significance, while Article 100 establishes the rules for calculating such time limits. This is also relevant in light of the cassation appeal referred to in the report, because a ruling of the Court of Appeal of Lithuania takes effect on the date of its adoption, although further procedural steps must be carried out in accordance with the rules on calculation of time limits under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure indicates that the earlier termination of proceedings in respect of some medical professionals could have been linked only to the statutory grounds for terminating a pre-trial investigation, including cases where Articles 36, 37, 38, 39¹, or 40 of the Criminal Code apply. Article 40¹ of the Criminal Code further provides that certain grounds for release from criminal liability may also be applied to legal persons; however, in this situation a fine was imposed on the company, meaning that such release was not applied in the final outcome
Consequences. In practical terms, the first consequence is criminal: the company and its former representatives must comply with the fines imposed, unless cassation proceedings alter the final outcome. The second consequence is financial and tax-related: the company was ordered to pay almost EUR 40,000 in unpaid taxes to the State Tax Inspectorate, which indicates that the unlawful payment scheme also had a tax dimension. The third consequence concerns compliance and control: the logic of Article 20(3) of the Criminal Code requires a legal person to demonstrate genuine supervision of employees, because insufficient control may become an independent basis for the liability of the legal person. The fourth consequence concerns the healthcare sector: the concepts of corruption risks and corruption prevention defined in Article 2 of the Law on the Prevention of Corruption make cases of this kind relevant not only for punishment, but also for the elimination of risk factors. The fifth consequence concerns physicians and healthcare institutions, because the remuneration-for-recommendation system established by the court shows that a professional decision linked to a monetary benefit may be assessed as part of a criminal act of a corrupt nature. Realistically, the further course of the matter may be limited to enforcement of the imposed fines and tax obligations, or may proceed to cassation review before the Supreme Court of Lithuania. At the cassation stage, the practically most important issues would be questions of application of law: the elements of bribery under Article 227 of the Criminal Code, the conditions for the liability of a legal person under Article 20 of the Criminal Code, and compliance with procedural rules
Does the adopted regulation of milk purchasing in fact prohibit unilateral termination of contracts and price reductions, or does it merely make them lawful only where notice, justification and supervisory procedures are observed?
Article 3(2)(1) of the Law prohibits not unilateral termination of a raw milk sale and purchase agreement as such, but termination “without notifying the other party to the contract” within the period specified in the contract, which may not be shorter than 30 days. The same logic applies to amendments to contractual terms under Article 3(2)(2): what is prohibited is an unnotified amendment, subject to the stated exceptions, not every unilateral amendment in general. In the area of pricing, Article 5 establishes not a cost-price floor, but a special control mechanism where the contractual purchase price for raw milk is reduced by more than 3 percentage points: the buyer must justify the reduction to the Agency, the Agency assesses its justification within 8 working days, and an unjustified reduction may not be applied.
Under Article 1, the regulation applies before conclusion of the contract, at the time of its conclusion and after it has been concluded; it is therefore not merely an ex post sanctions regime, but also a standard of conduct for negotiations and contractual performance.
The article’s statement that processors are prohibited from unilaterally terminating milk purchase contracts without notice to the producer and from changing their terms is correct only with an important qualification: the law does not prohibit termination or amendment of the contract if the contractual advance notice period is observed, and that period may not be shorter than 30 days. More precisely, Article 3(2)(1) and (2) prohibit unilateral termination or amendment of contractual terms without notice, or on notice that is too short. Likewise, the cost-price minimum discussed in the news item is not part of the adopted regulation on the evidence provided: Article 5 shows only a mechanism requiring justification for, and Agency control of, price reductions exceeding 3 percentage points.
The most legally accurate description of this law is therefore that it is a regime controlling unfair practices and the procedure for price reductions, not a general guarantee of a minimum milk purchase price.
The stronger argument after this amendment is not that the producer acquires a right to demand continuation of the contract at any price, but that the buyer must prove the formal and substantive lawfulness of the contractual amendment: the notice period, the contractual basis and, where the price is reduced by more than 3 percentage points, the justification submitted to the Agency. In practice, disputes should cite Article 3(2)(1) and (2) regarding the 30-day minimum and Article 5 regarding control of price reductions, rather than relying on the general assertion that “unilateral termination is prohibited”. For buyers, risk arises where a commercial decision is formalised as a simple operational change but in substance alters delivery frequency, quantity, quality or pricing terms without proper notice.
For producers, it is important not to frame the dispute abstractly as one about an “unfair price”, but to gather evidence as to whether the 30-day period was observed and whether the price reduction exceeded the 3-percentage-point threshold, because those are the criteria that activate the clearest statutory protection.
Core issue. The precise legal question is how, following the Seimas’ adoption of the so-called Milk Law, unfair conduct by buyers and sellers of raw milk will be restricted when concluding, amending and performing raw milk purchase and sale agreements. This question is primarily governed by Articles 1 and 3 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Prohibition of Unfair Practices by Economic Operators Buying and Selling Raw Milk and Trading in Dairy Products. Under Article 1(1) of that Law, the purpose of the regulation includes the prohibition of unfair practices by sellers and buyers of raw milk, requirements applicable to dairy products produced in Lithuania, and the system of supervision and liability. Under Article 1(2) of the same Law, the rules apply before the conclusion of a contract, during its conclusion and after a raw milk purchase and sale agreement has been concluded; accordingly, the regulation covers the entire course of the commercial relationship. The normative context also includes Articles 1, 4, 5 and 6 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Prohibition of Unfair Trading Practices in the Agricultural and Food Products Supply Chain, as those provisions establish categories of suppliers and buyers, prohibited practices, payment terms, the classification of perishable products and supervisory authorities. Where retail undertakings are involved in the relationship, Articles 3 and 4 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Prohibition of Unfair Practices by Retail Undertakings are also applicable
Legal assessment. In the raw milk supply chain, the essential obligation is to formalise the relationship in writing or on another contractual basis, because under Article 3(2)(3) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Prohibition of Unfair Practices by Economic Operators Buying and Selling Raw Milk and Trading in Dairy Products, an economic operator is prohibited from buying and selling raw milk without having concluded a raw milk purchase and sale agreement. This means that neither the producer nor the buyer may rely solely on actual supply as a sufficient legal basis if no contract has been concluded. The stability of the contract is protected by Article 3(2)(1) of the same Law, which prohibits unilateral termination of the contract without notifying the other party within the period specified in the contract, which may not be shorter than 30 days. Similar protection applies to amendments to contractual terms: under Article 3(2)(2), it is prohibited to amend the terms of a raw milk purchase and sale agreement without notifying the other party within the period specified in the contract, which, as a general rule, may not be shorter than 30 days. The exception in that provision is expressly linked to cases where the purchase price of raw milk is increased or where the buyer is an agricultural cooperative recognised in accordance with the procedure established by the Minister of Agriculture. Therefore, the prohibition referred to in the report on processors unilaterally terminating a contract or changing the frequency, method, place, time, quantity, quality and other terms of delivery is legally based not on absolute inviolability of the contract, but on a mandatory regime of prior notice and a minimum notice period. As regards payment for products, Article 4 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Prohibition of Unfair Trading Practices in the Agricultural and Food Products Supply Chain applies: for perishable agricultural and food products, the buyer must make payment no later than within 30 calendar days. If the products are not classified as perishable, Article 4(1) provides for other terms, including a 60-calendar-day limit in cases where the contract is concluded with a buyer that is not a public entity. Where the contract provides for regular supply, the commencement of payment terms under Article 4(2)(1) is linked to the end of the delivery period, which ends on the last calendar day of the month. Whether a product is deemed perishable is determined under Article 5 of the same Law, having regard to its nature and intended purpose, while the Government or an institution authorised by it approves the relevant procedural description and indicative list. Institutional supervision is divided according to the entities concerned: under Article 6(1) of the Law on the Prohibition of Unfair Trading Practices in the Agricultural and Food Products Supply Chain, general supervision, except in respect of retail undertakings with significant market power, is carried out by the Agricultural Agency under the Ministry of Agriculture. Under Article 6(2), compliance with requirements applicable to retail undertakings with significant market power is supervised by the Competition Council. In relation to retail undertakings, the powers of the Competition Council are detailed in Article 4 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Prohibition of Unfair Practices by Retail Undertakings: it supervises compliance with requirements, investigates infringements, examines cases, imposes sanctions and may issue binding instructions to provide documents and information. If dairy products are supplied to the Lithuanian market, an additional labelling aspect arises under Article 4 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Prohibition of Unfair Practices by Economic Operators Buying and Selling Raw Milk and Trading in Dairy Products, pursuant to which dairy products produced in Lithuania and included in the list approved by the Minister of Agriculture must be labelled by indicating the country of origin of the raw milk
Consequences. The practical consequence for milk producers is a stronger contractual position: the buyer may not abruptly terminate the relationship or amend essential supply terms, because it must comply with a notice period of at least 30 days. For buyers and processors, this means that procedures for amending and terminating contracts, delivery terms and payment arrangements must be put in order in advance, as infringements may be assessed as unfair practices. From March 2027, as indicated in the report, if the entry into force of the law is linked to that date, the focus of disputes will shift from political adoption to contractual performance and the practice of supervisory authorities. The first realistic scenario is a review of contracts before entry into force so that notice periods, payment arrangements and supply terms comply with statutory requirements. The second scenario is individual applications by producers or their cooperatives concerning contracts that have been unilaterally amended or terminated, which would be examined, according to competence, by the Agricultural Agency or the Competition Council. The third scenario concerns the involvement of traders: if rules relating to the retail segment are subsequently amended, the centre of supervision, according to the sources provided, would fall within the competence of the Competition Council under Article 4 of the Law on the Prohibition of Unfair Practices by Retail Undertakings. From the perspective of sanctions, the description of the procedure for imposing fines approved by Government Resolution No. 1085 of 15 December 2021 is significant; it provides that fines for infringements of the Law on the Prohibition of Unfair Trading Practices in the Agricultural and Food Products Supply Chain are calculated by reference to a base amount, mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and that in the case of a repeated infringement of the same kind within one year, the base amount may be increased by up to 100 percent. The legislation is therefore of practical importance not only to farmers, but also to processors, buyers, cooperatives and retail undertakings, because it allocates obligations, notice periods, payment discipline and supervisory risk differently across each link in the chain
Does the fictitious employment of third-country nationals and their actual work on a farm, where they sought to remain in Lithuania, in itself establish the elements of forced labour under Article 1471 of the Criminal Code, or is it necessary to prove a specific means of influence that restricted their will?
Article 1471(1) of the Criminal Code criminalises not any unlawful employment relationship, but unlawful coercion to work where physical violence, threats, deception, or other means specified in Article 147 of the Criminal Code are used. Article 147 includes among such means dependence, vulnerability, deception, and control through a benefit given to a person who in fact controls the victim. The decisive element is therefore not a breach of migration or labour law, but the denial of the worker’s autonomy of will.
Article 1472 of the Criminal Code, concerning the use of forced labour, is derivative: liability arises only where the labour was used with knowledge, or with the possibility of knowing, that the work was being performed as a result of the means of influence specified in Article 147. Article 2921 of the Criminal Code separately covers the employment of third-country nationals unlawfully present in the Republic of Lithuania. The Supreme Court’s reasoning therefore distinguishes the risk of unlawful employment from the constituent elements of trafficking in human beings or forced labour.
In its ruling of 17 June 2026 in criminal case No. 2K-123-697/2026, the Supreme Court of Lithuania upheld the acquittal delivered at first instance and quashed the conviction entered by the appellate court. The cassation court emphasised that the appellate court had substantiated neither dependence nor vulnerability, while its findings on deception were contradictory, because no essential reason was established that had induced the third-country nationals to agree to work on the farm.
The practical boundary drawn in this case is clear: workers’ expectation of remaining in Lithuania and an unlawful employment scheme do not yet amount to forced labour if it is proven that they had a genuine freedom of choice and were not subject to control restricting their will.
The news formulation that the offence of forced labour requires the elements of deception, dependence, and vulnerability is too narrow and legally imprecise. Article 1471 of the Criminal Code is framed in the alternative: the offence may be committed by using physical violence, threats, deception, or other means specified in Article 147 of the Criminal Code. It would therefore be more accurate to say that, in this case, the prosecution was based on the elements of deception, dependence, and vulnerability, but Article 1471 itself does not require all of those elements cumulatively.
This clarification matters because the Supreme Court’s logic in acquitting the defendants does not mean that forced labour is possible only where all three circumstances are proven together.
The stronger argument following this ruling is a defence-oriented one: unlawful or fictitious employment, even where connected to the migration status of third-country nationals, must be classified under the specific rules on illegal work or migration if control amounting to forced labour has not been proven. In such cases, it will not be sufficient for the prosecution to point to a disorderly employment scheme or the workers’ dependence on a residence permit; it will have to prove that deception, exploitation of vulnerability, or another means under Article 147 of the Criminal Code was what determined the person’s agreement to work. The risk for employers and legal persons does not disappear, since Article 2921 of the Criminal Code or rules on undeclared work may remain relevant, but the application of Articles 1471 and 1472 requires a qualitatively different evidential standard.
In practice, what should be cited is not an abstract proposition about “vulnerable migrants”, but the Supreme Court’s conclusion that it is necessary to establish the essential reason why the person agreed to work and a real restriction of that person’s freedom of choice.
