Article 147(3) of the Criminal Code provides that a victim may be exempted from criminal liability for a criminal offence that he or she was directly compelled to commit as a result of the act of trafficking in human beings committed against him or her.
The basic offence under Article 147 of the Criminal Code carries imprisonment from 2 to 10 years, while committing the offence against two or more persons or as part of an organised group carries imprisonment from 4 to 12 years.
The persons in this account, both potential victims and pseudo-employment “intermediaries”, fall within the scope of Article 147 of the Criminal Code: trafficking in human beings for the purpose of forced labour, conditions of slavery, or compelling a person to commit a criminal offence is punishable by imprisonment from two to ten years. The key point absent from the account is that the victim’s consent to work or travel is legally irrelevant. Article 4(b) of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings and Article 147 of the Criminal Code provide that consent is immaterial where at least one means of subjugating the person’s will has been used. The precise question to be determined is whether a fictitious job offer, debt bondage, confiscation of a passport, or the “Romeo” method constitutes the elements listed in Article 147 of the Criminal Code: recruitment, transportation, or holding in captivity by exploiting dependency or vulnerability, deception, or the giving of a benefit to a person exercising actual control over the victim.
The Prosecutor General’s recommendations identify three groups of constituent elements that the prosecutor will have to prove:
In practical terms, this means that a company whose employees recruited people online or held them in conditions of debt bondage will be liable as a legal person, while the individual employees will be personally liable, facing up to ten years’ imprisonment for the basic offence and up to twelve years where aggravating circumstances are present. As regards the victim, the procedure should result in recognition of the person as a victim and exemption from liability for acts committed under compulsion, rather than deportation or punishment. Employers who do not formally cross the threshold into trafficking but employ illegal third-country nationals under exploitative working conditions face a separate offence under Article 292-1 of the Criminal Code, punishable by imprisonment of up to two years. Accordingly, the “employers” behind pseudo job offers cannot shield themselves through nuances of legal classification.
Correction. The article’s statement that substantial harm in the offence of abuse of office arises “only” once 250 MSLs (EUR 12,500) are exceeded lacks essential context. Cassation case law, for example rulings No. 2K-P-59-495-2021 and 2A-7-17, recognises that, depending on the circumstances of the case, substantial harm may also be found at a lower amount, for instance having regard to the victim’s financial position. A more accurate formulation would be that 250 MSLs is a generally applied guideline, not an absolute threshold, and courts are therefore not formally required to acquit solely because the harm is below EUR 12,500. It is also inaccurate to state that Article 108 of the Code of Administrative Offences provides a penalty “for 3 MSLs (EUR 150)”: the condition for applying the article is that the value of the property does not exceed three basic amounts of penalties and fines, while the fine is not fixed but ranges from EUR 90 to EUR 400.
In the case of I. Tamašauskienė, the actual legal position is as follows: her application against Lithuania has already been declared admissible for examination by the ECtHR, meaning that the question of the Lithuanian State’s responsibility for criminal prosecution over the misappropriation of EUR 150 will be determined in Strasbourg by written procedure. The crux of the case is the threshold for legal classification: whether the misappropriation of EUR 150 (3 MSLs) can constitute abuse of office under Article 228 of the Criminal Code, which requires substantial harm, or whether it remains within the scope of an administrative offence under Article 108 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The second issue is whether the right to a fair and impartial hearing was breached, particularly given that comparable cases, such as the “receipt scandal” case involving Jonava Mayor M. Sinkevičius, were discontinued by the Supreme Court of Lithuania. Under Article 228(1) of the Criminal Code, abuse of office is punishable only where the State, a legal person, or a natural person has suffered substantial harm as a result; absent this mandatory element, criminal liability cannot arise. Under Article 183(4) of the Criminal Code, the misappropriation of another person’s property of minor value is classified as a criminal misdemeanour, while under paragraph 6 of the same article, a person is liable for acts under paragraphs 1 and 4 only where there is a complaint by the injured party, a statement by that party’s representative, or a prosecutor’s request.
Under Article 228 of the Criminal Code, the convicted person was fined EUR 7,500; the penalties provided in paragraph 1 are a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to four years, and in paragraph 2, imprisonment for up to six years.
If the ECtHR finds a violation of the Convention, Lithuania may be required to pay compensation for non-pecuniary damage, and grounds will arise for review of the conviction in domestic proceedings.
Under Article 3.192(3) of the Civil Code, both parents must provide financial support for their minor children in proportion to their financial circumstances.
Under Article 3.196(1) of the Civil Code, the court may award maintenance in the form of monthly periodic payments, a specific monetary amount, or by awarding certain property to the child.
Since the daughter resides with her father, the mother may, in practical terms, become the party liable to pay child maintenance: the parents’ duty to provide financial support for their minor children applies to both parents irrespective of which parent has been designated as the child’s place of residence. The essence of the dispute will not be the determination of the child’s place of residence, but the application of Article 3.192(1) and (3) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania: both parents must provide financial support in proportion to their financial circumstances, and the procedure and form of maintenance are determined by mutual agreement of the parents. If no agreement is reached, the matter is decided by the court under Article 3.194(1) and (2) of the Civil Code. The mother’s obligation would remain even if the child were separated from her: Article 3.195 of the Civil Code provides that the maintenance obligation remains where children are separated from their parents or parental authority is restricted.
In applying these provisions, three issues are determined: the person subject to the obligation, the amount of maintenance, and the form of the award.
If B. Navickaitė agrees, a court-approved agreement on the amount, procedure, and form of maintenance is possible; in that case, no judicial dispute is necessary, and non-performance gives rise to grounds for issuing a writ of execution.
The regulation was initiated by the Ministry of Justice together with a working group of legal experts as part of a package to modernise the provisions of Book Three of the Civil Code (family law), which also included updating the legal framework governing maintenance obligations. The aim was to align legislation with contemporary realities of family relations, to review the conditions for maintenance between spouses and relatives, the procedure for determining the amount of maintenance, and the related procedural and notarial provisions. The explanatory memorandum emphasises that the previous provisions were excessively based on earlier models of marriage and did not adequately take account of the interests of the child; accordingly, it was proposed to revise the categories of persons entitled to maintenance and the scope of the corresponding obligations. No objections are apparent from the documents: the draft was presented as being aligned with case law and international obligations.
Under Article 4(1), all natural and legal persons are required to comply with and implement international sanctions applicable in Lithuania, while Article 4(3) provides that the fact that sanctions apply is recorded in state registers.
Article 13-1(2): liability may arise for breach of the obligation to freeze the funds or resources of a sanctioned entity, while Article 13(3) provides for the liability of legal persons where the violation does not give rise to criminal liability.
For two individuals, A. Usmanov and M. Fridman, the EU has provisionally agreed to lift listing sanctions; however, until a final decision is adopted, they remain in Lithuania “persons subject to sanctions” within the meaning of Article 2(4) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on International Sanctions. The more precise question is when and how the delisting will become binding on Lithuanian entities, and what will happen if they disregard it. The answer is determined by Article 6(1) of the Law, under which sanctions established by EU legal acts are implemented in full, and by Articles 13 and 13-1, as amended on 15 May 2025, which establish liability for violations. For the remaining nearly 3,000 persons and entities, the sanctions are being extended for three years, changing the compliance planning horizon for Lithuanian companies.
Until the journalistic report about the agreement is transformed into an EU legal act, namely a delisting regulation, Lithuanian banks, notaries and other entities must continue to apply the freezing of funds and economic resources as defined in Article 2(1) and 2(2), meaning the prohibition of any movement, transfer or use. The competent authorities under Article 11(1) and 11(3), namely the Financial Crime Investigation Service, the Ministry of Finance and the Customs Department, decide on exemptions and respond to inquiries; the implementation procedure is set by the Government. Paragraph 70 of the Description applicable to the gambling sector shows that internal control procedures of other supervised entities must also be reviewed “more frequently, for example, when the requirements of legal acts establishing international sanctions change” - a change in the list is precisely such a moment. M. Fridman himself has chosen a legal remedy, a EUR 15 billion action against the EU over the sanctions, illustrating that listing decisions may be challenged before the courts.
If no EU Member State submits a written objection in the coming hours, the delisting will be enacted by an EU legal act and, under Article 6(1), will take effect automatically in Lithuania: pursuant to Article 4(4), the Financial Crime Investigation Service will provide information to register administrators, and the freezing measures in respect of these two individuals will cease to apply. For the remaining listed persons and entities, the three-year extension means that Lithuanian companies with links to sanctioned entities must plan compliance measures over a horizon of years rather than six months.
Under Article 149(1) of the Criminal Code, rape committed by taking advantage of the helpless condition of the victim is punishable by imprisonment from one to seven years.
