Article 40(1) of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection permits a fine of EUR 500 to EUR 5,000 for non-compliance with the requirements specified therein.
Under Article 182(1) of the Criminal Code, acquisition of another person’s property by deception may be punishable by a fine, restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment for up to three years.
For “Furny” and A. Romanchin, the most significant consequence is the financial liability already imposed by the SCRPA for breaches of consumer protection requirements. The amounts of the fines fall within the statutory administrative consumer protection ranges, while criminal liability would be a separate issue requiring proof of fraud. “Furny” accepted orders and payments but failed to deliver the goods or refund the money, while the “Sellmarket” website lacked mandatory information. The precise legal issue is whether the SCRPA had competence to impose the fines and whether the applicable fine amounts fall under Article 12(1)(1), (5) and (7), Article 40(1), and Article 44(1)–(4) of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection. The threshold for criminal liability is assessed under Article 182(1)–(6) of the Criminal Code if acquisition of another person’s property by deception were to be proven.
Article 1(1) of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection covers relations between consumers and sellers, out-of-court proceedings, and liability for breaches of consumer protection requirements. An e-commerce relationship in which a consumer pays EUR 500–1,000 for furniture or goods falls within the regulatory scope of that law. The SCRPA’s competence is expressly set out in the law:
For the amount of the fine, the key provision is Article 40(1) of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection, which permits a fine of EUR 500 to EUR 5,000 for non-compliance with the requirements specified therein. The EUR 2,750 fine imposed on “Furny” is in the middle of that range, and the EUR 1,200 fine imposed on A. Romanchin also falls within it. If the infringement concerned the requirements set out in Article 5(3)–(5) or Article 21(2)–(3), the same text of Article 40(1) provides for a different range: EUR 250 to EUR 2,500. The SCRPA was required to comply with the procedure under Article 44 of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection:
In the case of “Furny”, the scale of the infringements is evidenced by 18 consumer applications submitted between 15 May 2025 and 12 May 2026. In the case of “Sellmarket”, the core of the infringement is narrower: the identity of the trader carrying out the activity, clear delivery deadlines, and warranty service information were not provided. Under Article 182(6) of the Criminal Code, a legal person may also be held liable for the acts provided for in Article 182(1)–(3).
The practical result for the business is not only financial loss arising from the fines, but also a formal SCRPA finding that consumer rights were infringed. Such a finding is important for consumers because it confirms that their complaints were examined within the competence of the consumer protection authority. Realistic scenarios are:
For the market, this case is significant because of e-commerce information obligations: the trader’s identity, delivery deadlines, and warranty service details are not optional elements of a website. Where a consumer pays EUR 500–1,000 and receives neither the goods nor the money, the dispute becomes not merely a matter of service quality, but an issue concerning consumer interests protected by law. It remains to be seen whether, following the SCRPA decisions, their enforcement, amendment, or separate satisfaction of consumer claims will be publicly indicated.
The regulation was initiated by the Ministry of Justice with a view to strengthening the system for consumer rights protection and out-of-court resolution of consumer disputes. The objective was to align national rules with EU requirements on consumer protection cooperation and dispute resolution, and to clarify the functions of the SCRPA and other authorities. The main arguments were clearer procedures and more effective supervision; the excerpts provided do not indicate any material objections to this direction.
Correction. The article’s statement regarding Article 281¹ of the Criminal Code is not incorrect, but it is too narrow. It would be more precise to state that Article 281¹ covers not only driving with a blood alcohol level of 1.51 per mille or more, but also practical driving instruction, refusal to undergo testing where signs of intoxication are present, and alcohol consumption after a traffic accident before the relevant circumstances have been established, where that threshold is reached. The statement that drivers are considered intoxicated from more than 0.4 per mille is also incomplete. Under the wording of the Law on Road Traffic Safety provided, the general permitted concentration is 0.4 per mille; however, novice drivers and specified professional categories are subject to a stricter, essentially zero-tolerance regime.
A reading of 1.97 per mille moves the driver’s case into the criminal sphere, because the threshold under Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania begins at 1.51 per mille.
If these elements are established, the person may, under Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code, be sentenced to a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year.
The practical turning point is not limited to the issue of punishment: the vehicle may become subject to confiscation if it is recognised as an instrument of the criminal offence under Article 72 of the Criminal Code. The precise issue will be whether the established driving and intoxication satisfy the elements of Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code, applying Article 2(3)–(5) of the Criminal Code concerning guilt, the constituent elements of an offence, and punishment only in accordance with law.
Under Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code, liability arises where a person drives a motor vehicle while intoxicated and is found to have a blood alcohol concentration of 1.51 per mille or more. The stated level of 1.97 per mille exceeds the criminal liability threshold by 0.46 per mille. Applying the cited provisions, the authorities will need to verify the following elements:
The immediate outcome of the case will depend on whether the investigation confirms the lawful determination of intoxication and the fact of driving itself. The practical consequences may include:
Article 4.68(1) of the Civil Code requires, for immovable property, at least ten years of such possession.
If these conditions are proved, ownership may be acquired by acquisitive prescription under Article 4.47(11) of the Civil Code.
This family’s position will be determined not by the neighbour’s current demand, but by whether the building is legally attributable to their ownership. After 24 years of use, their strongest support lies in the permits, the neighbour’s consents, and a possible basis for acquisitive prescription. The core of the dispute is ownership of the 24 sq. m outbuilding. It should be assessed under Articles 4.37, 4.40, 4.46, 4.47, 4.68 and 4.69 of the Civil Code. Article 4.40(1) of the Civil Code establishes the initial rule: the owner of a land plot owns the structures located on that plot, unless otherwise provided by law or contract.
The family’s position depends on whether lawful, open possession of the building as their own can be proved.
The fact itself is established only by a court pursuant to Article 4.68(2) of the Civil Code. The more favourable line for the neighbour would be to prove that the object is an immovable thing marking the boundary of the plots and serving both plots. In that case, Article 4.46(1) of the Civil Code would apply, allowing common use of a boundary object where a single owner cannot be established. However, on the facts described, the outbuilding more closely resembles an independently used structure than a boundary marker or fence. If it was built and reconstructed on the initiative of a particular family, with official permits and the neighbour’s consent, co-ownership does not follow as a matter of course.
Article 4.69 of the Civil Code also limits acquisitive prescription. It is not available in respect of things belonging to the State or a municipality, or things registered in another person’s name.
In practical terms, the case may end in one of several outcomes. The court may recognise the family’s ownership, establish a regime of common use, or dismiss the neighbour’s claim for lack of a proven basis. If acquisitive prescription were applied, the family would obtain a court-confirmed fact of acquisition of ownership. If Article 4.46 of the Civil Code were applied, the neighbour could use the boundary object according to its purpose, without interfering with the other owner. It would not be sufficient for the neighbour to show that part of the building is physically situated in a location favourable to him. He would need a legal basis, because Article 4.37 of the Civil Code protects the owner’s right to possess, use and dispose of the thing. The most important evidence for the family will be prior permits, consents, duration of use and registration documents. The most important evidence for the neighbour would be data showing that the building is a boundary object or belongs to another owner.