Core issue. The precise issue is whether the work performed by third-country nationals in an agricultural company constituted not only potentially unlawful employment, but also the criminal exploitation of forced labour under Article 1471(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. This provision requires a finding that a person was unlawfully compelled to work through the use of physical violence, threats, deception, or other means specified in Article 147 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Since the case focused on elements of deception, dependence, and vulnerability, they must be assessed through the means established in Article 147(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania: taking advantage of the victim’s dependence or vulnerability and the use of deception. The second issue is whether the agricultural company and its director could incur liability for using forced labour under Article 1472(1) and (3) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. The third issue of legal distinction is whether fictitious employment and work performed in breach of the requirements governing the legal status of foreigners fall within the rationale of Article 2921 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, rather than automatically proving forced labour under Article 1471 of that Code
Legal assessment. Article 1471(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania protects not merely compliance with labour law or migration rules, but the freedom of a person’s will within an employment relationship. Accordingly, a conviction cannot be based solely on a finding that third-country nationals worked under conditions, or on a legal basis, other than those under which they ought to have worked. A specific means of overcoming the person’s will must be established: deception, dependence, vulnerability, violence, threats, or another measure specified in Article 147(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. This was precisely what the Supreme Court of Lithuania emphasised in its ruling of 17 June 2026 in criminal case No. 2K-123-697/2026, stating that the appellate court’s conclusions concerning dependence, vulnerability, and deception had not been properly substantiated. It is legally significant that the court of cassation found well-founded the first-instance court’s conclusions that the third-country nationals were able freely to choose their course of conduct. If the work on the farm initially satisfied them, and their decision to work was determined by their own expectation of remaining in the Republic of Lithuania, this does not confirm unlawful compulsion to work as a necessary element of Article 1471(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Deception in this offence must be material, that is, of such a nature as to have determined the person’s consent to work and narrowed their real freedom of choice. If the court does not establish the material reason that prompted the persons to agree to perform the proposed work, the element of deception cannot be replaced by a general assessment of unclear or irregular employment circumstances. The same logic applies to dependence and vulnerability: under Article 147(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, these elements must actually be used for the purpose of exploitation, and not merely linked in the abstract to the status of foreigners. Article 1472(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania depends on the prior establishment of the elements of forced labour, because liability for using labour arises where the user knew, or ought to have and could have known, that the work was being performed as a result of exploitative means used against the person. Consequently, in the absence of the elements of Article 1471 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, there is likewise no basis for liability of the agricultural company and its director under Article 1472 of that Code. Liability of a legal person is theoretically provided for both in Article 1471(4) and Article 1472(3) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, but it depends on the establishment of the constituent elements of the relevant criminal offence. From a procedural perspective, documents and objects relevant to such a case could be submitted under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, since the suspect, accused, defence counsel, victim, and other persons may, on their own initiative, submit information relevant to the case. Issues concerning time limits are resolved under Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, which define the purpose of procedural time limits and their calculation in hours, days, and months. If insufficient evidence to substantiate guilt were collected at the pre-trial investigation stage, the ground for terminating the pre-trial investigation set out in Article 212(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania would apply
Consequences. Since the Supreme Court of Lithuania quashed the appellate court’s conviction and left in force the first-instance acquittal, criminal liability under Articles 1471 and 1472 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania is no longer applicable in this case. The practical significance of this ruling lies in the rule of distinction it establishes: unlawful or fictitious employment is not equivalent to exploitation for forced labour. If similar situations are assessed in the future, the prosecution will have to prove not only a breach of migration or employment rules, but also a specific mechanism restricting the person’s will. Article 2921 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania remains important for employers and their authorised representatives, as it provides for liability for employing third-country nationals illegally present in the Republic of Lithuania under the conditions specified in that article. For persons regarded as victims, the practical consequence is that the exemption from liability provided for in Article 1471(3) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania applies only where it is established that they were compelled directly to commit a criminal offence as a result of the offence committed against them under that article. Issues of compensation for damage in criminal proceedings could be linked to Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania only in cases where the statutory conditions for compensating damage from state funds are met. This case is of practical importance for prosecutors and courts because it shows that, in forced labour cases, it is necessary to prove precisely the content of deception, dependence, or vulnerability, rather than relying solely on the general social or migration situation of the workers
Whether a reform of the EU External Action Service that strengthens the role of the High Representative may be treated as an internal administrative reorganisation if, in practice, it shifts the centre of gravity in foreign policy away from unanimous political agreement among the Member States towards more centralised EU institutional action.
No direct provisions of the Lisbon Treaty are provided in the evidence, so the conclusion rests on the general principle of EU constitutional pluralism, as described in Bulletin No. 18 of the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania on administrative-law practice. It states that changes to EU law must be made in a manner acceptable to the other legal system, and that national constitutions and EU law operate in a regime of mutual influence.
This rule is important because the news item concerns not merely a personnel or budgetary reform of the EEAS, but a possible redistribution of functions between the High Representative, the Council and the Commission. If the strengthening of K. Kallas’s role before the 2027 elections in France were, in practical terms, to reduce the Member States’ ability to block or shape a common position, this would no longer amount merely to improving the efficiency of the service.
For smaller states, the stronger argument is not an abstract “loss of sovereignty”, but a specific institutional risk: whether the reform alters the unanimity-based balance of foreign policy through administrative architecture. In practice, when assessing the ministerial discussion to be held in Wicklow in September, in September 2026, the focus should not be on whether the EEAS receives more coordination functions, but on whether it acquires a real ability to direct the political weight of Commission instruments and approximately EUR 11 billion in enlargement programmes without a clearly formulated mandate from the Member States. For Lithuania’s position, the safer line of citation would be the logic of vertical and horizontal coherence referred to in the Supreme Administrative Court bulletin: efficiency is permissible, but it cannot circumvent the constitutionally sensitive participation of the Member States in EU foreign policy.
It would be a mistake to frame the dispute solely as a question of K. Kallas’s personal style or Paris’s influence, because the legally significant point is the shift of competences between the Council, the Commission and the EEAS, which occupies an intermediate position.
Core issue. The precise legal question is not whether EEAS reform is politically desirable, but what constitutional and domestic procedural threshold applies in Lithuania where the institutional model of EU foreign policy, voting rules, or amendments to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union could alter the conditions of Lithuania’s participation in the EU. This question must be assessed under Article 7(1)(5), (10) and (11) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on International Treaties, Article 2 of the Law Amending and Supplementing Articles 1, 4, 6, 9, 15 and 16 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on International Treaties, the Constitutional Act of the Republic of Lithuania “On Membership of the Republic of Lithuania in the European Union”, and the Government’s provisions concerning the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. If the reform were limited to the internal organisation of the EEAS, it would primarily fall within the preparation and coordination of Lithuania’s position in EU institutions, since the Government rules on coordination of EU affairs require identification of the substance of the EU document, the adoption procedure, the voting method, and the timetable for consideration. If the reform entailed amendment of the Treaties, Article 7(1)(11) of the Law on International Treaties would apply, under which amendments to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union adopted pursuant to the procedure laid down in Article 48(6) of the Treaty on European Union must be ratified. If the reform took the form of an international mixed agreement, Article 7(1)(10) of the same law would be relevant, while the expediency of concluding such an agreement, under Article 2 of the amending law, would be determined in accordance with the Constitutional Act and the legislation governing Lithuanian positions in EU institutions
Legal assessment. The ministerial discussion reportedly planned in Wicklow in September 2026 would legally constitute an early stage of political and institutional position-forming, at which Lithuanian institutions would have to describe the document’s legal basis, procedure, responsible Commissioner or Directorate-General, as provided in the provisions of the rules on coordination of the Presidency of the Council of the EU. The provisions amending Government Resolution No. 21 of 9 January 2004 require assessment of whether a Council decision requires unanimity, a qualified majority, a simple majority, or another procedure; accordingly, the voting rules would be a central element of Lithuania’s position. Lithuania’s earlier position on the constitutional development of the EU, set out in the Government’s provisions concerning the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, emphasised that decisions in the Intergovernmental Conference must reflect the interests of all participating states. On institutional matters, that same position sought equal rotation in the Council of Ministers, Commissioners with equal rights from all EU states, and preservation of the existing ratio of state representation in the European Parliament. Therefore, from the perspective of Lithuanian legal positions, a proposal to strengthen a single EU foreign policy centre would have to be tested against the criterion of balance between small and large states, since the Government’s provisions considered the qualified majority system acceptable only insofar as it was based on an appropriate balance between the proportions of EU Member States and population. Lithuania’s position in the field of common foreign, security and defence policy was also cautious: paragraph 8.2.1 of the Government’s provisions stated that any formalisation of common EU defence would not benefit Lithuania’s security policy if it duplicated NATO structures and capabilities. For that reason, bringing the EEAS closer to the Commission or increasing the powers of the High Representative is not, in itself, prohibited under the sources provided, but must be assessed by reference to whether it alters the balance of competences, voting arrangements, and the relationship between security policy and NATO. Article 2 of the Law on Delegation shows that Lithuania’s participation in EU institutions may also be implemented through the delegation of individuals, while paragraphs 3.1.1-3.1.4 of the resolution on delegation priorities identify general EU matters, crisis prevention and management, common foreign and security policy, human rights, the rule of law, and the Eastern Partnership as priorities. This means that Lithuania’s practical interest in EEAS reform is not limited to the voting mechanism: it also includes the participation of Lithuanian experts in those EU fields that legislation already identifies as delegation priorities. The rules on representation of the Lithuanian State before courts are not the principal decision-making mechanism at this stage, but Article 51(3) of the Law on Compensation for Damage and Representation of the State would be relevant if a dispute concerning Lithuania’s position or an international obligation reached the Court of Justice of the European Union or another dispute-resolution body recognised by Lithuania. The sources provided contain no case law, so the analysis is based solely on the texts of statutes and Government resolutions
Consequences. First scenario: before the September 2026 discussion, Lithuania prepares a position which, in accordance with the rules on coordination of EU affairs, clearly identifies the legal basis, adoption procedure, voting method, and Lithuania’s interest in the participation of small states. Second scenario: the EEAS reform is presented as an internal institutional reorganisation without Treaty amendment, in which case Lithuania’s action would be coordination of its position in EU institutions, not ratification under Article 7 of the Law on International Treaties. Third scenario: the reform affects amendments to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or follows the model of an international mixed agreement, in which case a ratification requirement would arise under Article 7(1)(10) or (11) of the Law on International Treaties. Fourth scenario: an extension of qualified majority voting in the field of foreign policy is considered politically, but legally Lithuania’s position should be grounded in the earlier criterion of balance between large, medium-sized and small states, enshrined in paragraph 8.1.5 of the Government’s provisions. The practical significance for Lithuania is that EEAS reform may affect not only who speaks for the EU in Brussels, but also the extent to which Lithuania’s position has veto, blocking, negotiating or delegation channels. For small states, the most important legal risk under the sources provided is not abstract “centralisation”, but a procedural shift from an agreement reflecting the interests of all states to a model in which qualified majority voting is acceptable only where there is an appropriate balance between the proportions of states and population. It is therefore practically important for Lithuanian institutions to identify, before September 2026, whether the proposals by France and other states are administrative, institutional or treaty-based, because that will determine whether a Government-coordinated EU position is sufficient or whether a ratification procedure will be required
Can the Seimas, by abolishing the requirement to achieve at least the threshold level in the Lithuanian language and mathematics PUPP at the end of lower secondary education, decouple the acquisition of lower secondary education from minimum, actually verified attainment without breaching the purpose of attainment assessment established in the Law on Education?
Article 10(1) of the Law on Education defines the purpose of lower secondary education not merely as attendance of a programme, but as the provision of general literacy, the fundamentals of technological literacy, and the ability to continue learning. Article 38(1) links attainment assessment to determining a pupil’s attainments, comparing them with the levels established in the general curricula, and making decisions on further learning. The stronger legal argument against the amendment is therefore not abstract rhetoric about “lowering the bar”, but the fact that assessment, once deprived of any real consequence or mandatory support mechanism, becomes more weakly connected to the function assigned to it by the law itself.
Conversely, Article 24(1)–(3) guarantee the right to learn and acquire education, so an absolute closure of the pathway solely on the basis of a PUPP result would be justifiable only where a proportionate system of support and remediation is also in place.
In practice, the veto argument is most rationally grounded not in the claim that a certificate must always operate as a “sanction” for failing to achieve a mark, but in the fact that the Seimas amendment, as described in the news report, removes the legal obstacle without providing for an individual plan to address learning gaps or additional support. This permits the argument that the regulation shifts the problem into grades 11–12 and the state maturity examinations, even though Article 38 structures assessment as the basis for decisions on further learning. For the President or critics of the amendment, the strongest position would be to demand not only the reinstatement of a threshold mark, but a provision that automatically links failure to achieve the PUPP threshold with a mandatory support plan and clear consequences for further learning.
The legal risk for schools and the Ministry is that the certificate will begin to function as confirmation of formal completion of the programme, even though Article 10(1) defines lower secondary education by reference to acquired competences.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether abolishing the threshold achievement level in the PUPP is compatible with the purpose of lower secondary education, the function of assessing learning outcomes, and the State’s duty to ensure learning and support for the pupil. It must be assessed under Article 10, Article 24(1), (2), (3) and (5), and Article 38(1)–(4) of the Law on Education of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as Article 36(7) of the Law Amending Law No. I-1489 on Education of the Republic of Lithuania, under which Article 4 enters into force on 1 September 2026. Article 10(1) of the Law on Education defines lower secondary education not merely as attendance of a programme, but as the provision of moral, socio-cultural and civic maturity, general literacy, the foundations of technological literacy, and the ability to continue learning. Article 38(1) of the Law on Education provides that the purpose of assessing learning outcomes is to determine a pupil’s achievements and, by comparing them with the achievement levels established in the general curricula, to assist in making decisions regarding further learning or activity. The legal dispute therefore focuses on whether the achievement assessment remains a genuine basis for decisions on further learning if the acquisition of lower secondary education is no longer linked to at least a minimum level of achievement in Lithuanian language and mathematics
Legal assessment. Article 24(1) of the Law on Education establishes the right to learn and acquire an education, while Article 24(2) obliges the State to take measures to ensure that every child learns under the lower secondary education programme. However, this right is not defined solely by the formal receipt of a certificate: under Article 2(4) of the Law on Education, education is a person’s maturity, competence and qualification recognised in accordance with the procedure laid down by law, and under Article 2(5), competence is linked to the entirety of knowledge, abilities, skills and value-based attitudes. Article 38(4) of the Law on Education classifies achievement assessments upon completion of the lower secondary education programme as assessments of learning outcomes under general education programmes and assigns their organisation to an institution authorised by the Minister of Education, Science and Sport and to the municipal executive institution. Those same assessments must be carried out in accordance with the general curricula approved by the Minister and the descriptions of the procedure for organising and conducting learning achievement assessments. Article 38(4) of the Law on Education also requires assessments to be uniform for pupils in schools of all languages of instruction, without infringing the principle of equal opportunities, and to be adapted for pupils with special educational needs in accordance with the procedure established by the Minister. This means that the law treats the achievement assessment not merely as an administrative act, but as a standardised instrument for comparing pupils’ results with the general curricula. Article 24(5) of the Law on Education establishes a separate legal consequence for a person who has acquired primary or lower secondary education, or completed the first part of the lower secondary education programme, and has not reached a satisfactory achievement level: an individual plan for improving learning outcomes must be prepared for that person, and the necessary learning support must be provided. Accordingly, under the regulatory framework presented, an insufficient achievement level is not to be ignored, but turned into the basis for individualised support. The Government’s position on draft laws No. XIVP-922 and No. XIVP-923 reflects the same direction: it was proposed to establish in Article 24(5) of the Law on Education an individual plan for improving learning outcomes and the necessary learning support, with approximately EUR 800,000 per year envisaged for such support. The organisations’ argument that merely abolishing the threshold requirement without additional support does not eliminate learning gaps is therefore consistent with the logic of Article 24(5) of the Law on Education. On the other hand, the submitted versions of Article 38(4) of the Law on Education directly regulate the organisation, uniformity, adaptation of assessments, and assurance of proficiency in Lithuanian, but do not themselves clearly formulate a rule that the lower secondary education certificate must necessarily depend on the PUPP threshold result. The legal centre of gravity is therefore not the legality of conducting the PUPP itself, since it is provided for by law, but the significance of its results for recognising lower secondary education and activating the support mechanism. Article 36(7) of the Law Amending the Law on Education is important for the transitional assessment, because Article 4 is set to enter into force on 1 September 2026, that is, after today, 16 July 2026. Consequently, a decision of the Seimas adopted before 1 September 2026 would in practice alter a stage of lower secondary education regulation that has not yet begun to apply in full. Article 10(3) of the Law on Education provides that the lower secondary education programme is implemented in accordance with the Description of the Lower Secondary Education Programme, the general curricula and the general education plans approved by the Minister; therefore, following the amendment of the law, the executive authorities would have significant competence to specify the procedures for achievement assessments and support. Under Article 38(4), schools must ensure proficiency in Lithuanian in accordance with the Lithuanian Language and Literature general curriculum approved by the Minister; therefore, reducing the significance of the Lithuanian language achievement assessment would not eliminate the school’s own duty to pursue that outcome
Consequences. If the adopted amendment were to enter into force, the PUPP would continue to be organised under Article 38(4) of the Law on Education, but the legal significance of its result for the acquisition of lower secondary education would be narrower. In that event, the greatest practical significance would shift to the application of Article 24(5) of the Law on Education: for a pupil who has not reached a satisfactory level, an individual plan for improving learning outcomes would have to be prepared and the necessary support provided. If the reconsideration requested by the President resulted in the threshold requirement being retained, the PUPP result would remain not only diagnostic but also linked to a condition for recognising lower secondary education. In both scenarios, institutional implementation would fall not to the organisations that submitted the appeal, but to the institution authorised by the Minister of Education, Science and Sport, the municipal executive institution, and schools under Article 38(4) of the Law on Education. For pupils and parents, this is practically important because it determines whether an insufficient PUPP result in Lithuanian language or mathematics will be an obstacle to receiving a lower secondary education certificate, or will primarily become the basis for an individual plan to improve achievements. For schools and municipalities, this is important because of the duty to organise support, since Article 24(5) of the Law on Education requires not abstract concern, but a concrete plan and the necessary learning support. For the State, this is important because, under Article 10(1) of the Law on Education, lower secondary education must prepare a person for further learning, while under Article 38(1), assessment must assist in making decisions regarding further learning or activity
Can children’s access to social networks be restricted solely by an age threshold, or is the legally stronger basis the platform’s duty to disable, by default, design, recommendation and advertising features harmful to minors?
Article 7 of Lithuania’s Law on the Protection of Minors against the Detrimental Effect of Public Information prohibits the direct dissemination to minors of information that has a negative effect on them, while also allowing such information to be managed through technical measures: age verification, parental control tools, content filtering or other systems. This better fits a “youth mode” model than an absolute ban, because the rule is directed at controlled provision rather than the merely formal age of an account. Article 8 further restricts advertising and commercial audiovisual communications where they exploit minors’ inexperience, encourage them to pressure parents to buy, or create an impression of social advantage.
Accordingly, disabling targeted advertising for children has a more specific normative basis than a general ban on using social networks below the age of 15 or 16. Article 28 of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child protects the child from information capable of affecting mental or physical health, but the provisions cited speak more clearly about information and its dissemination than about infinite scroll, autoplay or push notifications as standalone design harms.
The stronger argument at present is not “ban the child from having an account”, but “prohibit the platform from activating risky architecture for the child by default”: highly personalised recommendations, addiction-inducing scrolling, autoplay, notification pressure and targeted advertising. In practice, for the draft EU legal act which, according to news reports, is expected after the 2026 summer recess, the critical issue will not be the age threshold itself, whether 13, 15 or 16, but whether the obligations are framed as default-by-design prohibitions on design and advertising practices. If the text remains limited to an age-based ban, Member States will continue to dispute different thresholds, and platforms will be able to shift the debate to the mechanics of age verification and parental consent.
If the text defines “youth mode” as a mandatory set of technical measures, it will align better with the existing logic under which the protection of minors is ensured not only by removing content, but also by measures restricting access, filtering, parental control and advertising.
Core issue. The precise legal question is not merely “from what age may a child use social networks,” but when the processing of a child’s personal data by a social network, where based on consent, is lawful, and whether that threshold can be harmonised at European Union level. Under Article 8(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, the General Data Protection Regulation, where information society services are offered directly to a child and Article 6(1)(a) GDPR applies, the processing of the child’s data is lawful only where the child is at least 16 years old; in the case of a younger child, consent or authorisation by the holder of parental responsibility is required. The same Article 8(1) GDPR permits Member States to provide by law for a lower age, but not below 13 years. In Lithuania, that discretion has been implemented by Article 6 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Legal Protection of Personal Data: where information society services are offered directly to a child, consent under Article 6(1)(a) GDPR may be given by a child who is at least 14 years old. Accordingly, a proposal to provide that children under 13 may use social networks only under adult supervision would fall within the regulatory core of Article 8 GDPR, but would not be limited solely to the form of consent if the design of the platform itself or the mode of use were regulated
Legal assessment. Article 8 GDPR does not create an absolute prohibition on children using social networks, but establishes a condition for the lawfulness of data processing where it is based on the child’s consent. The platform, as controller, must, under Article 8(2) GDPR, make reasonable efforts, taking into account available technology, to verify that consent or authorisation has been given by the holder of parental responsibility. Under Article 7(1) GDPR, it must also be able to demonstrate that consent was given, and under Article 7(3) GDPR, it must be as easy to withdraw consent as to give it. Article 4(11) GDPR defines consent as a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes; therefore, a merely formal click of a button in the context of children’s services would not be sufficient if the requirements of information and free choice are not met. Article 12(1) GDPR is particularly important in the case of children, as it requires information to be provided in a concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language, in particular where the information is addressed specifically to a child. This means that the legal basis for a “youth mode,” insofar as it relates to data processing, should be assessed by reference to actual information provided to the child and parents, verification of consent, and technical and organisational safeguards. Article 5(f) GDPR requires data to be processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing. The assessment, from a data protection perspective, of child-oriented features, recommender systems or notifications therefore cannot be separated from the question whether they entail additional collection, profiling or use of personal data without valid consent. Recital 18 GDPR distinguishes a child’s or family’s personal use of social networks from the responsibility of platforms: the Regulation does not apply to purely personal or household activity, but it does apply to controllers and processors that provide the means for such processing. Institutional competence is divided: under Article 57(1)(c) GDPR, national supervisory authorities advise the parliament, the government and other institutions on legislative measures, while under Article 57(1)(f) GDPR they handle complaints and investigate their subject matter. Under Article 58(3)(b) GDPR, they may, on their own initiative or on request, issue opinions to the national parliament, the government, other institutions and the public on any issue related to the protection of personal data. Where problems of cross-border application arise, Article 65(1) GDPR provides for binding decisions of the European Data Protection Board on disputes, including issues concerning the competence of supervisory authorities or relevant and reasoned objections to draft decisions. Article 70 GDPR gives the Board a role in developing guidelines, recommendations, best practices, codes of conduct and certification mechanisms. In addition, Article 40(2)(g) GDPR permits codes of conduct to specify the information provided to, and the protection of, children, as well as the manner in which consent is to be obtained from holders of parental responsibility over children. The direction of a future Commission legislative proposal, insofar as it relates to data protection, may be based on Article 98 GDPR, under which the Commission, where necessary, submits legislative proposals with a view to ensuring uniform and consistent protection of natural persons in relation to processing. Where third-country platforms or international actors are involved, Article 50 GDPR allows the Commission and supervisory authorities to take steps to strengthen international cooperation and enforcement
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is an EU-level rule harmonising the minimum regime for children’s consent or parental authorisation, thereby reducing the current tension between the national age threshold of 13 to 16 years permitted by Article 8 GDPR and differing political proposals in the Member States. Such a rule would be practically significant for Lithuania because the current national threshold under Article 6 of the Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data is 14 years, while a common EU solution could alter platforms’ obligations in respect of Lithuanian children. The second scenario is not a general prohibition, but mandatory platform procedures: reliable verification of parental authorisation under Article 8(2) GDPR, demonstrable consent under Article 7(1) GDPR, and information intelligible to the child under Article 12(1) GDPR. The third scenario is softer regulation through codes of conduct under Article 40 GDPR, guidelines under Article 70 GDPR, and supervisory authority opinions under Article 58(3)(b) GDPR, although that route would depend more heavily on supervisory practice and sectoral commitments. For platforms, this means a greater evidential burden regarding consent, age verification and verification of parental authorisation; for parents, a clearer legal role in authorising the processing of a younger child’s data; and for children, a right to information that is genuinely adapted to their understanding. For Member States, the key practical question will be whether they retain national age thresholds within the range permitted by Article 8 GDPR, or whether EU legislation will opt for a more uniform model
Does notification of a food supplement in itself reduce the manufacturer’s responsibility for product safety, where 1,377 new products entered the market in the first half of 2026?
Article 7(1) of the Law on Food establishes an outcome, not merely a procedure: food business operators must place safe food on the market. Article 7(2) of the same law triggers the obligation even before unsafety is finally proven, because it is sufficient for the operator to become aware that the food may be unsafe. In that case, the operator must immediately discontinue placing it on the market, inform consumers and the SFVS, and take steps to eliminate the risk.
Article 1 of the Law on Food frames this obligation as part of the consumer health and food safety regime. Accordingly, the scale of notification referred to in the article is not an argument for a lower standard of care.
The stronger argument here is not “the product has been notified, therefore the regulatory risk has been managed”, but rather “notification does not replace the continuing safety obligation under Article 7 of the Law on Food”. In practice, for food supplement businesses, the critical risk lies precisely where Dr Vaiva Bražinskienė identifies it in the article: in the choice of raw materials, form, additives and partners, because these details may become the basis for assessing whether the operator reasonably controlled product safety. For practitioners, Article 7(2) is worth citing: it allows the SFVS or a party to a dispute to emphasise not only the moment when the product was placed on the market, but also how quickly the company responded after receiving an indication that the supplement might be unsafe.
Core issue. The precise legal question is not whether the development of food supplements is commercially complex, but what public-law obligations an economic operator has before producing, handling, importing or supplying food supplements to the Lithuanian market. This question is determined by reference to the concepts of “food” and “food handling” established in Article 2(1) and 2(5) of the Law on Food of the Republic of Lithuania, Article 9 on institutional competence, Article 11 on official food control, Article 41 on the registration of food business operators, and paragraph 6 of Lithuanian Hygiene Standard HN 17:2010 “Food Supplements”. Since food includes a product or substance intended to be ingested by humans, and food handling includes production, preparation, processing, packaging, storage, transport, supply, placing on the market and sale, the food supplement business falls within the regulatory scope of food law. Paragraph 6 of HN 17:2010 establishes a specific rule: the supply of food supplements to the market of the Republic of Lithuania must be reported, that is, notified, in accordance with the procedure established by the Director of the State Food and Veterinary Service. Accordingly, the large volume of notified supplements referred to in the article is legally significant as a market-entry procedure, not merely as a fact of marketing or product development
Legal assessment. Under Article 9(2)(1) of the Law on Food of the Republic of Lithuania, the Ministry of Health shapes state policy in the areas of food safety and the prevention of food- and nutrition-related diseases, while under Article 9(2)(2) it regulates, insofar as this does not conflict with European Union law, inter alia, the safety of food supplements and the provision of food information to consumers, including health and nutrition claims concerning food products. This means that the composition and presentation of food supplements, and the information conveyed to consumers, are not matters left solely to the manufacturer’s discretion. Under Article 41(1) of the Law on Food, food business operators are registered in accordance with that law and the procedure established by the Director of the SFVS, and registered operators must comply with the food handling requirements laid down by legal acts. Under Article 41(2), an operator applying for registration must demonstrate compliance by submitting documents concerning the right to use the food handling premises, the compliance of infrastructure, equipment and the food handling process with hygiene requirements, the scope of activities, and the self-control system. Under Article 41(3)(1), where the intended activity is the production of food products of non-animal origin, the SFVS adopts a registration decision and informs the operator thereof no later than within 10 working days from the date of receipt of all duly completed documents, after verifying the compliance of the food handling premises with the requirements of food legislation. Paragraph 6 of HN 17:2010 supplements this general registration logic with a product-level obligation: the supply of food supplements to the market must be notified in accordance with the procedure established by the Director of the SFVS. If food supplements are imported as food of non-animal origin, paragraph 21 of the Description of the Procedure for Official Food Control of Imported Food of Non-Animal Origin allows a territorial SFVS official to check compliance with safety and quality indicators, the use-by or best-before date, labelling, a sample of Lithuanian-language labelling, the permissibility of food additives, and whether the food supplement is included in the list of notified food supplements. Article 11(1) of the Law on Food identifies the SFVS as the institution carrying out official food control, while Article 11(2) assigns it the task of verifying that food intended for the domestic market and for export is safe, properly labelled, does not infringe consumer interests, and complies with the requirements of the law and other legal acts. Under Article 11(3), control is carried out in accordance with the procedure established by the Director of the SFVS, generally without prior notice, regularly, taking account of risk, under approved programmes, and also where there are suspicions of infringements. Paragraph 9.1.9 of the SFVS Regulations further assigns to the Service the establishment of the procedure for notification of food supplements and foods for special purposes, while paragraph 9.2.2 assigns it control over the compliance of food intended for the domestic market and export with safety, quality, labelling, product information and other mandatory requirements. If materials or articles intended to come into contact with food are used in the production or supply of supplements, Article 43(1) of the Law on Food establishes a separate obligation for the manufacturers and suppliers of such articles to notify the SFVS, while Article 43(2) provides for the inclusion of data in a public list within 1 working day from receipt of a compliant notification
Consequences. In practical terms, the food supplement development pathway described in the article entails several sequential legal thresholds: the operator must be properly registered as a food business operator, its place of activity and processes must comply with hygiene and self-control requirements, and the specific food supplement must be notified before being supplied to the market. The large number of products notified in the first half of 2026 does not alter the substance of these obligations, but it does show that SFVS control and the list of notified supplements are becoming important instruments of market transparency. For businesses, this is important for time planning: in the case of registration, the specified 10-working-day period runs from receipt of all duly completed documents, meaning that deficient documentation may in practice delay the commencement of activities. For importers, it is additionally important that, during control, not only the product itself may be checked, but also its Lithuanian-language labelling and its inclusion in the list of notified food supplements. For a manufacturer or brand owner, legal risk arises not only from the product’s composition, but also from claims presented to consumers, because Article 9(2) of the Law on Food links the regulation of food information and health and nutrition claims to the competence of the Ministry of Health. The SFVS may conduct inspections without prior notice, so compliance must be maintained continuously, not only at the moment the product is placed on the market. For consumers, the practical significance is that the list of notified food supplements and labelling control make it possible to distinguish products that have passed the market-placement procedure prescribed by law from products in respect of which the requirements of that procedure may not have been fulfilled. The further course of such a market will generally depend on whether the specific supplements and their supply chain comply with registration, notification, safety, hygiene and labelling requirements; if they do, the products may be lawfully distributed, whereas if suspicions arise, the SFVS has grounds to carry out official food control under Article 11 of the Law on Food
Can a driver born in 1975 be charged under Article 281(5) of the Criminal Code with a breach of the Road Traffic Rules resulting in the death of a pedestrian born in 2005, where initial reports mentioned a possible version that the driver had suffered a health impairment?
The structure of Article 281 of the Criminal Code shows that criminal liability for a breach of road traffic safety rules is not based on the consequence alone: it must be established that, while driving a road vehicle, the person breached traffic safety rules or rules governing the operation of the vehicle, and that the road traffic accident occurred precisely as a result of that breach. In the news report, the prosecution links the legal classification to Article 281(5) of the Criminal Code because a person died in the incident, and grounds the factual breach on the allegation that the driver, travelling at approximately 60.2 km/h, changed direction towards the right-hand edge of the carriageway, mounted the pavement and struck two pedestrians. The essential axis for applying the provision is therefore not the abstract tragic nature of the accident, but the causal link between a specific breach of the Road Traffic Rules and the death.
The initial circumstance that the driver may have suffered a health impairment and was sober does not in itself preclude the application of Article 281, but shifts the dispute to issues of fault and the foreseeability of the loss of control.
At this procedural stage, the prosecution’s stronger argument is not speed in itself, but the version supported by expert examinations and specialist findings that the vehicle’s trajectory onto the pavement was caused by the driver’s actions and breaches of the Road Traffic Rules. For the defence, the critical point will not be sobriety, since the charge is not based on intoxication, but whether the health impairment was sudden, unforeseeable and in fact eliminated the driver’s ability to comply with the duty of care. In practice, in this case it will be important to monitor whether the indictment formulates the breach of the Road Traffic Rules as a breach relating to speed, trajectory, attentiveness or the general duty of care, because that will determine whether the health-impairment version undermines the very structure of the charge or remains merely a circumstance relevant to the individualisation of the sentence.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the driver, born in 1975, while driving a car on Žirmūnų Street and changing his direction of travel towards the right-hand edge of the carriageway, breached road traffic safety rules or vehicle operation rules in such a way that this caused a traffic accident in which one person died and another person sustained a minor impairment of health. This issue is to be assessed primarily under Article 281 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, “Violation of Road Traffic Safety or Vehicle Operation Rules”, because, as stated in the report, the charge itself has been brought under Article 281(5) of the Criminal Code. The apparent structure of Article 281 of the Criminal Code shows that criminal liability is linked to driving, a breach of road traffic safety or vehicle operation rules, a traffic accident, and consequences: non-serious impairment of health under Article 281(1), serious impairment of health under Article 281(3), while intoxication or impairment is addressed separately in Article 281(2) and (4). Article 1(2) of the Criminal Code is relevant because it is the Criminal Code that defines criminal offences and establishes penalties and the grounds and conditions for criminal liability. The procedural issue of referring the case to court must be assessed under Articles 98, 99-100, 118-120, and 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
Legal assessment. On the facts provided, the prosecution claims to have established three legally essential links: the driver’s conduct while driving, a breach of the requirements of the Road Traffic Rules, and a causal link with the consequences. Driving at approximately 60.2 km/h is not, in itself, on the basis of the sources provided, a sufficient basis for classification; accordingly, legal weight attaches to the alleged change of direction towards the right-hand edge of the carriageway, driving onto the pavement, and striking pedestrians. The information that the driver was sober and that, according to preliminary data, he may have suffered a health episode does not, within the limits of the legal sources provided, shift the analysis to the elements of an intoxication offence, since Article 281(2) and (4) of the Criminal Code apply where the act is committed while drunk or impaired. If there is no charge in the case alleging drunkenness or impairment, those provisions are practically relevant only as normative boundaries distinguishing an ordinary breach of traffic safety rules from a qualified breach based on the driver’s condition. The minor impairment of health sustained by the other pedestrian is not, under the text of Article 281 of the Criminal Code provided, independently identified as a consequence under paragraph 1 or paragraph 3, because paragraph 1 refers to non-serious impairment and paragraph 3 to serious impairment of health. Nevertheless, that fact may be relevant to the mechanism of the accident and to the issue of damage, since Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows participants in proceedings to submit objects and documents relevant to the investigation and examination of the criminal offence. Expert examinations and specialist conclusions are central here, because the prosecution states that they were carried out and obtained; under the cited provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, upon receiving the expert report, the prosecutor must notify the participants in the proceedings in writing and indicate where and when the report may be inspected. The prosecutor’s decision to draw up an indictment means that he did not choose the route of terminating the pre-trial investigation under Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, including on the ground of insufficient data to substantiate the suspect’s guilt. Institutionally, the investigative model corresponds to the allocation described in the report: the pre-trial investigation was organised and directed by the prosecutor, while investigative actions were carried out by police officers; thereafter, the case was referred to the Vilnius City District Court for examination. Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are relevant to subsequent procedural time limits: time limits may be calculated in hours, days, and months, and the day on which the time limit begins is not included in the calculation. Coercive measures, if applied or varied, are to be assessed under Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because their purpose is to ensure the accused’s participation in the proceedings, the unhindered examination of the case, and the enforcement of the judgment, as well as to prevent new criminal offences. Article 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for measures such as detention, house arrest, seizure of documents, an obligation to register with the police, and a written undertaking not to leave. The Review No. 30 of 24 March 2009 of the Case Law of the Supreme Court of Lithuania in Criminal Cases Concerning Violations of Road Traffic Safety or Vehicle Operation Rules is mentioned in the sources provided in the context of proving impairment: it emphasises that the testimony of persons who had direct contact with the offender before the traffic accident is also assessed. This is relevant only to the extent that the issue of proving the driver’s condition arises in the case, whereas the report concerning this case indicates the opposite factual line: sobriety
Consequences. The most immediate realistic scenario is the examination of the case before the Vilnius City District Court, where it will be assessed whether the totality of the data collected by the prosecution confirms a traffic safety violation within the meaning of Article 281 of the Criminal Code and its causal link with the death of a person. For the accused, the most practically important issues will be whether to contest or admit the breach of rules, the mechanism of the accident, causation, and material factual circumstances, including the version concerning a health episode, insofar as it is supported by the data in the case file. For the victims and their representatives, Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is important because they may submit objects and documents relevant to the case, as is Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, under which, in cases provided for by law, damage may be compensated from state funds if the accused or the persons materially liable for his actions lack the funds to compensate the damage. The court may agree with the prosecution’s classification under Article 281(5) of the Criminal Code, may assess the proven consequences and causal link differently, or may find that the charge has not been proved. It is also procedurally significant that, before referral to court, the case had already passed through the stage of expert examinations, specialist conclusions, and analysis of other data; accordingly, the dispute in court is likely to focus not on whether an investigation should have been opened, but on whether the data collected are sufficient for a conviction. Other publicly mentioned accidents in Žirmūnai should not, on the basis of the sources provided, be legally linked to this case, because liability under Article 281 of the Criminal Code is determined by reference to the specific driver’s conduct, the specific breaches, and the specific consequences
Could the Seimas, after the expiry of the date fixed in the Constitution for the spring session, 30 June, complete the formation of a new Government during an extended ordinary session, including approval of the programme and the ministers’ oath-taking?
Article 64 of the Constitution lays down a strict calendar for ordinary sessions: the spring session begins on 10 March and ends on 30 June. However, the same provision expressly permits the Seimas to resolve to extend a session. This means that sittings held after 30 June are not, by that fact alone, an extraordinary session, provided there is a decision of the Seimas extending the ordinary session.
In this case, the legally decisive point is not the political reason, namely the formation of Mindaugas Sinkevičius’s Government, but the fact that the Constitution does not impose any substantive limitation on the grounds for extending a session. Article 84(4) of the Constitution links the formation of the Government to a sequence of actions by the President and the Seimas; an extended session therefore makes it practically possible to avoid stalling the constitutional procedure between 30 June and 10 September.
The stronger argument is that an extended session is an independently constitutionally permissible mode of parliamentary work, not an exception requiring additional justification by special circumstances. Accordingly, when challenging decisions adopted during an extended session, the mere argument that they were adopted after 30 June would not suffice; one would need to apply the logic of Article 69 of the Constitution and identify specific breaches of the adoption procedure, voting majorities, or the Statute of the Seimas. The practical risk lies elsewhere: where roughly 400 legal acts are adopted during an extended session and the formation of the Government is completed at the same time, the political instrument of “extending the session” may become a means of compressing decision-making into a period which, under the ordinary constitutional rhythm, would already be parliamentary recess.
For professionals, it is worth citing not the general proposition that “the Seimas may extend a session”, but specifically the distinction in Article 64 of the Constitution between an extended ordinary session and the mechanism for convening an extraordinary session.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the extension of the Seimas spring session after 30 June 2026 and the continued decisions taken during that session concerning government formation and legislation fall within the constitutional regime governing the Seimas’ working time and institutional powers. This is primarily assessed under Article 64 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, which provides that the spring session begins on 10 March and ends on 30 June, but that the Seimas may resolve to extend the session. The internal form and procedure of the Seimas’ work are determined by Article 76 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, under which the structure and working procedure of the Seimas are established by the Statute of the Seimas, which has the force of law. Institutional responsibility for presiding over sittings is linked to Article 66 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, which provides that sittings of the Seimas are chaired by the Speaker of the Seimas or a Deputy Speaker. The government-formation aspect must be assessed under Article 84, points 4, 8 and 9, of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania: with the approval of the Seimas, the President of the Republic appoints the Prime Minister, charges him or her with forming the Government and approves its composition, and, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, appoints and dismisses ministers. Points 109, 110, 133 and 134 of the Rules of Procedure of the Government are also relevant, as they define the Government’s participation in the Seimas agenda, in sittings of committees, commissions and parliamentary groups, and its accountability before the Seimas
Legal assessment. Under Article 64 of the Constitution, the ordinary end date of the 2026 spring session was 30 June 2026; therefore, work after that date required a separate resolution of the Seimas to extend the session. The report states that the session was extended because of government formation, and, under the text of Article 64 of the Constitution provided, that reason is not limited by any specific list of grounds: the provision merely grants the Seimas the right to resolve on an extension. This means that the principal constitutional test is not the political expediency of the extension, but whether the extension was formalised by the will of the Seimas and whether subsequent work proceeded in accordance with the procedure established in the Statute of the Seimas, as required by Article 76 of the Constitution. The role of the Speaker of the Seimas in concluding the session and presiding over the course of sittings is consistent with Article 66 of the Constitution to the extent that he or she acts as the chair of sittings, or that function is performed by a Deputy Speaker. In the context of government formation, the role of the Seimas is not to approve the entire composition of the Government: under Article 84, point 4, of the Constitution, the Seimas gives its approval to the Prime Minister, while the President charges him or her with forming the Government and approves its composition. The appointment of ministers under Article 84, point 9, of the Constitution falls to the President, acting on the recommendation of the Prime Minister; accordingly, the extended session practically enabled completion of the part of government formation requiring the participation of the Seimas. If the Government had resigned or returned its powers, Article 84, point 8, of the Constitution obliges the President, within 15 days at the latest, to submit to the Seimas for consideration a candidate for Prime Minister; therefore, the Seimas’ ability to sit has direct significance for the effectiveness of that time limit. Point 109 of the Rules of Procedure of the Government shows that the Government may propose that a Government statement be additionally included in the agenda of the Seimas’ weekly sittings; thus, the relationship between a newly forming or newly functioning Government and the extended session is not merely symbolic. Under points 110 and 133 of the same Rules of Procedure, ministers, or civil servants acting on their instructions, must participate in sittings of Seimas committees, commissions or parliamentary groups and provide explanations; therefore, the extension of the session preserves the mechanisms of parliamentary scrutiny and information. Point 134 of the Rules of Procedure further strengthens this connection, because the Prime Minister or ministers must report to the Seimas and answer questions from members of the Seimas during Government Hour in accordance with the procedure established in the Statute of the Seimas. The scale of legislative activity, almost 60 sittings and approximately 400 legal acts, is not in itself, under the sources provided, a criterion of legality; what matters is that such activity took place during a session which, under Article 64 of the Constitution, could be extended. Article 80 of the Provisional Basic Law historically reflected a different model: the spring session of the Supreme Council had to end no later than 30 June, and extraordinary sessions were convened by the Presidium; however, the current wording of Article 64 of the Constitution expressly provides for the Seimas’ right to extend a session. The current regime is therefore more flexible: it is not necessary to move from an ordinary session to an extraordinary session solely because 30 June has passed. Article 144 of the Constitution reflects a separate model for action between sessions only in urgent cases of a state of emergency, where the President simultaneously convenes an extraordinary session of the Seimas; however, the situation described in the report is not of that kind, but rather an extension of the ordinary spring session
Consequences. The immediate legal consequence is that, after the end of the extended spring session, the Seimas enters, under Article 64 of the Constitution, the period before the autumn session, which in 2026 will begin on 10 September. If, before 10 September 2026, a need arose to address matters that could not be left until the autumn session, an extraordinary session could be convened under Article 64 of the Constitution by the Speaker of the Seimas on the proposal of not less than one-third of all members of the Seimas, or, in the cases provided for by the Constitution, by the President. For the Government, the practical point is that, after approval of its programme and formation of the Cabinet of Ministers, its relationship with the Seimas does not end: under points 110, 133 and 134 of the Rules of Procedure of the Government, the obligation remains to participate in parliamentary scrutiny, provide explanations and report. For the Seimas majority, the end of the extended session means that urgent political agreements on the Government must be translated into regular agenda-setting and scrutiny practice under the procedure regulated by the Statute of the Seimas, as indicated by Article 76 of the Constitution. For the opposition and committees, points 110 and 133 of the Rules of Procedure are of practical importance, because they provide a procedural basis for summoning ministers or their authorised officials to explain the implementation of laws and resolutions of the Seimas. For the legal acts adopted, the fact of the session’s extension would be relevant to the extent that anyone raised the question whether, after 30 June, the Seimas acted on the basis of an extension provided for in Article 64 of the Constitution. Realistically, the further course has three dimensions: the Government begins its work and submits agenda proposals to the Seimas, parliamentary scrutiny takes place in committees and sittings, and a new broader political cycle begins with the autumn session on 10 September 2026
Can the draft Government Programme registered on 3 July be regarded as an unlawful submission of the Programme to the Seimas if the Presidential Decree approving the composition of the Twenty-First Government was signed only on 6 July?
Article 6 of the Law on the Government requires the Prime Minister to present to the Seimas “the Government formed by him and approved by the President of the Republic” and to submit its Programme for consideration no later than within 15 days of appointment. This wording links the legally significant submission of the Programme not to the technical registration of a draft, but to a procedural act in the Seimas after the composition of the Government has already been approved by the President. Article 24 of the Law on the Government reinforces this sequence: the Prime Minister first forms the Government and submits its composition to the President, and only an approved Government becomes the entity whose Programme may be submitted for the confidence of the Seimas.
The opposition’s argument would therefore be strong only if the registration on 3 July were characterised as the very “submission for consideration” provided for in Article 6 of the Law on the Government, rather than as a preparatory movement of the document.
In practice, the stronger argument appears to be not the “calendar registration” argument, but the argument concerning procedural characterisation: it is necessary to establish when the Programme was formally submitted for consideration at a sitting of the Seimas, not when the draft appeared in the register system. If the circumstance indicated by M. Sinkevičius is correct, namely that by the time of the presentation at the Seimas sitting on 6 July the Presidential Decree had already been adopted, then the mere fact of registration on 3 July should not in itself negate the Government’s acquisition of powers.
The risk for the governing majority would remain not in relation to the content of the Programme itself, but in relation to proof of the procedure: in a dispute before the Constitutional Court, the decisive factors would be the precise metadata of Seimas documents, the course of the sitting, and the legal classification of registration under Seimas procedure. From a professional standpoint, the phrase in Article 6 of the Law on the Government that should be cited is “the Government approved by the President of the Republic”, because it is the narrowest and strongest point of dispute.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether the Programme of the Twenty-First Government was submitted to the Seimas for consideration in compliance with the sequence established in Article 6 and Article 24(2)(1) and (7) of the Law on the Government of the Republic of Lithuania. Under Article 6 of the Law on the Government, the Prime Minister must, no later than within 15 days of his or her appointment, present to the Seimas “the Government formed by him or her and approved by the President of the Republic” and submit its programme for consideration. Under Article 24(2)(1) of the Law on the Government, the Prime Minister forms the Government and submits its composition to the President of the Republic for approval, while under Article 24(2)(7) the Prime Minister submits the Government Programme to the Seimas for consideration. Accordingly, the core of the dispute is not merely a political issue, but a procedural sequence defined by legal norms: first, the Government is formed and approved by the President; then it is presented to the Seimas together with its Programme
Legal assessment. According to the circumstances presented, the draft Government Programme was registered in the Seimas on 3 July 2026, while the decree of the President of the Republic approving the composition of the Twenty-First Government was signed on 6 July 2026. Article 6 of the Law on the Government directly links the legally significant act to the Prime Minister’s duty to present to the Seimas an already formed and President-approved Government and to submit its Programme for consideration. This means that the preparation of a draft Programme is not, in itself, equivalent to the submission of the Programme for consideration within the meaning of Article 6 of the Law on the Government. Paragraph 36 of the Rules of Procedure of the Government defines the Programme as an activity plan, approved by the Seimas, binding on the respective Government for the entire duration of its mandate. Paragraph 37 of the Rules of Procedure of the Government provides that preparation of the Programme is led by the Prime Minister, while materials for preparing the Programme are provided both by institutions and by appointed ministers. Article 6 of the Law on the Government also provides that ministries and other state institutions must provide the newly appointed ministers with the materials necessary for preparing the Programme. The provisions therefore allow a distinction to be drawn between the organisation of the preparation of the Programme and its constitutionally and statutorily significant submission to the Seimas for consideration. If the Programme was presented and submitted for consideration at a sitting of the Seimas only after the President’s decree of 6 July 2026, the sequence established in Article 6 of the Law on the Government would formally be observed. If, however, the legally significant submission were deemed to be the registration on 3 July 2026, the opposite problem would arise: at that time, there was not yet any Government composition approved by the President whose Programme could be submitted to the Seimas under Article 6. The role of the Seimas in this procedure is essential, since the source concerning draft law No XIIP-1155 amending Section Four of the Law on the Government states that granting authority to the Government to act and exercising control over its activities are important areas of competence of the Seimas, while Article 67 of the Constitution identifies the prerogative of the Seimas to consider the Government Programme submitted by the Prime Minister and to decide whether to approve it. The Constitutional Court’s ruling of 10 January 1998, “On the compliance of the Resolution of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania of 10 December 1996 ‘On the Programme of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania’ with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania,” emphasised that the Government is a collegial institution of general competence, composed of the Prime Minister and ministers. This case law is important because, by its purpose, the Programme is not solely the Prime Minister’s plan, but the activity plan of the entire collegial Government. Article 22(3) of the Law on the Government confirms this connection: the Government implements the Government Programme, approves the implementation plan for its provisions, and coordinates the activities of subordinate institutions. Article 19(1), (3), (4) and (7) of the Law on Strategic Management further provides that the Programme is prepared and approved in accordance with the Law on the Government, that preparation of the implementation plan is coordinated by the Government Office, that the plan is approved by the Government, and that monitoring and reporting are organised by the Government Office. Once the Seimas approves the Programme, the new Government receives authority to act under Article 6 of the Law on the Government, and, under Article 1 of the Law Amending Article 6 of the Law on the Government, the Government must approve the implementation plan for the Programme’s provisions within three months
Consequences. In practical terms, the most important scenario depends on which act would be regarded as the legal submission of the Programme to the Seimas for consideration: the registration on 3 July 2026 or the subsequent presentation at a sitting of the Seimas after the President’s decree. If the relevant act is deemed to be the presentation at the sitting of the Seimas after the decree of 6 July 2026, then the sequence required by Article 6 of the Law on the Government is, in substance, maintained. In that case, the Seimas’s approval of the Programme under the same Article 6 grants the Government authority to act, and the Government becomes obliged to approve the implementation plan for the Programme’s provisions within three months. If it were established that the Programme had been submitted for consideration before the President had approved the composition of the Government, the dispute would concern not the content of the Programme but the very procedure by which the Government obtains its authority. That would be significant for the Seimas, because its approval of the Programme is the act granting authority, and for the President of the Republic, because the appointment of ministers and approval of the Government’s composition are necessary links in the procedure under Articles 6 and 24 of the Law on the Government. It is also important for ministers, because, under Article 26(3)(1) of the Law on the Government as set out in Article 4 of the amending law, a minister is directly responsible for implementing the Government Programme and the measures in the implementation plan for its provisions within the areas of governance assigned to him or her. If the dispute were referred to the Constitutional Court, the legal assessment would focus on the moment at which the Government, as a collegial institution, is formed, the significance of the Seimas’s approval of the Programme, and the procedural sequence laid down by law. The real political consequence would not be merely reputational, because Article 22(3) of the Law on the Government, Article 19 of the Law on Strategic Management, and the three-month deadline for the implementation plan of the Government Programme link approval of the Programme to the commencement of the work of the executive branch as a whole
Whether the driving by a man born in 1987 in Pakruojis District, Akmenėliai village, at 6:40 p.m. on 13 July 2026, when he was found to have a blood alcohol level of 2.97 per mille, in itself constitutes an offence under Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code, even though the news report does not mention a traffic accident or damage.
Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code criminalises the driving of a motor vehicle where a blood alcohol level of 1.51 per mille or more is established, and provides for a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. Since the stated concentration of 2.97 per mille is almost twice the threshold for criminal liability, the essential elements of the offence on the facts provided are not the consequences, but the fact of driving, the nature of the vehicle, and the reliably established level of intoxication. Article 281 of the Criminal Code would be a weaker basis for classification in this situation, because the relevant provision requires a traffic accident and either minor bodily injury or substantial property damage, and no such facts are reported in the news item.
Article 72 of the Criminal Code additionally raises the issue of confiscation of the Peugeot 307: if the car belongs to the offender and is treated as an instrumentality of the prohibited act, confiscation under Article 72(3) is framed as mandatory.
In practice, the stronger prosecutorial argument is that driving with a blood alcohol level of 2.97 per mille is an independent offence under Article 2811 of the Criminal Code, so the defence emphasis that “there was no accident” does not defeat this classification. The more material points of dispute would be the reliability of the breathalyser, the testing procedure, and proof of the moment of driving and the person’s identity, because these are the facts that connect the 2.97 per mille result with the elements of Article 2811. If the Peugeot 307 belongs to the driver, the real additional risk is not only a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year, but also confiscation of the vehicle under Article 72 of the Criminal Code.
If the car belongs to another person, the practical dispute shifts to the conditions under Article 72(4) of the Criminal Code: whether the owner knew, or ought to have known and could have known, that the vehicle would be used to commit a criminal offence.
Core issue. The legal issue is whether the conduct of the person who drove the Peugeot 307 on 13 July 2026, with a blood alcohol concentration of 2.97 per mille, is to be classified as a criminal offence under Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. This provision applies to a person who drove a motor vehicle while intoxicated, where a blood alcohol concentration of 1.51 per mille or more is established. The threshold for liability was exceeded here by almost double; therefore, based on the facts provided, the administrative liability model under Article 427 of the Code of Administrative Offences, which covers the range of 0.41 to 1.5 per mille, is not the primary basis for classification. If it were established that the driving caused a traffic accident and consequences for the health or property of other persons, Article 281 of the Criminal Code could additionally become relevant; however, no such consequences are indicated in the information provided. Article 19(1) of the Criminal Code means that intoxication by alcohol in itself does not exempt a person from criminal liability. Since the sanction under Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code also provides for imprisonment for up to one year, this conduct should not be regarded as a misdemeanour within the meaning of Article 12 of the Criminal Code
Legal assessment. The principal elements to be proved are the fact of driving, the nature of the vehicle, the driver’s intoxication, and the level of that intoxication. A car is a motor vehicle; accordingly, driving a Peugeot 307 falls within the scope of Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code. The established blood alcohol concentration of 2.97 per mille exceeds the criminal liability threshold of 1.51 per mille; therefore, the mere fact of driving while intoxicated, even without additional traffic-accident consequences, constitutes an independent basis for criminal liability. Article 281¹(2) of the Criminal Code is significant in that a person is also liable where the conduct provided for in paragraph 1 of that article is committed through negligence. This narrows the scope of the defence to disputing factual elements, for example the fact of driving or the determination of intoxication, but not to an assertion that the person did not intend to commit a criminal offence. Article 19 of the Criminal Code likewise prevents intoxication itself from being treated as a circumstance excluding liability. Article 281(2) or 281(4) of the Criminal Code would be relevant only if a breach of road traffic safety rules or vehicle operation rules and the consequences of a traffic accident were established, for example minor or serious impairment of health. On the facts available, Article 282 of the Criminal Code is inapplicable, as it concerns disruption of transport safety without driving a vehicle, or the unlawful use of a controlled or uncontrolled object. From a procedural standpoint, it is relevant that under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, participants in the proceedings and other persons may submit objects and documents relevant to the investigation and examination of the criminal offence. If an expert examination were conducted, the excerpt from Article 99 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the prosecutor’s duty to notify the suspect, defence counsel, and other relevant participants in the proceedings in writing of the expert report and to indicate where and when it may be examined. Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure establish the purpose and calculation of time limits: time limits are calculated in hours, days, and months, and the day or hour on which the time limit begins is not included in the calculation. Coercive measures under Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may be imposed to ensure the suspect’s participation in the proceedings, the unhindered conduct of the investigation, the hearing of the case, the execution of the judgment, and the prevention of new criminal offences. Under Article 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, such measures may include, among others, detention, house arrest, bail, seizure of documents, an obligation to report periodically to a police institution, or a written undertaking not to leave
Consequences. The most realistic further course, based on the facts provided, is a pre-trial investigation into the conduct provided for in Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code. The person faces a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. If the investigation does not reveal circumstances relating to a traffic accident, impairment of health, or substantial property damage, the classification should remain limited to driving by an intoxicated person and should not shift to the consequence-based offences under Article 281 of the Criminal Code. If evidence were gathered of a traffic accident and corresponding consequences, the case could be assessed under the more severe paragraphs of Article 281 of the Criminal Code, depending on the nature of the consequences. The pre-trial investigation could be discontinued only on the grounds specified in Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for example where insufficient evidence has been collected to substantiate the suspect’s guilt. The practical significance of this situation for the driver is that a reading of 2.97 per mille moves the case from the ordinary administrative sphere of drunk driving into the realm of criminal liability. For the police and the prosecutor’s office, the key point is to record accurately the fact of driving, the determination of intoxication, and the time limits for procedural actions. The issue of victims does not arise on the basis of the information provided; however, if damage were later identified, Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the possibility of compensation for damage from state funds in the cases and according to the procedure prescribed by law
Can the pre-trial investigation reclassified in 2018 under Article 100 of the Criminal Code be regarded as a procedurally sufficient response to the secret detention in Lithuania found by the ECtHR, where no one has been notified of suspicion and essential international legal assistance from the United States has not been obtained?
Article 100 of the Criminal Code criminalises not any unlawful detention, but intentional conduct carried out in implementation or support of a State or organisational policy to attack civilians on a large scale or systematically, including unlawful imprisonment, deprivation of physical liberty, torture, or refusal to acknowledge deprivation of liberty. It is therefore not sufficient for the prosecutor’s office merely to establish that persons may have been held in Antaviliai: there must be a link between specific actions by Lithuanian or other officials, an organisational policy, and a violation of international law. Article 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits the extension of a pre-trial investigation on grounds of complexity, large scope, or other important circumstances, but the basic rule remains that investigations must be conducted within the shortest possible time.
Article 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure further explains why the prosecutor’s office may restrict information: pre-trial investigation data may be disclosed before trial only with the prosecutor’s permission and only to the permitted extent.
The ECtHR cases referred to in the news item reveal a consistent line of civil human-rights responsibility: in the 2018 Abu Zubaydah case, the ECtHR found that a secret CIA prison operated in Lithuania in 2005-2006; in January 2024, Mustafa al-Hawsawi was awarded EUR 100,000; and last week, in the Al-Nashiri case, EUR 30,000 was awarded and Lithuania was directed to approach Washington for assurances that the death penalty would not be applied. The case law is not isolated or accidental: this is already the third similar ECtHR judgment against Lithuania concerning the CIA prison. Accordingly, the institutional argument that “officially there was no prison” is procedurally weakened not because the ECtHR changes the criminal standard of proof, but because the State must implement ECtHR judgments irrespective of whether suspects have been formally identified in the national investigation.
The article correctly states that part of the investigation material has been classified as a State or official secret, but the assertion that such information is therefore generally “not to be provided or disclosed” is too absolute. The cited clarifying rule points to a narrower proposition: once the prescribed classification period expires, classified information is declassified, and after declassification it should be capable of public dissemination. A more precise formulation would be: while the information is lawfully classified and while the non-disclosure regime for pre-trial investigation data under Article 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure remains in force, the prosecutor’s office may refrain from disclosing it, but this is not a perpetual or absolute prohibition.
This nuance matters because State-secret status cannot be presented as a standalone answer to the question whether the investigation is genuinely progressing and whether ECtHR judgments are being implemented.
The stronger argument now is not the presidential claim that “there was no prison”, but the procedural one: in the criminal proceedings, no one has yet been notified of suspicion under Article 100 of the Criminal Code, but ECtHR case law already creates enforceable obligations for the State, including the request to the United States for death-penalty assurances indicated in the Al-Nashiri case. In practice, two evidentiary fields should be distinguished: the ECtHR finding is sufficient for State responsibility and implementation of the judgment, but it is not automatically sufficient to notify a specific individual of suspicion under Article 100 of the Criminal Code. It is risky for journalists and lawyers to write either that the continuation of the investigation “refutes” the ECtHR’s findings or that the ECtHR’s findings “prove” national criminal guilt; the precise point is that the State is simultaneously disputing the factual narrative in domestic politics while being legally required to implement repeated ECtHR judgments.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether the data collected in the ongoing pre-trial investigation can substantiate conduct falling within Article 100 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, namely treatment of persons prohibited under international law. This provision covers, among other things, intentional unlawful imprisonment or other deprivation of physical liberty in violation of rules of international law, torture, as well as the detention, arrest, abduction or other deprivation of liberty of persons where such deprivation of liberty is not acknowledged or information on the fate or whereabouts of the persons is withheld. Since Article 100 of the Criminal Code falls within the group of Articles 99-113¹ of the Criminal Code, Article 7 of the Criminal Code is also applicable; under that provision, persons are liable under the Lithuanian Criminal Code for crimes against humanity and war crimes irrespective of their citizenship, place of residence, the place where the offence was committed, and whether the act is punishable under the law of the place of commission. The procedural issue is governed by Article 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania concerning time limits for pre-trial investigations, Article 177 concerning the non-disclosure of pre-trial investigation data, Article 212 concerning grounds for termination, and Article 215 concerning excessive duration of a pre-trial investigation. It is also important to distinguish Article 100 of the Criminal Code from Articles 101 and 103: in the provisions cited, the latter are linked to circumstances of war, armed conflict, aggression, occupation or annexation, whereas the investigation referred to in the report was specifically reclassified as treatment of persons prohibited under international law
Legal assessment. Under Article 100 of the Criminal Code, it is not sufficient for the prosecution merely to verify the purpose of the premises in Antaviliai or flight routes; it must assess whether the possible deprivation of liberty was intentional, carried out or supported pursuant to a State or organisational policy, and connected with a widespread or systematic attack against civilians. If the investigative theory concerns secret detention, the essential elements would be unlawful imprisonment, deprivation of physical liberty, unacknowledged deprivation of liberty, and failure to provide information on the person’s fate or whereabouts, as those acts are expressly identified in Article 100 of the Criminal Code. Article 7 of the Criminal Code explains why Lithuanian proceedings may legally encompass foreign nationals or acts connected with other States, provided that the conduct under investigation falls within the category of offences punishable on the basis of international treaties. Requests for mutual legal assistance to the United States, Poland, Romania and other States are consistent with the cited framework for international assistance, under which States provide assistance in criminal proceedings in relation to interviews, documents, records, other evidence, service of procedural documents, temporary transfer of persons, searches and seizures. If the requested information is not obtained, that is not in itself an independent ground for termination; however, Article 212(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits termination of a pre-trial investigation where insufficient data are collected to substantiate the suspect’s guilt. Article 176(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that, in respect of serious and very serious offences, a pre-trial investigation must be completed within the shortest possible time, but no later than within nine months, while paragraph 2 allows those time limits to be extended, by resolution of a superior prosecutor, due to the complexity or large scale of the case or other important circumstances. A renewed investigation lasting a decade can therefore be legally justified only through the prism of complexity, scale, international assistance and other important circumstances, while Article 176 nevertheless preserves the requirement of acting “within the shortest possible time.” The mechanism under Article 215 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would operate in this situation only where there is a suspect: six months after the suspect’s first interview, the suspect, their representative or defence counsel may complain to the pre-trial investigation judge about delay. Since the report states that no one has been served with suspicions, the right to complain under Article 215 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on the wording provided, currently has no subject to whom it is assigned. Article 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides the prosecutor with a procedural basis for restricting disclosure of information: pre-trial investigation data are non-public and, before the case is heard in court, may be disclosed only with the prosecutor’s permission and only to the extent deemed permissible. Accordingly, the prosecution’s refusal to provide details on the number of mutual legal assistance requests, responses, procedural actions or investigation results is consistent with the logic of Article 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, particularly where part of the material has been classified as a State or official secret. If a person capable of being recognised as a victim or as having suffered damage were to emerge, and a suspect or accused person were identified, Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would allow a civil claim for pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage to be brought in the criminal proceedings. Article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would give such a civil claimant the right to submit evidence and applications, challenge actions and decisions insofar as they relate to the civil claim, and access the case file in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The ECtHR judgments mentioned in the report concerning Abu Zubaydah, Mustafa al Hawsawi and Abd Al Rahim Hussein Al-Nashiri constitute significant factual context, but the legal sources provided do not include their reasoning; therefore, under those sources, any conclusion in the criminal proceedings must still be reached through the constituent elements of Article 100 of the Criminal Code and the rules of the Code of Criminal Procedure on evidence gathering and termination
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the investigation continues while the prosecution verifies the elements of Article 100 of the Criminal Code, uses international assistance channels, and extends the time limits provided for in Article 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure due to complexity. The second scenario is that, if insufficient data are collected to substantiate the guilt of a specific person, the investigation is terminated under Article 212(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The third scenario is that, upon obtaining sufficient data concerning a specific person, that person is served with suspicions, after which the possibility of control under Article 215 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to the duration of the investigation arises. The fourth scenario is that the prosecutor completes the pre-trial investigation by issuing an indictment, since Article 23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines an indictment as the document by which the pre-trial investigation is completed, the criminal act is described, the data supporting the charge are indicated, and the criminal law is specified. The practical significance for the prosecution is the duty to reconcile a lengthy investigation burdened by international requests with the requirement under Article 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to act within the shortest possible time. The practical significance for potential suspects would arise from the granting of procedural status, because their rights of defence and the delay-control mechanism under Article 215 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would then become operative. The practical significance for persons who may have suffered damage is the possibility, where the conditions of Articles 109 and 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are met, to bring a civil claim in the criminal case and exercise the procedural rights of a civil claimant. For the public and State institutions, the most important consequence is that, while the pre-trial investigation is ongoing, only a limited part of the proceedings is publicly visible, because Article 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows the prosecutor to control how much investigation data may be disclosed
Can employees of Klaipėda City Polyclinic individually recover, through the Labour Disputes Commission, the increased fixed component of remuneration and the remuneration “floor” provided for from 2026 in the 2024 collective agreement, where the employer failed to apply them after the first and second salary payments in 2026?
Article 213(3) of the Labour Code allows such a dispute to be classified as an individual labour dispute concerning a right, because it arises from the implementation of labour-law rules or agreements between a specific employee and employer. Article 220(1) of the Labour Code expressly covers non-performance or improper performance of mutual agreements, but in the case of a breach of a collective agreement it establishes not the general three-month time limit, but a one-month time limit for applying to the Labour Disputes Commission, running from the date on which the breach became known. Article 217(1) of the Labour Code empowers the Commission not only to establish a breach, but also to order restoration of the infringed rights and award pecuniary damage; accordingly, a monetary claim for salary arrears is an appropriate subject matter for these proceedings.
The amended wording of Article 223 of the Labour Code is practically important because the application must formulate a specific claim and indicate the circumstances and evidence; therefore, a mere reference to the collective agreement is insufficient without a calculation of the employee’s remuneration and the arrears.
At present, the stronger argument for employees is that this is not a matter of future negotiations or budgeting, but a failure to perform an agreement that has already entered into force, since the news report states that the Labour Disputes Commission has already examined 10 complaints and confirmed an infringement of employees’ rights. The employer’s risk is increasing not only because of the claims brought by 25 trade union members, but also because an individual underpayment can be calculated for each employee according to their position and the “floor” set in the collective agreement. For employee representatives, the most important point is not to miscalculate the time limit: in the case of a breach of a collective agreement, relying on the three-month time limit would be risky, because Article 220 of the Labour Code lays down a one-month rule.
The practical evidential core should be the relevant provision of the 2024 collective agreement, the data for the first and second salary payments in 2026, and a clear calculation of the difference, because that is what turns the dispute from general collective dissatisfaction into an enforceable individual wage claim.
Core issue. The legal issue is not the establishment of new remuneration terms, but the performance of an already concluded collective agreement: whether Klaipėda City Polyclinic was obliged, from 2026, to apply the agreed increase in the fixed component of remuneration and the remuneration “floor” to trade union members. This is to be assessed under Article 202 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Approval, Entry into Force and Implementation of the Labour Code, which classifies disputes concerning the performance, application or improper application of a collective agreement as labour disputes concerning rights. Under Article 213(3) of the same law, where an individual employee challenges the employer’s actions on the grounds of non-performance of labour-law norms or agreements in employment relations, this constitutes an individual labour dispute concerning rights. At the same time, under Article 213(4), an analogous disagreement between employee representatives and the employer concerning non-performance of mutual agreements may constitute a collective labour dispute concerning rights. The role of the trade union is based on Article 19, under which employees’ rights and interests are defended, in collective labour relations, by their representatives in accordance with the procedure established by law. The issue of the addressees of the collective agreement is also informed by the cited provision that, under Article 197(1) of the Labour Code, collective agreements apply to employees who are members of the trade unions that concluded them
Legal assessment. Since the information provided states that trade union members applied, their claim corresponds to the model of a dispute concerning the application of a collective agreement to employees falling within its scope under Article 202. The first unchanged salary in 2026 was the point at which the employees could have become aware of a possible infringement of their rights, while the second identical salary confirmed that the employer was in fact not applying the agreed terms. Under Article 220(1), in cases involving a breach of a collective agreement, an application to the Labour Disputes Commission must be submitted within one month from the date on which the person became aware, or ought to have become aware, of the breach. If that time limit has been missed, Article 220(2) allows the Labour Disputes Commission to restore it where the reasons stated in the application are recognised as significant. The competence of the Labour Disputes Commission in this case follows from Article 217(1): it may order the employer to restore rights infringed as a result of non-performance of agreements and award pecuniary damage, and, in cases provided for by labour-law norms or agreements, fines or default interest. The wage arrears arising from the failure to apply the agreed fixed component and “floor” are legally to be classified as a pecuniary claim by the employees against the employer. The fact that the Commission has already examined the complaints of 10 employees and confirmed the infringement of their rights means that, at least in respect of those employees, improper application of the collective agreement has been recognised. The institutional status of the Commission is defined in Article 221: it is a permanent body operating under the territorial divisions of the State Labour Inspectorate and is composed of a chairperson, representatives of trade unions and representatives of employers’ organisations. Under Article 217(3), such labour disputes are examined by the Commission free of charge, and litigation costs incurred by the parties are not awarded. If the dispute were to concern not individual employees, but a disagreement between the trade union and the employer regarding performance of the collective agreement, Article 217(2) would allow the body hearing the labour dispute to impose a fine of up to EUR 3,000 on the party in breach, payable to the other party. Article 234 is not the principal provision here, as it regulates collective labour disputes concerning interests, whereas this situation arises from the performance of terms already agreed, not from the establishment of new terms
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is the employer’s obligation to comply with final Labour Disputes Commission decisions and pay the employees the arrears due under the applicable terms of the collective agreement. Under Article 230(1), a Commission decision must be complied with once it becomes final, except where the decision or part of it is designated for urgent enforcement. Under Article 230(2), a Commission decision is an enforceable instrument and is enforced in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure. Under Article 230(3), the Commission may order urgent enforcement of its decision or part of it, meaning that the wage issue may have a direct enforcement effect on the employer. The second scenario is analogous individual applications by the remaining employees, provided that they fall within the scope of the collective agreement and comply with the time limit laid down in Article 220. The third scenario is a broader collective labour dispute concerning rights between the trade union and the Polyclinic, if the issue is assessed as systemic non-performance of the collective agreement. For the employer, this is significant because of the possible obligation not only to pay the accrued arrears, but also to apply the agreed remuneration “floor” in the future to all employees falling within its scope. For trade union members, this is significant as a test of the collective agreement’s practical effect: Article 202 allows them to demand not merely declaratory recognition, but mandatory application of the agreed terms. The favourable decisions already adopted by the Labour Disputes Commission in the cases of 10 employees practically strengthen the procedural position of the remaining similar claims, although each employee’s entitlement to specific arrears depends on whether that employee falls within the scope of the agreement and whether the agreed remuneration terms apply to that employee’s position
Does a temperature of 28 degrees Celsius or higher in the workplace, by itself, give an employee a right to a pay supplement, or only to employer-funded occupational safety and health measures?
Article 158(1)-(4) of the Labour Code does not establish a formula for a pay supplement, but rather the employer’s obligation to provide every employee with safe working conditions that are not harmful to health, to organise work in accordance with occupational safety and health requirements, and to finance those measures from the employer’s own funds. Accordingly, the provision directly gives rise to an obligation to ensure breaks, water, appropriate clothing, adjustments to working time, or other protective measures where heat becomes a harmful factor. However, the evidence provided does not support a general statutory rule that the 28-degree threshold alone automatically gives all employees a right to a supplement.
The stronger legal construction is that a supplement becomes claimable where it is provided for in an employment contract or collective agreement, while safety measures are mandatory irrespective of any such contractual clause.
In practice, an employee’s claim for a supplement will be strongest not by relying solely on the fact of heat, but by citing a specific provision of the employment contract or collective agreement concerning harmful working conditions. For the employer, the greater direct risk arises not from failure to pay an automatic supplement, but from failure to comply with the obligations under Article 158 of the Labour Code: if, at temperatures of 28 degrees and above, there is no rest schedule, water, appropriate clothing, adjustments to working time, or first-aid readiness, the breach may be framed as a failure to perform the duty to organise safety measures. A professional should distinguish between two claims: the monetary claim depends on the wording of the contract, whereas the safety claim rests on the employer’s statutory duty and the principle of employer financing.
It would be an error to promise an employee a universal supplement solely because a temperature threshold has been reached, where the evidence provided firmly supports only a contractual basis for the supplement and an independent duty to reduce heat-related risk.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not merely whether an employee is “entitled to an allowance” during hot weather, but first and foremost whether the employer, where heat operates as a risk factor in the working environment, fulfils the duty to provide safe and health-neutral working conditions. This issue is assessed under Article 158(1)–(4) of the Law on the Approval, Entry into Force and Implementation of the Labour Code of the Republic of Lithuania, Article 2(5), (7) and (8), Article 3(1)–(2), Article 11(1)–(2), Article 13(1), Article 31 and Article 33 of the Law on Safety and Health at Work of the Republic of Lithuania. Under Article 2(5) of the Law on Safety and Health at Work, the working environment is the space surrounding the workplace in which risk factors harmful or dangerous to the employee’s health may be present, while working conditions under Article 2(7) of the same law include the working environment, the nature of work, working and rest time, and other circumstances directly affecting the employee’s well-being, capacity for work, safety and health. Heat must therefore be legally assessed through the prism of the safety of the working environment and working conditions, and not merely as a matter of comfort or employer goodwill. Article 158(2)–(4) of the Labour Code provides that the workplace and working environment must be safe and not harmful to health, that work must be organised in accordance with the requirements of occupational safety and health legislation, and that safety and health measures are financed from the employer’s funds
Legal assessment. The content of the employer’s duty is specified in Article 11(1) of the Law on Safety and Health at Work: the employer must provide safe and health-neutral working conditions in all work-related respects, and this duty is not extinguished by the employee’s duty to protect themselves or others. Article 11(2) of the same law requires the organisation of preventive technical, medical, legal, organisational and other measures, the establishment of procedures for their implementation and control, the appointment of responsible persons, and the giving of specific instructions to them. This means that, during hot weather, the employer’s actions must not be incidental but organised: working conditions must be assessed, work and rest arrangements established, protective measures selected, employees informed, and compliance with the measures monitored. Article 13(1) of the Law on Safety and Health at Work further obliges the person representing the employer and authorised persons to inform and consult employees on all matters relating to the state of occupational safety and health, the planning of its improvement, and the organisation, implementation and control of measures. Accordingly, practical decisions concerning rest, working time, clothing, water or other measures must be incorporated into occupational safety and health management, rather than left to individual employee discretion. Under Article 3(2) of the Law on Safety and Health at Work, an employee has the right to apply to an employee representative, the head of a unit, a person authorised by the employer, the person representing the employer, the occupational safety and health committee, the State Labour Inspectorate or other state authorities, demanding safe and health-neutral working conditions. At the same time, the employee’s duties under Article 33(1) of that law are not passive: the employee must comply with the requirements of safety documents and legislation, properly use collective or personal protective equipment, and immediately report any situation which, in the employee’s opinion, may pose a risk to safety and health. Under Article 31(1) of the Law on Safety and Health at Work, the employer has the right to issue orders and instructions on occupational safety and health, and to require compliance with safety documents, technological processes, internal work rules, and working and rest time standards. Therefore, during hot weather, the employer’s instructions concerning breaks, the use of protective equipment or the organisation of work may become binding on the employee, provided the employee has been informed of them and trained to comply with them. Where several employers carry out work in the same place, Article 30 of the Law on Safety and Health at Work requires them to cooperate, coordinate actions, and inform one another, employee representatives and employees about possible hazards and risk factors. In the case of temporary agency work, Article 78(1) of the Labour Code specifically imposes on the temporary-work user the duty, before the commencement of work, to inform the temporary employee in writing of the working conditions and to take all measures to preserve the employee’s health and life in accordance with the Law on Safety and Health at Work, while Article 78(3) provides for the liability of the temporary-work user for damage caused to the temporary employee. On the basis of the sources provided, the issue of a salary allowance is not formulated as an automatic statutory payment arising solely from the fact of heat. Within the system of the provisions provided, the clearly mandatory element is the provision of safe conditions and employer-funded preventive measures under Article 158(4) of the Labour Code and Article 11(1) of the Law on Safety and Health at Work. Article 31(5) of the Law on Safety and Health at Work permits the employer to propose to employee representatives that collective agreements establish safer and healthier working conditions than those provided for in legislation, and therefore additional guarantees may form part of collective regulation. However, the provisions provided give rise directly not to the priority of a monetary allowance, but to the priority of actual safety measures: organisation of work, risk reduction, information, consultation, protective measures and control. In the case of remote work, Article 381(1)–(2) of the Law on Safety and Health at Work preserves the same principle: the employee must be provided with the same safety conditions and, where necessary, work equipment and personal protective equipment. In the case of project-based work, Article 90(3) of the Labour Code states that, where an employee may be exposed to conditions harmful to health or dangerous to life, the employer must inform the employee in good time and create conditions for safe work
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is an appropriate employer response: the undertaking establishes a procedure for managing heat-related risk, employees are informed and consulted, work and rest arrangements are adjusted, the necessary protective measures are provided, and those measures are paid for from the employer’s funds. The second scenario arises where employees consider the conditions unsafe: under Article 3(2) of the Law on Safety and Health at Work, they may apply to internal responsible bodies or to the State Labour Inspectorate, demanding safe and health-neutral conditions. The third scenario is relevant to construction sites, contracting arrangements or other shared workplaces: several employers must coordinate their actions under Article 30 of the Law on Safety and Health at Work and therefore may not confine themselves to formally instructing only their own employees while ignoring the overall risk at the workplace. The fourth scenario concerns temporary employees, because under Article 78 of the Labour Code the temporary-work user has a direct duty to inform them of the conditions and to protect their health and life. The issue of allowances is practically important for employees, trade unions and employers when negotiating additional guarantees, but on the basis of the sources provided it must be distinguished from the employer’s mandatory duty to ensure safety. For the employer, the key point is not to declare heat a seasonal inconvenience, but to have an implementable and controllable system of preventive measures under Articles 11 and 13 of the Law on Safety and Health at Work. For the employee, the key point is to know that the right to safe working conditions applies irrespective of the type of employment contract, workplace, nature of work or shift duration under Article 3(1) of the Law on Safety and Health at Work
Does the decision temporarily to direct mixed municipal waste from all eight municipalities in the VAATC region to the Kazokiškės landfill, in circumstances where an emergency situation due to pollution is already in force, constitute such a breach of law and violation of the public interest as would allow the prosecutor, under Article 19 of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office, to take action to defend the public interest?
Article 19(1) of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office links prosecutorial intervention not to any municipal dispute, but to three cumulative elements: a breach of a legal act must be established; that breach must infringe the rights and legitimate interests of an individual, society or the State; and the competent institutions must have failed to take measures to remedy the breach, or no such institutions must exist. Accordingly, Elektrėnai’s argument alone that Vilnius decisions “should not apply in another municipality” is not, under the provision cited, sufficient; the prosecution service would need to identify a specific breached requirement concerning decision-making, competence or environmental protection. The stronger basis here is not abstract municipal autonomy, but the chain of facts: since 24 March, an emergency situation has been in force in Elektrėnai due to pollution from the Kazokiškės landfill; the Environmental Protection Department stated that VAATC had failed to comply with an order to stop above-limit hydrogen sulphide pollution; and the new decision directs mixed waste from the entire region to that same facility.
Under Article 19(3), at this stage the prosecutor has not only the right to apply to court, but first the tools to gather facts: to request documents and information, to ask institutions to carry out inspections or provide conclusions, and to summon individuals to give explanations.
In practice, the most important point for Elektrėnai is to frame its application not as a political dispute with Vilnius or VAATC, but as a pattern of violation of the public interest: the decision was adopted without involving Elektrėnai and without assessing the consequences for residents and the environment, even though above-limit hydrogen sulphide pollution had already been recorded at the landfill and the Environmental Protection Department’s mandatory order had not been complied with. At present, the stronger argument is that institutions have a duty not to worsen an already established environmental risk, while the weaker argument is the bare assertion that decisions of the head of operations for Vilnius city’s emergency situation cannot, in themselves, have effect within the territory of another municipality, because the evidence submitted does not identify a specific rule on competence. The refusal by Elektrėnų komunalinis ūkis to comply with VAATC’s instruction is risky until there is a procedural decision by the prosecutor or a court, because Article 19 of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office does not, of itself, suspend the validity of the contested instruction.
VAATC’s termination of its contract with Energesman and the company’s undertaking to challenge that decision in court is a separate dispute, but it may become a significant factual background: if the diversion of waste to Kazokiškės is merely a measure to manage a contractual crisis, the prosecution service will need to assess whether the public interest has been shifted onto the Elektrėnai community, already affected by pollution, without a sufficient legal basis.
Core issue. The precise legal question is not whether the Kazokiškės landfill may generally accept waste, but whether the decisions of VAATC and the Head of Operations for the Vilnius City emergency situation may have resulted in a breach of a legal act infringing the legitimate interests of the public, the State, or the municipality. This question is to be assessed first under Article 19(1) of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Lithuania, which permits a prosecutor to defend the public interest only where a breach of a legal act and the inaction or absence of competent authorities have been established. If the dispute were to proceed to an administrative court, Article 55 of the Law on Administrative Proceedings of the Republic of Lithuania would be relevant, under which a prosecutor and public administration entities may, in cases provided for by law, apply to the court to defend the public interest. The evidentiary framework would be determined by Article 56 of the Law on Administrative Proceedings of the Republic of Lithuania, since the legality of the decisions would have to be substantiated by documents, explanations, explanations from specialists, expert opinions, and other factual data accepted by the court
Legal assessment. The application by Elektrėnai Municipality to the Prosecutor’s Office is, legally, a request to initiate an assessment of a possible violation of the public interest, not in itself a determination that the public interest has already been violated. Under Article 19(3)(1) of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office, the prosecutor may require VAATC, municipal institutions, companies, and other persons to provide documents and information concerning the basis for directing waste to the Kazokiškės landfill. Under Article 19(3)(2) of the same law, the prosecutor may require inspections or audits to be carried out, or conclusions to be submitted; accordingly, it could be examined what data were relied upon in selecting the Kazokiškės landfill specifically. Under Article 19(3)(3) of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office, explanations may also be obtained from VAATC, Vilnius City Municipality, Elektrėnai Municipality, the Environmental Protection Department, or other participating entities. Under Article 19(3)(5), the prosecutor may also require the appointment of specialists to assist in identifying possible violations of the public interest, which in this situation is practically significant for the assessment of pollution, waste flows, and the landfill’s load. The essential limit on the prosecutor’s powers is set out in Article 19(1) of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office: a merely political or economic disagreement between municipalities is not sufficient if no breach of a legal act and no indications of a violation of the public interest are established. On the other hand, the reported circumstances that representatives of Elektrėnai were allegedly not involved, and that an emergency situation due to pollution is already in force at the landfill, are relevant lines of inquiry because they relate to the legitimate interests of the public and the municipality. If the prosecutor considered that State or municipal institutions or companies had improperly performed their duties, Article 19(2) of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office allows the prosecutor to inform the institution exercising the owner’s rights and obligations and to take other measures provided for by law. In administrative proceedings, under Article 55(2) of the Law on Administrative Proceedings, the prosecutor would have the procedural rights and obligations of a party to the dispute. This means that, in court, it would be necessary not merely to declare a crisis, but to formulate a specific claim and substantiate it with evidence, as understood under Article 56(1) and (2) of the Law on Administrative Proceedings. Article 56(5) of the Law on Administrative Proceedings also allows the court, where necessary, to propose the submission of additional evidence or to request such evidence, meaning that the dispute could be resolved on the basis of more than the municipalities’ public statements alone. In the legal sources provided, the defence of the public interest is described as a complex process requiring the identification of the public interest, its distinction from private interests, and the proper formulation of claims. Accordingly, the actions of the Prosecutor’s Office in this situation should be directed at verifying whether the decisions to redirect waste have a lawful basis and whether the competent authorities have taken measures to eliminate any possible violation
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that, after collecting documents and explanations, the prosecutor does not establish the basis for a public interest violation required under Article 19(1) of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office and therefore does not apply measures for the defence of the public interest. The second scenario is that the prosecutor identifies a possible violation and applies to the court directly under Article 19 of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office and Article 55 of the Law on Administrative Proceedings. The third scenario is that the prosecutor, upon identifying improper performance of duties by institutions or companies, applies the mechanism of notification and other measures provided for in Article 19(2) of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office. For Elektrėnai Municipality, this is practically important as a legal avenue for challenging the impact of the decisions on the landfill located within its territory and on residents’ interests. For VAATC and Vilnius City Municipality, it is important because of the obligation to substantiate the legal and factual basis of their decisions with documents. For residents and environmental protection authorities, the most important point is that the dispute may be transferred from political consultation to a review of evidence and competence. Until such a review has been carried out, the involvement of the Prosecutor’s Office does not in itself change the waste transportation procedure, but it creates a procedural basis for requesting information, specialist assessments, and, where necessary, judicial review
Does the 21st Government of M. Sinkevičius, approved by the President’s decree of 6 July 2026, acquire authority to act by virtue of the appointment of ministers alone, or only after the Seimas approves the Government Programme, where the opposition challenges the suitability of particular ministers?
Article 6 of the Law on the Government establishes separate steps in the formation process: the Prime Minister is appointed by the President with the approval of the Seimas; ministers are appointed by the President on the proposal of the Prime Minister; and the Prime Minister must, within 15 days, present to the Seimas the Government approved by the President and its programme. This means that the President’s decree on the ministerial composition completes the personal formation of the Cabinet, but the political mandate to act is linked to the Seimas’s approval of the programme. If the Seimas, by a reasoned resolution, does not approve the programme, the same Article 6 requires the Prime Minister to submit a new programme within 15 days, rather than automatically replace the ministers who have been criticised.
Article 22 of the Law on the Government shows why the programme is legally essential: the Government implements the Government Programme, approves the implementation plan for its provisions, coordinates ministries, and prepares the draft State budget.
The stronger legal argument for the opposition at this stage is not abstract criticism of a minister’s competence, but reasoned opposition to the programme, particularly on the basis of undisclosed sources of funding, because the programme itself is the object of the Seimas’s conferral of authority. Criticism of the Minister of Finance, T. Valius, becomes legally significant to the extent that it is linked to the Article 22 function of preparing the draft budget and organising its implementation, rather than merely to political confidence or to a public quotation about a “creative” approach to finances.
The practical risk for the governing majority is that, in the procedure for approving the programme, it is not sufficient to rely on the President’s decree that has already been issued: if the programme lacks convincing financial logic, the opposition may use precisely that as the basis for reasoned non-approval. After approval by the President, the personalities of individual ministers are not the principal legal object of the vote; therefore, an attempt in the Seimas to hold a de facto vote on individual ministers will be weaker than the argument that the programme itself does not allow scrutiny of how the Government will discharge the budgetary and programme-implementation duties laid down in Article 22.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not whether the opposition’s political criticism of particular ministers is well founded, but whether the newly formed Government may acquire authority to act and what consequences follow from the Seimas approving or refusing to approve its programme. This is determined under Articles 84(4) and 84(9), 91, 92 and 101 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, and Articles 6, 8, 22, 24 and 40 of the Law on the Government of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 92 of the Constitution and Article 6 of the Law on the Government establish the same fundamental rule: the Prime Minister is appointed by the President of the Republic with the approval of the Seimas; ministers are appointed by the President of the Republic on the nomination of the Prime Minister; and a new Government acquires authority only after the Seimas approves its programme. Article 91 of the Constitution defines the composition of the Government as comprising the Prime Minister and ministers; therefore, criticism concerning the Minister of Finance or the Minister of the Interior falls within the question of the Government’s composition, but not within any separate approval of individual ministers by the Seimas. Article 101 of the Constitution is significant because it lays down parliamentary control mechanisms: the Government or ministers must account for their activities at the request of the Seimas; the Government must resign if the Seimas twice in succession refuses to approve the programme of a newly formed Government; and a minister must resign if more than half of all members of the Seimas express no confidence in that minister by secret ballot
Legal assessment. Under Article 84(4) of the Constitution, the President of the Republic, with the approval of the Seimas, appoints the Prime Minister, charges the Prime Minister with forming the Government, and approves its composition; under Article 84(9), the President appoints and dismisses ministers on the nomination of the Prime Minister. Article 24(2)(1), (2) and (7) of the Law on the Government specifies the role of the Prime Minister: the Prime Minister forms the Government, submits its composition to the President, proposes the appointment or dismissal of ministers, and submits the Government programme to the Seimas for consideration. Accordingly, the opposition’s doubts as to the competence of T. Valys or M. Katelynas do not in themselves alter the legal effect of the actions already taken by the President and the Prime Minister. They may become relevant at the stage of the Seimas’s political decision, because under Article 92 of the Constitution and Article 6 of the Law on the Government it is the majority vote of the members of the Seimas participating in the sitting that determines whether the Government will acquire authority to act. Article 6 of the Law on the Government also establishes a time limit: within 15 days of appointment, the Prime Minister must present to the Seimas the Government approved by the President and submit its programme. If the Seimas, by a reasoned resolution, does not approve the programme, the Prime Minister must submit a new programme within 15 days of the date of non-approval. Article 101(3)(1) of the Constitution establishes the most severe consequence: if the Seimas twice in succession refuses to approve the programme of a newly formed Government, the Government must resign. Article 8(4) of the Law on the Government is additionally relevant where more than half of the ministers are replaced, because in such a case the Government must again obtain authority from the Seimas. The information provided states that the President approved the new composition by decree and that the Seimas is considering the programme; therefore, legally, the decisive act is not the opposition’s assessment but the vote on the programme. In preparing the programme, Article 6 of the Law on the Government gives the newly appointed ministers the right to request materials and imposes on ministries and other state institutions the duty to provide them and to contribute to the preparation of the programme. After approval of the programme, Article 22(3) of the Law on the Government obliges the Government to implement the programme, approve a plan for implementing its provisions, and coordinate the activities of ministries and Government agencies. The financing issues raised by the opposition are legally connected with Article 22(4) of the Law on the Government, because the Government prepares and submits to the Seimas the draft law approving the financial indicators of the state budget and municipal budgets, and organises implementation of the state budget. Article 40 of the Law on the Government shows that subsequent draft legal acts and Government resolutions will be prepared, coordinated, considered and adopted in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Government, and that agenda items may be initiated by the Prime Minister and ministers. In its ruling of 10 January 1998, “On the compliance of the Resolution of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania of 10 December 1996 ‘On the Programme of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania’ with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania,” the Constitutional Court emphasised that the Government is a collegial institution of general competence. This conclusion is important because, even where criticism is directed at individual ministers, approval of the Government programme is a question of the authority of the Cabinet of Ministers as a whole. The clarification in Bulletin No. 38 of the administrative law practice of the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania supplements the aspect of individual responsibility: a minister heads a ministry, decides matters falling within its competence, and is directly responsible for implementing the Government programme and its implementation plan in the area of governance entrusted to that minister
Consequences. If the Seimas approves the programme by a majority vote of the members participating in the sitting, the new Government will acquire authority to act under Article 92 of the Constitution and Article 6 of the Law on the Government. The opposition’s criticism of ministers will then legally move into the sphere of parliamentary control: under Article 101 of the Constitution, the Government or individual ministers will have to account for their activities at the request of the Seimas, and a motion of no confidence in a minister may be brought by secret ballot. If the Seimas does not approve the programme by a reasoned resolution, the Prime Minister will have to submit a new programme within 15 days under Article 6 of the Law on the Government. If the Seimas twice in succession refuses to approve the programme of the newly formed Government, the Government will be required to resign under Article 101 of the Constitution, and its resignation will be accepted by the President of the Republic. The practical significance is greatest for the Prime Minister, who bears responsibility for submitting the programme and politically defending the composition of the Government, and also for the Seimas, which decides on granting authority and subsequently exercises control over the Government. After approval of the programme, individual ministers, including the Ministers of Finance and of the Interior, will be assessed not merely by reference to the fact of their appointment, but by how the requirements of the Government programme, laws, presidential decrees and Government resolutions are implemented in their respective areas of governance
Is the Prosecutor’s Office required to disclose publicly the specific breach on which it based the electronic monitoring measure imposed on Seimas member S. Skvernelis, where the information still forms part of pre-trial investigation material?
Article 177(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes not a duty to provide information, but the opposite starting rule: “pre-trial investigation data shall not be made public”. Before the case is heard in court, such data may be disclosed only with the prosecutor’s authorisation and only to the extent deemed permissible. Accordingly, the Prosecutor’s Office’s refusal to state whether the electronic monitoring measure was imposed because of communication with another suspect, A.
Silickienė, is formally grounded in a strong legal provision. The evidence provided does not identify the specific legal basis for imposing the particular remand measure, so it is not possible to assess reliably whether the electronic monitoring measure itself was proportionate; only the limits of public non-disclosure under Article 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be assessed.
The wording used in the article, namely that pre-trial investigation data are “provided in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure”, is incomplete, as it may create the impression that this provision establishes a general mechanism for providing such data. It would be more accurate to say that Article 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure primarily establishes the confidentiality of pre-trial investigation data, permitting their disclosure only with the prosecutor’s authorisation and only to a permissible extent. The Prosecutor’s Office’s position is therefore not merely a “no comment policy”; it is based on a procedural rule of confidentiality which, at this stage, gives the prosecutor discretion not to disclose publicly the factual basis for imposing the electronic monitoring measure.
In practical terms, the stronger argument at this stage lies with the Prosecutor’s Office, but only in the sphere of public communication: Article 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows information to be withheld from the media if the prosecutor does not consider its disclosure permissible. This does not, however, strengthen the legal arguments for the lawfulness of the electronic monitoring measure itself in court, because public confidentiality and the justification for a remand measure are separate issues. For the defence and for journalists, it is important not to infer from a refusal to comment that the breach has been proven; the precise point of dispute is not whether the public has a right to know everything now, but whether the reasons submitted to the court sufficiently justify this particular remand measure.
Core issue. The legal issue is twofold: whether the Prosecutor General’s Office is required publicly to disclose the factual grounds on which an electronic monitoring measure was imposed on the suspect, and whether the imposition of that measure should have proceeded under the rules governing remand measures. This issue is to be assessed under Articles 177, 119, 120, 121 and 1311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as Article 247 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Under Article 177(1) of the CCP, pre-trial investigation data are confidential, and before the case is heard in court they may be disclosed only with the prosecutor’s permission and only to the extent deemed permissible. Under Article 120(1) of the CCP, intensive supervision is a remand measure, and under Article 1311(1) of the CCP it entails control of the suspect by electronic monitoring devices. Accordingly, the publicly requested answer concerning the basis for the “ankle monitor” legally falls at the intersection of two regimes: public interest in a procedural decision is limited by the confidentiality of pre-trial investigation data, while the lawfulness of the measure itself is reviewed not through public communications but through the procedure for imposing and challenging remand measures established by the CCP
Legal assessment. Article 119 of the CCP provides that remand measures may be imposed in order to secure the suspect’s participation in the proceedings, the unhindered conduct of the pre-trial investigation, the hearing of the case in court and the enforcement of the judgment, as well as to prevent new criminal offences. The provisions cited show that intensive supervision cannot be imposed solely because of political or public resonance: under Article 121(2) of the CCP, there must be sufficient data giving grounds to believe that the suspect committed a criminal offence. Article 1311(2) of the CCP establishes a specific competence: during the pre-trial investigation, intensive supervision is imposed, upon the prosecutor’s request, by order of a pre-trial investigation judge. The same article provides that the issue is decided at a hearing to which the prosecutor, the suspect and his or her defence counsel are summoned. In addition, Article 121(2) of the CCP gives the person and his or her defence counsel the right, before the court hearing, to access all material submitted by the prosecutor on which the application for imposition of the remand measure is based. This means that the arguments supporting intensive supervision must first be disclosed to the procedural participants, not to an unrestricted public audience. The prosecution service’s refusal publicly to detail the basis is consistent with Article 177(1) of the CCP if the information requested constitutes pre-trial investigation data and the prosecutor has not deemed its disclosure permissible. Article 177(2) of the CCP also allows the prosecutor or pre-trial investigation officer to warn participants in the proceedings or other persons who have witnessed investigative actions that disclosure of pre-trial investigation data without the prosecutor’s permission is prohibited. In that event, Article 247 of the Criminal Code is also relevant, as it provides that disclosure of pre-trial investigation data without the permission of a judge, prosecutor or pre-trial investigation officer constitutes a criminal misdemeanour. The sources concerning tax inspection rules submitted additionally emphasize that the duty not to disclose pre-trial investigation data applies not only to pre-trial investigation authorities, but also to other participants in the proceedings and persons who have witnessed actions being carried out. Therefore, reports concerning possible communication with another suspect, if based on investigation data, are not legally equivalent to a duty on the prosecution service publicly to confirm or deny those data. If intensive supervision was imposed because of a breach of an earlier procedural condition, that is relevant under the cited provisions only insofar as such breach is linked to the objectives set out in Article 119 of the CCP. Article 1311(5) of the CCP provides that the suspect is warned that, for breach of the conditions of intensive supervision and for failure to comply with the duties and prohibitions laid down in paragraphs 6 and 7 of that article, detention may be imposed if grounds for it exist. Under Article 1311(6) of the CCP, the person must wear an electronic monitoring device and comply with the established daily schedule, while under paragraph 7 he or she is prohibited from removing, damaging or destroying the device. The term of intensive supervision itself is set in the order under Article 1311(4) of the CCP, but may not initially exceed six months; it may be extended by order of a pre-trial investigation judge for up to three months, and the number of extensions is not limited. Article 121(3) of the CCP allows several remand measures milder than detention to be imposed simultaneously, meaning that intensive supervision may operate alongside other procedural restrictions if this is necessary for the purposes of Article 119 of the CCP. In the context of searches, Article 149 of the CCP applies: when commencing a search or seizure, the order or ruling must be announced, a copy must be served, and only items and documents relevant to the investigation, or items whose circulation is prohibited, may be seized. However, that provision explains only the procedure for earlier investigative actions, not a public right to receive the reasons for a remand measure
Consequences. In practical terms, several procedural paths are likely: intensive supervision may remain in force until the term specified in the order, be extended in accordance with Article 1311(4) of the CCP, or be replaced by another remand measure following the logic of Chapter XI of the CCP. If the suspect challenges the measure, the essential forum for assessment is the court process, because intensive supervision is imposed by order of the pre-trial investigation judge or the court under Article 121(1) and Article 1311(2) of the CCP. For the prosecution service, it is practically important not to exceed the limits of Article 177 of the CCP: even where there is substantial public interest, only what the prosecutor deems permissible may be disclosed. For the suspect and defence counsel, the key point is not public commentary but the right to access the material submitted by the prosecutor to the court under Article 121(2) of the CCP and to contest the necessity of the measure at the hearing. For the media and other disseminators of information, it is significant that Article 247 of the Criminal Code establishes liability for disclosure of pre-trial investigation data without permission. For the public, this situation matters insofar as it illustrates the boundary between the public interest in knowing about the procedural status of a senior official and the duty, established in Article 177 of the CCP, to protect pre-trial investigation data. The legal direction of the case will depend not on the extent of the prosecution service’s public explanations, but on whether the data submitted to the court substantiate the objectives and conditions for a remand measure set out in Articles 119 and 121 of the CCP
Can an IT employer, as the market slows, unilaterally shift remuneration growth from base salary to bonuses, allowances, or regional pay bands where such elements have already been agreed in the employment contract or in the remuneration system?
Article 139 of the Labour Code defines remuneration broadly: it comprises not only base salary, but also the additional component of remuneration, supplements, allowances, and bonuses established by agreement of the parties, by labour law rules, or by the remuneration system applied at the workplace. Accordingly, an employer’s attempt to pay more through annual bonuses instead of increasing base pay is not merely a managerial decision if the bonus formula or entitlement to such bonuses has already become part of the contract or the system. Article 45 of the Labour Code leads to a stricter conclusion: the employer may change mandatory or additional employment contract terms only with the employee’s written consent, and an employee’s refusal to work for reduced remuneration cannot constitute a lawful reason to terminate the employment contract.
Article 46 of the Labour Code is relevant in the opposite situation: an employee may request better terms, and the employer’s refusal to amend mandatory or additional terms must be reasoned in writing within five working days, but the provision itself does not give the employee a right unilaterally to demand market indexation.
The stronger argument in this situation is the employer’s right no longer to increase remuneration at the pace expected by the market in 2021-2022, but not a right unilaterally to reduce an already agreed base salary or contractual bonus component. In practice, the safest approach for IT companies is to distinguish clearly between three categories: base salary, bonuses defined by an objective formula, and wholly discretionary incentive bonuses under Article 139(2)(6) of the Labour Code. The greatest risk arises where an “annual bonus based on project profitability” effectively becomes a regular component of remuneration, while its rules remain unclear: in such a dispute, the employee will rely not on the employer’s slowing budget, but on Articles 139 and 45 of the Labour Code.
The employee’s bargaining power may weaken economically, but legally it remains strong where the change concerns not a future increase, but an already agreed remuneration element.
Core issue. The precise legal question is not whether a slowdown in the IT market allows an employer to pay less, but rather the procedure by which a software services company may change an employee’s remuneration structure, bonuses, place of work, or working time arrangement. This is assessed under Article 44(1)(2), (4), (9), and (10), Article 45, Article 46, Article 139, and Article 142 of the Labour Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Since remuneration and its constituent elements must be specified separately before the commencement of work under Article 44(1)(9) of the Labour Code, remuneration “bands”, base salary, supplements, and bonuses are not legally the same category. Article 139(2) of the Labour Code clearly distinguishes base remuneration, the additional component of remuneration, allowances, premium payments, and bonuses; therefore, any change to each element must be assessed by reference to its legal basis. The essential boundary is Article 45(1) of the Labour Code: the employer may change mandatory and additional employment contract terms, the agreed type of working time arrangement, or transfer to another locality only with the employee’s written consent
Legal assessment. If a company merely freezes future salary growth or offers lower starting remuneration to new candidates, the sources cited do not create an obligation to increase remuneration solely because of previous market practice. The position is different where the aim is to reduce an already agreed base salary or to change an additional remuneration component established in the employment contract: under Article 45(1) of the Labour Code, the employee’s written consent is required. The employer must set a time limit for the employee to respond, but under Article 45(2) of the Labour Code that time limit may not be shorter than five working days. Article 45(2) is particularly important in the context of a market slowdown, because an employee’s refusal to work for reduced remuneration cannot be regarded as a lawful reason for terminating the employment contract. Accordingly, cost control cannot be achieved by simply pressuring the employee to accept a lower salary where already agreed remuneration is concerned. If the employer nevertheless unilaterally amended the employment contract, Article 45(3) of the Labour Code gives the employee the right to apply to the body hearing labour disputes concerning rights and to seek an order requiring the employer to perform the employment contract and compensate damage. This right is subject to a clear procedural time limit: three months from the moment when the employee became aware, or should have become aware, of the infringement of rights. In the case of bonuses, the decisive issue is whether they constitute remuneration for work established in the employment contract, the remuneration system, or labour law norms, or whether they are merely an incentive granted on the employer’s initiative. Under Article 142(1)(1) of the Labour Code, a bonus may form part of remuneration for work in accordance with established cases, amounts, and procedure, while under Article 142(1)(2) it may be an incentive for work well performed or for results achieved. If the bonus scheme falls within Article 142(1)(1), the termination of the employment relationship does not, under Article 142(3), release the employer from the obligation to pay a proportionate bonus, unless the parties have established a different period. If the bonus is an incentive under Article 142(1)(2), Article 142(2) of the Labour Code allows it not to be awarded where the employee has committed a breach of duties during the previous six months. Article 58 of the Labour Code is relevant here only to the extent that breaches of duties may have independent consequences, including termination of the employment contract due to the employee’s fault; however, the employee’s mere refusal to agree to a reduction in remuneration is not such a breach. Elements of remote or hybrid work also cannot be treated merely as a managerial benefit if they affect the place where the work function is performed or the working time arrangement, because Article 44(1)(2) and (10) of the Labour Code require this information to be provided to the employee, while Article 45(1) protects changes to agreed terms. Article 46 of the Labour Code operates in the opposite direction: the employee may request changes to working conditions, for example regarding remuneration, a flexible working model, or other agreed terms. Under Article 46(2) of the Labour Code, an employer’s refusal to grant a written request concerning mandatory or additional employment contract terms must be reasoned and provided in writing no later than within five working days. If the request is rejected, under Article 46(3) the employee may submit a repeated request concerning those terms no earlier than one month after submitting the previous request. In the context of work-family balance, the source concerning the draft amendment to Article 138 of the Labour Code indicates that employees may agree on an individual working time arrangement, a flexible work schedule, the rescheduling of working time, remote work, or a project-based employment contract. Differentiation of remuneration according to qualifications, technological complexity, or performance is not in itself precluded, but the sources concerning the principle of equal pay require compliance with the principles of fair pay for work and equal pay for the same or equivalent work. In Summary No. 09 of the case-law summaries of the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania, remuneration conditions are described as a specific type of working condition, and reduction of remuneration is linked to the need for the employee’s written consent
Consequences. In practical terms, three lawful routes are likely: leaving existing contracts unchanged and increasing future remuneration more slowly, amending the remuneration structure by agreement, or more clearly regulating the rules on bonuses and variable pay in the remuneration system. The riskiest scenario for the employer would be to unilaterally reduce the base salary or the contractual additional component of remuneration, because the employee could challenge the change within the three-month time limit established in Article 45(3) of the Labour Code. Employers must distinguish between cases where they are merely setting a new policy for the future and cases where they are changing individually agreed terms, because in the latter case written consent and proper procedure are required. For employees, the key point is that a request for a salary increase under Article 46 of the Labour Code does not confer an automatic right to higher remuneration, but it does oblige the employer to provide a reasoned and timely response where the request concerns changes to agreed terms. For clients, this message is indirectly significant: more stable remuneration costs may affect service pricing, but the lawfulness of employment relations depends on whether companies refrain from changing employees’ agreed terms by circumventing the requirements of Articles 45 and 142 of the Labour Code