Under Article 149(5) of the Criminal Code, a person is liable for rape only upon the victim’s complaint, a statement by the victim’s lawful representative, a prosecutor’s request, or the initiation of a pre-trial investigation on grounds indicating domestic violence.
The situation depicted in Emilija’s story should, under the current wording of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, be legally assessed under Article 149(1) (Rape), which criminalises sexual intercourse against a person’s will by “taking advantage of the helpless condition of the victim” and provides for a penalty of imprisonment from one to seven years. The precise legal question raised is whether Lithuanian criminal law will define the elements of sexual violence by reference to the absence of the victim’s active resistance (the coercion model) or by reference to the absence of consent. This assessment will be based on Articles 149, 150 and 151 of the Criminal Code, which currently require violence, threats, or another form of deprivation of the ability to resist; Article 150 additionally provides for the “helpless condition of the victim.”
Under the current regulation, the essential evidentiary issue in Emilija’s case would be her resistance or helpless condition, not whether Martynas obtained consent. The following provisions would apply:
Emilija’s dissociation, namely freezing and losing the ability to speak, is not an independent basis for prosecution under this model; it is relevant only insofar as it helps establish a helpless condition within the meaning of Article 149(1). The author’s criticised proposition that “the coercion model is outdated” is supported, in the context of EU law, only by the fact stated in the report that 18 EU Member States have already moved to a lack-of-consent model. Attention should also be drawn to Article 152 of the Criminal Code (sexual harassment), a criminal misdemeanour applicable only in respect of a dependent person and only upon the victim’s complaint (Article 152(2)); this shows that the concept of “consent” does not operate directly in the current Criminal Code.
If the Seimas adopts legislation establishing a consent model, the positions of defendants and victims would be distributed as follows:
Conversely, if Articles 149-151 of the Criminal Code are not amended, cases of Emilija’s type will continue to depend on the complaint requirement (Article 149(5)) and on proof of resistance. The statistics cited in the report, namely up to one hundred registered sexual violence offences per year under Articles 149 and 150 of the Criminal Code, half of them against minors, indicate that the application of these provisions is highly limited, while leniency in cases of dissociation contributes to the fact that most victims do not contact law enforcement at all. However, if the understanding of consent is harmonised across the EU, the practice of international cooperation could also change, since liability for certain offences under Article 7 of the Criminal Code does not depend on citizenship or the place where the offence was committed. The practical consequence for policymakers is the need to consider whether the complaint requirement in Article 150(5) is consistent with the logic of the consent model.
Under Article 8(1) of the Law on the Management, Use and Disposal of State and Municipal Assets, the functions of owner of municipal assets are performed by municipal councils, while Article 12(1) provides that decisions on the transfer of municipal property are adopted by the council or by asset managers authorised by it.
Under paragraph 35 of the Description, the asset manager may terminate a loan-for-use agreement without a separate council decision or mayoral decree only on the grounds provided for in the agreement.
For the Alytus Aeroclub, this situation amounts to the de facto loss of use of municipal buildings before the legal dispute has been finally resolved: the locks were changed not by bailiffs, but by municipal employees accompanied by the police, which, in the assessment of the Aeroclub’s representatives, exceeds the municipality’s powers. The key legal question is whether, in terminating relations under a loan-for-use agreement, the municipality may resort to self-help measures, or whether it must rely solely on judicial protection under the provisions of the Civil Code governing ownership and loan-for-use relations, as well as Articles 8 and 12 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Management, Use and Disposal of State and Municipal Assets. The second question is procedural: under the Description of the Procedure for Asset Management approved by Alytus City Municipal Council Decision No. T-14 of 30 January 2019, a decision to transfer municipal property on the basis of loan for use and to terminate a loan-for-use agreement is adopted by the municipal council or the mayor, while the asset manager may terminate a loan-for-use agreement without a separate council decision only “on the grounds provided for in the agreement” (paragraph 35 of the Description). The third question concerns the separation of land and buildings: the Aeroclub states that it has the right to use approximately 100 hectares of land until 2078, meaning that the takeover of the buildings also affects the continuity of the land-use relationship.
Under local self-government Description No. T-14, property may be transferred on the basis of loan for use only to budgetary institutions, public institutions, associations, and foundations pursuing specific social objectives (subparagraphs 16.1-16.3, amendment of 29 February 2024). The Aeroclub does not fall within these categories, and therefore the basis for its use of the buildings was most likely another contractual arrangement, the validity of which is disputed by the parties. For the municipality’s position, it is significant that, under paragraph 35 of the Description, the asset manager may terminate a loan-for-use agreement without a separate council decision or mayoral decree if the relevant grounds are set out in the agreement itself. For the Aeroclub’s position, it is significant that the court’s lifting of interim protective measures does not in itself give the municipality the right to physically take possession of the premises; this must be done through enforcement proceedings or contractual mechanisms, not by unilateral acts of self-help. The municipality’s right to defend its interests in court is confirmed by Article 69(1) of the Law on Local Self-Government, but that same provision also means that municipalities defend their rights through the courts, rather than by unilateral coercion. Article 63 provides that the procedure for managing municipal property is established by the Constitution, laws, Government resolutions, and municipal council decisions. The Aeroclub’s planned referral to the prosecutor’s office will be assessed by reference to whether the actions of municipal employees constitute a criminal or administrative offence.
The decision of 29 September will determine whether the land loan-for-use relationship with the Aeroclub will remain in place, but even a favourable decision concerning the land would not automatically restore access to the buildings in which aircraft, equipment, and documentation remain. If the Aeroclub proves that the property was locked without a legal basis, the realistic course of action would be a claim for access or for compensation for losses. The legal costs for this year cited by the Aeroclub’s representatives amount to EUR 20,000, and the dispute has been ongoing for more than a decade. A successful outcome for the municipality would open the way for the use of the property in business development projects; the value of the project launched in 2026 is approximately EUR 7.59 million.
If the charge is not paid within the period laid down in the municipal regulations, administrative liability applies under Article 418 of the Code of Administrative Offences: for a first offence, a fine of EUR 20 to EUR 40; for a repeated offence within one year, EUR 40 to EUR 100.
The Trakai District regulations provide, in the event of non-payment of the charge, a 72-hour period to pay the prescribed amount irrespective of the duration of parking on that day.
For a driver who has received a notice concerning an unpaid parking charge, the initial risk is financial rather than legal: payment of the daily charge within the prescribed period prevents the initiation of administrative offence proceedings. Administrative liability under Article 418 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania applies only if the charge is not paid within the period laid down in the municipal regulations: for a first offence, a fine of EUR 20 to EUR 40; for a repeated offence within one year, EUR 40 to EUR 100. The specific legal issue, namely whether the infringement will be resolved by payment of the charge or will become an administrative offence, is determined under Article 418 of the Code of Administrative Offences and the local charge regulations approved by the municipal council, since Article 11(1)(6) of the Law on Charges authorises municipalities to collect a charge for the use of parking spaces designated by the council.
The basis of the two-stage mechanism is local self-government legislation. The Vilnius City regulations (Council Decision No. 1-127 of 13 July 2011) provide that, upon expiry of paid parking time where payment is made through a mobile communications operator, the driver must immediately pay an additional charge or leave the paid parking space; it is precisely the failure to comply with this obligation that is recorded by inspectors or enforcement vehicles reading registration plates. Subparagraph 13.3 of the Siauliai City regulations governs the leaving of a notice and the procedure for paying the charge by 24:00 on the following day, while the Trakai District regulations provide, in the event of non-payment, a 72-hour period to pay the prescribed amount irrespective of the duration of parking on that day. The Vilnius zone tariffs (from 1 July 2025, approximately EUR 96 per day in the blue zone) are a municipal act, not a statutory provision. A disproportionality should be noted: in the blue zone, the daily charge (approximately EUR 96) exceeds even the upper limit of the fine range for a first offence under Article 418 of the Code of Administrative Offences, namely EUR 40, because the charge is calculated according to the daily tariff for the zone, whereas the fine is based on a fixed statutory range. If the charge is not paid, the municipality recovers it in accordance with its own legal acts, for example, under the procedure for recovery of arrears approved by Order No. 30-2127/20 of the Director of the Vilnius City Municipal Administration of 1 September 2020; in addition, grounds arise for drawing up an administrative offence report under Article 418 of the Code of Administrative Offences. Related offences should be distinguished: non-payment of a charge for entry into state-protected territories or municipal reserves falls under Article 419 of the Code of Administrative Offences (with fines of the same amounts), while breach of the rules on entry into low-emission zones falls under Article 419¹ of the Code (EUR 40 to EUR 80, and EUR 80 to EUR 200 for a repeated offence); those provisions do not apply to ordinary unpaid parking in an urban zone.
In practical terms, the course available to the driver depends on the speed of the response and the zone: