A referendum majority could not, by itself, eliminate the interpretation of Article 38 of the Constitution under which the family is protected not solely as a form of marriage.
If a narrowing formulation were submitted to referendum, its constitutional risk would arise not from the vote itself, but from the possible discrimination of participants in family relationships.
The referendum on the concept of family is, first and foremost, not a dispute over whether the nation is “reasonable”, but a dispute over the limits of a constitutional initiative. Its legality would be assessed by reference to whether the proposed question is compatible with the existing protection of the family and the standard of non-discrimination. The issue concerns an advisory referendum on the “clarification” of the concept of family. The matter falls to be assessed under Article 9, Article 38 and Article 105 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, Articles 1 and 2 of the Constitutional Law on Referendums, and Articles 3.2, 3.3 and 3.5 of the Civil Code. From the perspective of the child, Article 4 of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child is additionally applicable, as the legal regulation of the family is directly linked to the protection of children’s interests.
Article 9 of the Constitution permits the most important issues concerning the life of the State and the Nation to be decided by referendum, and a referendum is called by the Seimas or upon the demand of not fewer than 300,000 citizens with the right to vote. Article 1 of the Constitutional Law on Referendums establishes the procedure for initiating, calling, organising and conducting a referendum, while Article 2 enshrines free participation, universal, equal and direct suffrage, and secret voting.
| Provision | Number or term |
|---|---|
| Article 9 of the Constitution | requirement of not fewer than 300,000 citizens |
| Article 2 of the Constitutional Law on Referendums | citizens aged 18 and over participate |
| Article 153 of the Constitution | until 25 October 1993, the specified amendments were possible by a three-fifths majority vote of all Members of the Seimas |
However, the legality of the referendum procedure does not answer the question whether the substance of the definition of family itself would comply with the Constitution. Article 38 of the Constitution protects the family, motherhood, fatherhood and childhood, and also provides that marriage is concluded by the free mutual consent of a man and a woman. Article 3.2 of the Civil Code recognises the Constitution, the Civil Code, laws and international treaties as sources of family law, and permits customs to be applied only in the cases provided for by law. Accordingly, moral or customary arguments used in public debate do not, in themselves, alter the hierarchy of legal sources.
Article 3.3 of the Civil Code bases the regulation of family relations on the voluntary nature of marriage, the equality of spouses, the priority of children’s rights, the upbringing of children in the family, and the complementarity of fatherhood and motherhood. Article 3.5 of the Civil Code permits persons to exercise family rights at their discretion, but prohibits abuse of those rights at the expense of the rights or legitimate interests of others.
Under Article 105 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court decides whether laws and other acts of the Seimas are in conflict with the Constitution. In its ruling of 28 September 2011 concerning the State Family Policy Concept, the Constitutional Court stated that the concept of family is not limited to the traditional family founded on marriage. In its ruling No. KT3-N1/2019 of 11 January 2019, it clarified that, under the first and second paragraphs of Article 38 of the Constitution, interpreted together with Article 29 of the Constitution, all families corresponding to the constitutional concept of family are protected.
A referendum majority could not, by itself, eliminate the interpretation of Article 38 of the Constitution under which the family is protected not solely as a form of marriage. A proposal to “clarify” the family would legally encounter the fact that the constitutional concept of family already encompasses lasting bonds, mutual responsibility, understanding, emotional attachment, assistance and the voluntary assumption of duties. If a narrowing formulation were submitted to referendum, its constitutional risk would arise not from the vote itself, but from the possible discrimination of participants in family relationships.
The regulation of children’s rights additionally limits the political simplification of the definition of family. Article 4 of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child requires adherence to the priority of the best interests of the child and to the preservation of the family environment and family ties. The same article establishes the priority of the biological family, but only insofar as this is not contrary to the interests of the child.
In practical terms, the three most important scenarios are as follows:
This is of practical importance not only for the referendum initiators and the Seimas, but also for families whose bonds arise not solely from marriage. It is also important for child rights protection authorities, because their decisions under Article 4 of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child must be based on the interests of the particular child, and not merely on an abstract formula of family.
Procedurally, the next step would be to await either a citizens’ demand for a referendum, supported by not fewer than 300,000 citizens with the right to vote, or a decision of the Seimas to call a referendum in accordance with the procedure established by law.
A construction site does not become a closed legal island: mud on a pavement is already an issue under municipal rules, not merely a matter of contract-work organisation.
Recurrence does not arise merely because the municipality has identified three cases this year at different construction sites.
The Klaipėda construction-site case concerns not building permits, but enforcement of the municipal cleanliness regime. It is assessed under Article 366 of the Code of Administrative Offences and the requirement in the Klaipėda City Maintenance and Cleanliness Rules not to pollute streets, pavements, or green areas beyond the boundaries of a construction site. The news item states that three breaches of construction-site order were identified in Klaipėda in 2026. The precise legal question is this: whether construction transport and the approaches to the construction sites were managed so as to prevent pollution outside the boundaries of the construction site. If the breach is repeated, Article 40 of the Code of Administrative Offences is also relevant for classification, as it links recurrence to a one-year period after compliance with an administrative order or after a decision becomes final.
Under the Klaipėda City Maintenance and Cleanliness Rules, participants in the construction process have clear obligations:
| Situation | Applicable Provision | Sanction |
|---|---|---|
| First breach of maintenance and cleanliness rules | Article 366(1) CAO | warning or fine of EUR 20-140 |
| Repeated breach of that kind | Article 366(2) CAO | fine of EUR 140-600 |
| Breach of municipal waste management rules | Article 367(1) CAO | warning or fine of EUR 30-140 |
| Repeated breach of waste management rules | Article 367(2) CAO | fine of EUR 140-600 |
Recurrence does not arise merely because the municipality has identified three cases this year at different construction sites. Under the rule in Article 40 of the CAO, as set out in the sources, there must be a new offence by the same person under the same article of the CAO. In addition, recurrence begins to be calculated only after compliance with an administrative order or after a decision becomes final. If an officer issues a warning, then, under the wording of Article 608(5) of the CAO provided, a decision is drawn up for that offence. The other articles cited indicate the limits of classification but do not alter the principal provision. Article 362-1 of the CAO applies to the identification of persons present on a construction site and therefore does not, in itself, cover a situation involving mud on a street. Paragraph 7 of the Construction Waste Management Rules would be relevant if the breach concerned the sorting and storage of waste on the construction site. The pollution of streets and pavements described in the news item primarily leads to Article 366 of the CAO, not to sanctions relating to technical supervision of construction.
In practical terms, the municipality will need to distinguish three matters:
An AI summary that replaces the click-through to the source and uses parts of publishers’ texts beyond the 125-character threshold legally appears to be licensable use of content, rather than a search convenience feature.
Therefore, the essential issue of proof in APIG’s complaint would not be Google’s size, but whether AI summaries reduce publishers’ ability to operate in the market and appropriate the economic value of their content.
The dispute over AI summaries is not merely a question of traffic to websites: it is first and foremost becoming a test of the publisher’s exclusive right to control the use of parts of an electronic publication. The legal axis is whether a search summary remains within the limits of a hyperlink and 125 printed characters, or becomes reproduction and making available to the public under Article 57¹(1)–(2) of the Law on Copyright and Related Rights.
| Question | Limit or consequence |
|---|---|
| Very short extract | 125 printed characters, excluding the headline and spaces |
| Publication date | the right does not apply to publications first published before 6 June 2019 |
| Earlier sanction in the news item | EUR 250 million fine in 2024 |
Under the cited rules, a Google search summary must be assessed not by the name of the technology, but by the act performed in relation to an electronic press publication. If the summary takes over part of the publication and presents it to the user on the search page, the issue arises under Article 57¹(1)(1)–(2) concerning reproduction and making available to the public. If only a hyperlink or individual words of up to 125 printed characters are provided, the publisher’s exclusive right under Article 57¹(2)(2)–(3) does not cover such use. An AI summary that replaces the click-through to the source and uses parts of publishers’ texts beyond the 125-character threshold legally appears to be licensable use of content, rather than a search convenience feature.
In the field of competition law, the cited sources make it possible to distinguish dominance from abuse. A breach of Article 7 of the Law on Competition, as indicated in the source concerning Draft No. XIIP-3217, arises not from the dominant position itself, but from specific conduct while holding that position. The source concerning Draft No. XIVP-9 states that abuse requires a restrictive effect on competition, the restriction of other economic operators’ opportunities, or harm to consumer interests. Therefore, the essential issue of proof in APIG’s complaint would not be Google’s size, but whether AI summaries reduce publishers’ ability to operate in the market and appropriate the economic value of their content.
In case A858-1309/2010, the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania emphasized that the actions of regulators and competition authorities must not duplicate the examination of identical market problems. For the present situation, that case sets a procedural boundary: the competition authority must investigate the competitive effect, rather than re-determine solely the scope of copyright authorization. The separation of institutional competences is particularly relevant because the news item refers both to the 2022 commitments and to the EUR 250 million fine imposed in 2024. According to the competition regulation materials provided, procedural consequences may also arise for failure to provide information, provision of misleading information, or failure to comply with obligations, linked to Article 36(4) of the Law on Competition.
First scenario: the authority finds that the AI summaries fall within the exceptions in Article 57¹(2), if they are limited to hyperlinks, individual words, or very short extracts. Second scenario: the summaries are classified as reproduction and making available to the public of parts of publications, meaning that Google would have to obtain publishers’ authorization or adjust how the feature operates. Third scenario: the case turns toward competition law, where the assessment concerns whether the conduct restricts publishers’ ability to operate in the market and whether earlier commitments are not being fulfilled.
In practical terms, this matters not only for APIG members, but also for authors, because Article 57¹(6) links revenue received by publishers to the authors’ right to an appropriate share. For Google, this matters because of licensing, the architecture of content display, and the risk that earlier commitments will be assessed as unfulfilled. For users, the consequence would be visible in the structure of search results: more links to sources, shorter extracts, or more clearly licensed content. Procedurally, the next expected step is the competition authority’s decision on whether to accept the complaint and take investigative measures, primarily requests for information and data concerning the operation of AI summaries.