Under Article 7(1) of the Law on International Sanctions, transactions whose performance contravenes international sanctions implemented in Lithuania are null and void.
For the breaches referred to in Article 13¹, natural and legal persons are liable in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 13(2), while criminal liability applies to legal persons only where provided for by other laws (Article 13(3)).
Statements by Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs K. Budrys on the margins of the UN General Assembly concerning additional sanctions against Russia, a stricter visa policy, and action against the “shadow fleet” indicate the direction in which Lithuania may expand the scope of restrictive measures. In concrete legal terms, this means the possible introduction of new restrictive measures or the tightening of sanctions already in force under the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on International Sanctions and Article 1 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Establishment of Restrictive Measures in View of Military Aggression Against Ukraine. The issue to be addressed is formulated as follows: what is the procedure in Lithuania for imposing new sanctions or restrictive measures, and what liability is borne by natural and legal persons that breach restrictions already in force? The assessment will apply Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 6–2, 7, 8, 11, 13 and 13¹ of the Law on International Sanctions.
Under Article 1(2) of the Law on International Sanctions, the law establishes the general conditions in Lithuania for submitting proposals concerning the imposition of sanctions, for establishing restrictive measures, and for implementing them. The types of sanctions are identified in Article 3: economic, financial, political, transport, social and other sanctions. The stricter visa policy and restrictions on the activities of operatives mentioned by the Minister would correspond to political and transport sanctions, while pressure on the “shadow fleet” would correspond to economic sanctions. The scope of implementation is determined by Article 6: sanctions imposed by EU legal acts are implemented in full; sanctions imposed by UN Security Council resolutions are implemented directly and in full; and measures recommended by the UN General Assembly or the OSCE are implemented having regard to whether this is necessary to achieve the objectives set out in Article 1(1). From this perspective, K. Budrys’s call to “create a real cost for the aggressors” means that the most convenient route for Lithuania is to initiate decisions under the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, which apply automatically in Lithuania, or to establish national measures under the Law on the Establishment of Restrictive Measures in View of Military Aggression Against Ukraine. All natural and legal persons must comply with restrictions in force (Article 4(1)), while the list of breaches is set out in Article 13¹: ranging from creating conditions for access to funds, non-frozen resources and the continuation of transactions with third countries, to breaches of prohibitions or restrictions on the import or export of goods or the provision of financial services. Natural and legal persons are liable for such breaches in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 13(2); legal persons are liable under the law where their breaches do not give rise to criminal liability (Article 13(3)). Breaches are investigated by the institutions applying enforcement measures: the competent supervisory authorities referred to in Article 14(1) and the Financial Crime Investigation Service; other competent authorities must transmit information without delay (Article 14(2)). The functions of competent authorities (decision-making, exceptions and authorisations, inquiries, and exchange of information) are specified in Article 11(1), while the FCIS, the Ministry of Finance and the Customs Department are identified by areas of activity in Article 11(3). The effect of sanctions on transactions is substantive: Article 7(1) prohibits the conclusion of transactions that contravene sanctions and deems such transactions null and void; Article 7(3) requires transactions concluded before the implementation of sanctions to be terminated or suspended without delay; and Article 7(4) releases parties from civil liability for such non-performance. In the most serious cases, Article 8(1) gives the Minister of Finance the right to appoint a temporary administrator for a legal person whose owner or controlling person is subject to sanctions, in order to avoid adverse consequences for society.
If the Minister’s calls reach the legislative stage, the most realistic scenarios are as follows. If allies agree on additional EU sanctions, they will take effect in Lithuania directly, without additional ratification; if there is no agreement at EU level, Lithuania may act nationally through the Law on the Establishment of Restrictive Measures in View of Military Aggression Against Ukraine. For Lithuanian businesses and the financial sector, the most important practical risk is the nullity under Article 7 of transactions linked to sanctioned entities or third countries, and the obligation to terminate such relationships. For companies that may become stuck because they are unable to perform transactions, the institution of a temporary administrator under Article 8 is significant: it would allow critical activities to continue, but control would pass to a state-appointed administrator. The FCIS and other supervisory authorities will continue to investigate possible breaches listed in Article 13¹; culpable natural or legal persons face liability under Article 13. Point to monitor: in the near term, EU or Lithuanian Government documents should be expected that specifically codify the measures mentioned by the Minister (stricter visa policy, restrictions on the “shadow fleet”).
The Migration Department must issue or replace a new document no later than within one month from the date of receipt of the application and all documents (Article 6(2) of the Law on Identity Cards and Passports).
A citizen residing in Lithuania who has lost an identity card or passport may be issued a temporary certificate, the form and procedure for issuance of which are established by the Minister of the Interior (Article 7(1)).
A citizen who has lost documents in a fire is not left without a legal procedure: the law imposes on him both a duty to report the loss and a right to obtain a temporary certificate and a new identity document. In practice, however, the timeframe for issuing the document and the waiting period for mobile services block access to banking and telecommunications services, because operators and banks carry out identification under strictly regulated rules. The precise legal issue in this situation is how quickly and under what procedure a citizen who has lost his passport in a fire and is hospitalized can regain an identity document, and what identification measures telecommunications and banking service providers are required to apply during that period. The matter is governed by Article 7 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Identity Cards and Passports (notice of loss and temporary certificate), Article 6(2) (issuance timeframe), and the Description of the Procedure for Issuing Identity Cards and Passports (Order No. 1V-200/V-62), including Annexes 3 and 6 thereto.
The citizen’s obligations and options under the sources provided are as follows:
N. Vėta will be issued a document within the ordinary timeframe laid down in Article 6(2), that is, no later than within one month. Once he receives the document, he will restore Smart-ID and full access to electronic banking; until then, he accessed his bank accounts using a code generator, while Tele2 delivered SIM cards and will compensate telecommunications services until the end of the year. If the homestead that burned down were located within the territory of the relevant municipality, under paragraph 56.7 of Mažeikiai District Municipal Council Decision No. T1-137, one-off assistance could be requested for fire losses where no insurance had been paid: up to 40 BSI where a residential dwelling has burned down, up to 30 BSI where it has been damaged by fire, and up to 15 BSI for a non-residential building; up to 1 BSI is allocated for handling personal documents where the person has no income. Rokiškis District Municipal Council must adopt its own decision on analogous assistance. Accordingly, the practical points to monitor are the decision on issuing the new passport within the statutory one-month period and, separately, the municipal decision on assistance to the victims.
Correction. The news report states that the Council could dismiss the Director immediately only if it found a gross breach of duties. That is incomplete. Under Article 13 of the LRT Law, there are two grounds for dismissal: failure to meet the requirements of impeccable reputation or the requirements of Article 13(4), and a gross breach of duties. It would be more accurate to say that dismissal is possible on either ground, but that in this case the debate concerns the classification of the conduct as a gross breach, not the reputation requirements.
Under Article 13(2) of the LRT Law, the Council must publicly announce the voting results no later than within five working days from the date of the vote on the appointment or dismissal of the Director General.
The Council may dismiss the Director General only as an exercise of the power enshrined in Article 11(1)(9) of the LRT Law, applicable in accordance with the procedure established by law, and not at its discretion.
LRT Director General Monika Garbačiauskaitė-Budrienė remains in office for the time being: the Council assessed her breach concerning undisclosed data on service providers as non-gross, while the Council may dismiss the Director General only by exercising the powers under Article 13(2) of the LRT Law, which the law links to the public competition procedure and term-of-office conditions. The precise legal issue now to be decided by the Council and, likely, the Constitutional Court is twofold: first, whether the Council’s assessment that the breach does not constitute a gross breach of employment duties complies with Article 11(1)(9) of the LRT Law; second, whether the amendments to the LRT Law adopted in June concerning the new dismissal procedure are compatible with the Constitution. The lawfulness of the Council’s decision is also to be assessed in light of the principles of transparency and accountability set out in Article 3(1) of the LRT Law, which the Council must observe when adopting personnel-related resolutions.
The following set of obligations follows:
In practical terms, the Director General faces three scenarios: an evaluative decision by the Council without dismissal (the current position); dismissal if the Council reclassifies the breach as gross under the new procedure adopted by the Seimas; or the impossibility of dismissal if the Constitutional Court annuls the June amendments. For LRT employees and contractors, it is important that a breach of procurement transparency may provide grounds for the Procurement and Investment Policy Committee, established by the Council under Article 11(1)(3), to review procurement procedures. For the public and the journalistic community, the key point of oversight is the obligation under Article 13(2) to publish voting results within five working days, which enables verification of whether the decision was adopted by a lawfully constituted Council. Follow-up point: the Constitutional Court’s ruling on the June amendments to the LRT Law — it is that ruling which will determine what dismissal procedure the Council may use going forward.
The regulation was initiated by members of Seimas parliamentary groups and the Mixed Group of Members of the Seimas, seeking to legalise their right to speak on LRT air not only during election periods. They argued that, after parliamentary elections, MPs’ right to express their position on the national broadcaster remains merely declaratory, contrary to the statutory principles of objectivity, impartiality and diversity. The draft was opposed by the Communications Regulatory Authority of Lithuania, which considered the proposed function assigned to it, supervision of prices for LRTC services, to be excessive, creating a significant administrative burden and requiring additional state budget funds, contrary to what was stated in the explanatory memorandum. The committee also criticised the imperfect drafting of the bill: in view of the requirements of logic, clarity and unambiguity, it was proposed that the provisions on the purpose of the law and the status of LRT be redrafted.
Applying Article 182(3) of the Criminal Code, the EUR 74,939 misappropriated from the company and the additional EUR 12,700 fall within the category of property of very high value; accordingly, the sanction is imprisonment for up to eight years.
Under Article 72(1)–(3) of the Criminal Code, confiscable property belonging to the offender must be confiscated in all cases.
O. Y., who withdrew nearly EUR 88,000 from ATMs in Riga using other persons’ payment cards, has already been sentenced to an aggregate term of 4 years’ imprisonment. The legal essence of this matter is that, within a chain of telephone fraud, individual participants incur liability under different articles of the Criminal Code: the conduct of the fraudsters who obtained the data by deception falls under Article 182(3) of the Criminal Code (fraud involving property of very high value or committed by an organised group, punishable by imprisonment for up to eight years), whereas the role of courier and cash-withdrawer corresponds to Article 214(1) of the Criminal Code, namely the unlawful acquisition, possession, transfer or realisation of another person’s electronic payment instruments or user authentication data sufficient to initiate a financial transaction (punishable by a fine or imprisonment for up to six years). The precise issue determined in this case was what share of liability attaches to a person who did not personally participate in the deception but cashed out criminally obtained funds; that issue is resolved by reference to Article 214, Article 182, and the rules on aggregation of penalties in Article 42(5) of the Criminal Code. For the victims, namely the company, the accountant and the bank that granted the loan, the issue is compensation for pecuniary damage, which the court determines in the judgment.
Applying Article 182(3) of the Criminal Code, the EUR 74,939 misappropriated from the company and the additional EUR 12,700 (a fraudulently obtained loan and personal funds) fall within the category of property of very high value; accordingly, the applicable sanction is imprisonment for up to eight years. The acts imputed to O. Y. also satisfy the elements of Article 214(1) of the Criminal Code: he unlawfully acquired, possessed and used other persons’ payment instrument data sufficient to initiate financial transactions, on the basis of which cash was withdrawn from ATMs in Latvia. The sources also refer to Article 216(1) of the Criminal Code (legalisation of property obtained by criminal means, punishable by imprisonment for up to seven years), which may apply to persons carrying out financial transactions involving criminally obtained property with the aim of concealing its origin. The structure of the sentence was determined by Article 42(5) of the Criminal Code: where, for a concurrence of several criminal offences, more than two different types of penalties are imposed, the final aggregate sentence is set by retaining two penalties, namely the most severe and one selected additional penalty. In this case, the final outcome was 4 years’ imprisonment. The accused was also ordered to compensate pecuniary damage to the company, the accountant and the bank, as well as the costs of extradition from Spain to Lithuania. In addition, under Article 72(1)–(3) of the Criminal Code, property subject to confiscation includes the instrument, means or proceeds of a criminal act, and confiscable property belonging to the offender must be confiscated in all cases. This means that money obtained from the criminal act, or property that facilitated it, may be taken into state ownership separately from compensation for damage. The sources provided do not include case law, so I cannot cite precedent. Attention should also be paid to the intermediate link in the chain: a taxi driver who was unaware of the crime bears no liability, because Article 189(1) of the Criminal Code (acquisition of property obtained by criminal means) requires knowledge that the property was obtained by criminal means.
The practical consequences fall into several categories:
The documents contain no information about a fraudster convicted in Panevėžys or about the specific regulation of this case. The explanatory notes provided concern amendments to the Criminal Code on sentencing rules, suspension of the execution of sentences, amounts of fines, and the criminalisation of manipulation of sports results, prepared by the Ministry of the Interior with a view to balancing the use of custodial sentences and addressing the problem of overcrowded prison facilities. These documents are essentially unrelated to the stated topic. [SKIP]
Correction. The news report’s statement that the appellate court’s decision “became final immediately, although it may still be appealed” is inconsistent with procedural logic and with the rule cited in the source: a ruling of the appellate instance becomes final upon expiry of the time limit for lodging a cassation appeal, not at the moment of appealability. More precisely, the judgment becomes final upon expiry of the appeal period; if a cassation appeal is lodged, it becomes final after the decision of the cassation court. A second inaccuracy is that the 20-working-day period is presented as though it starts running afresh after clarification of the circumstances. Under points 12-13 of the STT procedural rules, the period for examining a report is not counted during the period in which missing information is being requested and continues after the information is received. In other words, it is a single overall period subject to suspension, not a new 20-day period. Third, the article does not state that the impeccable-reputation requirements in the cited version of Article 5 of the Law on the Civil Service apply directly to municipal administration posts. That is a separate legal question which the article does not analyse.
Under Article 5(2)(2) of the Law on Civil Service, a person is not deemed to be of impeccable reputation if he or she has been found guilty of a criminal misdemeanour against the civil service and public interests and three years have not elapsed since completion of the sentence.
The Special Investigation Service is currently carrying out a clarification of the circumstances, not a pre-trial investigation, and has 20 working days to decide whether to open an investigation.
R. Malinauskas’s transfer from the mayor’s office to the position of chief adviser to the director of the municipal administration within a single day raises the question whether a person found guilty, by a final conviction, of corruption-related offences may hold positions within a municipal administration. The precise legal issue is whether such a person is subject to the requirement of impeccable reputation and whether the employment complies with the requirements of the Law on Civil Service. In assessing the possibility of criminal liability, the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania will be considered, in particular Article 228 (abuse of office) and Article 229 (failure to perform official duties), while in the context of administrative offences, Article 505 of the Code of Administrative Offences concerning failure to comply with lawful requirements of officials and decisions of collegial bodies will be relevant. The content of the reputation requirements is established by Article 5 of the Law on Civil Service and by the amending law establishing the criterion of impeccable reputation (Law Amending and Supplementing Articles 4, 9, 18, 29 and 44, Article 1).
R. Malinauskas was found guilty of bribery, subornation, trading in influence and illicit enrichment, was fined EUR 60,000, and the appellate court’s decision became final immediately, meaning that the period during which reputation-related restrictions apply has only just begun. The municipality stated that the position of chief adviser is not subject to competition; however, under Article 8(3)(5) of the Law on Civil Service, job descriptions for municipal administration positions are approved by the mayor, while Article 10 specifies who appoints persons to office. These procedures do not displace the reputation requirement. If it emerged that, upon taking office, the person concealed information that would have precluded appointment, Article 35(1)(9) would apply, namely dismissal from office. The concept of abuse of office (use of official position other than in the interests of the service or for self-interested purposes) is defined in the provisions of the laws amending the Law on Civil Service (Article 2(13)), which may be assessed as context when applying Article 228 of the Criminal Code. That article provides for a fine, arrest or imprisonment for up to four years, and where material gain is sought, imprisonment for up to six years; legal persons are also liable for these acts.
The realistic scenarios depend on the conclusion of the Special Investigation Service:
The retail price of non-prescription medicines simply must not exceed the statutory ceiling: Article 59-1(4) of the Law on Pharmacy sets only a ceiling, not uniformity.
Paragraph 20.3 of the Good Pharmacy Practice Regulations prohibits displaying, in any form, information in a self-service area about discounts and price reductions for non-prescription medicines.
In Rūta’s case, the legal issue is not that the pharmacy is selling medicines at excessive prices; that pricing dynamic appears lawful, since the retail price of non-prescription medicines simply must not exceed the statutory ceiling. The question raised by this case is different: whether the pharmacy operates its loyalty programme and presents prices in compliance with Article 41-6(1)(4) of the Law on Pharmacy of the Republic of Lithuania (also cited in the sources as Article 416) and paragraph 20.3 of the Good Pharmacy Practice Regulations, which prohibits displaying information in self-service areas about discounts and price reductions for non-prescription medicines. Under Article 41-6(1)(4)(a) of the Law on Pharmacy, the sales price must be clearly visible on the storage equipment, while Article 59-1(3) prohibits a pharmacy from applying a higher trade mark-up than that set by the Government.
The pharmacy’s obligations in this situation appear from the sources as follows:
For Rūta and other consumers, the legal position is as follows: if the pharmacy displays the price in breach of the visibility requirements or advertises discounts in the self-service area, this is an infringement recorded during an inspection under paragraphs 7.13 and 7.16 of the inspection rules, and in more serious cases the sanctions provided in Section Fifteen of the Law on Pharmacy concerning the marketing of medicinal products apply. For the consumer, the mere price difference between pharmacies, or between an online order and the in-store price, is not a legal infringement: Article 59-1(4) of the Law on Pharmacy sets only a ceiling, not uniformity, and the Medicines Policy Guidelines expressly acknowledge that the law does not even require uniform declared prices between the reimbursed and non-reimbursed regimes for the same medicine. In practical terms, this means that price comparison remains the consumer’s responsibility, not the pharmacy’s; the next monitoring point in Rūta’s case is that the only realistic further step is a possible scheduled or unscheduled inspection of the pharmacy by the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority.
The regulation was initiated by members of the Seimas with a view to reducing patients’ expenditure on non-reimbursed medicinal products, increasing transparency and competition in this sector, and eliminating the “first-hand” rule, whereby pharmacies first offer more expensive medicines from a particular manufacturer, as well as “shelf fee” practices. It was argued that, where only maximum mark-ups apply, pharmacies have no incentive to sell cheaper preparations and patients therefore pay unjustifiably more. Objections were raised by the association of pharmaceutical manufacturers and other economic operators, who argued that the proposed restrictions (for example, a prohibition on informing consumers of a lower price or transporting medicines to another location) unjustifiably restricted freedom of economic activity and residents’ ability to purchase at a lower price, and that it had not been demonstrated that a reduced price would lead to irrational use of medicines.
Under Article 2(1) of the CTKĮ, assets are confiscated where the difference between their value and lawful income exceeds the amount of 2,000 basic penalties and fines; the proposal would reduce this threshold from EUR 100,000 to EUR 45,000.
An action for confiscation must be brought before the court within 30 days of the prosecutor’s decision (Article 10(3) of the CTKĮ), and from the entry into force of the judgment the State acquires ownership of the assets (Article 13(1) of the CTKĮ).
A significant expansion of confiscation proceedings is approaching for persons whose assets do not correspond to lawful income: if the Seimas approves the Government’s proposals, the value threshold for confiscation will fall from EUR 100,000 to EUR 45,000, and proceedings will be initiated in respect of any very serious, serious, or less serious offences involving proprietary gain, without a closed list of offences. The precise legal questions to be addressed are determined by three rules: whether the assets cannot be justified by lawful income and exceed the threshold (Article 2 of the CTKĮ), whether the person falls within the definition of a “person under investigation” or a “bad-faith acquirer” (Article 2(2) of the CTKĮ; points 3.1-3.2 of the Description of the Asset Investigation Procedure), and whether urgent seizure of assets may be applied before an action is brought (the proposed amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure). The amendments also legalise a settlement with the prosecutor and a monetary recovery alternative where the assets have been concealed or transferred.
The current procedure under the CTKĮ operates as follows:
Practical consequences for individuals and the market: