⚖️ Legal prism — 2026-07-21

Core issue. The precise legal issue is twofold: whether the employment of foreigners in Lithuania may be structured as a strictly time-limited stay with an obligation to leave upon expiry of the permit, and under what procedure the movement of foreigners across Lithuanian borders would be controlled, including temporarily reintroduced control at an internal border of the European Union. This must be assessed under Article 1(1), (2), (2¹) and (4), Article 5(1)–(3), Article 9(1)–(3), Article 57(1)–(3), Article 61, Article 121(1)–(3) and Article 125(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Legal Status of Foreigners. For the labour migration aspect, Article 57 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Legal Status of Foreigners is particularly significant, as it determines when a foreigner must obtain a work permit, who establishes the procedure for issuing it, and which institution issues, revokes and extends it. The border control aspect must be assessed under Article 5(1) and Article 9(1) of the same Law, as the entry and departure of foreigners are subject to the Schengen Borders Code, while entry across an internal border of the European Union, where control at that border is temporarily reintroduced, is controlled by the State Border Guard Service. In the visible part of the sources, the issue of national security checks is also directly linked to Article 3(4) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Restrictive Measures in View of Military Aggression Against Ukraine, which provides for an individual additional detailed screening of citizens of the Russian Federation travelling across the external border of the European Union in order to assess threats to national security, public order, internal security, public health or international relations

Legal assessment. Under Article 1(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Legal Status of Foreigners, this Law constitutes the principal legal framework governing the entry, departure, stay, residence, asylum, integration of foreigners and appeals against decisions; accordingly, the political proposal concerning “two years and six months’ departure” must be converted into a specific rule within this framework or into an implementing procedure. Article 1(2) of the Law emphasises alignment with European Union legislation, meaning that a domestic model cannot be assessed merely as a national labour market measure. Article 1(2¹) of the Law distinguishes the position of citizens of Member States of the European Union and of the European Free Trade Association, as they are subject to a more favourable regime based on free movement; therefore, the strictest work permit model is primarily to be associated with third-country nationals. This is also consistent with the description of earlier regulation provided in the sources: paragraph 27 of the Resolution approving the Economic Migration Regulation Strategy and its Implementation Measures Plan for 2007–2008 stated that a third-country foreigner had to obtain a temporary residence and work permit before arrival, that the work permit was linked to the needs of the Lithuanian labour market, was issued for up to two years, and that upon expiry of its validity the foreigner was required to leave Lithuania. In the current text of the Law provided, Article 57(1) directly identifies the obligation to obtain a work permit in cases of seasonal work and posted work, while Article 57(2) assigns the establishment of the procedure for issuing work permits to the Minister of Social Security and Labour, in coordination with the Minister of the Interior. Institutional competence is clear: under Article 57(3), a work permit is issued, revoked and extended by the Employment Service under the Ministry of Social Security and Labour of the Republic of Lithuania. Therefore, an employer wishing to rely on labour migration would operate legally not merely on the basis of the need for an employment contract, but within a permit system in which the foreigner’s right to work is the subject of an administrative decision. The foreigner, in turn, has an obligation to hold a work permit in cases where the Law does not exempt him or her from that obligation; and where, under the requirements of the Law, the foreigner must hold health insurance, Article 61 requires such insurance to be valid for the entire period of stay or residence in Lithuania and to cover the costs of emergency medical assistance and possible return for health reasons. If the basis for employment or residence were to expire, Article 125(1)(2), (4) and (5) provides grounds for a decision to return the person to a foreign state where a residence permit is revoked, where the person resides after expiry of a temporary residence permit, or where a person who entered lawfully resides without a mandatory permit. This means that the proposed mandatory departure after a fixed-term period of employment would legally have to be linked to the expiry of a residence permit or other basis for stay, rather than merely to a political declaration. As regards the border with Latvia, Article 9(1) of the Law allows the State Border Guard Service to control entry not only across the external border of the European Union but also across an internal border of the European Union where control at that border is temporarily reintroduced. Under Article 9(2), when admitting a foreigner, officers of the State Border Guard Service must determine compliance with the conditions of the Schengen Borders Code and verify whether there are any grounds for refusal of entry established in the Schengen Borders Code. Under Article 9(3), this control is not merely an internal action of the service, as the State Border Guard Service cooperates with Lithuanian institutions, foreign state institutions and international organisations. If a person submits an asylum application at a border crossing point, in a transit zone or shortly after an unlawful border crossing, Article 5(2) provides that the person’s presence in the specified temporary accommodation locations is not regarded as entry into the territory of the Republic of Lithuania until a decision to admit the person has been taken. Under Article 5(3), in such a case the Migration Department, within 48 hours of submission of the application, takes a decision to admit the asylum applicant into the Republic of Lithuania and to accommodate him or her in accordance with the procedure established by law, except in the cases referred to in Article 5(3¹). As regards Schengen visas, Article 121(1) refers to the Visa Code, Article 121(2) permits a foreigner who has obtained a seasonal work permit for up to 90 days to apply for a Schengen visa, and Article 121(3) provides for the collection of biometric data to confirm identity. For citizens of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus, an additional regime arises from Article 3(1)–(3) of the Law on Restrictive Measures in View of Military Aggression Against Ukraine, which suspends the acceptance, through the specified channels, of relevant applications for Schengen visas, national visas and temporary residence permits for citizens of the Russian Federation, subject to the exceptions provided in that Article itself

Consequences. The first realistic scenario is the tightening of labour migration rules through the permit system: in that case, the practical burden would fall on employers, the Employment Service and foreigners, because the work permit under Article 57 would become the main filtering point. The second scenario is an increase in return decisions in cases where a person remains in Lithuania after expiry of a visa, travel authorisation or temporary residence permit, as such grounds are expressly identified in Article 125(1). The third scenario is the temporary reintroduction of control at the internal border with Latvia, the practical significance of which would be checks by the State Border Guard Service under Article 9(1)–(3) and an assessment of foreigners’ compliance with the conditions of the Schengen Borders Code. The fourth scenario is not a general enhanced screening of all migrants, but enhanced screening defined only on specific statutory grounds, in particular under Article 3 of the Law on Restrictive Measures in View of Military Aggression Against Ukraine in relation to citizens of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus. From a practical perspective, the most important point is that a political direction does not in itself change a foreigner’s status: rights and obligations are determined by the legal bases of the work permit, visa, residence permit, asylum application and return decision. Therefore, for businesses the most significant issues will be the regime governing the duration, extension and revocation of permits; for border authorities, a clear basis for temporary internal border control; and for foreigners, whether their stay in Lithuania has a valid legal basis provided by law

Core issue. The legal issue is not whether it is politically justified to use the Kaunas mayor’s reserve funds, but whether the allocation of EUR 108.5 thousand for eliminating the consequences of a fire and the corresponding increase in the appropriations plan comply with the rules governing competence in municipal budget execution. It must be assessed under Article 15 of the Law Amending the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Budget Structure No. I-430 and Article 25 of the Law on the Budget Structure, as set out in Article 2 of the Law Amending Articles 11, 25, 26, 27, 31 and 34 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Budget Structure No. I-430, which regulate the mayor’s reserve. Also applicable are Article 13 of the Law Amending the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Budget Structure No. I-430 concerning the purpose of municipal budget appropriations, and Article 25(2) of that law concerning the allocation of municipal budget revenue exceeding the approved plan. Article 25(1) of the Law on the Budget Structure provides that the mayor’s reserve must be not less than 0.25 per cent and not more than 1 per cent of approved municipal budget revenue, excluding state grants to municipal budgets, and that the specific amount is set annually by the municipal council when approving the budget. The same paragraph clearly separates competences: the council determines the amount of the mayor’s reserve, while the mayor allocates the funds of the mayor’s reserve. The substantive basis for use is Article 25(2)(2) of the Law on the Budget Structure, which permits mayor’s reserve funds to be used to eliminate the consequences of fires and to partially cover losses caused by them

Legal assessment. According to the information provided, the funds were allocated specifically for eliminating the consequences of a fire; therefore, under the cited Article 25(2)(2) of the Law on the Budget Structure, the purpose of the expenditure falls within the list of permitted uses of the mayor’s reserve. This means that, from a legal standpoint, the essential condition is not the declaration of an emergency situation, but the link with eliminating the consequences of the fire or partially covering losses arising from it. An emergency situation would be relevant under Article 25(1) only if the mayor’s reserve exceeded 1 per cent of approved municipal budget revenue, excluding state grants. The information states that EUR 1 million 118.2 thousand remains in the mayor’s reserve; however, on the basis of the sources provided, the issue assessed is not the political proportion of the reserve balance, but whether the purpose of the allocation is permitted by law. Since Article 25(1) of the Law on the Budget Structure provides that the mayor allocates the funds, council approval of an increase in the appropriations plan does not alter the mayor’s competence to allocate the reserve itself. On the other hand, where the issue concerns increasing the appropriations plan of the programme “A City Managed Sustainably in Accordance with the Principles of Sustainability and the Green Deal” using city budget funds, the relevant competence is that of the council to amend the distribution of the municipal budget. Article 25(2) of the Law Amending the Law on the Budget Structure No. I-430 provides that municipal budget revenue received in excess of the approved plan is allocated by decision of the municipal council. Therefore, if an increase in the annual plan of budget revenue and appropriations is based on municipal budget revenue exceeding the approved plan, the decision on its allocation must be adopted not by the mayor acting alone, but by the municipal council. This is consistent with the procedure described in the information, which states that the project was approved by the Kaunas City Municipal Council. The purpose of municipal budget appropriations is defined in Article 13 of the Law Amending the Law on the Budget Structure No. I-430: they are used to perform independent municipal functions and functions delegated by the state, as well as to implement the Law on Local Self-Government and other laws through the programmes of municipal budget appropriation managers. Accordingly, the increase in programme appropriations should lawfully be assessed by reference to its connection with the performance of municipal functions, and not solely by reference to the programme title or public communications. Paragraph 80 of the amendment to Government Resolution No. 543 of 14 May 2001 further provides that municipal councils establish the procedure for amending municipal budget appropriations and covering arrears, in accordance with the Law on the Budget Structure. This means that the specific internal budget adjustment procedure of Kaunas City Municipality must be based on the procedure established by the council, and the sources provided identify no other institution that could replace the council in allocating municipal revenue exceeding the approved plan. The rules governing the Government reserve, laid down in Article 15 of the Law on the Budget Structure and paragraph 7 of the Rules on the Allocation and Use of Government Reserve Funds, do not apply directly to this situation, because they regulate the Government reserve of the state budget and funds allocated by Government resolution. No case law is included among the sources provided; therefore, this analysis is not based on the resolution of a dispute in a specific case

Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is smooth budget execution: part of the mayor’s reserve is used for the consequences of the fire under Article 25(2)(2) of the Law on the Budget Structure, and the programme appropriations plan is adjusted accordingly by council decision. The second scenario would be a procedural dispute as to whether the procedure established by the municipal council for the use of the mayor’s reserve and amendments to appropriations was followed, since the law permits the funds to be used only in accordance with the procedure established by the municipal council. The third scenario could arise in relation to the limits of competence: the mayor allocates reserve funds, but municipal budget revenue exceeding the approved plan is allocated by the council under Article 25(2) of the Law on the Budget Structure. The fourth scenario will depend on the next council meeting scheduled for 15 September because, based on the date of 21 July 2026, this is the next indicated point in the council’s work after the summer break at which new budget adjustments may be considered. This is important for the municipal administration and appropriation managers because, under Article 13 of the Law on the Budget Structure, appropriations must be linked to programmes and the performance of municipal functions. It is also important for persons affected by the fire or entities eliminating its consequences, because the institution of the mayor’s reserve provides not for compensation of all losses, but for their partial coverage. For the council, this matters because it controls decisions on the budget plan and allocation of revenue exceeding the approved plan; for the mayor, it matters because his discretion in respect of the reserve is limited by the purposes listed in the law and by the procedure established by the council

Core issue. The legal issue is whether a blow struck in a public place during a protest, if proven, satisfies the elements of the offence of disturbing public order under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. This provision requires not merely a violent or insolent act, but also that the act demonstrate disrespect for those present or for the surroundings and disturb public peace or order. Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code is also relevant in the alternative, since violence against a person may be assessed as causing physical pain or minor bodily injury; however, according to the report, the charge is specifically linked to Article 284 of the Criminal Code. The issue of punishment must be determined under the sanction in Article 284(1), which permits the imposition of imprisonment for up to two years. Since the prosecutor relies on an unserved prior custodial sentence, the aggregation of sentences under Article 64(1)–(4) of the Criminal Code is also relevant where a new criminal act is committed before the imposed sentence has been served. Procedurally, the rights of the accused under Article 16(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania are material: to have defence counsel, submit evidence, participate in the examination of evidence, ask questions, give explanations, make a final statement, and appeal the judgment

Legal assessment. Under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code, it would not be sufficient for the court merely to establish physical contact as a formal matter: it must establish a public place, insolent acts, a demonstration of disrespect for those present or for the surroundings, and an actual disturbance of public peace or order. A protest outside the Seimas, according to the circumstances stated in the report, is a public context, and therefore a blow to another person in such a setting may be assessed as an insolent act. The source concerning draft law No. XIVP-1868 supplementing the Criminal Code with Article 171-1 emphasises that criminal liability under Article 284 of the Criminal Code is linked to dangerous consequences, namely a disturbance of public peace or order. Accordingly, the success of the prosecution will depend on whether the case materials confirm not only a conflict with V. Bartkevičius, but also a disturbance of public order in a broader sense. The defence argument concerning provocation may be legally relevant in assessing the content of intent, the nature of the insolence, and the sequence of events, but, on the basis of the provisions provided, it does not in itself preclude the possible application of Article 284 of the Criminal Code. The accused’s assertion that his hand merely caught the hood is directed at rebutting the factual basis of the act, because without proof of a blow or another insolent act there would be no basis for applying Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code under the factual version advanced by the prosecutor. The defence request to examine V. Mickevičius is consistent with the accused’s right, enshrined in Article 16(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to submit evidence and participate in its examination. Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure also permits the accused, defence counsel, the victim, and other persons to submit objects and documents relevant to the examination of the criminal act. The prosecutor’s request to add a further seven months to the already imposed sentence of three years and six months’ imprisonment is legally connected to Article 64(1) and (3) of the Criminal Code, if it were established that the new act was committed before the earlier sentence had been served. Under Article 64(3) of the Criminal Code, where sentences are partially aggregated, the unserved part of the sentence is added to the sentence imposed by the new judgment, or part of the new sentence is added to the larger unserved part. Article 64(4) of the Criminal Code sets an upper limit: the aggregated custodial sentence may not exceed 25 years. Release from criminal liability upon reconciliation under Article 38(1) of the Criminal Code would require an admission of guilt, compensation for damage or an agreement concerning compensation, reconciliation, and grounds to believe that the person will not commit new acts; the reported position of denying guilt is incompatible with such a framework

Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that, on 21 September 2026, the court finds the accused guilty under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code and imposes a sentence for disturbing public order. In that event, the court will have to decide on the aggregation of sentences under Article 64 of the Criminal Code, since the prosecutor relies on an earlier final and unserved custodial sentence. The second scenario is that the court finds that the facts of the incident do not prove the elements of Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code and enters an acquittal; under Article 16(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, such an accused would become an acquitted person. The third scenario is that the court identifies a violent episode but considers the elements of disturbance of public order insufficient; in that case, the application of Article 284 of the Criminal Code would be problematic, because the core of this provision is the disturbance of public peace or order. The practical significance for the accused is direct: a conviction may increase the total term of imprisonment, while an acquittal would remove the criminal consequences of this particular case. For the victim, the key issue is whether the court will find that the act committed against him was not a private conflict, but a criminal act disturbing public order. For the State and the prosecution service, this case is significant as a test of the application of Article 284 of the Criminal Code in the context of a public protest, particularly where the dispute concerns the fact of the blow, provocation, and the disturbance of public peace. The judgment will not merely constitute a factual assessment of the incident: under Article 16(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused will have the right to appeal it

Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether, once the court finds proven a blow delivered in a public place, a new custodial sentence may be imposed and how it would be combined with an already imposed but unserved sentence. According to the sources provided, the materially relevant provision is Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, which establishes liability for a person who, by beating or otherwise using violence, causes physical pain to another person or causes a minor bodily injury or a short-term illness. The issue of combining sentences is primarily to be resolved under Article 64(1)-(4) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, because the report indicates that the prosecutor refers to adding a new sentence to an already imposed and unserved custodial sentence. If several criminal acts were to be assessed within a single sentencing context, Article 63 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania would also be relevant; under that provision, the court imposes a sentence for each act separately and then imposes a final aggregate sentence. Article 65 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania is relevant to the recalculation of sentences, as it determines how different sentences are added or converted, while Article 73 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania applies separately to penal measures

Legal assessment. If the court were to find that the accused, by beating or otherwise using violence, caused V. Bartkevičius physical pain, the sanction under Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code would allow the imposition of community service, restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. The regulation provided states that the causing of physical pain may be established on the basis of case-file evidence confirming the fact of beating or other violence, while minor impairment of health is associated with health impairment lasting no more than 10 days or a 5 percent loss of working capacity. Accordingly, the prosecutor’s proposed sentence of 7 months’ imprisonment, assessed solely by reference to the sanction limits under Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code, falls within the permissible range of imprisonment of up to one year. The defence arguments concerning provocation and the accused’s request for acquittal would procedurally amount to a dispute regarding the fact of violence, guilt, and sufficiency of the evidence; however, according to the sources provided, the relevant point is that Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows the accused, defence counsel, the victim, and other persons to submit objects and documents relevant to the case. The witness examination and the evidence requested by the accused are, in this context, procedural means by which the court assesses whether there is a basis to find the act proven. If a sentence were imposed by a new judgment while the earlier custodial sentence remained unserved, Article 64(1) of the Criminal Code requires the court to aggregate the sentences. Under Article 64(2) of the Criminal Code, in the case of full addition, the entirety of the unserved part of the sentence is added to the sentence imposed by the new judgment. Under Article 64(3) of the Criminal Code, in the case of partial addition, the unserved part of the sentence is added to the sentence imposed by the new judgment or, if the unserved part is greater, part of the sentence imposed by the new judgment is added to it. The prosecutor’s request to “add” 7 months therefore corresponds legally to the logic of partial or full addition of sentences, but the final method of addition and the reasons for it are determined by the court. Article 64(4) of the Criminal Code limits an aggregate custodial sentence to 25 years; therefore, in this situation, the sum of the stated 3 years and 6 months and the proposed 7 months would not, on the figures provided, reach that limit. If different types of sentences were imposed, Article 65(2) of the Criminal Code provides that, when aggregating sentences under Articles 63 and 64 of the Criminal Code, the more lenient sentence is converted into the more severe one, while a fine is not converted and is imposed together with the other sentence. Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is also important for the practical course of the proceedings, because remand measures may be imposed to ensure the participation of the accused or convicted person in the proceedings, the examination of the case in court, and the execution of the judgment. Under Article 120(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, such measures include detention, intensive supervision, house arrest, bail, seizure of documents, an obligation to register with a police authority, and a written undertaking not to leave. Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure explain that procedural time limits define the commencement, performance, or completion of procedural acts and are calculated in hours, days, and months, while the date announced by the court for the decision, 21 September 2026, represents a specific procedural step following closing speeches

Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the court finds guilt and imposes imprisonment, which would be aggregated with the already imposed unserved sentence under Article 64 of the Criminal Code. In that event, the practically most important issue would be not only the length of the new sentence, but the duration and execution of the final aggregate sentence. The second scenario is that the court finds guilt but selects another type of sentence provided for in Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code; in that case, the rules in Article 65 of the Criminal Code would determine how it is combined with the more severe sentence. The third scenario is that the court delivers an acquittal if the factual premise of violence on which the charge is based is not confirmed. For the victim, the practical significance relates to recognition of the fact of violence and the possible direction of compensation for damage, while Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that, in cases established by law, damage may be compensated from state funds if the accused or materially liable persons lack funds. For the accused, the key point is that an additional 7-month sentence, if imposed and joined, would increase the actual term of imprisonment. The court’s essential duty is not to endorse the prosecutor’s proposal mechanically, but to clearly determine the sentence, the method of addition, and the length of the final sentence under Articles 63, 64, and 65 of the Criminal Code

Core issue. The precise legal issue is twofold: first, whether the allegation of a blow to the face may fall within Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, under which physical pain or minor bodily injury caused by beating or other violent conduct is punishable by community service, restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. Second, if guilt were established and a custodial sentence imposed, the court would have to determine its relationship with the already final sentence of three years and six months’ imprisonment under Article 42(3)–(5), Article 63(1)–(4), and, if its conditions are met, Article 64(1)–(4) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 42(3) of the Criminal Code provides that only one penalty is imposed for a single criminal offence, but Article 42(4) permits two penalties to be imposed in the cases provided for in Articles 63 and 64. Accordingly, the prosecutor’s request to “add” seven months legally concerns not an independent administrative extension, but the determination of the final aggregate sentence. The issue of remand measures is governed by Article 119 and Article 120(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania: their purpose is to secure participation in the proceedings, the unobstructed examination of the case, and enforcement of the judgment, and the available measures include detention and a written undertaking not to leave

Legal assessment. For the application of Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code, what is material is not merely the context of a conflict or protest, but the fact of violent conduct and its consequence: physical pain, minor bodily injury, or short-term impairment of health. The sources provided indicate that Article 140 of the Criminal Code covers intentional beating or other violent conduct, while minor impairment of health is associated with a health impairment lasting no more than 10 days or a 5 percent loss of working capacity. If the court were to find that the blow to the face caused at least physical pain, the sentencing range under Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code would permit imprisonment for up to one year, meaning that a request for seven months falls within the apparent statutory range. The accused’s denial of guilt does not in itself remove the court’s duty to assess whether the elements specified in Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code are present. If a sentence were imposed in the new case and had to be combined with the earlier sentence for financial offences, Article 63(1) of the Criminal Code requires the court first to impose a sentence for each offence separately, and only then to impose the final aggregate sentence. Under Article 63(1)–(4) of the Criminal Code, the court may absorb the sentences, add them in full, or add them in part; where it adds them in part, it must state the reasons for each part of the sentence being added. Absorption under Article 63(2) of the Criminal Code would mean that the more severe sentence absorbs the more lenient one, so that the final sentence remains equal to the most severe sentence imposed. The prosecutor’s request to add seven months corresponds not to the logic of absorption, but to partial or full addition under Article 63(3)–(4) of the Criminal Code or Article 64(2)–(3). Article 64(1) of the Criminal Code applies where a convicted person commits a new criminal offence before serving the imposed sentence; in that event, after imposing a sentence for the new offence, the court aggregates the sentences. Under Article 64(3) of the Criminal Code, in the case of partial addition, the unserved part of the sentence is added to the sentence imposed by the new judgment, or, if the unserved part is greater, part of the sentence imposed by the new judgment is added to it. Article 64(4) of the Criminal Code establishes an upper limit: such an aggregate custodial sentence may not exceed twenty-five years. As regards remand measures, Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows them to be applied not as punishment for a breach, but as procedural measures for specific purposes: participation in the proceedings, unobstructed examination of the case, enforcement of the judgment, or prevention of new offences. Article 120(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure reflects the gradation of measures, since alongside detention it also lists more lenient measures, including a written undertaking not to leave. Accordingly, a breach of an undertaking not to leave must still be legally linked to the purposes set out in Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: whether the person no longer participates in the proceedings, obstructs the examination of the case, poses a risk to enforcement of the judgment, or presents a risk of new offences. If the accused participates in hearings remotely and does not disrupt the examination of the case, the court may consider that the most severe measure is not proportionate to the purpose of remand measures. On the other hand, failure to enforce a final custodial sentence is directly connected with the purpose of enforcement of the judgment specified in Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the prosecutor therefore has a procedural basis to raise the issue of a stricter measure

Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the court does not find the elements of Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code established and no additional sentence is imposed in this case. The second scenario is that the court finds guilt, imposes a separate sentence for the violent offence, and, under the apparent rules of Articles 63 or 64 of the Criminal Code, decides whether to absorb it or add it in full or in part to the custodial sentence already imposed. The third scenario is that the court agrees with the prosecutor’s requested direction of adding seven months, but the final sentence must still be reasoned as an aggregate sentence, rather than as a mechanical increase of the earlier term. As regards the remand measure, the practical dividing line is this: being abroad and breaching an undertaking not to leave strengthen the issue of enforcement of the judgment, but Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure still requires an assessment of the specific purpose of the measure in the case. This is practically important for the prosecution, because its requests must be based not only on the prior conviction, but also on the rules governing aggregation of sentences and the purpose of remand measures. This is important for the accused, because his remote participation may reduce the need for detention from the perspective of securing the conduct of the proceedings, but it does not eliminate the issue of enforcement of the final judgment. This is important for the victim, because classification under Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code determines whether the blow will be treated as a criminal offence and within what sentencing range the court will determine liability

Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether both individuals who drove an all-terrain quadricycle and a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 1.51 per mille are liable under Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, rather than under Article 427 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code applies to a person who drove a motor vehicle, tractor, or self-propelled machine while intoxicated, where a blood alcohol concentration of 1.51 per mille or more was established, and provides for a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. Article 2811(2) of the Criminal Code further provides that liability also arises where such an act is committed through negligence. Article 427(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences covers repeated driving of vehicles where the driver’s intoxication is between 0.41 and 1.5 per mille; therefore, based on the alcohol measurement data provided, it is not the principal provision for classifying these two driving episodes. The Rules for Establishing Intoxication or Impairment of Persons Driving Vehicles and Other Persons are relevant to the intoxication testing procedure; paragraph 2.3 defines intoxication testing as actions by police officers, officers of the State Border Guard Service, and other officials carried out using metrologically verified special technical devices, based on the concentration of ethyl alcohol in exhaled air

Legal assessment. The readings established for the first driver, 2.35 and 1.83 per mille, both exceed the 1.51 per mille threshold set out in Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code; accordingly, the legally decisive factor is not the colloquial label of “moderate intoxication” but the numerical threshold expressly prescribed by criminal law. The readings established for the second driver, 2.35 and 2.24 per mille, likewise satisfy the element set out in Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code. In this situation, the all-terrain quadricycle should be treated as a vehicle, and Article 422(2) of the Code of Administrative Offences separately refers to motorcycles, light quadricycles, quadricycles, and heavy quadricycles; therefore, within the normative framework presented, such a vehicle does not fall outside the regulation of driving while intoxicated. In the case of the Nissan Murano, the vehicle element is even clearer, as the facts state that it was driven on a road and bore Lithuanian registration plates. Article 422 of the Code of Administrative Offences is primarily relevant to borderline administrative situations: paragraph 2 provides for liability for driving certain vehicles, including motorcycles and quadricycles, with a blood alcohol concentration of more than 0 but not more than 0.4 per mille. The readings specified here exceed the threshold in Article 422(2) many times over; therefore, administrative liability for the act of driving while intoxicated under that paragraph does not compete with Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code. Article 427(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences would be relevant to repeated driving where intoxication is not less than 0.41 but not more than 1.5 per mille, and where there is a prior administrative penalty or an unspent conviction for driving while intoxicated; however, by reference to the per mille readings, these episodes fall within the scope of criminal liability. Article 427(2) of the Code of Administrative Offences provides for mandatory deprivation of the right to drive vehicles for a period of three to five years for the administrative offence specified in paragraph 1 of that article, but that sanction applies specifically to situations falling under Article 427. Article 11(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences confirms the general rule of administrative liability that intoxication in itself does not exempt a person from administrative liability, while paragraph 3 establishes the general intoxication threshold of 0.41 per mille, unless a specific article provides otherwise. Procedurally, it is important that, under paragraph 2.3 of the Rules, both police officers and officers of the State Border Guard Service may conduct intoxication testing using special technical devices; therefore, in the second episode, the test conducted by officers of the State Border Guard Service falls, according to the source provided, within the definition of their competence. In the first episode, officers of the State Border Guard Service identified signs of intoxication and notified the police, while police officers conducted the test; such allocation of institutional actions is consistent with the list of entities specified in paragraph 2.3 of the Rules. Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows any natural or legal person to submit objects and documents relevant to the investigation and examination of a criminal offence; accordingly, video surveillance system data, vehicles, or other objects connected with the driving may be procedurally significant. Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure establish the purpose and calculation of procedural time limits: time limits are calculated in hours, days, and months, and a time limit calculated in days expires at midnight on the final day or at the end of the working hours of the institution where the procedural act is to be performed before an official or in court. If, in the pre-trial investigation, issues arose concerning the suspect’s participation in the proceedings or the prevention of new offences, Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines the purpose of remand measures, while Article 120(1) lists such measures as seizure of documents, an obligation to periodically register at a police station, and a written undertaking not to leave

Consequences. The most realistic further course, based on the sources provided, is a pre-trial investigation into each driver’s conduct under Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code, because in each case the alcohol concentration exceeded 1.51 per mille. If guilt were established, the sentencing range is clear: a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year under Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code. From a practical perspective, the most important evidence would be the fact of driving itself, the nature of the vehicle, and the results of the intoxication test, as those elements form the core basis for applying Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code. For the first driver, the footage recorded by the video surveillance system and the circumstances of the stop are additionally important in practical terms, as they may substantiate that the quadricycle was actually being driven. For the second driver, it is significant that officers of the State Border Guard Service had a breathalyser and conducted the test, since paragraph 2.3 of the Rules expressly includes the State Border Guard Service among the entities authorised to conduct intoxication testing. The scenario in which Article 427 of the Code of Administrative Offences would apply would be relevant only within a different per mille range, namely from 0.41 to 1.5 per mille, and subject to the conditions of repetition or prior conviction; therefore, in this case it primarily explains the boundary between administrative and criminal liability. The practical consequences for the drivers will depend on the outcome of the criminal proceedings and the sanction imposed, while for the institutions they will depend on the duty properly to document the testing, the submission of objects and documents, and compliance with procedural time limits under Articles 98–100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

Core issue. The precise legal question is not whether “Kimi K3” is technologically advanced, but what obligations arise for Lithuanian institutions and economic operators when an AI model is downloaded, modified, and deployed in their own infrastructure. This question must be assessed under Article 1(1)–(3) of the Law on Technology and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania, because that law creates conditions for the development and deployment of innovations, establishes the structure of the technology and innovation system, and is aligned with Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 referred to in its annex. The annex to the Law on Technology and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania, supplemented by Article 8, is also relevant, as it expressly refers to Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, i.e. the Artificial Intelligence Act. The issue of institutional competence must be assessed under Article 14(2)(1)–(7) of the Law on Technology and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as under Article 5(2)–(4) of the law amending that law. Cybersecurity and data protection aspects must be assessed under Article 1(1) and (3), Article 9 of the Law on Cybersecurity of the Republic of Lithuania, and Article 1(1)–(3) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Personal Data Processed for the Purposes of Prevention, Investigation, Detection or Prosecution of Criminal Offences, Execution of Criminal Penalties, or National Security or Defence. Since today is 21 July 2026, it is also important that the entry into force date of Article 5(4) specified in Article 9(2) of the law amending the Law on Technology and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania, namely 2 August 2025, has already passed

Legal assessment. If a Lithuanian organisation were to deploy such an open-weights AI model, the deployment itself would fall within the field of technology and innovation policy, because Article 1(1) of the Law on Technology and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania refers to the creation of favourable conditions for the development and deployment of innovations. However, that law does not confer a general freedom to deploy any AI system without procedural oversight, since Article 1(3) establishes its alignment with Regulation (EU) 2024/1689. Under Article 14(2)(1), (2), (4), (6) and (7), the institution implementing State technology and innovation policy has functions including implementing programmes, financing applied research, experimental development and innovation activities, coordinating participation in EU and international programmes, and providing information and advisory services. Therefore, for the public sector or economic operators wishing to apply such a model as an innovation project, the practical issue is not merely the technical possibility of downloading it, but also the project’s compliance with funding and assessment procedures. Under Article 5(2) of the amending law, which amended Article 14(2)(8), the institution organises the assessment of experimental development projects of entities seeking State funding in accordance with a methodology approved by the Minister of the Economy and Innovation. Under Article 5(3) of the same law, which supplemented Article 14(2) with point 12¹, it assesses whether the activities of economic operators seeking State support have significant and innovation-based business development potential, and adopts a decision on that matter. Accordingly, the legal route to obtaining State support would depend not on the origin of the model or its public appeal, but on the assessment of the specific project under the prescribed procedure. Under Article 5(4), which supplemented Article 14(2) with point 12², the same institution performs, pursuant to Articles 28(1) and 70(1) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, the functions of the national competent authority, namely the notifying authority. This function is performed in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, the procedures for the assessment, designation, notification and monitoring of conformity assessment bodies established by the Minister of the Economy and Innovation, and other legal acts regulating conformity assessment. Article 9(5) of the amending law provided that the Minister of the Economy and Innovation was to adopt the implementing legislation for Article 5(4) by 1 August 2025, while Article 9(2) provided that this part would enter into force on 2 August 2025. From a cybersecurity perspective, it is important that Article 1(1) of the Law on Cybersecurity of the Republic of Lithuania covers cybersecurity policy institutions, their powers, the duties of cybersecurity entities, information exchange, inspections and enforcement measures. Article 1(3) of the same law provides that certain requirements do not apply to cybersecurity entities where EU legal acts applicable to them impose requirements of equivalent effect concerning risk management, reporting of significant cyber incidents, or the appointment of responsible persons. If deployment of the AI model were linked to personal data, Article 9 of the Law on Cybersecurity of the Republic of Lithuania would be relevant because the State Data Protection Inspectorate implements cybersecurity policy in the field of personal data protection and performs the tasks of the supervisory authority laid down in Regulation (EU) 2016/679. If the model were used by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, criminal prosecution, execution of criminal penalties, public security, national security or defence, the special personal data processing regime under Article 1(1)–(3) of the above-mentioned personal data law would be relevant. Article 4 of the law amending the annex to the Law on Information Society Services also shows that Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 has been included in the list of EU legal acts implemented by that law, meaning that the AI issue is not confined solely to the area of technology funding

Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that Lithuanian economic operators or public-sector organisations use such a model as the basis for experimental development or innovation activity and seek State support; in that case, the assessment procedure referred to in Article 14(2)(8) and 12¹ of the Law on Technology and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania becomes essential. The second scenario is that the project falls within the field of AI conformity assessment, making relevant the function of the national competent authority, namely the notifying authority, under Article 14(2)(12²) and Articles 28(1) and 70(1) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689. The third scenario is that the model is deployed in sensitive information systems, in which case cybersecurity entities are concerned with the duties, inspections and enforcement matters defined in Article 1 of the Law on Cybersecurity of the Republic of Lithuania. The fourth scenario is that the model processes personal data, in which case the competence of the State Data Protection Inspectorate under Article 9 of the Law on Cybersecurity and the special regime applicable where data are processed by competent authorities under Article 1 of the personal data law acquire practical significance. Government Resolution No. 395 of 27 May 2026 shows that issues concerning implementation of the AI Act have been submitted to the Seimas together with amendments to the Law on Technology and Innovation, the Law on Information Society Services and the Law on the Bank of Lithuania. In practical terms, this matters for companies, public-sector bodies, innovators seeking funding, conformity assessment bodies and supervisory authorities, because the mere availability of an AI model does not in itself remove procedural, competence-related and compliance obligations. The legal conclusion is as follows: downloading and adapting a “Kimi K3”-type model in Lithuania may be an act encouraged by innovation policy, but since 2 August 2025 it must be assessed within Lithuania’s already operative institutional framework for implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1689

Core issue. The precise legal issue is not the general problem of the “expensiveness” of dental prices, but rather when a patient is entitled to dental care paid for from the budget of the Compulsory Health Insurance Fund and what information concerning the scope, conditions, and prices of reimbursed services the patient may require before commencing treatment. This is determined under Articles 9(1)–(2), 26(1)–(2), 38(1), (2), (5), (6), and (7), and 41 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Health Insurance, as well as Articles 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Dental Practice and Oral Care Practice. Article 9(1) of the Law on Health Insurance provides that insured persons are reimbursed, from CHIF funds, for healthcare, including dental prosthetics referred to in paragraph 4, while Article 9(2) covers personal healthcare services upon the occurrence of an insured event. Article 26(1) of the Law on Health Insurance links reimbursement to an agreement between the National Health Insurance Fund and a personal healthcare institution; therefore, the patient’s financial position depends not only on the clinic’s price list, but also on whether the service falls within the contractual CHIF payment regime. Article 19(3) of the Law on Dental Practice and Oral Care Practice directly establishes every person’s right to information on the scope and prices of dental care services and related services reimbursed under compulsory health insurance

Legal assessment. As an insured person, the patient may, under Article 38(1) of the Law on Health Insurance, choose a personal healthcare institution with which the National Health Insurance Fund has concluded an agreement. Under Article 38(2) of the same law, the patient is entitled to receive healthcare paid for from CHIF funds only in accordance with the procedure and on the grounds established by law; therefore, the mere medical necessity of a dental service does not in itself mean that the entire invoice will be reimbursed. Article 38(5) of the Law on Health Insurance grants the right to obtain, from a contracted institution, information on the scope, conditions, and location of the services provided, while Article 38(6) grants the right to review the agreements referred to in Article 26. This means that, before registration or the commencement of treatment, a patient’s questions as to which dental services are paid for from CHIF funds are not merely a practical request, but the exercise of a right established by law. Article 14(1) of the Law on Dental Practice and Oral Care Practice links dental care services to the prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of diseases of the oral cavity organs and to dental prosthetics; therefore, any explanation of prices must be connected to the specific type of service. Under Article 14(2) of that law, the list of primary, secondary, and tertiary dental care services is drawn up by the Ministry of Health, which is relevant when assessing the level of service requested and which institution may provide it. In the case of free dental care services, Article 16(1) of the Law on Dental Practice and Oral Care Practice links their provision to the list of services approved by the Government and to specific conditions for seeking care. At the primary level, the patient must apply to a dentist working at a primary-level institution of the Lithuanian National Health System operating in the patient’s place of residence; at the secondary or tertiary level, Article 16(1)(2) requires a referral from a primary-level dentist. Under Article 16(2), these requirements do not apply to patients seeking emergency dental care. Article 17 of the Law on Dental Practice and Oral Care Practice specifies the territorial features of the provision of free services: primary services are linked to residents of the municipality, secondary services to permanent residents of the relevant county, and tertiary services are provided irrespective of place of residence. The obligation of the head of an institution to inform residents about the types and scope of free dental care services supported by the state and municipalities arises from Article 18 of the Law on Dental Practice and Oral Care Practice. In the case of supplementary health insurance, Article 20(1)–(2) of that law likewise relies on an agreement with a health insurance organisation and grants the person the right to information on the scope and prices of reimbursed services. From an institutional perspective, Article 12(4)–(5) of the Law on the Health System allocates organisational functions: municipal mayors organise primary personal healthcare, they also organise secondary personal healthcare as a delegated state function, while tertiary personal healthcare is organised by the Ministry of Health. Article 11(5) of the Law on Healthcare Institutions provides that the need for services of Lithuanian National Health System institutions is determined by the Minister of Health in coordination with the National Health Insurance Fund. Under point 1.3 of the list approved by the Minister, full-scope primary dental care services reimbursed from CHIF budget funds must be provided for no less than 38 hours per week. A dispute concerning personal healthcare services reimbursed from CHIF funds is examined, under Article 41 of the Law on Health Insurance, in accordance with the procedure established by the Law on Patients’ Rights and Compensation for Damage to Health, and under Article 38(7) the insured person may also apply to the National Health Insurance Fund or to a court regarding breaches of legal acts regulating compulsory health insurance

Consequences. In practical terms, the most important first scenario for the patient is to choose in advance an institution that has an agreement with the National Health Insurance Fund and to request information under Article 38(5)–(6) of the Law on Health Insurance and Article 19(3) of the Law on Dental Practice and Oral Care Practice. The second scenario is where the service falls within the scope of free or CHIF-reimbursed services, but the conditions for access, referral, or territorial eligibility established in Articles 16 and 17 apply; in that case, the patient must comply with them, except in cases of emergency dental care. The third scenario is where the selected service does not fall within the scope of reimbursement under CHIF or supplementary insurance pursuant to the relevant agreement; in that case, the patient’s expense remains an issue of a paid service rather than reimbursement. The fourth scenario is where the institution fails to provide information on the scope, conditions, or prices of reimbursed services; in that case, the dispute may be brought under the procedure established by the Law on Patients’ Rights and Compensation for Damage to Health, as well as by applying to the National Health Insurance Fund or to a court under Articles 38(7) and 41 of the Law on Health Insurance. This is practically important for insured patients, Lithuanian National Health System institutions, private institutions that have agreements with health insurance funds, the National Health Insurance Fund, territorial health insurance funds, and municipalities, because it is precisely the agreements, service levels, and information obligations that determine whether a dentist’s invoice becomes a personal expense for the patient or a CHIF-paid service

Core issue. The precise legal issue is what civil liability consequences arise from the collapse of the fountain, which caused the death of a thirteen-year-old and injured other persons. It is to be assessed under Article 6.245 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, which defines the concept and types of civil liability, as well as under Article 6.283 of the Civil Code concerning compensation for damage in cases of injury to health and Article 6.284 of the Civil Code concerning damage resulting from deprivation of life. It is legally important to distinguish the claims of the deceased teenager’s close relatives from the claims of the injured persons, because Article 6.284 of the Civil Code governs the consequences of deprivation of life, whereas Article 6.283 of the Civil Code governs the consequences of injury to health. Article 6.245(4) of the Civil Code permits such a claim to be classified as delictual civil liability where the damage is not related to contractual relations. The central axis of the case law in the sources provided is the ruling of the Supreme Court of Lithuania of 8 November 2013 in civil case No. 3K-3-553/2013, which emphasised that injury to health or deprivation of life creates an obligation on the person who caused the damage to compensate it

Legal assessment. Under Article 6.245(1) of the Civil Code, civil liability is a pecuniary obligation whereby one party has the right to claim compensation for damage and the other party is obliged to compensate it. In the case of the fountain collapse, the injured persons could, on the basis of Article 6.283(1) of the Civil Code, claim compensation for all losses incurred and for non-pecuniary damage from the person responsible for the damage. Under Article 6.283(2) of the Civil Code, such losses include lost income and expenses related to restoration of health, including treatment, medication, care and other necessary expenses. If the injured person’s health were to deteriorate after a decision on compensation for damage had already been made, Article 6.283(3) of the Civil Code would confer the right to bring a claim for additional expenses, except where the damage had been compensated by a specific lump-sum amount. In the case of the deceased teenager, Article 6.284(1) of the Civil Code grants the right to compensation to persons who were maintained by the deceased or who, on the date of death, had the right to receive maintenance from him or her, and also grants such persons the right to compensation for non-pecuniary damage. Article 6.284(2) of the Civil Code links the amount of damage to the portion of the deceased’s income that the dependants received or were entitled to receive while he or she was alive. However, according to the case-law overview provided, in cases of deprivation of life, the right to compensation for non-pecuniary damage is generally held by parents, children, a spouse or a cohabiting partner. The same overview states that brothers, sisters, grandparents and other close relatives are awarded such compensation only in exceptional cases, where they had particularly close spiritual and emotional ties with the deceased. Supreme Court of Lithuania ruling No. 3K-3-553/2013 is significant because it links deprivation of life and injury to health with the rules on delictual liability, based on the duty not to cause damage to another person by one’s acts or omissions. As regards the amount of non-pecuniary damage, the source provided concerning compensation for damage caused by acts prohibited under criminal law states that the court must take into account the requirements of good faith, justice and reasonableness. The insurance aspect, according to the railway and construction sources provided, would be relevant only insofar as the damage falls within an activity governed by specific rules on compulsory civil liability insurance. Under the rules on compulsory civil liability insurance for railway undertakings, a third party is a person entitled to an insurance payment for deprivation of life, injury to health or damage to property where the damage arose from the specified carriage activity or use of railway rolling stock. The excerpt from the draft Construction Law concerning compulsory civil liability insurance for construction, reconstruction, repair, renovation, demolition of a structure or construction works for the maintenance of a cultural heritage structure provides that the insurer compensates damage to the developer, the policyholder and third parties, including damage to health and damage resulting from deprivation of life

Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario would be independent claims by the injured persons for treatment, other health-restoration expenses, lost income and non-pecuniary damage under Article 6.283 of the Civil Code. The second scenario would be claims by the close relatives of the deceased teenager for non-pecuniary damage and, for persons meeting the requirements of Article 6.284(1) of the Civil Code, for pecuniary damage due to loss of maintenance. The third scenario would be directing claims against the insurer if the specific civil liability were insured under the compulsory insurance model described in the sources provided. The fourth scenario would be litigation concerning the liable person, the amount of damage and the assessment of non-pecuniary damage in accordance with the requirements of good faith, justice and reasonableness. This is practically important for the deceased’s family, the injured persons, the potential liable person and the insurer, because the classification under Articles 6.245, 6.283 and 6.284 of the Civil Code would determine who has the right to claim compensation, what types of damage are compensable and the procedure by which they would be awarded or paid

Core issue. The precise legal issue is not the content of criminal culpability, but whether, in 2019-2022, funds allocated for the activities of a municipal council member were received without a legal basis and are therefore repayable to the municipality under Article 6.242(1) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania. This issue is also connected with the regulation of remuneration for, and forms of, a municipal council member’s activities under Article 12(1) and Article 16(1)-(3) of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania. Institutional oversight of the legality of a council member’s conduct and activities is to be assessed under Article 15(3), as amended by Article 2 of the Law Amending Articles 13, 15 and 23 of Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania. A possible political-legal liability procedure, if questions of loss of mandate were raised, is governed by Article 13(1)-(5) of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania. The nature of the civil obligation is defined by Article 6.245(1) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, under which one party has the right to claim compensation for losses and the other is obliged to compensate them

Legal assessment. Under Article 12(1) of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government, a council member is remunerated for working time spent performing the duties of a council member, and that remuneration is linked to time actually worked. The same provision’s reference to the forms of activity established in Article 16 means that the lawfulness of payment depends on a connection with council meetings, committees, commissions, the municipal college, factions, groups, a mixed group, or the reception of residents. Article 16(3) of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government further provides that the council’s working procedure is established by law and by the rules of procedure; accordingly, the substantiation of expenses must be assessed not in the abstract, but by reference to the procedure applicable to the council member’s activities. The report states that expense reports and supporting documents were assessed; therefore, in the civil dispute, the essential circumstance was not the politician’s status itself, but the connection of the specific EUR 574 with lawfully remunerated council-member activity. Article 6.242(1) of the Civil Code provides that a person who has been unjustly enriched at another person’s expense without a legal basis must compensate losses in the amount of the unjust enrichment. Accordingly, the EUR 574 awarded by the court must be characterised as a pecuniary benefit repayable to the municipal administration, not as a political sanction. Within the meaning of Article 6.245(1) of the Civil Code, this is a pecuniary obligation: the municipal administration has a claim, and T. Budrikis has a duty to pay the awarded amount. The termination of the criminal investigation, as stated in the report, excluded the application of criminal liability, but did not in itself extinguish the civil claim concerning funds allegedly received without justification. The outcomes of these two proceedings are compatible, because Article 6.242 of the Civil Code does not require a determination of the constituent elements of a criminal offence, but focuses on the legal basis for the benefit received and its amount. Paragraph 44.3.1.7 of the Regulations of the Register of Suspects, Accused Persons and Convicted Persons shows that prosecutors’ decisions to terminate pre-trial investigations, and the documents approving them, are separate criminal-procedure documents. This confirms the procedural distinction between a decision on the conclusion of an investigation and a civil court judgment on funds repayable to the municipality. Article 15(3), as amended by Article 2 of the Law Amending Articles 13, 15 and 23 of Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government, confers on the Ethics Commission competence to supervise, investigate and adopt decisions concerning the compliance of council members’ activities with the law, the Code of Conduct for State Politicians, the law on the reconciliation of interests, the rules of procedure, and other legal acts regulating activities and conduct. For that reason, the civil judgment concerning EUR 574 may be relevant to the Ethics Commission’s assessment insofar as it relates to the transparency of the council member’s activities and compliance with the rules of procedure. Article 13(1) of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government provides for a procedure for loss of mandate by decision of the municipal council in respect of actions contrary to the Constitution or laws committed while performing the duties of a council member or mayor. Under Article 13(2), initiation of that procedure requires a group comprising at least one third of the council members, and under Article 13(4), the submission must be filed no later than one month from the date on which the grounds became apparent. The sources do not identify any case law; therefore, rules derived from analogous cases are not applied in this assessment

Consequences. The most immediate practical consequence is enforcement of the civil court judgment: T. Budrikis must repay EUR 574 to the Administration of Šilutė District Municipality. For the municipality, this matters as an issue of recovering budgetary funds, based on Article 6.242(1) of the Civil Code. For T. Budrikis, it matters because, according to the outcome stated in the report, criminal liability is not applied, but a civil pecuniary obligation remains. For the council and its Ethics Commission, the relevant question is whether the circumstances established in the civil proceedings provide grounds to assess the compliance of the council member’s activities with the requirements specified in Article 15(3) of the Law on Local Self-Government. If a group of council members considered that a ground specified in Article 13(3) of the Law on Local Self-Government existed, the procedure would require a reasoned written submission, evidence, and compliance with the one-month time limit from the date on which the grounds became apparent. If such a procedure is not initiated, or if the conditions stated in the sources are not present, the matter in practice ends with enforcement of the civil judgment and a possible ethics assessment. More broadly, this situation is significant for all municipal council members because it shows that expense substantiation documents are assessed by reference to the forms of council-member activity and remuneration rules, and that the conclusion of criminal proceedings does not preclude civil recovery of funds received without justification

Core issue. The legal issue is not merely the punishment of individual drivers, but whether, on Naujoji Street, as a road or street surface used for public traffic within the meaning of Article 2(3) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Road Traffic Safety, the road manager and the competent authorities are required to take additional road safety measures. This issue is to be assessed under Article 1(1), Article 6, Article 10(1), Article 11(1)-(2), Article 11¹(1), Article 11⁴ and Article 32 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Road Traffic Safety. Article 1(1) of the Law links the purpose of road traffic safety regulation to the protection of the life, health and property of road users and other persons, as well as to the improvement of conditions for vehicle and pedestrian traffic. Accordingly, the legally relevant facts are not only the speed of 150 km/h, 110 speeding incidents or 11 noise violations, but also whether repeated accident and infringement statistics justify the application of infrastructural, technical and organisational measures. Article 6 of the Law on Road Traffic Safety provides that road traffic safety is ensured by establishing the competence of institutions, controlling the activities of natural and legal persons, introducing technical innovations, securing financial support for measures, and carrying out supervision and control

Legal assessment. If Naujoji Street is a local street, Article 11(1) of the Law on Road Traffic Safety imposes on the municipality or another road owner or manager the duty to ensure safe traffic conditions by implementing road safety measures. This duty is not limited to police operations, because Article 11(2) links road safety measures to design, construction, reconstruction, repair and maintenance in accordance with road design regulatory documents, standards and other legal acts. Police control of speed and vehicle noise falls within the logic of activity control and state supervision established in Article 6(2) and 6(8), while the basis for offenders’ liability arises from Article 32. Nevertheless, Article 32 links liability for infringements to the aim of ensuring road safety and protecting life, health and property; therefore, the system of individual sanctions does not replace the road manager’s duty to assess the safety situation of the street itself. The data indicated in relation to Naujoji Street concerning 19 traffic accidents, three reportable traffic accidents, previous fatal accidents and systematic speeding are precisely the type of factors that Article 11⁴(2) of the Law on Road Traffic Safety requires to be assessed when deciding on speed cameras. Under Article 11⁴(1), stationary speed cameras may be installed on roads, and the procedure for their installation and operation is established by the Government or an institution authorised by it. Under Article 11⁴(2), speed cameras are installed for the purpose of road safety, after assessing the safety situation of the road or road section, the circumstances of traffic accidents caused by speeding, the extent of speeding, traffic intensity, traffic organisation and other risks. The same provision expressly states that speed cameras on roads are installed by the road manager; therefore, an argument based solely on cost is not a legally conclusive answer, since Article 6(6) directly links the ensuring of road traffic safety to the material and financial provision necessary for implementing measures. If traffic-light speed management sensors or radars are selected, they must be assessed as technical traffic organisation or road safety measures, the implementation of which must comply with the requirements of Article 11(2) concerning the legibility and visibility of traffic lights, road signs and road markings. Article 11⁴(3) and 11⁴(4) of the Law on Road Traffic Safety also mean that the deployment of stationary measures must be accompanied by distinct signage, and that signs informing drivers of speed control and indicating the permitted speed must be installed before operational speed cameras. Article 11¹(1)(1) of the Law on Road Traffic Safety provides that a road safety audit must be carried out for all roads and streets intended for public traffic that are being designed, constructed or already in operation; therefore, a repeatedly accident-prone urban street falls within the category of objects subject to such a safety management procedure. Under Article 10(1)(1), the competence of the Ministry of Transport and Communications or institutions authorised by it includes the approval of technical requirements, regulatory documents and procedures, including requirements for road safety audits, road safety impact assessments, road safety inspections, the determination of the safety level of the road network and the identification of high-accident road sections. Consequently, the municipality’s decision must not be a declaratory political discussion, but a procedurally substantiated assessment of the safety situation in accordance with the regulation established by the competent authorities

Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the road manager, relying on the criteria set out in Article 11⁴(2), substantiates the installation of stationary speed cameras or other stationary traffic enforcement measures on Naujoji Street. In that case, the practical consequence for drivers would be continuous speed control marked in advance by road signs, while the municipality would have a duty to ensure that installation, signage and operation comply with Article 11⁴(3)-(4). The second scenario is that, before a specific measure is selected, a street safety audit or safety inspection is carried out under Article 11¹(1), after which a decision is made on changes to traffic organisation, traffic-light operation logic, signage or reconstruction measures under Article 11(2). The third scenario is that police control continues and offenders are held liable under Article 32; however, that course does not exhaust the duties of the municipality or the road manager if accident, speeding and traffic intensity data continue to indicate systemic risk. For residents, this is important both for the protection of their life, health and property as “other persons” under Article 1(1), and for the actual improvement of traffic conditions, which forms part of the purpose of the Law. For the municipality, this is important because Article 11(1) links the ensuring of safe conditions on local streets to its functions as road owner or manager, not solely to police initiatives. For the police, this is important as a component of control and the application of liability, but under the cited provisions the core of infrastructural decision-making lies with the road manager and the road safety management system

Core issue. The legal issue is not whether an emergency situation is being declared in Visaginas, but on what legal basis the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union may conduct exercises involving entities of the crisis management and civil protection system. It is to be assessed under Article 9(1)(1), (5) and (6), Article 11(1)(7) and (8), and Article 19(1)(4) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union, as well as Article 25(1), Article 26(1)–(5), and Article 13(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Crisis Management and Civil Protection. Article 9(1)(1) of the LRU Law directly assigns military training and exercises of riflemen to the functions of the LRU, while Article 11(1)(7) grants the right to organise, conduct and participate in military training of riflemen, civil protection training and other training. Where the police, the State Border Guard Service, the Public Security Service, the Fire and Rescue Department, the Armed Forces, the municipality and an economic operator participate in the exercises, the function established in Article 9(1)(5) of the LRU Law, namely to provide assistance to these entities in the cases and in accordance with the procedure laid down by law, becomes relevant. Article 26(1) of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection defines exercises as part of crisis management and civil protection training; therefore, the nature of the weekend exercises described in the notice is legally linked to the testing of preparedness, procedures and actions, rather than to an actual regime restricting rights

Legal assessment. In this case, the LRU acts as the organiser of the exercises, since the notice states that they are organised by the Col. Pranas Saladžius 9th Riflemen’s Unit of the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union. Such organisation is consistent with Article 11(1)(7) of the LRU Law, which permits the organisation and conduct of military training, civil protection training and other training. Article 9(1)(6) of the LRU Law also permits cooperation with state and municipal institutions and bodies; therefore, the list of institutions specified in the notice does not in itself conflict with the applicable legal regulation. If the content of the exercises includes crisis management or civil protection actions, the model described in Article 26(2) of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection applies: under simulated emergency or crisis conditions, actions and procedures provided for in plans are tested, decision-making skills are improved, and the organisation of search, rescue and urgent works is practised. The role of the municipality is not merely informational, because Article 13(1)(1) of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection assigns to the mayor the task of organising preparedness for emergencies in the municipality, while Article 13(1)(2) assigns the task of organising the provision of information on events and emergencies in accordance with the procedure established by the Government. Under Article 26(4)(1) of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection, the director of the municipal administration organises municipal-level civil protection exercises, and under Article 26(4)(2) ensures the participation, within their competence, of municipal bodies, public institutions and municipally controlled companies in state-level exercises. The notice states that residents may hear sound signals and simulated gunfire, see simulated smoke and armed participants bearing distinguishing insignia; therefore, the practical importance of municipal information provision is connected with the municipality’s civil protection functions and public education under Article 25 of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection. However, the procedure for assistance during an emergency event or emergency situation laid down in Article 19(2)–(4) of the LRU Law does not apply here as an actual response procedure, because the notice concerns planned exercises, not an emergency event or a declared emergency situation. For the same reason, the municipal-level emergency management measures provided for in Article 33(1) of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection, namely convening an operations centre, considering the declaration of an emergency situation, warning residents or evacuation, would become relevant only if the factual situation changed into a threat or an existing municipal-level emergency situation. The declared compliance with fire safety, environmental protection and road traffic rules means that the exercises are presented as training organised within the limits of ordinary activity, not as a special regime granting participants broader intervention powers. The rights of riflemen provided for in Article 43 of the LRU Law to require compliance with public order or the provision of information are linked to assistance to the director of the municipal administration or to the military commandant during martial law; therefore, on the facts presented, they do not constitute the legal basis for these Visaginas exercises. The functions of the director of the municipal administration established in Article 10 of the Law on Martial Law are likewise not applicable merely by reason of the exercises, since the notice contains no indication of martial law or measures thereof

Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the exercises begin at 12:00 on 24 July 2026 and end at 19:00 on 26 July 2026 as a training activity under Articles 9 and 11 of the LRU Law and, as regards the civil protection component, under Articles 25 and 26 of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection. In that case, what is practically most important for residents is that visible weapons, smoke and gunfire simulations, and vehicle movement be understood as elements of the exercises, not as an automatic indication of an emergency situation. The second scenario is that civil protection procedures are trained during the exercises, in which case it is important for institutions that their participation correspond to their competence, and that the involvement of municipal institutions and bodies align with Article 26(4) of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection. The third scenario is that, if a real threat or emergency situation were to arise during or in the vicinity of the exercises, the legal regime would change: Article 33 of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection on municipal-level emergency management would become relevant, and LRU assistance could be provided under Article 19(1)–(4) of the LRU Law. In such a case, pursuant to Article 19(4) of the LRU Law, LRU units assisting entities of the crisis management and civil protection system would be directed by the emergency operations commander, or, until such commander is appointed, by the rescue operations commander. The practical significance of the notice is therefore twofold: for residents, it reduces the risk of an unfounded perception of danger, while for institutions, it records the time, place, participants and communication channel of the exercises required for coordinated preparedness activity

Core issue. The precise legal question is not whether “Kimi K3” may be downloaded, but what obligations arise for a Lithuanian organisation that deploys such a general-purpose AI model on its own infrastructure and uses it to process personal data by automated means. This question is primarily governed by Article 2(1) of the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679, because the Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means. Article 1(2) of the Law Amending the Republic of Lithuania Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data also links the purpose of the law to automated processing of personal data and the protection of data subjects’ rights. If the model is used by a controller established and operating in Lithuania, the rule in Article 1(3)(1) of the same law concerning the processing of personal data in the territory of the Republic of Lithuania is applicable. The substantive core of the obligations lies in the principle of integrity and confidentiality established in Article 5(1)(f) GDPR, the controller’s responsibility set out in Article 24 GDPR, and the security of processing provided for in Article 32 GDPR. At the level of artificial intelligence regulation, Article 4 of the Law Amending Articles 1, 2 and 23 and the Annex to the Republic of Lithuania Law on Information Society Services No. X-614 is relevant, as it includes Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, the Artificial Intelligence Act, in the annex to that law

Legal assessment. If a Lithuanian company, bank, healthcare institution or public-sector body were to download and use such a model in its own environment for the analysis of documents, customer queries, or medical, legal or administrative texts, legal risk would arise where personal data are submitted to, or generated through, the model. In such a case, the organisation could not confine itself to asserting that the model operates “locally”, because under Article 24(1) GDPR the controller must implement appropriate technical and organisational measures and be able to demonstrate compliance with the Regulation. Article 24(2) GDPR allows those measures to be linked to data protection policies where this is proportionate to the specific processing activity. Article 24(3) GDPR is relevant in that approved codes of conduct or certification mechanisms may constitute only one element of demonstrating compliance, but do not replace the controller’s own responsibility. Article 32(1) GDPR requires the level of security to be selected by reference to the state of the art, the costs of implementation, the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing, and the risks to the rights and freedoms of natural persons. Accordingly, the deployment procedure for such a model should assess encryption, pseudonymisation, the confidentiality, integrity, availability and resilience of systems, restoration capabilities, and regular testing of the effectiveness of measures, as all of these are expressly identified in Article 32(1)(a)-(d) GDPR. Article 5(1)(f) GDPR means that it is not sufficient to control only external transfers of data to the cloud; it is also necessary to manage risks of unauthorised processing, loss, destruction or damage within the organisation itself. If the model were used by competent public authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, Article 2(2)(d) GDPR provides for an exemption from the application of the GDPR. The same distinction is explained in recital 19 GDPR, according to which such processing is governed by a more specific Union legal act, while processing carried out by competent authorities for other purposes may fall within the scope of the GDPR. At national level, Article 321 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data provides that, in respect of infringements of other directly applicable European Union legal acts committed in the processing of personal data, the measures referred to in Article 58(2) GDPR apply mutatis mutandis, including administrative fines under Article 83 GDPR and Article 33 of that law. Institutional competence regarding the AI Act in Lithuania is still linked to a separate law under preparation: point 2.2 of the Government’s position on the draft amendment to the Law on Public Administration states that the Ministry of the Economy and Innovation is preparing a draft law that will define the competence of state institutions implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, as well as the rights and obligations of other entities. The same point 2.2 links the forthcoming public administration regulation to the harmonised standards provided for in Article 40 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689. Lithuania’s public policy direction in the field of AI is not merely prohibitive: point 147 of the 2020 National Reform Agenda identifies the enablement of AI as a priority area of activity and links it to technological solutions specific to the Lithuanian language

Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is a controlled deployment, where an organisation uses the model on its own infrastructure but, before submitting personal data, defines controller responsibility, security measures, access rights, restoration procedures and the procedure for testing measures in accordance with Articles 24 and 32 GDPR. The second scenario is a high-risk deployment, where the model is launched in sensitive processes without sufficient technical and organisational measures; in that case, the legal consequence would be assessed through Article 5(1)(f), Article 24 and Article 32 GDPR, and the sanctions mechanism in Article 321 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data. The third scenario is relevant to the public sector: until the competence of institutions under Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 is clarified in the national implementing law, it is particularly important for public administration bodies not to equate technological capability with procedural legality. The fourth scenario is sector-specific adaptation to the Lithuanian language, supported by point 147 of the 2020 National Reform Agenda, but such adaptation does not remove the application of the GDPR where personal data are used. This is practically important for managers, data protection officers, information systems controllers and public-sector institutions, because responsibility arises not from the mere possession of an advanced model, but from its specific use in data processing. A downloadable high-capacity model reduces dependence on external cloud services, but increases the organisation’s own obligation to demonstrate that its internal infrastructure, processes and controls meet the level of security and accountability required by the GDPR

Core issue. The precise legal issue is when an employer may pay per diems lower than the maximum amounts approved by the Government and what limits apply until 30 September 2026 and from 1 October 2026. This issue is primarily determined under Article 107(2) and (3) of the Labour Code of the Republic of Lithuania, as those provisions distinguish between compensation for additional business trip expenses and the mandatory payment of per diems where the business trip lasts longer than one working day or involves travel abroad. Before the amendment, the relevant provision was point 2 of the Description of the Procedure for Payment of Per Diems, under which lower specific per diem amounts had to be “differentiated according to objective criteria” and established in a collective agreement or, in the absence of one, in a local normative legal act, without reducing them below 50 percent of the maximum amounts approved by the Government. Article 191 of the Labour Code is relevant insofar as a collective agreement may be concluded at national, territorial, sectoral, employer or workplace level. Disputes concerning unpaid or reduced per diems fall under Article 213 of the Labour Code, as they may constitute an individual labour dispute over rights arising from the implementation of labour law norms in employment relations. The consequences of settlement are assessed under Article 147 of the Labour Code: while the employment relationship continues, default interest may arise, and after its termination, penalties for delayed settlement may apply

Legal assessment. Under Article 107(3) of the Labour Code, an employer has no discretion to refuse to pay per diems altogether where the conditions specified in that provision are met. Until 1 October 2026, the employer’s discretion was limited to the possibility of setting lower amounts, but only in compliance with point 2 of the Description of the Procedure for Payment of Per Diems regarding a collective agreement or local normative legal act, objective criteria and the 50 percent threshold. In its judgment of 10 December 2024 in civil case No. e2A-2941-1097/2024, Vilnius Regional Court interpreted this rule by reference to its compensatory purpose: per diems cover the employee’s increased expenses caused by the business trip, and therefore the reduction criteria must be directly linked to a reduction in such expenses. Under that interpretation, features of the work, such as the year of manufacture of the truck, the length of the vehicle combination, the route or pallet exchange, do not in themselves justify lower per diems, because they do not demonstrate lower business trip expenses. Kaunas Regional Court took a different approach in its ruling of 16 September 2025, No. e2A-2200-945/2025: it noted that national legislation does not expressly identify the purpose of per diems and that the obligation to pay per diems is not directly linked to the specific expenses incurred by the employee. Accordingly, under that interpretation, per diems may be understood in two ways: both as compensation for expenses and as additional remuneration for work, and criteria relating to the nature and complexity of the work are not necessarily non-objective. The judgment of Klaipėda Regional Court of 13 November 2025, No. e2A-1429-513/2025, and the judgment of Panevėžys Regional Court of 17 June 2026, No. e2A-331-1059/2026, show that the same wording of point 2 of the Description of the Procedure for Payment of Per Diems was applied inconsistently. From 1 October 2026, the new wording of point 2 of the Description indicated in the notice changes the focus of the dispute: the requirement to prove “objective criteria” is removed, but the obligation to set specific lower amounts in an appropriate act remains. In a collective agreement, the threshold remains not less than 50 percent of the maximum amounts set by the Government, while in a local normative legal act a reduction is possible only where the business trip lasts at least 7 days and only down to not less than 65 percent. The employee’s right to clarity is strengthened by the requirement to inform the employee in writing of the lower amounts before the start of the business trip, while the employer’s ability to change the amounts is limited by the rule that they remain valid until the end of the specific business trip

Consequences. Until 30 September 2026, disputes concerning previously reduced per diems will continue to be assessed under the wording of point 2 of the Description that was in force at the time, and it will therefore remain important for the court to determine whether the reduction procedure was established in an appropriate act, whether the 50 percent threshold was observed and how the criteria were substantiated. If an employee challenges the reduction, such disagreement should be classified under Article 213 of the Labour Code as an individual labour dispute over rights. If the reduction of per diems is found to have been unlawful, the practical consequence for the employer is an obligation to pay the difference in per diems, and issues of default interest or penalties may also arise under Article 147 of the Labour Code. From 1 October 2026, the key issue for employers will no longer be proving the objectivity of the criteria, but formal compliance with the new thresholds: 50 percent in a collective agreement or 65 percent in a local normative legal act where the business trip lasts at least 7 days. For employees, the practical significance is that, under the new procedure indicated in the notice, unilateral reduction by a local normative legal act should no longer apply to business trips shorter than 7 days. For employers, particularly in the international transport sector, the transitional period until 1 October 2026 means that local normative legal acts and collective agreement provisions must be reviewed so that they comply with the new structure of point 2 of the Description. Realistically, disputes concerning earlier periods may still arise, because divergent regional court practice has already shown an inconsistent understanding of “objective criteria”. Disputes under the new procedure should focus on the duration of the business trip, written notification to the employee before departure, the applicable country or city rate where the route changes, and the chosen legal basis: a collective agreement or a local normative legal act

Core issue. The precise legal issue is not whether the political discussion has been “concluded”, but whether the presence of allied nuclear weapons on Lithuanian territory for the purpose of collective defence would be compatible with Article 137 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, which prohibits weapons of mass destruction and foreign military bases on Lithuanian territory. This issue would also fall to be assessed under Article 139 of the Constitution, Article 12(2) and (3) of the Law on the Organisation of the National Defence System and Military Service, Article 4 of the Law on Martial Law, and Article 105 of the Constitution. Article 137 of the Constitution formulates a direct prohibition; accordingly, nuclear weapons, as weapons of mass destruction, fall within the strictest field of constitutional scrutiny. On the other hand, Article 139 of the Constitution establishes the defence of the State against foreign armed attack as a right and duty of citizens and entrusts the organisation of national defence to law. The legal conflict therefore arises between an apparently absolute territorial prohibition and the constitutionally and statutorily embedded system of collective defence

Legal assessment. Article 12(2) of the Law on the Organisation of the National Defence System and Military Service provides that, during martial law or armed defence against aggression, the principal task of the armed forces is to defend, by force of arms, the State of Lithuania and other allied States, both independently and together with the armed forces of allied States. Article 12(3) of the same law permits the armed forces, pursuant to international treaties or international agreements of the Ministry of National Defence, to cooperate with NATO institutions and the armed forces of other NATO States. The part of Chapter 7 set out in Article 1 of the Law on the Basics of National Security provides that the defence of Lithuania is universal and unconditional, and is coordinated with the implementation of NATO collective defence principles. It is further stated there that Lithuania’s defence capability is based on assistance and solidarity provided by NATO allies. Thus, the participation of allied forces in Lithuania’s defence is not an exceptional or ad hoc phenomenon, but is incorporated into the legal architecture of national security. Nevertheless, allied status alone does not in itself displace the prohibition in Article 137 of the Constitution, since that provision refers directly to weapons of mass destruction on Lithuanian territory. The sources cited support the participation of NATO forces, host nation support, and collective defence, but the issue of the deployment of nuclear weapons would have to be assessed through the relationship between Article 137 of the Constitution and the norms governing collective defence. Paragraph 56.1 of the Concept for the Prospective Legal Regulation of Mobilisation and Host Nation Support states that the NATO Treaty enshrines the principle of collective defence, under which an armed attack against one or more parties is considered an attack against all, and assistance may include the use of armed forces. Paragraph 8.1.2 of the same Concept notes that the basis of Lithuania’s defence system is implemented taking into account NATO’s collective defence principle. Procedurally, Article 4(1) of the Law on Martial Law provides that martial law is introduced by the Seimas when it is necessary to defend the Homeland or to fulfil the international obligations of the Lithuanian State. In the event of armed attack, under Article 4(2) of the Law on Martial Law, the President of the Republic immediately adopts a decision on defence against armed aggression, introduces martial law, and submits the relevant decisions to the Seimas for approval. Article 4(4)(5) of the Law on Martial Law requires that the decree or resolution of the Seimas specify whether military units of other States are permitted to enter the territory of the Republic of Lithuania and to be used for the purposes of collective defence or another operation, if such a decision has not previously been adopted. This is significant because allied military presence must be based on decisions of the competent Lithuanian institutions, not merely on a political or expert assessment. Article 105 of the Constitution provides that the Constitutional Court decides whether laws, acts of the Seimas, and acts of the President of the Republic and the Government comply with the Constitution, and also issues conclusions on the conformity of international treaties with the Constitution. Accordingly, the final constitutional answer regarding a specific legal act authorising such deployment would fall within the competence of the Constitutional Court if such an act were challenged or an international treaty were assessed. In its ruling of 24 September 2009, as indicated in the sources, the Constitutional Court held that the legislature has a duty to establish regulation ensuring that the Republic of Lithuania has well-organised armed forces capable of defending the State against foreign armed attack. The same ruling noted that regulation of national defence must be established having regard to the geopolitical situation, possible threats to State security, the State’s participation in mutual assistance organisations, and international obligations. This case law strengthens the argument that legal norms on defence are to be interpreted not in isolation, but in the context of State security, NATO obligations, and real threats

Consequences. In practical terms, several legal scenarios are possible: a political decision could be confined to the presence of allied forces without weapons of mass destruction; a specific act could be adopted concerning a broader allied military presence; or the constitutionality of such an act could be reviewed by the Constitutional Court under Article 105 of the Constitution. If the issue arose in circumstances of martial law or armed aggression, the chain of decision-making would be based on Article 4 of the Law on Martial Law, involving the President of the Republic and the Seimas. If the decision were based on NATO collective defence, the legal basis would consist of Article 12(2) and (3) of the Law on the Organisation of the National Defence System and Military Service, together with the defence provisions set out in Article 1 of the Law on the Basics of National Security. However, the prohibition in Article 137 of the Constitution would remain the principal constitutional threshold, and it cannot be displaced solely by the opinion of a former President of the Constitutional Court. Therefore, the claim that the discussion has supposedly been “concluded” is legally overstated: the sources cited permit an argument based on collective defence, but not an inherently final and institutionally binding conclusion. This is of practical importance to the Seimas, the President of the Republic, the Government, national defence institutions, and NATO allies, because any decision concerning a military presence of such scale would have to be formulated in a manner capable of withstanding scrutiny under Articles 137 and 105 of the Constitution

Core issue. The legal issue arising is whether parliament may, by constitutional or statutory amendment, provide for the individually applicable termination of the powers of the head of state, judges of the Constitutional Court, or members of parliament, thereby bypassing the grounds and procedures enumerated in the Constitution. On the basis of the sources provided, this question must primarily be assessed under Article 88 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, concerning the termination of the powers of the President of the Republic; Article 108, concerning the termination of the powers of a judge of the Constitutional Court; Article 63, concerning the termination of the mandate of a member of the Seimas; and Article 102, concerning the competence of the Constitutional Court to review the conformity of acts of the Seimas with the Constitution. The institutional limit is established by Article 5(2) of the Constitution, as interpreted in the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 11 July 2002: the powers of state authority are limited by the Constitution, and one state institution may not take over, or restrict by statute, the powers conferred by the Constitution on another institution. With respect to judges of the Constitutional Court, Articles 10, 11, 48 and 55 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania are additionally applicable, regulating the suspension and termination of powers, recusal or removal from a specific case, and the adoption of rulings

Legal assessment. Under Article 88 of the Constitution, the powers of the President terminate only on the specified grounds: upon expiry of the term of office, upon the holding of early elections, upon resignation, upon death, upon removal from office through impeachment proceedings, or where the Seimas, on the basis of a conclusion of the Constitutional Court and by a three-fifths majority of all members of the Seimas, establishes that the President’s state of health prevents him or her from performing the duties of office. Accordingly, the model described in the report, whereby the President is given a five-day period to sign an amendment, followed by mandatory resignation, would, under the provisions provided, be assessed not as an independent ground for termination of powers, but as an attempt to create an additional ground alongside Article 88 of the Constitution. If such departure were treated as resignation, the legally material issue would be whether it satisfies the ground of resignation established in Article 88(3) of the Constitution, rather than merely a deadline set by parliament or political pressure. Article 102 of the Constitution confers on the Constitutional Court the competence to decide whether laws and other acts of the Seimas are contrary to the Constitution, and therefore that court would be the institutional filter for any dispute concerning the constitutionality of such an amendment. The rule formulated in the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 11 July 2002 would mean that an act of the Seimas altering or restricting the grounds for termination of the President’s powers directly established in the Constitution would breach the principle of separation of powers. The same logic applies to judges of the Constitutional Court: Article 108 of the Constitution and Article 11 of the Law on the Constitutional Court link termination of powers to expiry of the term of office, death, resignation, state of health, or removal from office through impeachment proceedings. Article 10 of the Law on the Constitutional Court permits only the suspension of a judge’s powers on specific grounds, including the commencement of impeachment proceedings following the conclusion of a special investigation commission, but this does not constitute the automatic removal of the judge. Removal under Article 48 of the Law on the Constitutional Court is a procedural institution applicable to a specific case where doubts arise as to a judge’s impartiality, and therefore cannot be equated with termination of the judge’s term of office. Articles 9 and 15 of the Law on the Constitutional Court show that the status of a judge includes the right to a deliberative vote, the right to participate in hearings, and the right to obtain information necessary for the case; the loss of these rights under Article 10 is linked only to suspension of powers on the grounds established by law. With respect to members of parliament, Article 63 of the Constitution likewise provides an exhaustive scheme for termination of mandate, and therefore a maximum number of terms could operate only insofar as it is compatible with the constitutional grounds governing elections and termination of mandate. The sources concerning draft Electoral Code provisions emphasise that requests to the Constitutional Court concerning electoral violations are submitted and examined in accordance with the procedure established by the Law on the Constitutional Court, while decisions of the Seimas concerning termination of powers or impeachment are linked to a conclusion of the Constitutional Court. This confirms that, in the field of the legal consequences of elections, a parliamentary decision is not wholly autonomous where the Constitution or statute requires a conclusion of the Constitutional Court. Article 55 of the Law on the Constitutional Court provides that a ruling is adopted in the deliberation room no later than one month after completion of the hearing, by majority vote, and that judges may not refuse to vote or abstain. Procedural review is therefore not a political veto, but a formalised mechanism of constitutional review with a clear decision-making procedure. The rule-of-law doctrine referred to in the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 14 January 2002 reinforces the conclusion that state institutions may not exceed the powers established for them in the Constitution. In the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 23 October 2002 in case No. 36/2000, emphasis was placed on the balance of constitutional values, meaning that even the pursuit of political effectiveness cannot in itself justify a reallocation of competences among branches of state authority. In the ECtHR case of Macatė v. Lithuania, as cited in the source provided, the assessment of restrictions is linked to the tests of legality and proportionality, and restrictions therefore cannot be based solely on political expediency

Consequences. If such a situation were assessed under the Lithuanian constitutional model provided, the most realistic legal route would be an application to the Constitutional Court concerning the conformity of an act of the Seimas with the Constitution under Article 102 of the Constitution. Until a decision on constitutional review is adopted, the political fact may be implemented, but its legal stability would depend on whether the termination of powers falls within the grounds set out in Articles 88, 108 or 63 of the Constitution. For the President, the most important practical issue would be whether his or her signature is treated as voluntary resignation under Article 88(3) of the Constitution, or as an additional mechanism for termination of powers imposed by an act of parliament. For judges of the Constitutional Court, the key point would be that termination of their powers under Article 108 of the Constitution and Article 11 of the Law on the Constitutional Court cannot be replaced by a simple political decision based on age or number of terms if such a ground does not fall within the specified list. For members of parliament, the practical significance would concern the stability of the mandate and the consequences of voters’ choice, since Article 63 of the Constitution clearly defines when the mandate of a member of the Seimas terminates. Institutionally, the most important consequence would be the strengthening of the role of the Constitutional Court: under Article 102 of the Constitution, it would have to decide not a political dispute, but the question of the limits of state authority. The final scenario would depend on whether it were recognised that parliament acted within the limits of the powers conferred on it by the Constitution, or that it took over or restricted the powers of other constitutional institutions, as prohibited under the interpretation of Article 5(2) of the Constitution in the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 11 July 2002

Core issue. The precise legal question is whether threats against executives and employees of artificial intelligence companies, intrusion into premises, threats against children, calls for attacks, and an attempt to blow up a residence would be assessed as a threat to kill, terrorisation of a person, a threat to commit a terrorist offence, and a risk of breach of the employer’s duty to ensure a safe working environment. The principal criminal-law provision is Article 145(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, applicable to a threat to kill or seriously impair health where there are sufficient grounds to believe that the threat may be carried out. Article 145(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania is relevant where a person terrorises another by threatening to cause an explosion, set fire, or commit another act dangerous to life, health, or property, or systematically intimidates that person through psychological coercion. If the threat is directed at a terrorist offence specified in Articles 250, 251, or 252 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, Article 2503(1) of that Code must also be assessed. The employer’s response is determined under Article 30(1) and (2) of the Labour Code of the Republic of Lithuania and Article 11(1) and (2) of the Law on Safety and Health at Work of the Republic of Lithuania. From a procedural perspective, Articles 98, 99, 100, 118, 119, 120, and 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania are relevant

Legal assessment. Entry into a company building and a statement that a manager will be killed, under the provisions cited, primarily fall within the assessment framework of Article 145(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania: it is necessary to assess not only the content of the words used, but also whether there were sufficient grounds to believe that the threat could be carried out. The episode involving an attempt to blow up a house, on the basis of the available sources, goes beyond a simple verbal threat and approaches the terrorisation referred to in Article 145(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, as that provision expressly mentions a threat to cause an explosion or set fire. The submitted report on implementation of the United Nations Convention states that Article 145 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania applies where only a threat has been expressed, whereas where preparation for an offence or an attempt has begun, liability is linked to preparation or attempt to kill or seriously impair health. Threatening manifestos calling for attacks against artificial intelligence leaders and investors, according to the sources provided, should in themselves be assessed only insofar as they are connected with specific threats or indicators of preparatory acts. Article 2503 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania could be relevant only where the threat is to commit specifically a terrorist offence listed in Articles 250, 251, or 252 of that Code and there are sufficient grounds to believe that the threat may be carried out. Threats against employees’ children, submitted through a job application or another communication channel, would be assessed under Article 145 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania by reference to the content of the threat, its credibility, and the systematic nature of any psychological coercion. Since Article 145(3) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania provides for a complaint by the victim, a statement by a lawful representative, or a prosecutor’s request, the procedural initiative of the victim or the prosecutor is important for the commencement of proceedings under that provision. A company that is aware of threats to managers, employees, or premises must, under Article 11(1) of the Law on Safety and Health at Work of the Republic of Lithuania, provide safe and healthy working conditions in all work-related respects. Paragraph 2 of the same provision allows safety measures to be understood broadly: technical, legal, organisational, and other preventive measures may include access control, security, the use of cameras, and internal reporting procedures. Article 30(1) of the Labour Code of the Republic of Lithuania supplements this duty, as the employer must ensure an environment in which employees are not subjected to aggressive or intimidating conduct directed at their physical or psychological integrity. Article 30(2) of the Labour Code of the Republic of Lithuania defines violence and harassment in such a way that a threat alone is sufficient if it may create an intimidating, hostile, degrading, or offensive environment or result in physical, pecuniary, or non-pecuniary harm. Under Article 31 of the Law on Safety and Health at Work of the Republic of Lithuania, the person representing the employer has the right to issue orders on safety, require employees to comply with safety documents, obtain information from state authorities, and access inspection materials of the State Labour Inspectorate. Under Article 33(1)(4) of the Law on Safety and Health at Work of the Republic of Lithuania, employees must immediately report any situation in workplaces or other company locations which, in their view, may pose a risk to employee safety and health. If an employer or its authorised person, being aware of real threats, were to breach occupational safety or health requirements and this could result in an accident, incident, or other serious consequences, a risk would arise under Article 176(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania

Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is the commencement of a pre-trial investigation for threat or terrorisation, following a complaint by the victim, a statement by a lawful representative, or a prosecutor’s request under Article 145(3) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, the company, a manager, an employee, or another person may submit objects and documents relevant to the investigation of the criminal offence, such as records of threats, applications, correspondence, or premises security data. If a suspect is identified, remand measures under Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania may be applied in order to secure the suspect’s participation in the proceedings, ensure an unobstructed investigation, and prevent new criminal offences. Under Article 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, possible measures include detention, intensive supervision, house arrest, an obligation to live separately from the victim, bail, seizure of documents, an obligation to register with a police authority, and a written undertaking not to leave. Procedural time limits would be calculated under Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania: in hours, days, or months, excluding the hour or day on which the period begins, while periods of temporary detention and remand detention are calculated from the moment the measure is actually applied. Another scenario is termination of the investigation under Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania if, during the pre-trial investigation, insufficient data are collected to substantiate the suspect’s guilt or another ground specified in that Article arises. This is practically important not only for managers, but also for employees, security services, persons representing the employer, and the prosecutor, because the same factual situation may simultaneously raise issues of criminal liability, procedural protective measures, and duties relating to workplace safety

Core issue. The precise legal issue is not the validity of political epithets, but whether the new Government lawfully obtained authority to act if its programme was submitted to and approved by the Seimas pursuant to Article 6 of the Law on the Government of the Republic of Lithuania. Under Article 91 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and Article 1 of the Law on the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, the Government consists of the Prime Minister and ministers; therefore, legal significance attaches specifically to the formation of that composition. The sequence for forming the Government is regulated by Article 6 of the Law on the Government of the Republic of Lithuania: the Prime Minister is appointed by the President of the Republic with the approval of the Seimas; ministers are appointed by the President of the Republic on the proposal of the Prime Minister; and, no later than 15 days after appointment, the Prime Minister presents to the Seimas the Government formed by him or her and approved by the President of the Republic, and submits its programme for consideration. The key rule is the provision in Article 6 of the Law on the Government of the Republic of Lithuania that a new Government receives authority to act when the Seimas approves its programme by a majority vote of the members participating in the sitting. Accordingly, any dispute concerning the earlier registration of the programme can be assessed only through this rule on the conferral of authority, and not through its political description as a “draft”

Legal assessment. If the Seimas approved the programme by 72 votes in favour, 29 against and 4 abstentions, then, on the data provided, the decision is assessed not by reference to a majority of all members of the Seimas, but by reference to the majority of votes of the members participating in the sitting, as specified in Article 6 of the Law on the Government of the Republic of Lithuania. This provision clearly distinguishes the preparation of the programme from the acquisition of authority to act: ministries and other state institutions must provide material for the preparation of the programme to the newly appointed ministers, but authority arises only after approval by the Seimas. Therefore, the mere fact that the text of the programme was prepared or registered before the entire Government was approved by decree of the President of the Republic is not, under the provisions cited, in itself identified as a ground for considering the Government not to have been formed or the programme to be invalid. The competence of the President of the Republic in this context is to appoint the Prime Minister and ministers under Article 6 of the Law on the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, while the competence of the Seimas is to approve the programme and thereby confer authority on the Government to act. Article 95 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and Article 40 of the Law on the Government indicate that, once it has received authority, the Government decides matters of state administration at its sittings, and considers and adopts draft legal acts in accordance with the procedure established by the Rules of Procedure of the Government. The role of the Government Chancellor, under the amendment to Article 45 of the Law on the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, is to assist the Prime Minister in implementing the provisions of the Government programme and to organise the analysis of draft legal acts submitted; accordingly, implementation of the programme is not merely a political promise. Under Article 26(3) of the Law on the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, ministers head ministries and are directly responsible for implementing the Government programme and the tasks in its implementation plan within the areas of administration assigned to them. Article 22 of the Law on the Government defines the substance of Government activity: it protects the constitutional order, guarantees state security and public order, implements laws, implements the Government programme, prepares the draft state budget and submits draft legal acts to the Seimas. Therefore, the security and birth-rate objectives mentioned in the report are legally relevant insofar as they become part of the Government programme, its implementation plan, the budget or draft legal acts. Government responsibility is not solely the personal responsibility of the Prime Minister: under Article 5 of the Law on the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, the Government is collectively accountable to the Seimas for its overall activities, while ministers are accountable to the Seimas and the President of the Republic and are directly subordinate to the Prime Minister. The mechanisms of parliamentary scrutiny are concrete: under Article 18 of the Law on the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, the Prime Minister or a minister must answer an interpellation submitted by a member of the Seimas, and, upon invitation by a committee or commission of the Seimas, ministers or authorised officials must attend the sitting and provide explanations. Article 101 of the Constitution further provides that, at the request of the Seimas, the Government or individual ministers must account to the Seimas for their activities. The contextual provision of the Constitutional Court ruling of 29 November 2001 cited in the sources emphasises that, under Article 5(1) and Article 91 of the Constitution, the Government is one of the institutions exercising state power and consists of the Prime Minister and ministers; this is also consistent with the statement in the source that the Government is a collegial institution of general competence

Consequences. The first realistic scenario is ordinary Government operation: after the Seimas approves the programme, the Government implements the programme, approves the plan for implementing its provisions, and, through ministers, carries out tasks in individual areas of administration pursuant to Articles 22 and 26 of the Law on the Government of the Republic of Lithuania. The second scenario is parliamentary scrutiny: the opposition and other members of the Seimas may use interpellations, questions, committee or commission sittings, and require accountability under Articles 5 and 18 of the Law on the Government and Article 101 of the Constitution. The third scenario is escalation of political responsibility: under Article 101 of the Constitution, the Government would be required to resign if the Seimas, by a majority vote of all members of the Seimas in a secret ballot, expressed no confidence in the Government or the Prime Minister. The position of an individual minister may also become a separate issue, because under Article 101 of the Constitution a minister must resign when more than half of all members of the Seimas express no confidence in that minister by secret ballot. The practical significance for the Seimas is that approval of the programme does not eliminate scrutiny, but shifts it into the sphere of accountability, interpellations, committee work and confidence procedures. The practical significance for the Government is that, under the provisions cited, the core of its legitimacy is linked to its composition, the appointments made by the President of the Republic and the Seimas’s approval of the programme, not to public political characterisations. For the public, this situation matters insofar as the implementation of the programme, budget drafts and legislation will determine whether declared security or other objectives are translated into binding decisions of governance

Core issue. The legal issue is not merely whether the purchase of a quadricycle is suitable for a child, but whether the specific vehicle, by legal category, may be driven by a child in public traffic and what duties are borne by the driver and the owner. It is determined first under Article 23(1)(1) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Road Traffic Safety, which assigns mopeds and light quadricycles to category AM, and Article 23(1)(5), which assigns quadricycles to category B1. The second group of rules consists of Article 13(1)–(3) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Road Traffic Safety: the prohibition on driving without the right to drive, the prohibition on driving a technically defective vehicle, and the duty to take all necessary measures to ensure the safety of oneself and passengers. Third, the duties of the owner or possessor arise from Article 20(1)–(3) of the Law Amending the Republic of Lithuania Law on Road Traffic Safety, while the general standard of care derives from Article 12(1), (3), (4) and (5) of the same law. Accordingly, the call issued by the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority described in the notice legally amounts to a check of the vehicle category, the right to drive, technical compliance, owner control, and the duties of care owed by a road user

Legal assessment. If the electric or other quadricycle used by a child falls, by its characteristics, within the scope of a light quadricycle, category AM is relevant under Article 23(1)(1) of the Law on Road Traffic Safety; if it is a quadricycle as a separate category, category B1 is relevant under Article 23(1)(5). This means that age and physical readiness do not, in themselves, alter the legal category: what is decisive is the vehicle actually being driven and whether the person has the right to drive that particular vehicle. Article 13(1) of the Law on Road Traffic Safety directly prohibits a person from driving a motor vehicle without the right to do so and also prohibits allowing a vehicle to be driven by a person who does not have the right to drive it. Therefore, a decision by parents or guardians to allow a child to drive in public traffic is not merely a matter of supervision: if the child lacks the required right to drive, handing the vehicle over to that child for driving falls within the prohibition in Article 13(1). Under Article 13(2), before starting to drive, the driver must ensure that the vehicle is in proper technical condition and that mandatory equipment is present; therefore, failure to comply with the manufacturer’s instructions and technical requirements is legally relevant both before and during the trip. Under Article 13(3), the driver must take all necessary measures to ensure the safety of themselves and passengers; this duty is particularly significant where a child is concerned, because the risk described in the notice arises from the vehicle’s power, speed, mismatch with the child’s age, and failure to use protective equipment. The source concerning amendments to the Road Traffic Rules states that when riding a quadricycle motorcycle, a light quadricycle motorcycle, or a moped, motorcycle helmets must be worn and/or fastened; in this respect, a helmet is therefore not merely a recommended precaution. The general duty of a road user under Article 12(5) of the Law Amending the Law on Road Traffic Safety is not to endanger the safety of other road users, other persons, or their property, and to take necessary measures to avoid or reduce harmful consequences. The owner or possessor is additionally subject to the standard in Article 20(1): they must take care of, and are responsible for, the vehicle belonging to them. If required by a police officer for the purpose of establishing an offence, the owner or possessor must, under Article 20(2), identify the person who was operating or using the vehicle at the relevant time. Under Article 20(3), the owner or possessor, upon receiving a summons, must appear at the police authority and have the specified documents; therefore, after an incident or inspection, the chain of responsibility does not end simply with identifying the child who was driving. Sources concerning draft amendments to Articles 2 and 22 of the Law on Road Traffic Safety emphasize that AM-category vehicles are associated with the risk posed by young drivers: in 2020–2023, 19.1 percent of road traffic accidents were caused by young people aged 16–25. The same sources state that, in 2023, moped drivers who held AM-category driving rights but had not reached the age of 16 committed 471 Road Traffic Rules violations, while moped and light quadricycle drivers who had acquired AM driving rights but had not reached the age of 16 caused 19 road traffic accidents in which 13 people were injured. These data explain why the application of the rules focuses not only on the formal driving licence, but also on age, driving experience, the dangerousness of the vehicle, and the need for effective supervision. The discussion in the cited sources of Article 4(2) and Article 4(6)(a) of Directive 2006/126/EC shows that the age threshold for category AM under European Union law is linked to the minimum age for obtaining a driving licence and to Member States’ discretion to adjust it. At the same time, the cited sources refer to the rule in Article 6(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences, under which liability for an administrative offence applies to a person who had reached the age of 16 before committing the offence; accordingly, in cases involving children driving, practical control may also shift toward the duties of the owner, possessor, or supervising adult

Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is preventive: before allowing a child to drive, parents or guardians must determine whether the vehicle is in category AM or B1, whether it is technically roadworthy, whether the driver has the right to drive it, and whether mandatory safety equipment is being used. The second scenario is a police inspection or investigation of an incident, where the duties under Article 13(1)–(3), Article 12(4)–(5), and Article 20(2)–(3) of the Law on Road Traffic Safety apply. The third scenario arises where a child without the right to drive is driving in public traffic: in that case, legally relevant factors include not only the child’s conduct, but also who handed the vehicle over to the child and who, as owner or possessor, was required to control it. The fourth scenario concerns technical condition: if the quadricycle does not meet the technical requirements applicable to vehicles, Article 13(2) prohibits driving it, and the driver must assess this before starting to move. This is important for parents, guardians, sellers, and rental or entertainment organizers, because the risk described in the notice is transformed by the cited rules into specific duties to prevent unlawful driving, ensure technical roadworthiness, ensure safety equipment, and maintain traceability of the owner. The broader legal significance is that children’s use of quadricycles cannot be treated merely as a domestic leisure activity where the vehicle, by category, falls within the regime applicable to motor vehicles. In such a case, what applies is not a general recommendation to “drive carefully”, but the system established by the Law on Road Traffic Safety concerning the right to drive, technical condition, helmet use, care, and owner liability

Core issue. The precise legal question would be whether religious rites and the practice of faith may provide an exception permitting the unlawful possession or use of cannabis where such conduct falls within the scope prohibited by criminal law. It must be assessed under Article 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, Articles 2 and 8 of the Law on Religious Communities and Associations, and Articles 259, 260, 2601, 264, 265 and 261 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 26 of the Constitution protects the right freely to choose a religion, profess it, perform religious rites and practise faith, but permits restrictions on the profession of religion by law where necessary to safeguard public security, public order, human health, morals and the rights of others. Article 2 of the Law on Religious Communities and Associations restates the same principle and expressly provides that a person’s religion or belief may not justify a criminal offence or non-compliance with the law. Accordingly, the issue is not an abstract right of Rastafarians to have a religion, but the specific boundary between freedom of ritual practice and the prohibition on unlawfully possessing narcotic or psychotropic substances

Legal assessment. Under Article 8 of the Law on Religious Communities and Associations, religious rites may be performed in places of worship, homes, certain institutions and other public places; however, in public places they may not breach public order, human health, morals, or the rights and freedoms of others. This provision does not create an independent authorisation to use prohibited substances in rites; it defines the freedom to perform rites and the limits of that freedom. Article 259(1) of the Criminal Code criminalises the unlawful production, processing, acquisition, possession, transportation or sending of narcotic or psychotropic substances without intent to distribute, while Article 259(2) separately provides for liability in respect of a small quantity. If cannabis were acquired, possessed or transported for religious meditation, those objective acts would be legally material, because Article 259 of the Criminal Code does not require an intent to distribute. If an intent to sell or otherwise distribute, or distribution itself, were established, the situation would fall under Article 260(1) of the Criminal Code, which provides for liability for unlawful possession with intent to distribute or for distribution. If the substances were transported or sent across the state border of the Republic of Lithuania without presenting them for customs control, by evading such control, or without authorisation, Article 2601 of the Criminal Code would apply; that provision differentiates liability according to quantity and intent to distribute. If anyone assisted another person in acquiring, coerced, induced or otherwise habituated that person to use narcotic or psychotropic substances for non-medical purposes, Article 264 of the Criminal Code would be relevant, and in the case of a minor liability would be more severe under paragraph 2 of that Article. Cannabis cultivation is likewise not neutral from the perspective of religious practice: under Article 265(1) of the Criminal Code, breach of the established procedure by cultivating a large quantity of cannabis entails criminal liability. Where narcotic or psychotropic substances are distributed to minors, Article 261 of the Criminal Code applies, providing for imprisonment from three to twelve years. Article 19(1) of the Criminal Code is additionally relevant in that committing a criminal act while intoxicated by narcotic or psychotropic substances does not exempt a person from criminal liability. Thus, under the provisions cited, a religious motive may explain the impetus for a person’s conduct, but it does not in itself remove the unlawfulness of the act if the elements of Articles 259, 260, 2601, 264, 265 or 261 of the Criminal Code are satisfied. From a procedural standpoint, under Article 16(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure the accused has the right to know the charge, have defence counsel, submit evidence, participate in its examination, and appeal the judgment and rulings of the court. Evidence concerning the significance of religious practice, the nature of the rites or the circumstances of possession could be submitted under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since objects and documents relevant to the case may be submitted by the suspect, the accused, defence counsel and other persons. Time limits for such procedural acts are calculated under Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: they determine the time for the commencement, performance or completion of procedural acts and are calculated in hours, days or months. The sources provided contain no case law formulating an exception for religious cannabis use

Consequences. In practical terms, such a dispute would mean that a religious community could demand that its rites not be obstructed under Article 8 of the Law on Religious Communities and Associations, but that demand could not be upheld insofar as the content of the rites would amount to non-compliance with the law or justification of a criminal offence under Article 2 of that Law. For a person who merely acquired, possessed or transported cannabis for personal use without intent to distribute, Article 259 of the Criminal Code would be the most relevant provision, and the severity of liability would depend on the quantity. Mutual encouragement among members of the community to use substances, or assistance in acquiring them, could create an independent risk under Article 264 of the Criminal Code, particularly if minors were involved. If the religious-practice argument were raised in criminal proceedings, it would primarily operate as a defence argument concerning the facts and the proportionality of restrictions on rights, but under the provisions cited it would not confer automatic immunity from criminal liability. If an adverse procedural decision is adopted, the accused has the right to appeal it under Article 16(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and, in respect of final judgments or rulings, the court of cassation is the Supreme Court of Lithuania under Articles 24 and 25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This is practically important for religious communities, law enforcement authorities, schools, places of detention and other institutions, because freedom of ritual practice must be ensured, but the conditions under which it is organised cannot negate criminal prohibitions designed to protect public order and human health

Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the conduct of the two drivers, where a blood alcohol concentration of 1.55 per mille was established while driving a Mazda 6 and 2.61 per mille while driving an Audi A8, is to be classified as driving a vehicle while intoxicated under Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. This provision applies to a person who drove a motor vehicle while intoxicated, where an intoxication level of 1.51 per mille or more is established, and provides for a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. According to the text provided, Article 281(1)-(4) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania links liability to a breach of road traffic safety or vehicle operation rules that caused a traffic accident and the specified consequences to human health or property. Therefore, the mere fact of driving with an intoxication level of 1.51 per mille or more, under the provisions provided, primarily falls within the structure of Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code, while the application of Article 281 of the Criminal Code would depend on the existence of a traffic accident and consequences, which are not indicated in the information provided

Legal assessment. In both cases, the essential threshold has been exceeded: 1.55 per mille and 2.61 per mille fall within the range of “1.51 per mille or more” under Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code. This means that, for criminal liability under this provision, it is sufficient that a motor vehicle was driven and that the established intoxication reached the qualified threshold, without requiring a traffic accident or harmful consequences. Article 2811(2) of the Criminal Code further provides that a person is also liable where the acts specified in paragraph 1 of that article were committed through negligence. Article 19(1) of the Criminal Code excludes the argument that intoxication itself could eliminate criminal liability: a person who commits a criminal act while intoxicated by alcohol is not exempt from criminal liability. The threshold for administrative liability under Article 427(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania, as reflected in the sources provided, covers intoxication of more than 0.4 per mille but not more than 1.5 per mille; therefore, both cases described fall not within that administrative threshold, but within the scope of Article 2811 of the Criminal Code. If only intoxication up to 1.5 per mille and the conditions for repeat offending were established, Article 427(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences would provide for a fine, and paragraph 2 for mandatory deprivation of the right to drive for three to five years; however, those facts are not the principal basis for classification here. From the perspective of the procedure for establishing intoxication, the Rules for Establishing the Intoxication or Impairment of Persons Driving Vehicles and Other Persons are relevant: paragraph 3 provides that police officers test a driver suspected of intoxication, and where an ethyl alcohol concentration of more than 1.5 per mille is established in exhaled air, they take the person to a healthcare institution for a medical examination. Once a pre-trial investigation has been commenced, items and documents relevant to the investigation and examination of the criminal act may, under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, be submitted by the suspect, defence counsel, the victim, civil parties to the proceedings, and any natural or legal person. Procedural time limits under Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure determine the time for the commencement, performance, or completion of procedural acts and are calculated in hours, days, and months. During the pre-trial investigation, remand measures may also be relevant, since Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits them to be imposed in order to ensure participation in the proceedings, an unobstructed investigation, the hearing of the case, enforcement of the judgment, or prevention of new criminal acts. Under Article 120(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, such measures include detention, intensive supervision, house arrest, bail, seizure of documents, an obligation to report periodically to a police institution, and a written undertaking not to leave. If the case raises the issue of the vehicle’s fate, Article 72(1)-(3) of the Criminal Code establishes confiscation of property as the compulsory uncompensated taking of confiscable property into state ownership, and treats as confiscable property the instrument, means, or proceeds of the prohibited act. Confiscable property belonging to the offender must, under Article 72(3) of the Criminal Code, be confiscated in all cases, while property belonging to another person may be confiscated only where the conditions specified in Article 72(4) are met

Consequences. The most realistic next course is for the pre-trial investigation to verify the fact of driving, the intoxication data, and compliance with the procedure, and to decide whether to issue a suspicion under Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code. If these data are sufficient, the case may result in the imposition of criminal liability, the sanction for which is a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. If the investigation reveals a traffic accident and the consequences specified in Article 281(1)-(4) of the Criminal Code, classification could also be assessed under those provisions, as they cover a traffic accident, impairment of health, or substantial property damage. If sufficient data substantiating the suspect’s guilt are not collected during the pre-trial investigation, Article 212(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for termination of the pre-trial investigation. The practical significance for drivers is that, once the 1.5 per mille threshold is exceeded, the legal regime shifts from administrative to criminal liability under Article 2811 of the Criminal Code. For the police and the prosecution service, the key issues will be the lawfulness of the intoxication determination, the sufficiency of the data, and the need for remand measures. For vehicle owners, Article 72 of the Criminal Code is significant because the vehicle may be assessed as a means of committing the prohibited act; however, confiscation of property not belonging to the offender is linked to the separate conditions set out in Article 72(4). The issue of victims does not arise on the basis of the information provided, but if damage were established, Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the possibility, in cases prescribed by law, of compensating damage from state funds where the accused or materially liable persons lack the means to compensate it

Core issue. The precise legal question is whether the unreleased technologies, processes, products, internal information disclosed during recruitment processes, and data concerning the circumvention of exit procedures identified by Apple qualify as trade secrets under Article 1.116(1) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania. The dispute would be assessed primarily by reference to the three criteria set out in Article 1.116(1) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania: the information must be secret, have actual or potential commercial value because it is secret, and its lawful holder must take reasonable steps to keep it secret. Article 1.116(2) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania is also relevant, because a confidentiality label alone is insufficient if the information is widely known, publicly disclosed, easily obtainable, or, in ordinary working circumstances, has become experience, skills, abilities, or knowledge honestly acquired by employees. The procedural issue would be governed by Article 101(1)-(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, which sets out the specific rules for protecting trade secrets in cases concerning their unlawful acquisition, use, or disclosure. A possible criminal-law aspect is linked to Article 210 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, under which the unlawful acquisition of information regarded as a trade secret, or its transfer to another person, gives rise to criminal liability. The nature of information as an object of civil rights is reinforced by Article 1.97(1) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, which identifies information as an object of civil rights

Legal assessment. On the basis of the information provided, Apple would have to prove not confidentiality in the abstract, but that the specific technologies, processes, product plans, or technical solutions, either as a whole or in their precise composition, were not generally known and could not readily be obtained in the relevant professional environment. The second core evidentiary issue would be commercial value: under Article 1.116(1)(2) of the Civil Code, data concerning unreleased products, processes, and hardware direction are protected only where their value derives specifically from their secrecy. The third core issue would be Apple’s reasonable protective measures under Article 1.116(1)(3) of the Civil Code; accordingly, the company’s rules, access management, employment exit procedures, and internal security protocols would become relevant. If Apple merely marked the information as confidential, but the information does not satisfy all criteria for a trade secret, Article 1.116(2)(1) of the Civil Code would preclude treating it as a trade secret. If the disputed information constituted experience, skills, abilities, or knowledge honestly acquired by employees, Article 1.116(2)(3) of the Civil Code would apply, rather than trade secret protection. Conversely, the reported instructions to circumvent security procedures and encouragement to disclose internal data during recruitment processes, if proven, would be legally significant in assessing unlawful acquisition, use, or disclosure, which Article 1.116(3) of the Civil Code refers to regulation by special legislation. In civil proceedings, pursuant to Article 101(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court could, by reasoned ruling, restrict the circle of persons entitled to access the case file, participate in closed hearings, and receive copies of the judgment or ruling if there are grounds to believe that a trade secret may be disclosed in the case. Under Article 101(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, that circle of persons may not be broader than necessary to ensure the right to judicial protection and a fair hearing of the case. Since the parties to the dispute are legal persons, Article 101(3)(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that such persons include at least one natural person conducting the case on behalf of the legal person and a representative of the legal person. The prohibitions sought by Apple to stop the possible use of secrets are consistent with the logic of such proceedings: the case should be organised so that the information necessary to resolve the dispute is submitted to the court, while its disclosure is not expanded beyond what is necessary. Article 210 of the Criminal Code would become relevant only if the unlawful acquisition of information regarded as a trade secret, or its transfer to another person, were established. That provision establishes a range of sanctions from community service or a fine to imprisonment for up to two years; it is therefore directed not at a contractual conflict of trust as such, but at unlawful dealing in a trade secret. The grounds for suspending limitation periods set out in Article 1.101 of the Civil Code could be relevant only to the procedural calculation of time limits, for example in cases of force majeure, a moratorium, or suspension of the operation of the legal act governing the disputed relationship. The cited sources concerning amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the Government indicate a general protection standard in the public sector: draft legal-application acts and accompanying documents containing information constituting a trade secret must be submitted in a manner ensuring protection of the relevant information. That standard does not assign the Apple and OpenAI dispute to an administrative procedure, but it confirms that, in law, trade secret protection is linked not only to the content of the information, but also to the regime governing its transfer and access

Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the court recognises that part of the identified information satisfies the criteria in Article 1.116(1) of the Civil Code, and the proceedings then continue subject to the access restrictions under Article 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In that case, the most important practical point for Apple would be to define the boundaries of the protected information with sufficient precision so that protection does not extend to employees’ honestly acquired general knowledge under Article 1.116(2)(3) of the Civil Code. The second scenario is that some claims are narrowed because the information is recognised as merely confidential, but not as a trade secret under Article 1.116(2)(1) of the Civil Code. This would be practically significant for OpenAI, because in that event an allegation of breach of confidentiality rules alone would not suffice for trade secret protection to apply. The third scenario is that, if unlawful acquisition or transfer of a trade secret were established, the possibility of applying Article 210 of the Criminal Code would arise. The fourth scenario is that the civil dispute focuses not on the entire partnership, but on specific data flows: recruitment communications, employee exit procedures, access rights, and whether those measures were reasonable under Article 1.116(1)(3) of the Civil Code. In practical terms, this case is most significant for technology companies that simultaneously cooperate and compete, because the cited sources show that protection depends on the precise status of the information, its value by reason of secrecy, and the existence of an actual protection regime

Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the conduct of a 23-year-old driver, who was found to have a blood alcohol concentration of 2.18 per mille while driving a Toyota, constitutes the criminal offence provided for in Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. This provision applies to a person who drove a motor vehicle while intoxicated, where a blood alcohol concentration of 1.51 per mille or more was established, and provides for a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. The basis for liability must also be assessed under Article 2(1), (3) and (4) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania: the act must be prohibited by the criminal law in force, the person must be culpable, and the act committed must correspond to the elements of a criminal offence. Intoxication in itself does not exempt a person from liability, since Article 19(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania provides that a person who commits a criminal offence while intoxicated by alcohol is not exempt from criminal liability. At the same time, Article 281(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania must be distinguished, as it would be relevant only if, as a result of a violation of road traffic safety or vehicle operation rules committed by an intoxicated driver, another person’s health were mildly impaired or substantial property damage were caused to the injured party

Legal assessment. On the facts provided, the 2.18 per mille reading clearly exceeds the 1.51 per mille threshold established in Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania; therefore, the mere act of driving a motor vehicle at that level of intoxication falls within the scope of criminal liability. The fact that the vehicle knocked down a fence and entered the yard of a private house does not preclude the application of Article 2811, since the essence of this offence is driving at an established criminalised level of intoxication. Article 2811(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania is also relevant, because a person is liable where the act referred to in paragraph 1 of that Article is committed through negligence. Accordingly, a defence position based solely on the assertion that the driver did not intend to cause an accident or damage the fence would not, under the applicable provisions, eliminate liability for the act of driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 2.18 per mille. Article 19(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania means that the fact of alcohol consumption is not a circumstance excluding liability; on the contrary, in this offence it is the principal criterion of criminalisation. Qualification under Article 281(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania could be considered only if the consequences specified therein were present; however, the reported knocking down of a fence does not in itself establish that “substantial property damage” was caused within the meaning of that provision. Article 282 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania is not the central provision in this situation, because paragraph 1 of that Article concerns a person who, without driving a vehicle, violated transport traffic order or safety rules, whereas the conduct described here is specifically that of the driver. Procedurally, the pre-trial investigation that has been commenced must be based on data concerning the fact of driving, the motor vehicle, the established intoxication, and the circumstances of the incident. Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania allows the suspect, defence counsel, victim, civil claimant and other persons, on their own initiative, to submit objects and documents relevant to the investigation and examination of the criminal offence. For the owner of the private house, documents and physical evidence substantiating the damage to the fence, the cost of repair and the circumstances of the incident are therefore of practical importance. If procedural time limits are set, they are calculated in accordance with Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania: time limits may be set in hours, days and months, and a time limit calculated in days expires at 24:00 on the final day. Measures of restraint are permissible only for procedural purposes, since Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania links them to ensuring participation in the proceedings, the unhindered conduct of the investigation, examination of the case, enforcement of the judgment, and prevention of new criminal offences. Under Article 120(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, such measures include detention, house arrest, bail, seizure of documents, an obligation to report periodically to a police authority, and a written undertaking not to leave. In relation to compensation for property damage, the sources provided indicate that the rules on the administration of damage caused during a road traffic accident and the payment of insurance compensation regulate the administration of damage and the procedure for payment of compensation where civil liability arises for the vehicle operator. Those rules also state that damage is assessed and compensation is paid in respect of insured events caused by vehicle operators in the Republic of Lithuania. The sources provided on compulsory civil liability insurance for vehicle operators emphasise that damage caused by the at-fault driver is compensated by the insurance undertaking that insured that driver’s civil liability, or by the Motor Insurers’ Bureau of the Republic of Lithuania, to the extent that the person responsible for the road traffic accident would be required to compensate the damage. The same sources, with respect to damage to property, emphasise the restorative purpose of compensation and indicate that, under the regulatory material provided, non-pecuniary damage is not compensated where only property damage has been caused. Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania sets out the grounds for terminating a pre-trial investigation, including situations where insufficient data are collected to substantiate the suspect’s guilt, or where insignificance, reconciliation or release on surety is applied under the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code

Consequences. The most realistic course of the case, on the facts indicated, is the continuation of the pre-trial investigation for driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 1.51 per mille or more, as provided for in Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. If guilt were proven, the range of sanctions under this provision would include a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. If the investigation were to establish the consequences specified in Article 281(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, in particular substantial property damage to the injured party, the legal assessment could become more serious under that provision. For the owner of the private property, the practically most important issue is not only the outcome of criminal liability, but also substantiation of the damage to the fence and other property, since the administration of the claim and any potential insurance payment will depend on it. For the driver, it is important that, under the regulatory framework provided, the 2.18 per mille reading moves the situation from the administrative intoxication threshold into the sphere of criminal liability, and intoxication does not exempt him from liability under Article 19(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. The final procedural outcome will depend on whether sufficient data are collected concerning the driving, the determination of intoxication, culpability and the consequences of the incident, and procedural decisions will have to be taken in compliance with the rules laid down in Articles 98, 99, 100, 119, 120 and 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania

Core issue. The legal issue is whether the violent acts that occurred on Laisvės Avenue were properly classified not only as non-serious impairment of health, but also as non-serious impairment of health committed for hooligan motives and as a breach of public order. This issue is assessed under Article 138(1) and Article 138(2)(8) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 138(1) of the Criminal Code covers injury to, or causing illness in, a person where the victim loses a minor part of working capacity or is ill for a prolonged period, but where the consequences of serious impairment of health specified in Article 135(1) of the Criminal Code are absent. Article 138(2)(8) of the Criminal Code classifies the same act more severely where the non-serious injury is committed for hooligan motives, and permits the imposition of imprisonment for up to five years. The constituent elements of breach of public order under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code require that, in a public place, by brazen conduct, threats, mockery or acts of vandalism, disrespect is demonstrated towards others or the environment and public peace or order is disturbed. At the appellate stage, the legal framework of the dispute is Article 328(1)–(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, because a judgment may be amended due to improper application of the criminal law, an unjust sentence, or court findings inconsistent with the circumstances of the case

Legal assessment. The convicted persons’ argument that there were no hooligan motives directly targets Article 138(2)(8) of the Criminal Code, because if that element were removed, the act would remain within the scope of Article 138(1) of the Criminal Code, where the maximum penalty is imprisonment for up to three years rather than up to five years. However, the issue of classification under Article 138 of the Criminal Code alone does not resolve the application of Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code, because breach of public order protects a different legal interest: public peace and order in a public place. The cited sources indicate that brazen conduct or malicious mockery in a public place, where disrespect is demonstrated towards others or the environment and public peace or order is disturbed, falls within the breach of public order provided for in Article 284 of the Criminal Code and may be classified independently or as a concurrence of offences. Accordingly, the fight on Laisvės Avenue is legally significant not only because of the victim’s health, but also because of whether public peace or order was disturbed in a public place. The criteria for the extent of non-serious impairment of health set out in the sources are linked to a health impairment lasting more than 10 days or to a loss of working capacity of more than 5 percent but less than 30 percent. Article 135(1) of the Criminal Code is relevant in this case as a delimiting provision, because Article 138 of the Criminal Code applies where the consequences of serious impairment of health are absent, such as loss of sight, hearing, speech or fertility, severe mutilation, or loss of a substantial part of working capacity. Article 139 of the Criminal Code, concerning non-serious impairment of health through negligence, is not the central provision according to the information provided, because the charge is described as intentional non-serious impairment of health committed for hooligan motives. The severity of the penalties should be assessed under Article 55 of the Criminal Code: for a person tried for the first time for a negligent offence or for a non-serious or less serious intentional offence, the court generally imposes penalties not involving arrest or fixed-term imprisonment, and if it imposes arrest or fixed-term imprisonment, it must provide reasons for that decision. This means that custodial sentences are not excluded as such, but their imposition in a case of this type must be justified by specific reasons. The prosecutor’s appeal procedurally permits issues to be raised concerning both the leniency of the sentence and the legal classification, while the convicted persons’ appeals may challenge the element of hooligan motives and the sentences. Under Article 328 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appellate court may amend the judgment if it finds improper application of the criminal law or an unjust sentence. Under Article 327 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a conviction is quashed and the proceedings are terminated only where the specified grounds exist precluding criminal proceedings or releasing the person from criminal liability. Under Article 329 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a new judgment may be adopted if the appellate court concludes that it has not been proven that the accused participated in the commission of the criminal act, or that no act was committed containing the elements of a crime or criminal misdemeanour

Consequences. In practical terms, several procedural outcomes are possible: the appeals may be dismissed, the judgment may be amended, or, where the grounds specified in Articles 327 or 329 of the Code of Criminal Procedure exist, it may be quashed. If the appellate court finds that hooligan motives have been proven, the classification under Article 138(2)(8) of the Criminal Code remains in place, and any increase in the severity of the sentences may be assessed under Article 328(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as an issue of the justice of the sentence. If hooligan motives are removed, that would directly mitigate the classification of the health impairment, but would not in itself preclude the application of Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code if the elements of breach of public order remain. For the convicted persons, the key issue is whether the appellate court will uphold the custodial sentences, increase them, reduce them, or change the legal classification. For the victims and the public, it is significant that violence committed in a public place is assessed under Article 284 of the Criminal Code not merely as a consequence of a private conflict, but also as a breach of public peace or order. If a cassation appeal were lodged after the appeal, Article 382 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania provides for the cassation court’s powers to dismiss the appeal, quash procedural decisions, remit the case for fresh examination, or amend the judgment or ruling

Core issue. The legal issue is not political confidence in the Twenty-First Government, but whether the Seimas’ approval of its programme could lawfully confer authority on the Government to act if the procedure for submitting the programme to the Seimas did not comply with Article 6 of the Law on the Government of the Republic of Lithuania. Under Article 6 of the Law on the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, the Prime Minister, no later than within 15 days of appointment, presents to the Seimas the formed Government approved by the President of the Republic and submits its programme for consideration, while a new Government acquires authority to act only when the Seimas, by a majority vote of the members participating in the sitting, approves its programme. A dispute concerning the constitutionality of such a resolution of the Seimas could be brought before the Constitutional Court under Article 106 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, because not less than one-fifth of all members of the Seimas have the right to apply concerning the acts referred to in the first paragraph of Article 105. The content and formal requirements of the petition are set out in Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania: it must indicate the contested legal act, the grounds for hearing the case, the applicant’s position, and the legal reasoning

Legal assessment. In this situation, the decisive line is between the mere registration of the programme and the actual submission of the programme to the Seimas for consideration, because Article 6 of the Law on the Government reflects not only the logic of technical submission, but also that of parliamentary consideration. If the Constitutional Court were to hold that the programme must not only be registered but also presented in a timely manner at a sitting of the Seimas and submitted for consideration, the Seimas resolution approving the programme would be assessed through the prism of a breach of the procedure for conferring authority. If the mere fact of submitting the programme to the Seimas were sufficient, a conclusion more favourable to the Government could be possible on the basis that Article 6 of the Law on the Government links the acquisition of authority to the Seimas vote on the programme. It is important for the opposition to collect the signatures of not less than one-fifth of all members of the Seimas, because Article 106 of the Constitution grants precisely such a right to apply to the Constitutional Court. Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court requires that a petition by a group of members of the Seimas be signed by all applying members of the Seimas, indicate their representative, and have the signatures certified by the Speaker of the Seimas or a Deputy Speaker. Representation in such a case is further specified in Article 32 of the Law on the Constitutional Court: a group of members of the Seimas is represented by the member or members of the Seimas indicated in the petition. Article 106 of the Constitution also allows the Constitutional Court to refuse to accept an application if it is based on non-legal grounds; therefore, the applicants should formulate the dispute not as political dissatisfaction, but as a breach of a procedural condition for conferring authority. A similar issue had already been raised by Government Resolution No. 1429 of 18 December 1997, which requested an examination of whether the Seimas Resolution of 10 December 1996 “On the Programme of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania” was contrary to Article 92(4) of the Constitution. In the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 10 January 1998 “On the Compliance of the Resolution of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania of 10 December 1996 ‘On the Programme of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania’ with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania,” it was emphasised that conferring authority on the Government to act and supervising its activities constitute an important area of the Seimas’ competence. In the same context of constitutional jurisprudence, it was stated that the Government is a collegial institution of general competence and occupies a special place in the system of executive power; therefore, the procedure by which its authority arises is not merely an internal technical formality. Article 22 of the Law on the Government demonstrates the practical significance of this procedure: only a Government possessing authority implements the Government Programme, approves the plan for implementing its provisions, and coordinates the activities of ministries and Government agencies. Article 19 of the Law on Strategic Management extends that connection, because the Government Programme is prepared and approved in accordance with the Law on the Government, and its implementation is coordinated by the Government

Consequences. If the Constitutional Court were to find that the Seimas’ approval of the programme was adopted in breach of the procedure laid down in Article 6 of the Law on the Government, the practical question would be how to restore the lawful chain for conferring authority. The most realistic course under the cited rules would be to return to the procedure for considering the programme and obtaining the Seimas’ approval, because a new Government acquires authority precisely through the Seimas’ approval of its programme. If the Seimas does not approve the programme, Article 6 of the Law on the Government provides that the Prime Minister must submit a new programme for consideration no later than within 15 days from the date of non-approval. If the Seimas twice in succession does not approve the programme of the newly formed Government, the Government must resign under Article 101 of the Constitution. If the Constitutional Court were to dismiss the petition or not find a procedural breach, the Seimas’ approval of the programme would remain the basis for the Government to act under Articles 6 and 22 of the Law on the Government. In practical terms, this is important not only for the Prime Minister and ministers, but also for the Seimas, because the Seimas’ decision on the programme is a constitutionally significant form of conferring authority on the Government. It is also important for ministries and the Government Chancellery, because Article 19 of the Law on Strategic Management links the implementation of the Government Programme, the preparation of the plan, monitoring, and evaluation to a lawfully approved programme

Core issue. The precise legal issue is not merely the liability of the minor who committed the violence, but whether the prevention and child supervision system of the municipality, school, police, child rights protection authorities, and other institutions operated as required by law. It must be assessed under Article 29(1)-(5), Article 60(1)-(2), and Article 23 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child, as well as Articles 11, 12, 18, 21, and 27 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Minimum and Medium Care of the Child. Article 1(1)-(2) of the Law Amending the Law on Minimum and Medium Care of the Child defines the purpose of this system: it is intended for the socialisation, education, and support of a child with behavioural problems, while also taking account of public safety needs. The essential normative criterion is the principles laid down in Article 4 of the Law Amending the Law on Minimum and Medium Care of the Child: the primacy of the child’s interests and welfare, hearing the child, individualisation, developing responsibility for one’s conduct, non-separation from the family, and implementation of measures as close as possible to the child’s place of residence. Accordingly, the public question of why prevention is not working legally entails an examination of whether preventive work was properly coordinated, whether violence and social risk factors were identified in time, and whether minimum or medium care measures should have been initiated

Legal assessment. Article 29(1) of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child imposes an obligation to protect a child from criminal acts provided for in the Criminal Code, while Article 29(2) additionally protects a child from all forms of violence, even where no criminal liability is prescribed for such conduct. Under Article 29(3) of the same law, any natural or legal person who becomes aware of a child harmed by such an act and of a possible need for assistance must notify the police and/or the State Child Rights Protection and Adoption Service or its territorial division. The fact that persons nearby observed and filmed the incident is legally relevant insofar as it relates to this reporting obligation and to the protection of the child from the demonstration of violence under Article 29(2)-(3) of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child. Under Article 29(4), liability for violations of children’s rights falling within the sphere of criminal acts is applied in accordance with the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, while liability for other acts of violence and rights violations is applied in accordance with the Code of Administrative Offences, the Civil Code, and other laws. The issue of institutional managers’ liability arises from Article 29(5): heads and employees of educational, healthcare, and other institutions under whose supervision a child is placed are liable if they fail to perform their duties or perform them improperly and thereby violate the rights of the child. The municipal level is central here, because Article 60(1) of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child links child rights protection in municipalities with municipal councils, executive institutions, child rights protection institutions, police officers responsible for juvenile matters, schools, and other institutions that develop and implement measures for the prevention of violations of children’s rights. Article 11(1) of the Law on Minimum and Medium Care of the Child assigns to the municipal administration’s preventive work coordination group the task of coordinating the implementation of social education, rehabilitation, prevention, and other programmes in the municipality, as well as interinstitutional cooperation. Under Article 11(2), such a group is composed of representatives of the territorial police, child rights protection, social services, education, health, and other institutions involved in prevention. Under Article 11(3), it collects information necessary for a decision on minimum or medium care measures, coordinates prevention programmes, and coordinates the activities of school preventive work groups. The functions of the interinstitutional cooperation coordinator under Article 29(1)(1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Law Amending the Law on Minimum and Medium Care of the Child No. X-1238 include planning the implementation of measures, analysing the causes of violence and crime, assessing the accessibility of services, and reporting annually to the director of the municipal administration. The procedure for applying individual measures depends on the municipality of the child’s place of residence. Under Article 9 of the Law Amending the Law on Minimum and Medium Care of the Child, minimum and medium care measures are imposed on a child by the director of the administration of the municipality of the child’s permanent place of residence, on the proposal of the municipal administration’s child welfare commission, and certain measures require court authorisation. Article 11 of the Law Amending the Law on Minimum and Medium Care of the Child No. X-1238 also identifies the director of the municipal administration as the institution imposing minimum and medium care measures and assistance to the child’s legal representatives. Under Article 12(2) of the Law on Minimum and Medium Care of the Child, applications for minimum care measures may be submitted by the interinstitutional cooperation coordinator, the child’s legal representatives, the territorial police authority, the school, the eldership, the prosecutor, the court, and the institution examining an administrative offence case. The grounds for minimum care under Article 8(1) of the Law Amending the Law on Minimum and Medium Care of the Child and Article 10(1) of the Law Amending Law No. X-1238 include cases where a child commits an act bearing the elements of a crime, criminal misdemeanour, or administrative offence, but ordinary liability is not applicable due to age or other reasons specified by law. If measures are imposed, the child’s legal representatives, under Article 18(1)-(2) of the Law on Minimum and Medium Care of the Child, have the right to receive information and assistance and to lodge complaints with competent institutions, but they must also participate in the preparation and implementation of the individual plan and provide the necessary information

Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that law enforcement continues the process already initiated, while child rights protection and municipal institutions separately assess what assistance and supervision are required for the victim, the minor who committed the violence, and their legal representatives. The second scenario is that, at municipal level, the preventive work coordination structure provided for in Article 11 of the Law on Minimum and Medium Care of the Child is activated; it collects information, assesses the actions of the school, police, child rights protection authorities, and social services, and submits proposals on measures. The third scenario is that, under Article 12 of the Law on Minimum and Medium Care of the Child, one of the authorised institutions applies for minimum or medium care measures, and the decision is taken in the municipality of the child’s place of residence, in compliance with the principles of individualisation and the primacy of the child’s interests. The fourth scenario is that, if there were grounds for medium care or an educational-impact measure, the practical significance would shift to the functions of a child socialisation centre under Article 21 of the Law on Minimum and Medium Care of the Child: education, resocialisation, social integration, safety, and behavioural monitoring. The questioning of institutional managers referred to by the Prime Minister is practically significant because, under Article 29(5) of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child, failure to perform duties or improper performance of duties is not merely a matter of political assessment. At ministerial level, the consequences may relate to legislation and the organisation of services, because Article 27 of the Law on Minimum and Medium Care of the Child assigns ministries the role of participating in policy formation, coordinating its implementation, and submitting proposals to the Government and municipalities. For the victim and her representatives, the most practically important matter is the protection from violence and the duty to notify competent institutions established in Article 29 of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child; in the case of the minor who committed the violence, it is not declaratory punishment, but the statutory mechanism of responsibility, assistance, supervision, and resocialisation. For the municipality and the school, this case is significant as a test of their prevention system under Article 60 of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child and Articles 11 and 29 of the Law on Minimum and Medium Care of the Child. The legally significant conclusion is that the sources provided require not only a response after violence has occurred, but also the continuous collection and analysis of risk factors, coordination, and the application of individual measures to the child and his or her representatives

Core issue. The legal issue is not whether the European Commission’s assessment itself changes the financing of Lithuanian courts, but what obligations the existing regime of financial and material guarantees for the courts creates for state institutions. This issue is to be resolved under Article 11 of the Law on Courts of the Republic of Lithuania, which links the autonomy and independence of courts to financial and material guarantees; Articles 126–128 of the Law on Courts, which establish the source of financing, the preparation of draft budgets, and material and technical provision; and Article 7 of the Law Amending the Law on Administrative Proceedings of the Republic of Lithuania No. VIII-1029, concerning the independence of courts and judges in the administration of justice. Article 126 of the Law on Courts provides that courts are financed from the State budget and that each court has a separate expenditure estimate. Article 127 of the Law on Courts lays down the procedure: draft budgets and investment programmes are prepared by the appropriation managers, namely the courts; their proposals are submitted to the Judicial Council; and, once approved, they are submitted to the Government, except for the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Administrative Court, which submit their drafts directly to the Government. Article 11(3) of the Law on Courts further prohibits the deterioration of the financial and material technical conditions for court operations provided for by law, unless the economic and financial situation of the State substantially deteriorates and the Seimas reviews those conditions

Legal assessment. The problem of insufficient funding identified by the Commission legally falls within the scope of Article 11(1) of the Law on Courts, because that provision identifies financial and material guarantees as a means of ensuring the autonomy and independence of the courts. Article 11(2) of the Law on Courts requires material and technical provision to correspond to scientific and technological progress, but that requirement is linked to the State’s economic capacity; accordingly, the funding issue must be addressed through the budgetary procedure rather than merely through a declaratory political assessment. As appropriation managers, courts have the primary obligation under Article 127(1) of the Law on Courts to prepare their draft budgets and investment programmes, meaning that their needs relating to staff, judges, and infrastructure must be formalised precisely at that stage. Under Article 127(2) of the Law on Courts, the role of the Judicial Council is to approve the proposals submitted by the courts and submit them to the Government; it therefore acts as an institutional link defending the justification of the needs of the court system as a whole. Under Article 127(3) of the Law on Courts, the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Administrative Court have a more autonomous route, as they submit their draft budgets directly to the Government. Decisions of the Government and the Seimas concerning the State budget cannot be assessed separately from the prohibition in Article 11(3) of the Law on Courts against worsening the financial and material technical conditions for court operations provided for by law. If a reduction or failure to ensure funding amounted to such a deterioration of conditions, it would have to be based specifically on the premise set out in that provision: a substantial deterioration in the State’s economic and financial situation and a review by the Seimas. At the level of implementation of material and technical provision, Article 128(1) of the Law on Courts assigns to court presidents the duty to organise and ensure such provision in accordance with approved expenditure estimates and, in the case of centrally procured goods and services, to the National Courts Administration. Article 128(2) of the Law on Courts assigns approval of draft investment programmes to the Judicial Council and management of State investment programmes to the Ministry of Justice; funding decisions are therefore not a matter within the competence of a single entity. Article 7(1) of the Law Amending the Law on Administrative Proceedings No. VIII-1029 requires judges and courts to decide cases under conditions that do not create opportunities for judges to be influenced externally; accordingly, long-term insufficient funding is legally significant insofar as it affects the conditions for the independent administration of justice. In its ruling of 21 December 1999 in case No. 16/98, as indicated in the sources provided, the Constitutional Court held that, having regard to the functions performed by a judge, a judge cannot be classified as a civil servant; this is important when assessing remuneration and social guarantees, because the status of judges is not an ordinary segment of civil service funding. In its decision No. KT16-S9/2016 of 16 May 2016, the Constitutional Court emphasised that the constitutional function of courts is to administer justice, and therefore other activities of judges must not impede the proper and effective performance of that duty; this reinforces the argument that issues of human resources and workload must be addressed in a manner that does not weaken the core function of the courts. Article 12 of the Law on Courts also shows that the Lithuanian court system is a unified system of courts of general jurisdiction and specialised courts established by law, and therefore the funding problem is not merely a matter of the internal administration of an individual court

Consequences. The immediate legal path is to raise budgetary needs through the procedure established in Article 127 of the Law on Courts: drafts prepared by the courts, approval by the Judicial Council, and submission to the Government, or direct applications to the Government by the highest courts. The practical significance for court presidents follows from Article 128(1) of the Law on Courts, because they must ensure material and technical provision in accordance with approved estimates, although their actions depend on the limits of approved funding. For the National Courts Administration, the relevant aspect is centralised procurement and the provision of courts’ needs; for the Ministry of Justice, it is the management of State investment programmes under Article 128(2) of the Law on Courts. For the Judicial Council, this information is practically significant as a basis, at the stage of approving budgetary and investment needs, for substantiating that funding is not only an administrative or operational matter, but also a matter of guarantees of judicial independence. For the Seimas, Article 11(3) of the Law on Courts is significant: deterioration of the financial and material technical conditions of the courts is permissible only on the basis specified there and through a review, where the economic and financial situation of the State has substantially deteriorated. If funding is increased or stabilised, the legal course will be consistent with the logic of Articles 11 and 126–128 of the Law on Courts: ensuring, through State budget funds, the conditions necessary for court autonomy and the effective administration of justice. If the funding problem remains unresolved, the principal legal risk under the provisions cited would not be the negative assessment itself, but the possible weakening of financial and material guarantees linked to judicial independence and the effective hearing of cases. In practical terms, this is most important for participants in proceedings, because the equality before the law and the courts enshrined in Article 2 of the Law on Courts operates in reality only when the court system has sufficient organisational and material conditions to administer justice equally and in a timely manner

Core issue. The legal issue is not whether a person convicted of sexual offences against children deserves a more lenient regime, but under what conditions the state may release him on parole and what measures it must use to manage the risk of his reoffending. This issue is determined primarily under Article 157 of the Republic of Lithuania Code on the Execution of Sentences, which permits conditional release where the risk of the convicted person’s criminal conduct is low or where he has made evident progress in reducing that risk. Article 157(1) of the Code on the Execution of Sentences also links conditional release to the portion of the sentence already served: one third, one half, or two thirds of the sentence, depending on the category of the convicted person and the length of the sentence imposed. The probation regime is defined in Article 2(5) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Probation as a conditional alternative to a sentence of arrest or imprisonment, including conditional release from a custodial institution. Accordingly, a released person is not simply “free without conditions”: under Article 2(6), (8) and (9) of the Law on Probation, probation conditions, behavioural control and supervision apply to him. The direction of these measures is established by Article 4 of the Law on Probation: the aim is effective resocialisation and reduction of recidivism, while the principles require a balance between the probationer’s resocialisation and public safety

Legal assessment. Under the cited provisions, the fact of a sexual offence against a child does not in itself preclude conditional release, provided that the criteria of risk, progress and portion of the sentence served, as laid down in Article 157 of the Code on the Execution of Sentences, are met. However, the release of such a convicted person is legally meaningful only where, after release, an individual supervision plan for the probationer, as provided for in Article 2(1) of the Law on Probation, is actually implemented, setting out the procedure, measures and time limits for supervision. Risk assessment must be not an impression but a standardised examination, since Article 2(4) of the Law on Probation defines assessment of the risk of criminal conduct as an examination of the likelihood of the convicted person’s criminal conduct and the possibilities for reducing that likelihood. The Probation Service’s selection of different obligations according to the person’s lifestyle, relationships, addictions, income and prior conduct is consistent with Article 4(2)(2) of the Law on Probation, under which measures are individualised having regard to personality, conduct, risk assessment results and other circumstances relevant to resocialisation. Electronic monitoring by ankle tag falls legally within Article 22(1)(4) and Article 22(2) of the Law on Probation, which allow electronic monitoring measures to be used to monitor compliance with probation conditions where this ensures more effective behavioural control. Restrictions on routes of movement, prohibitions on being in certain places, prohibitions on communicating with specific persons, or an obligation to be at home at certain times should be regarded as measures for controlling compliance with probation conditions under Article 2(6) and (8) and Article 22(1) of the Law on Probation. The obligation to attend behaviour-change programmes is consistent with Article 2(10) of the Law on Probation, because resocialisation includes measures promoting the ability to live without offending and social integration. The competence of the Lithuanian Probation Service in this situation also arises from Article 10(1) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Activities of Correctional Officers: it implements resocialisation and recidivism-reduction measures for probationers, controls their behaviour, and examines the social environment and criminogenic factors. The role of the Lithuanian Prison Service before release is linked to Article 10(2) of the Law on the Activities of Correctional Officers, under which it carries out social work with convicted persons and implements resocialisation and recidivism-reduction measures for convicted persons serving custodial sentences. If the probationer complies with the conditions, Article 30(1) of the Law on Probation establishes a clear consequence: upon expiry of the conditional release period, he is deemed to have served the sentence. If the conditions are not complied with, Article 30(2) of the Law on Probation allows the court, upon a submission by the Probation Service, to extend the term, impose additional impact measures, or revoke conditional release and enforce the remaining part of the sentence. The legality-supervision chain is not merely an internal matter for the Probation Service: under Article 32 of the Law on Probation, its probation activities are supervised by courts, prosecutors, the Seimas Ombudspersons, the Equal Opportunities Ombudsperson, the Ombudsperson for Children’s Rights, the Ministry of Justice, the Prison Department and other state institutions in accordance with law. Of the provisions cited, the child-protection aspect is most clearly based on Article 4(2)(1) of the Law on Probation, because in such cases the need for public safety also includes protection of the victimised child from the risk of repeated contact. The concept of a protection measure is also defined in Article 2(2) of the Law “On Mutual Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions of the Member States of the European Union in Criminal Matters” as prohibitions or obligations intended to protect a protected person from danger to life, physical or mental integrity, dignity, personal liberty or sexual integrity

Consequences. In practice, the first scenario is orderly conditional release: the convicted person meets the conditions of Article 157 of the Code on the Execution of Sentences, an individual supervision plan is drawn up for him, and electronic monitoring, a behaviour-change programme, employment or treatment obligations, and restrictions on contacts and routes are applied. In such a case, the main legal work shifts from the court or custodial institution to the implementation of probation, because the real risk is reduced not by the fact of release itself, but by the control provided for in Article 22 of the Law on Probation and the resocialisation defined in Article 2(10). The second scenario is adjustment of probation conditions, where the person formally complies with the principal obligations but his conduct or breaches indicate a need for additional control; in that case, under Article 30(2) of the Law on Probation, the court may, upon a submission by the Probation Service, impose additional obligations or impact measures. The third scenario is revocation of conditional release if the probationer fails, without justified reasons, to comply with the conditions or, after additional conditions have been imposed, continues not to comply with them; in that event, under Article 30(2)(3) of the Law on Probation, the remaining part of the custodial sentence is enforced. For victimised children and their environment, this framework is practically important because individual probation conditions may become the principal instrument for restricting the convicted person’s movement, contacts and presence in places connected with the child’s daily life. For the Probation Service, this situation entails a duty to justify each restriction by reference to risk assessment and proportionality, because Article 4(2)(3) of the Law on Probation prohibits excessive restriction of rights but permits measures necessary to achieve the aim of probation. For courts and supervisory institutions, this is important as a matter of control: under Article 32 of the Law on Probation, they must assess whether probation is being implemented lawfully, not merely formally. The nearest practical tension will be between the right to conditional release under Article 157 of the Code on the Execution of Sentences and the need, through individual probation conditions, to ensure that release does not become an uncontrolled return to an environment in which the victimised child lives

Core issue. The precise legal issue is not whether the Food Council politically “met expectations”, but which body, under the cited provisions, has competence to change the model for consultation on food-sector matters. This issue must be assessed under Article 3(1) and (2), Article 4(1) and (2), and Article 5(1)–(3) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Agriculture, Food Sector and Rural Development, as well as under Article 8 and Article 9(1)–(2) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Food. Article 4(1) of the Law on Agriculture, Food Sector and Rural Development clearly assigns policy formation to the Ministry of Agriculture, and implementation to other authorised institutions and bodies within their respective competence. Article 4(2) of the same law establishes a duty to cooperate with associations of agricultural and food producers, purchasers and processors, as well as with advisory, research and education organisations. Accordingly, discontinuing the Food Council is legally possible only insofar as it does not remove the duty of cooperation itself and does not infringe the competences of institutions established by law. It is separately important that Article 5(3) of the Law on Agriculture, Food Sector and Rural Development expressly provides for the Lithuanian Rural Network Council, its public basis, and the approval of its composition and regulations by the Ministry of Agriculture, whereas the cited provisions contain no equivalent express statutory provision establishing the Food Council

Legal assessment. The Minister’s intention to propose to the Government that the current Food Council format be discontinued is based primarily on the role of the Ministry of Agriculture in forming agriculture, food-sector and rural-development policy under Article 4(1) of the Law on Agriculture, Food Sector and Rural Development. If the council operates as a consultative mechanism for policy formation, its format is not an autonomous policy objective, but a means of implementing the cooperation established in Article 4(2). That provision does not require the State to maintain a council with a specific name or specific composition, but it does require cooperation with producers, purchasers, processors, associations, and research, advisory and education organisations. Therefore, the Minister’s proposed return to an advisory-council model is not, in itself, contrary to the cited provisions, provided that it preserves a genuine opportunity to consult with these groups. Article 3(2)(1) of the Law on Agriculture, Food Sector and Rural Development allows food-sector measures to be assessed by reference to the objective of creating competitive and efficient sectors, while Article 3(2)(5) allows assessment by reference to the supply to the market of safe, good-quality food products in a broad assortment. However, the cited provisions do not identify price reduction as a separate autonomous objective; accordingly, the assessment of “tangible results” in relation to prices is a matter of political and administrative expediency, rather than a result directly formulated in statute. The Government’s competence under Article 8 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Food is to prepare and approve the State strategy for food safety, quality and improvement of public nutrition, and to perform other functions related to food safety and control. This means that, according to the cited sources, the Government’s role is linked primarily to food safety, quality, nutrition and control, rather than to the political assessment of an advisory format as an end in itself. The competence of the Ministry of Health under Article 9(2) of the Law on Food includes the formation and coordination of food-safety policy and policy for the prevention of diseases related to food and nutrition, as well as a broad regulatory area covering safety, hygiene, consumer information and other requirements. Therefore, changing the consultative format cannot take over or narrow the food-safety competence assigned to the Ministry of Health. Under paragraph 1 of the regulations approved by Government Resolution No. 744, the State Food and Veterinary Service is a Government body, and under paragraph 8.1 of those regulations its objective is to implement policy on the supervision of food safety, quality and handling. Under the regulation reflected in paragraphs 9.1 and 9.2 of the same regulations, the Service performs supervisory functions; therefore, abolishing the Food Council would not alter the legal status of the SFVS as a control authority. Article 126 of the Law on Food regulates appeals against SFVS decisions imposing fines within 20 days in accordance with the procedure established by the Law on Administrative Proceedings; therefore, that procedure would be relevant only to specific supervisory decisions, not to the change of the consultative format itself. The model of the Lithuanian Rural Network Council under Article 5(3) of the Law on Agriculture, Food Sector and Rural Development shows that, where the legislature wishes to establish a body operating on a public basis, it expressly provides for its formation, purpose, composition and approval of its regulations. This comparison is important: the cited sources contain no analogous statutory status for the Food Council, and therefore, under the visible provisions, changing its format should be assessed as a matter of institutional consultation arrangements, not as the abolition of a body guaranteed by statute

Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the Government approves the Minister’s proposal and cooperation on food-sector matters continues through a ministerial advisory model, while preserving the involvement of the social, business and research partners referred to in Article 4(2) of the Law on Agriculture, Food Sector and Rural Development. The second scenario is that the current format is retained, but its composition, tasks or working procedures are adjusted so that it better corresponds to the food-sector policy objectives set out in Article 3(2). The third scenario is that the Government or the Ministry separates the issue of prices from issues of food safety, quality and control, because under Articles 8 and 9 of the Law on Food, food safety and nutrition have clearly defined institutional directions. In practical terms, this is important for producers, purchasers, processors and their associations, because their legitimate interest is not the name of a particular council, but the opportunity to participate in a cooperation mechanism under Article 4(2) of the Law on Agriculture, Food Sector and Rural Development. It is also important for research, advisory and education organisations, because their involvement in cooperation on policy implementation is expressly identified in the law. For consumers, the most significant consequence is that a change in the consultative format must not reduce the food safety, quality, hygiene, information and control functions which, under Articles 8 and 9 of the Law on Food and the SFVS regulations, remain assigned to the competent institutions. The strongest legal basis for a future decision would not be an abstract statement that the council “failed to meet expectations”, but a clear demonstration of how the new consultation model will continue to ensure the cooperation and division of competences established by law

Core issue. The precise legal issue is how, for corporate income tax purposes, to treat a company’s expenses where it pays for a manager’s participation in the INSEAD component in France of the ISM Executive MBA programme. It is assessed under Article 17(1), Article 17(2)(3), (4) and (8), Article 26(1), and Article 31(1)(5), (9), (10) and (13) of the Law on Corporate Income Tax of the Republic of Lithuania. The employee income aspect is linked to Article 9(1)(4) of the Law on Personal Income Tax of the Republic of Lithuania. If the expenses were incurred not by the employer but by a manager carrying on individual activity, the assessment would be made under Article 18(1) and (2) of the Law on Personal Income Tax and paragraphs 32.5-32.6 of the rules for completing form GPM311. The timing criterion is also important: the information provided was published on 21 July 2026, so the applicable provisions must be assessed for expenses of the 2026 tax period, while the effective dates of amendments indicated in the sources cover earlier periods or 2025 and subsequent periods

Legal assessment. Under Article 17(1) of the Law on Corporate Income Tax, a company may recognise as deductible expenses the ordinary expenses actually incurred for such activity, which are necessary for earning income or obtaining economic benefit. In this situation, the manager’s study expenses may be linked to economic benefit, because the information states that the programme is intended for senior executives, strategic decision-making, governance, growth, sustainability and long-term value. The more specific rule is Article 26(1) of the Law on Corporate Income Tax: amounts paid directly to schools for the education of natural persons related to the company by employment relationships may be deducted from income where, upon completion, those persons acquire higher education and/or a qualification, provided that such education or qualification is necessary for earning the company’s income. The practical focus is therefore not merely that the studies take place at INSEAD, but whether the company makes the payment directly to the educational institution, whether the participant is an employee, whether completion results in a qualification or higher education, and whether that qualification is necessary for earning the specific company’s income. Article 9(1)(4) of the Law on Personal Income Tax provides that a resident’s benefit is not recognised as income in kind where another person pays educational institutions directly for the resident’s education, upon completion of which the resident acquires post-secondary or higher education and/or a qualification. This is consistent with the second sentence of Article 17(1) of the Law on Corporate Income Tax: expenses incurred for the benefit of employees are treated as deductible expenses if the benefit received by the employee is subject to personal income tax under the Law on Personal Income Tax, although in the case of education a special structure under Article 26(1) of the Law on Corporate Income Tax is apparent. If the individual benefit of a specific employee were undefined, Article 26(2) of the Law on Corporate Income Tax could be relevant, but the information describes clearly identifiable Executive MBA participants and a specific module, so the principal assessment turns on Article 26(1). If the study expenses were classified as business travel, advertising or representation, Article 17(2)(3) and (4) of the Law on Corporate Income Tax would direct them to deductible expenses subject to quantitative limitations; however, on the factual description provided, the education itself is qualification development rather than representation in substance. If the expenses exceeded the limits established for limited deductible expenses, the excess would not be deductible under Article 31(1)(5) of the Law on Corporate Income Tax. If the payments were not supported by evidence, they could not reduce taxable income under Article 31(1)(10) of the Law on Corporate Income Tax. If the studies were paid for as a gift rather than as education related to work and income earning, Article 31(1)(9) of the Law on Corporate Income Tax would create a risk of non-deductibility. If the company could not demonstrate a connection with income earning or the ordinary nature of the activity, the expenses would fall within the scope of Article 31(1)(13) of the Law on Corporate Income Tax as expenses unrelated to income earning and non-ordinary expenses. Article 46¹(1)-(2) of the Law on Corporate Income Tax, concerning investment projects, has no independent basis here, because those provisions concern groups of unused fixed assets such as equipment, computer hardware, software or acquired rights, whereas the information describes executive education and a certificate. The non-taxable income listed in Article 12 of the Law on Corporate Income Tax is likewise not the central rule for this situation, because the information concerns study expenses, not insurance proceeds, penalties or other income received by ISM or the managers and listed in that article. Article 32 of the Law on Corporate and Group Reporting and paragraphs 3.6-3.7 of the rules for preparing the corporate income tax information report may become relevant only at the level of report content, where profit before corporate income tax and accrued corporate income tax must be shown by tax jurisdiction. Article 1 and recital 4 of ATAD 2016/1164 confirm that anti-tax avoidance rules are directed at corporate income taxpayers and their permanent establishments, but the facts provided do not indicate a controlled foreign company situation under Article 7 of ATAD

Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that a Lithuanian company directly pays for the education of its employee-manager, the education is completed with a qualification or higher education, and the company substantiates its necessity for earning income; in that case, the expenses may be treated as deductible expenses under Article 26(1) and Article 17(1) of the Law on Corporate Income Tax. The second scenario is that the education is paid for but is not sufficiently connected with the company’s specific activity, or is presented as a prestigious personal benefit for the manager; in that case, there is a risk that Article 31(1)(13) of the Law on Corporate Income Tax will apply. The third scenario is that payment is not made directly to the educational institution or documents of legal significance are lacking; in that case, the practical risk arises under Article 31(1)(10) of the Law on Corporate Income Tax. The fourth scenario is relevant to a manager acting individually: under Article 18(1) of the Law on Personal Income Tax, the manager could rely only on ordinary expenses related to income actually received or earned from individual activity, while paragraphs 32.5-32.6 of the GPM311 rules would require declaration of expenses actually incurred and supported by documents having legal effect. The greatest practical significance is for companies that send managers to the ISM and INSEAD programme, because they must define in advance the payment model, documentation, the connection between the education and the duties, and the benefit to the company’s income. For managers, what matters is whether education paid for by the employer is not treated as income in kind under Article 9(1)(4) of the Law on Personal Income Tax where the conditions relating to education and the qualification acquired are met. For ISM and INSEAD, this analysis is practically important for the structure of contracts and invoices, because the tax outcome will depend not on the prestige of the partnership, but on whether the educational service, payer, recipient and qualification outcome correspond to the wording of the legislation

Core issue. The precise legal issue is not the historical or political significance of the memorial, but whether Lithuania’s EUR 70,000 contribution to a pan-European memorial in Brussels may lawfully be planned, allocated and used as state budget funds in the field of foreign affairs. This issue is to be assessed primarily under Article 27(1)–(3) of the Law on the Budget Structure of the Republic of Lithuania, concerning the use of appropriations, and Article 33(1)(1)–(3) of that Law, concerning the right of the Government or an institution authorised by it to allocate and reallocate appropriations. Since the matter concerns funding relevant as of 21 July 2026 and the objective of opening the memorial in 2027, the temporal application of the law is material: Article 2(1)–(2) of the Law Amending Law No. I-430 on the Budget Structure provides for entry into force on 1 March 2024 and application to the preparation, approval, implementation, evaluation and control of the budgets for 2025–2027 and subsequent years. If the EUR 70,000 constituted progress funds, their purpose would be limited by Article 27(2) of the Law on the Budget Structure, under which such funds may be used only to finance progress measures, subject to the stated exceptions. If they constituted European Union or other international financial assistance funds or co-financing funds, Article 27(1) of the Law on the Budget Structure would permit their use only for the programmes, projects, direct payments or coordinated support for which that category of funds is intended

Legal assessment. The information provided indicates that the funds are being collected by the Platform of European Memory and Conscience and that Lithuania has allocated EUR 70,000; accordingly, the legal assessment turns on the purpose of the appropriations, the appropriation manager and the competence to adopt the relevant decision. Under Article 33(1)(1) of the Law on the Budget Structure, the Government or an institution authorised by it has the right to allocate, by programme, state budget appropriations approved by the Seimas; therefore, such a contribution must be based on an approved appropriation and a corresponding programme. If the funds had been borrowed on behalf of the State, Article 33(1)(2) of the Law on the Budget Structure would permit their allocation to appropriation managers only for the purposes established in the law approving the financial indicators of the state budget and municipal budgets for the relevant year. If European Union or other international financial assistance funds were used for the project, Article 33(1)(3) of the Law on the Budget Structure would allow their reallocation only in accordance with EU and Lithuanian legal acts governing the administration of such funds, and having regard to data on the implementation of programmes, projects and funds. The role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in this situation is consistent with the model reflected in the sources provided: by subparagraph 1.1 of Government Resolution No. 752 of 27 September 2023, “On the Allocation of Funds”, EUR 12,000,000 was allocated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to cover expenditure incurred in participating in international initiatives for the reconstruction of Ukraine’s infrastructure. A similar precedent for financing a memorial appears in paragraph 6 of the Government Resolution “On the Allocation of Funds”, under which LTL 10,000 was allocated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to support the construction of a memorial to the victims of communism in Washington. These sources do not establish an automatic right to finance any foreign memorial, but they show that, in the acts provided, the allocation of state budget funds through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for international initiatives and remembrance projects is not an alien instrument. Article 27 of the Law on the Budget Structure requires not only political approval, but also consistency between the category of funds and their designated purpose: financial support must be used specifically for the project or measure to which it has lawfully been assigned. Under Article 27(3) of the Law on the Budget Structure, a special rule on carry-over cash balances applies to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: unlike most ministries, it may retain carry-over cash balances equal to three months’ expenditure in the specified foreign accounts or with accountable persons. This is practically relevant for a project implemented abroad, since the financing of the memorial in Brussels may involve arrangements for payments and administration outside Lithuania. Nevertheless, the obtaining of local permits, as mentioned in the information provided, is not, on the basis of the sources submitted, a matter of Lithuanian budget law; the acts provided regulate the allocation, use, distribution and control of Lithuanian funds, not the issuance of permits by Belgian local authorities

Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the EUR 70,000 contribution remains lawfully used if it is assigned to an appropriate programme or measure, allocated in accordance with Article 33(1) of the Law on the Budget Structure, and used in accordance with the purpose-related restrictions laid down in Article 27. The second scenario is that, as the project expands and the opening of the memorial in 2027 is pursued, any additional Lithuanian funding would have to be coordinated with the regime for the preparation, implementation, evaluation and control of the 2025–2027 budgets, since that is the period covered by Article 2(2) of the Law Amending Law No. I-430 on the Budget Structure. The third scenario is that, if the category of funds were changed, for example by using international financial assistance funds, co-financing funds or progress funds, a stricter purpose-based filter would arise under Article 27(1) and (2) of the Law on the Budget Structure. The fourth scenario is that, if the project depended on contributions from several states, Lithuanian budget law would not by itself ensure the implementation of the memorial, because it regulates only the legality of the allocation and use of Lithuanian appropriations. In practical terms, this is important for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a potential appropriation manager, for the Government or an institution authorised by it as the entity allocating appropriations, and for the control bodies assessing whether the funds have been used in accordance with the approved purpose. For the initiators of the memorial and the Platform of European Memory and Conscience, the key point is that political approval must be converted into budgetarily defined funding used for its designated purpose. Lithuania’s 2027 Presidency of the Council of the EU does not legally alter the rules on the use of appropriations, but it makes the timing of budget planning and implementation practically sensitive. Accordingly, the next steps will depend on three legally significant conditions identified in the sources provided: whether the appropriation has been approved for the appropriate purpose, whether the competent institution has allocated it in accordance with the law, and whether the funds are used in accordance with their legal purpose

Core issue. The legal issue is not the conclusion of the Medinės Šnipiškės urban study itself, but how the Vilnius City Municipal Administration, when publishing and administering information on the Website, lawfully processes the personal data of visitors, persons submitting enquiries, and participants in surveys, public consultations or voting. This issue is assessed under Article 3 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, the General Data Protection Regulation, concerning territorial scope; Article 4(7) and (8), concerning the concepts of controller and processor; Article 6(3), concerning the legal basis for public interest and the exercise of official authority; Article 13(2) and Article 14(2), concerning information obligations; Article 15(2)-(4), concerning the right of access; Article 24, concerning the responsibility of the controller; Article 29 and Article 32(4), concerning the actions of persons acting under authority and on instructions; and Article 37(3)-(4) and Article 38(1)-(2), concerning the data protection officer. At national level, Article 1 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Legal Protection of Personal Data is applicable, as it regulates relationships arising from the automated processing of personal data and establishes the rights of data subjects, the procedure for protecting those rights, and the duties and liability of legal and natural persons. Since the Administration is a public administration institution established in the Republic of Lithuania, Article 3(1) GDPR and Article 1(3)(1) of the Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data substantiate the application of these rules to data processing carried out on its Website. Under Article 4(7) GDPR, the Administration is to be regarded as the controller, because it determines the purposes and means of processing the data collected on the Website. Under Article 4(8) GDPR, information technology, data storage, telecommunications or other service providers may be processors if they act on behalf of the Administration

Legal assessment. The methods of data collection specified on the Website include data obtained through cookies, such as IP address, browser type, number of visits, pages viewed and time of visit, as well as data provided by the visitor when registering, using electronic services, or participating in surveys, public consultations or voting. Such processing falls within the scope of Article 1(2) of the Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data, because it concerns automated processing of personal data and possible structured data filing systems. Where data are processed for the purposes of public administration, determining, ensuring and improving the quality of online services, the central point of assessment is Article 6(3) GDPR, under which the basis referred to in Article 6(1)(c) and (e) must be laid down by Union or Member State law, and the purpose of the public interest or exercise of official authority must be defined in that legal basis. Therefore, the Administration, as controller, must not only declare the purposes, but also, under Article 24(1) GDPR, implement appropriate technical and organisational measures in order to be able to demonstrate compliance with the Regulation. Article 24(2) GDPR allows data protection policies to form part of those measures, so a published privacy policy may be one element of accountability, but its sufficiency depends on the actual operation of the measures. The duty to provide information arises under Article 13(2) GDPR where data are obtained from the visitor directly, and under Article 14(2) GDPR where data are not obtained directly from him or her. These provisions require information to be provided on the retention period or the criteria used to determine it, the rights of access, rectification, erasure, restriction of processing, objection to processing, data portability, withdrawal of consent, and the right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory authority. The Website policy identifies these rights and, in the case of direct marketing, states that data are retained until the recipient opts out of receiving communications or withdraws consent, but no longer than is necessary to achieve the purpose. Where a visitor requests access to data, Article 15(3) GDPR requires the controller to provide a copy of the personal data undergoing processing, and where the request is made by electronic means, the information is generally to be provided in a commonly used electronic form. Article 15(4) GDPR limits that right insofar as obtaining a copy must not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others. The procedure indicated by the Administration for submitting requests in person, by post or by email signed with an electronic signature is a procedural mechanism for verifying the data subject’s identity and enabling the exercise of rights. The involvement of the data protection officer is important under Article 38(1) GDPR, because he or she must be involved, properly and in a timely manner, in all issues relating to the protection of personal data. Under Article 38(2) GDPR, the Administration must provide the officer with resources, access to data and involvement in processing operations. Where processors are engaged, their employees and other persons acting under their authority may not, under Article 29 and Article 32(4) GDPR, process data without instructions from the controller, unless required to do so by Union or Member State law. If several entities jointly determined the purposes and means of processing data for a specific project, survey or consultation, Article 26(1)-(3) GDPR would require a transparent arrangement between joint controllers and the ability for the data subject to exercise rights in respect of each controller

Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is straightforward: the Administration publishes the results of the urban study, collects only the data necessary for the functioning of the Website, enquiries, consultations or service quality, informs visitors and handles their requests in accordance with Articles 13, 14 and 15 GDPR. The second scenario is relevant to direct marketing: once a visitor withdraws consent or opts out of communications, the Administration, under the retention rule it has itself specified, must no longer continue retaining data for that purpose beyond what is necessary. The third scenario arises in the event of a dispute: if a visitor disagrees with the response of the Administration or the data protection officer, he or she may contact the State Data Protection Inspectorate, and the supervisory role of that authority is also confirmed by point 16 of the action plan implementing Council Decision 2008/615/JHA, which states that compliance with the Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data is supervised by the State Data Protection Inspectorate. The fourth scenario concerns third countries: if engaged persons were established outside the European Union or the European Economic Area, information on appropriate transfer safeguards would be important to the data subject under Article 15(2) GDPR, while international cooperation between supervisory authorities is supported by Article 50 GDPR. This is practically important for every Website visitor who reads the study results, submits questions, or participates in consultations or voting, because his or her rights depend not on the significance of the urban planning topic, but on whether his or her personal data are in fact collected and processed. For the Administration, this is important as a matter of accountability: under Article 24 GDPR, it must be able to substantiate that the published policy, technical measures, control of processors and involvement of the data protection officer operate in the specific processing process on the Website

Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the management and use of a crematorium built by the municipality must be granted by way of a concession, or whether it could be transferred to a municipal enterprise without a competitive procedure. It is to be assessed under Article 2 of the Law Amending the Law on Concessions of the Republic of Lithuania, which defines a concession as a special authorisation to carry out economic activity, provide public services, and manage and use municipal property, where the concessionaire assumes all or a substantial part of the risk. Article 3 of the Law Amending the Law on Concessions of the Republic of Lithuania is also applicable, as the subject matter of a concession may include the management, use and maintenance of infrastructure facilities, and, under Article 3(2)(15), a concession may also be granted in another area by decision of the municipal council. The procedural pivot is Article 6 of the Law Amending the Law on Concessions of the Republic of Lithuania: concessions are granted by open public tender, except in the cases provided for by law in which they may be granted without a tender. The concept of the Law on Cremation of the Republic of Lithuania is relevant to the nature of cremation services: points 2–3 provide that cremation activity includes the provision of cremation services and the supervision and control of undertakings, while point 17 states that cremation activity will be subject to licensing

Legal assessment. On the facts provided, the crematorium is an infrastructure facility of a municipal project, the operator of which would be expected to manage and use it and provide cremation services. Such a model substantially meets the criteria set out in Article 2(1) and (3) of the Law Amending the Law on Concessions of the Republic of Lithuania, since the operator would be granted the right to use the infrastructure and provide services while assuming the risks associated with the activity. If crematorium operations do not fall directly within one of the areas listed in Article 3(2)(1)–(14) of the Law Amending the Law on Concessions of the Republic of Lithuania, the legal basis may be Article 3(2)(15), under which a concession may be granted in any other area by decision of the municipal council. Accordingly, the administration’s instruction that documents should first be prepared for the council regarding a concession tender is consistent with the competence of the council provided for in Article 3(2)(15). The concession procedure cannot be replaced merely by a simple transfer of property if the actual legal relationship is the granting of a special authorisation to carry out economic activity and use municipal property. Article 16(1) of the Law on Concessions of the Republic of Lithuania allows municipality-owned property to be transferred to the concessionaire for the term of the concession agreement without a separate tender, but that rule operates for the implementation of an already concluded concession agreement, not as an independent substitute for selecting the concessionaire. In other words, the property required for performance of the agreement may be transferred without a separate tender, but the concessionaire itself is generally selected by open public tender under Article 6 of the Law Amending the Law on Concessions of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 60 of the Law Amending the Law on Concessions No. I-1510 of the Republic of Lithuania confirms the logic of competitive selection: the agreement is concluded with the participant whose tender meets the requirements of the documents, who has not been excluded, and whose tender has been recognised as successful after negotiations. If the successful participant refuses to conclude the agreement, fails to provide the required security, or does not sign the agreement in time, Article 60(4) provides that the participant is deemed to have refused to conclude the concession agreement. Point 17 of the concept of the Law on Cremation means that the future operator would have to meet the requirements applicable to licensed activity, and the competent authorities would supervise compliance with those requirements. The same point 17 clearly allows cremation services to be provided by both state- or municipality-controlled undertakings and private undertakings; therefore, the status of a municipal enterprise alone is not a necessary legal precondition for providing the service. If payments to the concessionaire were provided for under the concession agreement, they would have to be established in the agreement itself pursuant to Article 27(1) of the Law Amending the Law on Concessions of the Republic of Lithuania. If the services were linked to a local levy, Article 27(2) would allow the granting authority to transfer the right to collect such levies, but the municipality would have to ensure that all necessary decisions of the competent municipal institutions are adopted

Consequences. The nearest legally coherent scenario is a council decision authorising the organisation of a concession tender; according to the indicated 2026 date, the first mentioned possible date of a council meeting would be 15 September 2026. Following such a decision, the municipality would have to conduct a competitive procedure and conclude the concession agreement only with a compliant successful tenderer under Article 60 of the Law Amending the Law on Concessions No. I-1510 of the Republic of Lithuania. Another practical scenario is delay: until there is council approval, tender documents and a selected concessionaire, the transfer of property for the implementation of the concession provided for in Article 16 has no addressee to whom it can be applied. If the facility were transferred directly to a municipal enterprise without a competitive procedure, the principal risk under the sources provided would not be the ownership form of the cremation service provider, but the circumvention of the open public tender rule established in Article 6 of the Law Amending the Law on Concessions of the Republic of Lithuania. This situation matters differently to a private economic operator, a municipal enterprise and the municipality: for the first, because of the opportunity to compete for the activity; for the municipality, because of the obligation to justify procedurally the selection of the operator; and for residents, because of when cremation services will actually become available in Kaunas. If a concession were concluded, any subsequent disputes between the granting authority and the concessionaire concerning the interpretation or performance of the agreement would, under Article 18(1) of the Law on Concessions of the Republic of Lithuania, first be resolved by negotiations and, failing that, before the courts of the Republic of Lithuania where the concessionaire is a Lithuanian undertaking

Core issue. The precise legal issue is not whether political criticism in Palanga is justified, but whether the described social media channels, anonymous platform, and potentially coordinated content should be regarded as election campaigning, political advertising, compromising information, or dissemination of public information subject to transparency and accountability requirements. This issue should first be assessed under Article 85 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania, concerning breaches of the procedure for election or referendum campaigning; Article 85¹, concerning breaches of the procedure for publishing compromising information or a reply opinion; and Article 545, concerning failure to provide data and documents by a political campaign participant or a producer or disseminator of public information. Article 39 of the Law on the Provision of Information to the Public of the Republic of Lithuania is also relevant, as it requires advertising and commercial audiovisual communications to be truthful and clearly identifiable, while prohibiting surreptitious advertising. In terms of the relationship between the municipality, the mayor, and residents, Article 43 of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania applies with respect to informing local residents, as do Articles 41 and 42 concerning the initiation and announcement of a residents’ survey. If the issue were raised through municipal institutional communication, another relevant element is the exclusive competence of the municipal council referred to in Article 1 of the Law Amending the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania: the rules of procedure must set out the principal forms and methods of communication with residents

Legal assessment. The content described in the report is linked to upcoming municipal elections, one politician, and one municipality. The legal assessment therefore focuses on whether such communication goes beyond general opinion and falls within the regulatory scope of election campaigning or political advertising. Article 85(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences provides for liability for breaches of the election campaigning procedure established in the Electoral Code. Accordingly, the decisive factor would not be the political tone of the text, but non-compliance with specific requirements of the Electoral Code. Article 85(2) of the same Code provides for stricter fines where, as a result of such a breach, an election or referendum is declared invalid. This provision therefore links the extent of liability to the significance of the impact on the election result. Article 85¹ of the Code of Administrative Offences is particularly close to the situation described, as it applies to breaches of the restrictions established in the Electoral Code on publishing compromising information, or breaches of the procedure for publishing a reply opinion concerning a participant in an election political campaign, a list of candidates, or a candidate. If the platform’s content were in fact aimed at damaging the reputation of a specific current or future participant in a political campaign, the procedure governing the publication of compromising information and reply opinions would be applicable, and liability under Article 85¹ would arise for the heads of producers or disseminators of public information, or for other persons responsible for the content. The analysis of the draft Electoral Code provided in the sources directly states that the rules on compromising information also apply to persons who publish such information on a website or social media account. Accordingly, the mere fact that communication takes place through a social network does not in itself remove it from the scope of electoral law regulation. If the content were paid for or financed for the purpose of political influence, the rule referred to in the analysis of Article 96(4) of the draft Electoral Code would be relevant: paid political advertising must be clearly marked by indicating the source of funds. The source analysis also notes that political advertising may be published not only during an election political campaign. Therefore, the mere argument that the official campaign stage has not yet begun or is unclear would not necessarily remove the relevance of labelling requirements. Conversely, according to the logic of Article 98(3) of the draft Electoral Code discussed in the sources, unpaid reports or comments on matters of public interest in dedicated opinion sections are not political advertising, except where they involve campaigning. Accordingly, the “platform,” “channel,” AI-voiced recordings, and thematic concentration on a single municipality mentioned in the report are not, in themselves, legal violations. The question of a violation would arise where a campaigning character, a funding or commissioning link, absence of mandatory labelling, or non-compliance with the reply opinion procedure were established. Article 545 of the Code of Administrative Offences is relevant because it provides for fines for failure to submit data or documents by a political campaign participant or treasurer, as well as for failure to submit a declaration by a producer or disseminator of public information. This means that the practical question of “who is behind this and whose funds are being used” legally becomes a question of transparency of data, documents, declarations, and financing, rather than merely political polemic. Article 39 of the Law on the Provision of Information to the Public additionally requires advertising to be clearly identifiable and prohibits surreptitious advertising. Accordingly, paid political content presented anonymously or unclearly would raise an identifiability issue. A municipality’s response to such a public dispute must be distinguished from election campaigning: under Article 43 of the Law on Local Self-Government, information for local residents must be published in such a way that all residents can access it, by at least two means, one of which must be the municipality’s website. The same Article 43 requires clear text that does not require specialist knowledge, accessibility for persons with disabilities, and contact details for further information. Therefore, municipal institutional communication concerning factual city problems or decisions must be procedurally orderly and not merely polemical. If residents wished to formalise an issue concerning municipal information, trust, or a specific local problem, Article 41 of the Law on Local Self-Government allows them to initiate a survey through an initiative group of at least 10 residents who have the right to vote. Under Article 41(4), the director of the municipal administration must register the initiative group no later than within 3 working days, and must issue signature collection sheets no later than within 2 working days from registration. Under Article 41(5), a two-month period applies for exercising the residents’ right of initiative to announce a survey, and under Article 42(1), once the required signatures have been collected and no violations have been identified, the survey must be announced no later than within one month. Under Article 42(4), the decision of the municipal council or the director of the municipal administration must specify the survey question, territory, method, date, location, and the composition of the commission, while the initiative group has the right to delegate its representative to the commission

Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the content remains within the sphere of political opinion and criticism, provided that no campaigning, payment, surreptitious advertising, breach of the procedure for compromising information, or failure to comply with declaration obligations is established. The second scenario is that, if a breach of the election campaigning procedure is established, the fines provided for in Article 85(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences apply to the responsible persons, entities, or political campaign participants. The third scenario is that, if the breach concerns the procedure for publishing compromising information or a reply opinion, liability would be assessed under Article 85¹ of the Code of Administrative Offences and would be directed at the responsible persons controlling the dissemination of public information or the content. The fourth scenario is that, if a political campaign participant, treasurer, or producer or disseminator of public information failed to submit mandatory data, documents, or a declaration, Article 545 of the Code of Administrative Offences would become relevant. For the municipality, the practical importance lies in ensuring that its response to residents is based on the information requirements laid down in Article 43 of the Law on Local Self-Government, because this separates factual institutional information from electoral polemic. For residents, the practical importance is that they should not only assess social media content, but also make use of the survey procedure provided for in Articles 41 and 42 of the Law on Local Self-Government if they want a formal municipal response to a specific local issue. For political campaign participants and disseminators of information, the principal risk is non-compliance with transparency obligations: unmarked funding, an unclear responsible disseminator, failure to submit documents, or failure to provide an opportunity for a reply opinion may turn political communication into a matter of administrative liability

Core issue. The precise legal issue is no longer whether a secret detention facility operated in Antaviliai, but how the Lithuanian State must execute the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights awarding EUR 30,000 in compensation and establishing an obligation to take further steps vis-à-vis the United States. This issue is governed by Article 1(1), Article 2(1), and Article 2(2)(3) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Compensation for Damage Caused by Unlawful Acts of Public Authorities and Representation of the State and the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as by Articles 6.271 and 6.272 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 1(1) of the Law directly covers the execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and representation of the State; accordingly, under national law such a judgment is treated as enforceable not as a matter of political choice, but as a matter of statutory procedure. The legal basis for payment of monetary compensation is Article 2(2)(3) of the Law on Compensation for Damage, under which the Ministry of Justice executes judgments of the European Court of Human Rights from the relevant appropriations. The substantive basis of liability is linked to Article 6.271 of the Civil Code, because it covers any act or omission by a public authority that directly affects a person’s rights, freedoms, and interests, and to Article 6.272 of the Civil Code insofar as the situation concerns unlawful arrest, detention, or measures of procedural coercion

Legal assessment. Under Article 6.271(1) of the Civil Code, damage caused by unlawful acts of State authorities must be compensated by the State from the State budget, irrespective of the fault of any particular official. Paragraph 3 of the same Article defines an “act” broadly, including both action and inaction; therefore, from a legal perspective, the circumstances established by the ECtHR may be implemented through the model of State liability for acts or omissions of public authorities. Article 6.271(4) of the Civil Code links liability to the fact that institutions or their employees failed to act as they were required to act under the law. Article 6.272(1) of the Civil Code provides for the State’s obligation to compensate fully for damage caused by unlawful arrest, detention, or measures of procedural coercion, while paragraph 3 expressly permits compensation for non-pecuniary damage as well. In this situation, the ECtHR has already determined the amount of monetary compensation, so the mechanism in Article 4(1) of the Law on Compensation for Damage, which is intended for cases where an international institution does not determine the amount of compensation, does not apply. For the same reason, the out-of-court limits of EUR 10,000 for pecuniary damage and EUR 5,000 for non-pecuniary damage under Article 4(1) do not prevent payment of the EUR 30,000 awarded by the ECtHR. The competence of the Ministry of Justice here derives not from discretion to reassess the damage, but from Article 2(1) of the Law on Compensation for Damage, under which it is the manager of appropriations, and Article 2(2)(3), under which it executes ECtHR judgments. As regards the non-monetary part of the judgment, paragraph 19 of the Rules on Representation of the State before the European Court of Human Rights and Other International Institutions applies: ECtHR judgments are executed by the competent institutions according to their field of activity. The same paragraph 19 requires such institutions, within one month of receiving notice of the judgment, to submit an implementation plan to the institution representing the State. They must also provide information on implementation progress and promptly report the measures adopted. In relation to representation, the text of Article 51(3), introduced by Article 6 of the Law Amending and Supplementing the Law, is relevant: in ECtHR cases against the Republic of Lithuania, the State is represented by the Representative of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania before the European Court of Human Rights. The practice reflected in the sources concerning the allocation of funds shows that compensation awarded against the Republic of Lithuania under ECtHR judgments is in fact paid; for example, in T. v. Lithuania, no. 10544/17, EUR 13,315 was allocated pursuant to the judgment of 1 October 2019, and in V. and 4 Others v. Lithuania, nos. 21934/18 et al., EUR 36,700 was allocated pursuant to the judgment of 12 September 2019. This practice does not disclose analogous factual circumstances concerning secret detention, but it confirms the budgetary and administrative model for executing sums awarded by the ECtHR

Consequences. The immediate legal consequence is payment of the EUR 30,000 compensation from State budget appropriations managed, under Article 2(1) of the Law on Compensation for Damage, by the Ministry of Justice. At the same time, under paragraph 19 of the Rules, the competent institutions must prepare and submit an implementation plan for the judgment and subsequently provide information on progress. In practical terms, this means that the Ministry of Justice’s statement regarding execution of the judgment corresponds to the function assigned to it by law in respect of executing the monetary part. Measures in the field of foreign affairs, referred to in the report as diplomatic notes to the United States, legally fall within the logic of implementing the non-monetary part of the judgment, where specific measures are carried out by competent institutions according to their field of activity. If execution of the judgment were limited solely to payment of money, the part requiring an institutional plan and progress reporting under paragraph 19 of the Rules would remain unfulfilled. The issue of recourse is also practically significant for the State: Article 6.272(4) of the Civil Code provides for a right of recourse against officials where the damage resulted from intentional acts of pre-trial investigation officers, prosecutors, court officials, or judges. However, on the basis of the sources provided, it is sufficient in this case to state that the institution of recourse exists in law, while its application would depend on the conditions specified by statute. For the applicant, the key point is that the awarded amount has already been determined by the ECtHR judgment, so there is no need to initiate a separate out-of-court procedure to determine the amount of compensation. For Lithuanian institutions, the key point is to comply with two levels of execution: the Ministry of Justice administers the payment, while the competent institutions implement the substantive measures required by the judgment according to their field of activity. The broader consequence is that repeated ECtHR cases concerning the same factual problem increase the importance not of a new dispute over the calculation of compensation, but of coordination in executing judgments and of ensuring that public administration practice complies with human rights standards