Under Article 3.112(1) of the Civil Code, enforcement in respect of obligations of one spouse arising from transactions concluded without the other spouse’s consent may be directed against that spouse’s share of the joint property only where property that is the separate property of that spouse is insufficient.
Under Article 3.109(3) of the Civil Code, a joint and several obligation of the spouses does not arise where one spouse takes out a loan without the other spouse’s consent, unless it is necessary to meet common family needs.
In this scenario, the legal position turns not on whether the husband is “at fault”, but on whose property the creditor may use to satisfy its claims, and this is governed by Article 3.112 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania. The husband unilaterally, without his wife’s knowledge, took out a EUR 5,000 consumer loan, which he failed to repay; the creditor therefore transferred the debt to a debt collection company and enforcement proceedings were commenced. The precise legal issue is whether this debt is to be satisfied from the spouses’ joint marital property or only from the husband’s separate property, and whether the wife is jointly and severally liable. The criminal-law aspect is secondary here: a loan that is simply unpaid, if taken out without deception, does not constitute fraud under Article 182 of the Criminal Code, because there is no deception in acquiring property or avoiding an obligation.
Under Article 3.112(1) of the Civil Code, enforcement in respect of obligations of one spouse arising from transactions concluded after registration of the marriage without the other spouse’s consent may be directed against that spouse’s share of the joint property only where the creditor’s claims cannot be satisfied from property that is the separate property of that spouse. The enforcement sequence is as follows:
In practical terms, the most important point for the wife is to know that her separate property and her share in the joint property may be affected only to a limited extent:
Under Article 260 of the Criminal Code, unlawful possession of narcotic substances with intent to distribute is punishable by imprisonment for two to eight years, and, in the case of a very large quantity, by imprisonment for ten to fifteen years.
Article 7 of the Criminal Code permits the application of the Lithuanian Criminal Code irrespective of citizenship and the place where the act was committed only to a defined category of offences, which includes narcotic-substance offences (Articles 260–2671), but not prostitution-related offences.
The legal position of the individuals concerned has not yet been formalised: N. Kockar’s detention is only a procedural measure in Turkey, and Novaturas has not received any official information; therefore, the allegations or their substance cannot be treated as established facts. The key point is that detention is not yet a charge, and the acts referred to in the media (drug supply and prostitution) would, under Lithuanian law, be assessed under Articles 260 and 307–308 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, although the applicable law depends on where and when the act was committed. The precise legal question is whether the acts in respect of which Turkish law enforcement authorities are investigating the businessman may be classified under the provisions of the Criminal Code, and what sentencing ranges that would entail: under Article 260 of the Criminal Code (unlawful possession of narcotic substances with intent to distribute, punishable by imprisonment for two to eight years, and, in the case of a very large quantity, by imprisonment for ten to fifteen years), Article 307 of the Criminal Code (profiting from another person’s prostitution, punishable by up to five years; directing prostitution, punishable by imprisonment for one to seven years), and Article 308 of the Criminal Code (involvement in prostitution, punishable by up to five years).
Under Article 2(1) of the Criminal Code, a person is liable only for an act that was prohibited by the criminal law in force at the time the criminal act was committed, while Article 3(1) of the Criminal Code provides that the criminality of an act is determined by the law in force at the time of its commission. This means that acts committed in Turkey are not automatically assessed under the Lithuanian Criminal Code. Article 7 of the Criminal Code extends the application of the Lithuanian Criminal Code irrespective of citizenship and the place where the act was committed only to a defined category of offences, including offences related to possession of narcotic or psychotropic substances (Articles 260–2671), but prostitution-related offences (Articles 307–308) are not included in that list. Classification under Article 260 of the Criminal Code would require assessing whether the conduct satisfies the specific elements of the offence: intent to distribute under paragraph 1 (2–8 years), a large quantity under paragraph 2 (8–10 years), or a very large quantity under paragraph 3 (10–15 years). If the conduct involves carriage across a border, Article 260-1(3)–(4) of the Criminal Code would apply (2–10 and 4–12 years’ imprisonment, respectively). As regards prostitution, the paragraphs of Article 307 of the Criminal Code differentiate between receiving income (up to 5 years), organising prostitution (up to 6 years), and directing prostitution (1–7 years), while Article 308(2) of the Criminal Code (coercion, dependency, deception) provides for imprisonment for 2–8 years. Both provisions of the Criminal Code — Articles 260 and 307–308 — include, in their paragraphs 4–5, provisions establishing liability for legal persons; however, the sources contain no information indicating that Novaturas was connected to the conduct under investigation, and therefore there is currently no basis for raising the issue of the company’s liability.
In practical terms, the most important point is that detention in Turkey does not yet give rise to any criminal liability in Lithuania: the formulation of charges, legal classification, and sentencing ranges will become relevant only once official information emerges regarding the safeguarding of suspects’ rights and possible extradition or international cooperation. Novaturas’ risk profile is informational rather than criminal: the company has announced that it has not received any official information, meaning that the question of its liability currently remains open only in the assessment of market participants, not as a matter of law enforcement action. If the Turkish proceedings were to disclose acts satisfying the elements of Article 260 of the Criminal Code, Lithuanian authorities could assess the grounds for international cooperation under Article 7 of the Criminal Code; however, no such basis for prostitution-related offences follows from the sources provided.
In this matter, the legal risk has shifted to the other side: the convicted person’s case has concluded and the sentence remains in force, while the prospect of criminal liability now arises for A. Kandrotas himself and other disseminators of false information. The precise question is whether the content published during the live Facebook broadcast on 15 September, alleging that two girls had been raped and that the convicted person was a paedophile and a member of the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union, while disclosing his name, date of birth and exact address, constitutes defamation under Article 154 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, and whether the personal data regime under the Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data of the Republic of Lithuania was additionally breached. In view of the published address and date of birth, Article 167 of the Criminal Code, concerning the unlawful collection of information about a person’s private life, must also be assessed. The conviction itself is based on Article 149 of the Criminal Code: for the rape of a minor, paragraph 3 provides for imprisonment from four to ten years.
On 14 September, Panevėžys Regional Court dismissed the appeals lodged by the prosecutor and the victim’s representative; accordingly, the judgment of Utena District Court remains in force. The convicted person’s current obligations are as follows:
As regards A. Kandrotas’s statement, Article 154(1) of the Criminal Code provides for liability for disseminating, through a mass media outlet, information that does not correspond to reality, where such information may cause contempt for or humiliation of a person or undermine confidence in that person, or for defaming a person by alleging that he or she committed an intentional criminal offence. The applicable penalty is community service, a fine, restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. The statement appears to be inaccurate in light of the court’s findings: the court established one rape at Labirintų Parkas in Anykščiai District, while membership of the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union was officially denied the following day; it has not been confirmed that the convicted person was a volunteer or a young rifleman. Article 154(2) of the Criminal Code determines the procedure: investigation and liability arise only upon receipt of a complaint from the injured person, an application by his or her legal representative, or a request from the prosecutor.
| Provision | Liability for | Penalty range | Condition |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article 154(1) CC | False information through the media / defamation alleging an intentional criminal offence | imprisonment for up to one year | only upon the victim’s complaint or the prosecutor’s request |
| Article 167(1) CC | Unlawful collection of information about a person’s private life | imprisonment for up to three years | no complaint requirement |
| Article 168(1) CC | Disclosure of information concerning private life, where such information was obtained by virtue of office or profession, or collected under Articles 165–167 | imprisonment for up to three years | only upon the victim’s complaint or the prosecutor’s request |
The publication of the address and date of birth must be assessed separately from the perspective of personal data protection: under Article 2(1) and 2(4) of the Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data, a date of birth and address are personal data, and their publication constitutes data processing, which must comply with the conditions of lawfulness. Article 4 of the amending law provides an exemption, for data processed for journalistic purposes, from the application of several provisions of Regulation (EU) 2016/679; however, that exemption applies only to genuine journalistic activity, not to arbitrary “doxing” of personal data. A distinction must be drawn: Article 3(2) of the amending law prohibits the public disclosure of a personal identification number. A date of birth, taken separately, is not a personal identification number, and that provision therefore does not apply directly here.
The practical set of scenarios for these parties is as follows:
Under Article 22(2)(2) of the Law on Personal Income Tax, income from sports activities received from a permanent resident of Lithuania is classified as Class A income, i.e. income whose taxation is linked to the procedure for payment from a Lithuanian entity.
Article 116(1)–(2) of the Law on VAT gives a foreign taxable person the right to recover VAT paid in Lithuania, but only if Lithuanian taxable persons have the same right in that person’s state.
The legal core of this item is not the partnership itself, but the fact that a natural person resident in the United States receives remuneration from a Lithuanian entity for ambassadorial services, thereby raising the issue of personal income tax and potential VAT obligations in Lithuania. The specific question is: into which class, according to the tax payment procedure, are O’Neal’s income classified, and under what procedure are they taxed. The analysis will apply Article 22 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Personal Income Tax (income classes), Article 2 thereof (definitions of “non-resident of Lithuania” and “royalties”), and Articles 14 and 116 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Value Added Tax (chargeable event and the right of a foreign person to recover VAT in Lithuania).
If O’Neal is not treated as a permanent resident of Lithuania under the criteria in Article 4 of the Law on Personal Income Tax, he is a non-resident, and his remuneration for advertising activities from Nord Security falls within the scope of Class A income under Article 22. Article 14(3) of the Law on VAT provides that, in respect of a service supplied by a foreign taxable person where the purchaser is required to calculate and pay VAT, the obligation arises upon the earliest of the following events: receipt of an accounting document, payment of consideration, or the last day of the tax period in which the service was supplied. The commentary to Article 58 of the Law on VAT gives an example stating that advertising services supplied by a Lithuanian VAT payer to a person from a third country are deemed to be supplied outside Lithuania and are declared in box “Transactions carried out outside Lithuania – not subject to VAT in Lithuania” of form FR0600. This logic illustrates that the place of taxation of advertising services is determined by reference to the customer’s location, and in this partnership the customer is a Lithuanian taxable person. The definitions in Article 2 of the Law on Advertising apply if elements of the campaign are disseminated in Lithuania; Article 9 of the Law on Advertising prohibits advertising only where the advertised activity is prohibited by law or unlawful, or where the advertised goods have been withdrawn from circulation, and advertising of VPN services does not fall within such prohibitions. Since the planned “360°” campaign is aimed at the U.S. market, the Lithuanian advertising law regime is practically relevant only to any possible dissemination within the territory of Lithuania.
The practical set of obligations for the parties appears as follows:
The legal weight of the Turkish investigation, in which N. Koçkar, the largest shareholder of Novaturas, was detained in Antalya on 29 September, currently rests with the natural person himself, not with the company. Under Lithuanian law, the conduct of a shareholder, even one holding a controlling stake, does not in itself constitute a criminal offence by the company: Article 20(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania provides for liability of a legal person only where the offence was committed for its benefit or in its interests by a person who had the right to represent the company, make decisions on its behalf, or control its activities.
The allegations referred to in the sources (suspected drug use and organisation of prostitution, an operation at 35 addresses and on two vessels) are, on the available information, linked to Koçkar’s personal conduct, not to Novaturas’ tourism business. For the company to be liable under Article 20(2) of the Criminal Code, the prosecution would have to prove that the offence was committed specifically for the company’s benefit or in its interests; paragraph 4 covers only acts of controlled or representative *other legal persons*, and therefore the detention of a natural-person shareholder does not provide such a basis. Territorial aspect: under Article 8(1) of the Criminal Code, a person is liable under Lithuanian law for an act committed abroad only if it is criminal in both states, while under paragraph 2 the person is not liable if he has already served the sentence imposed by the foreign state or has been acquitted. The hypothetical sanctions for a legal person under Article 43(1) of the Criminal Code are as follows:
| Type of penalty | Content | Amount or term |
|---|---|---|
| Fine (Article 47 CC) | Monetary penalty calculated in MGL units | 200-100,000 MGL; if annual income exceeds 300,000 MGL, 2-15% of annual income |
| Restriction of activity (Article 52 CC) | Prohibition on participating in certain transactions or engaging in certain activities | From one to five years |
| Liquidation (Article 53 CC) | Obligation to cease all economic activity and close branches | Within a period set by the court |
In addition to a penalty, the court may order confiscation of property under Article 72 of the Criminal Code; paragraph 4(4) also provides for confiscation of property belonging to another person if it has been transferred to a legal person whose participants holding at least 50% of the shares are the offender or his close relatives. The international framework is consistent with domestic law: Article 22 of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings requires liability of legal persons for offences committed for their benefit, while Article 4 of the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’ Financial Interests requires effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties, including deprivation of the right to engage in commercial activity and judicial winding-up. If a penalty were imposed, failure to enforce it would constitute a separate offence: under Article 244 of the Criminal Code, the company’s manager commits a criminal misdemeanour for failure to comply with an imposed penalty, except confiscation of property.
On the current factual footing, the most realistic scenario is that the investigation remains personal: Turkish proceedings continue against Koçkar, while Novaturas continues operating in the ordinary course without consequences under the Criminal Code.
Article 30(1) requires the controller to notify the data subject of the breach without delay where it is likely to result in a high risk to rights and freedoms.
Where it becomes apparent that data have been transmitted unlawfully, the recipient must be notified without delay and the data must be erased or their processing restricted pursuant to Article 14.
The publication, confirmed by the Armed Forces, of conscripts’ data in the public procurement system constitutes a personal data security breach giving rise to obligations for the State under the special data protection statute. Most importantly, Article 2(2) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Legal Protection of Personal Data Processed for the Purposes of the Prevention, Investigation, Detection or Prosecution of Criminal Offences, the Execution of Criminal Penalties, or National Security or Defence expressly defines such unauthorised disclosure or granting of access as a security breach. The precise legal issue is whether the Armed Forces, as controller processing data for defence purposes, complied with its obligations to notify data subjects and the supervisory authority, as well as its data quality control obligations, and what civil liability risk arises as a result. The relevant provisions are Articles 6, 7 and 30 of that Law, together with the right to private life under Article 2.23 of the Civil Code.
Under Article 7(1) of the special law, processing for defence purposes is lawful only insofar as it is necessary for the performance of the functions of a competent authority and is based on legislation; publication in a public procurement system is difficult to justify by reference to that criterion. The SMS notices sent by the Armed Forces fulfil the obligation provided for in Article 30(1), while the information provided to JRDA concerning the duration of public availability and the categories of data corresponds to the requirement in Article 30(2) to describe clearly the nature of the breach. Article 18 requires records of processing activities to be maintained, including the categories of recipients of the data; this is relevant to JRDA’s question whether conscripts’ data entered third-country platforms. In civil law terms, Article 2.23(1) of the Civil Code prohibits the publication of information about private life without the person’s consent, while paragraph 3 prohibits dissemination of collected information except where such dissemination serves a legitimate public interest; in the event of breach, individuals may seek compensation for non-pecuniary damage before the courts. The breach concerning approximately 45,000 citizens, as indicated by JRDA, means that the pool of potential claimants is very large. As regards criminal liability, the sources provided are not directly applicable to an accidental data publication of this nature without hacking: Article 295 of the Criminal Code regulates the unlawful installation of technical means for collecting information, which is unrelated to the present case.
The inspection initiated by the Armed Forces may result in a finding that additional organisational measures are necessary, while JRDA’s inquiry may lead to institutional responses concerning the duration of public availability, the categories of data, and the fact of notification to the supervisory authority; the content of those responses will determine whether individuals have grounds to bring civil claims under Article 2.23 of the Civil Code. In practical terms, the key point for conscripts is that, upon receiving an SMS notice from karys.lt, they have the right to contact their Military Conscription Division and request information on the nature of the breach under Article 30(2). Legislative amendments registered by the Ministry, which from January 2027 would discontinue the public list of conscripts and provide for identification through the karys.lt website, will alter the legal basis for the publication of the data itself; however, until they enter into force, the existing procedure remains to be assessed under the current rules. Monitoring point: await the conclusions of the Armed Forces’ inspection and the responses to JRDA’s inquiry regarding the duration of public availability and the scope of the data, and monitor whether this incident is raised as a separate argument in cases already pending before national courts concerning the Armed Forces’ data processing practices.
Under Article 2(4) of the Criminal Code, only a person whose act corresponds to the statutory elements of a crime or criminal misdemeanor may be held liable, and the prosecutor found that no such elements were present in the case of the newborn’s death.
If the act had been classified under Article 132 of the Criminal Code, negligent deprivation of life would have carried arrest or imprisonment for up to four years, and, in the event of a breach of special safety rules, imprisonment for up to seven years.
For the persons involved in this case, namely the newborn’s parents or other persons present with the infant, the legal position is as favorable as possible: the pre-trial investigation has been discontinued, and no criminal liability applies because, in the prosecutor’s assessment, the act contains no elements of a crime or criminal misdemeanor. The precise legal question effectively resolved by this prosecutor’s decision is whether the newborn’s death by choking on food may be attributed to any criminal act, in particular negligent homicide under Article 132 of the Criminal Code, or leaving a child without care under Article 158 of the Criminal Code. The basis for the answer is Article 2(4) of the Criminal Code: under criminal law, only a person whose act corresponds to the statutory elements of a crime or criminal misdemeanor may be held liable, while Article 2(3) of the Criminal Code also requires culpability and the possibility of requiring conduct compliant with the law.
Had the investigation established a criminal act, the reference point would have been Article 132 of the Criminal Code: negligent deprivation of one person’s life would carry arrest or imprisonment for up to four years; deprivation of the lives of two or more persons would carry imprisonment for up to six years; and where special safety rules of conduct established by legal acts were breached, imprisonment for up to seven years would apply, with a legal person also potentially liable in such a case. An alternative classification would have been Article 158 of the Criminal Code, leaving a child without necessary care with the intention of abandoning the child, punishable by community service, restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment for up to two years, or Article 156 of the Criminal Code, abduction of a child or substitution of newborns. However, the facts reported, namely the absence of injuries and the established cause of death by choking, do not satisfy the elements of those offences. Acting under Article 2(4) of the Criminal Code, the prosecutor concluded that the collected data did not disclose the elements of an offence; accordingly, the investigation, the purpose of which was to establish the cause of death, was discontinued. The decision was adopted on 29 September by prosecutor Edvinas Alosevičius, who supervised the pre-trial investigation. Importantly, this prosecutor’s decision is not final: it may be appealed to a higher prosecutor, meaning that the decision may be reviewed by a higher level within the prosecutorial hierarchy.
In practical terms, this means that no person will stand trial and no person faces either the penalties listed in Article 42 of the Criminal Code, such as community service, a fine, restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment, or the penal measures provided for in Article 67 of the Criminal Code, for example deprivation of the right to perform certain work or a contribution to the Fund for Victims of Crime. The newborn’s relatives, if they consider that the circumstances of the death were assessed incorrectly, may exercise the right to appeal the prosecutor’s decision to a higher prosecutor. If the higher prosecutor dismisses the appeal, the discontinuation of the investigation will remain in force and the case will be closed; if the appeal is upheld, the investigation may be reopened. Monitoring point: await whether, in the near term, an appeal against the 29 September decision is submitted to a higher prosecutor, and what response the prosecution service gives.