⚖️ Legal prism — 2026-07-20

Core issue. The precise issue is whether the instances of driving established on 19 July 2026 in Biržai District with a blood alcohol level of 1.55 per mille and in Pasvalys District with a level of 2.61 per mille are to be classified as criminal offences under Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. This provision applies to a person who drove a motor vehicle while intoxicated, where a blood alcohol level of 1.51 per mille or more was established, and provides for a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. Article 281(1)-(4) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania addresses a different legal situation: a breach of road traffic safety or vehicle operation rules where that breach caused a traffic accident and the specified consequences occurred. Accordingly, the driving described in the report, where in both cases the 1.51 per mille threshold was exceeded, falls directly within Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code, rather than solely within the model under Article 281 of the Criminal Code, which requires consequences. The threshold for administrative liability is also relevant for delimitation in this situation: versions of Article 427(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences refer to intoxication from 0.41 to 1.5 per mille, whereas both established levels here exceed that threshold

Legal assessment. The first driver’s reading of 1.55 per mille exceeds the 1.51 per mille threshold laid down in Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code only slightly, but sufficiently as a matter of law. The second driver’s reading of 2.61 per mille exceeds the same threshold substantially, but the basis for classification under the cited provision is the same: driving a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level of 1.51 per mille or more. Article 2811(2) of the Criminal Code is relevant in that liability may also arise where the act provided for in paragraph 1 of that article was committed through negligence. In the intoxication determination procedure, paragraph 3 of the Rules for Determining Intoxication or Impairment of Persons Driving Vehicles and Other Persons applies: police officers test drivers suspected of being intoxicated and, where the concentration of ethyl alcohol in exhaled air exceeds 1.5 per mille, bring them to a personal health care institution for a medical examination. This means that in both described cases the competence of the police includes not only the initial test, but also ensuring the subsequent medical examination in accordance with that paragraph of the Rules. Once a pre-trial investigation has been commenced, relevant objects and documents may be submitted under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the initiative of the suspect, defence counsel, victim, or other specified persons. Procedural time limits in such an investigation are assessed under Article 99 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that they define the time for the commencement, performance, or completion of acts having procedural significance. Article 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes that such time limits are calculated in hours, days, and months, and where a time limit expires on a non-working day, the first working day thereafter is deemed to be the final day of the time limit. If an expert examination were ordered in the investigation and an expert report obtained, the prosecutor, according to the cited extract from the Code of Criminal Procedure, must notify the suspect, defence counsel, and other specified participants in the proceedings in writing of where and when they may familiarise themselves with it. Remand measures may be considered only by reference to their purpose, as set out in Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: to secure participation in the proceedings, the unhindered conduct of the investigation, the hearing of the case, the enforcement of the judgment, or the prevention of new criminal offences. Under Article 120(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the list of possible remand measures includes, among others, detention, house arrest, bail, seizure of documents, an obligation to register periodically with a police authority, and a written undertaking not to leave. The issue of the Mazda 6 and Audi A8 vehicles may become a separate question of criminal-law consequences under Article 72 of the Criminal Code, because property subject to confiscation includes the instrument or means of a prohibited act. If the vehicle belongs to the offender, Article 72(3) of the Criminal Code provides that confiscable property belonging to the offender must be confiscated in all cases. If the vehicle belongs to another natural or legal person, Article 72(4) of the Criminal Code permits confiscation only where the conditions specified therein are met, for example where the owner knew or ought to have known and could have known that the property would be used to commit a criminal offence. Article 36 of the Criminal Code theoretically permits release from criminal liability where the court finds that, before the hearing of the case, the person or the act committed by him or her ceased to be dangerous due to a change in circumstances. This is also linked to Article 212(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, under which a pre-trial investigation is terminated where, on the basis of Article 36 of the Criminal Code, it is recognised that dangerousness has been lost

Consequences. The most realistic course is that both pre-trial investigations will continue under Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code, because both established levels of intoxication exceed the threshold for criminal liability. If the evidence collected confirms the fact of driving, the nature of the vehicle, and the established intoxication, the legal consequences may be a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. If remand measures are applied during the investigation, they must be based on the aims set out in Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and selected from the list established in Article 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The practical issue for the drivers will be not only the penalty, but also the fate of the vehicles under Article 72 of the Criminal Code. For vehicle owners, if they are not the same persons as the drivers, Article 72(4) of the Criminal Code is important because it defines when property belonging to another person may be confiscated. A pre-trial investigation could be terminated only on the grounds specified in Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, including insufficient evidence of guilt or the loss of dangerousness provided for in Article 36 of the Criminal Code. For the police and the prosecution service, the documents relating to the intoxication determination procedure, the medical examination data, and compliance with procedural time limits under Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure will be of the greatest practical importance. For both drivers, this information is legally significant because the 1.51 per mille threshold moves the situation from the field of administrative drink-driving liability into the field of criminal liability under Article 2811 of the Criminal Code

Core issue. The precise legal issue is not whether the Vainatrakis crematorium has been built, but by what lawful means municipal property may be transferred for use in providing cremation services: to a municipal enterprise under the right of trust, or to a concessionaire following a competitive procedure. This issue is governed by Article 2(5) and (7), Article 8(1) and (2), Article 8¹, and Article 12(1)–(3) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Management, Use and Disposal of State and Municipal Property, as well as Article 63(1)–(3) of the Law Amending the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Local Self-Government No. I-533. If the concession model is chosen, Article 16(1) and Article 31(1)–(2) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Concessions apply, while Article 3 of the Law on Concessions, as set out in Article 2 of the Law Amending and Supplementing the Law on Concessions and the Law on Local Self-Government, is relevant to the scope of the concession subject matter. Article 6(1)–(2) of the Law on the Burial of Human Remains is relevant only at the service provision stage, because it establishes that cremation is carried out upon the request of the person arranging the burial or the funeral service provider and upon submission of the prescribed documents

Legal assessment. If the crematorium building belongs to the municipality, it constitutes municipal property within the meaning of Article 2(5) of the Law on the Management, Use and Disposal of State and Municipal Property, and its operation would constitute use of property within the meaning of Article 2(7) of the same law. Under Article 63(2) of the Law on Local Self-Government, the municipal council exercises the functions of the owner of property owned by the municipality; therefore, the administration’s indication that council approval will be required before a concession tender is consistent with the allocation of competences described above. Article 8(1) of the Law on the Management of State and Municipal Property allows municipal property to be managed by the municipal council as the body exercising owner functions, and by municipal institutions, enterprises, establishments and organisations under the right of trust. However, Article 8(2) means that the content of such management is not a matter of an unrestricted political mandate: the relevant rights and obligations are determined by laws, municipal council decisions, statutes and, where applicable, a trust agreement. Under Article 12(1), the transfer of municipal property under the right of trust takes place in accordance with the procedure established by the municipal council, and the decision is adopted by the municipal council or by property managers authorised by it. Accordingly, the cited provisions do not indicate that a simple administrative arrangement bypassing the procedure established by the council would be a sufficient legal basis for transferring the facility to the municipal enterprise “Kapinių priežiūra”. Conversely, Article 12(2)(1)–(3) shows that granting the right of trust to municipal entities is in principle possible; the issue is therefore not the form of a municipal enterprise as such, but the legal basis for the transfer, the procedure followed, and the compliance of the terms with the principles of property management. Those principles are established in Article 8¹: the principles of public benefit, efficiency, rationality and public law require that a completed facility be managed diligently, with a view to maximising public benefit, avoiding waste of property, and acting only by means provided for in legislation. If the municipality chooses a concession, Article 16(1) of the Law on Concessions permits municipal property necessary for the implementation of the concession contract to be transferred to the concessionaire for the duration of the contract without a separate tender, either under the right of trust pursuant to a trust agreement or under lease rights. This provision is significant because the tender would be organised not separately for the transfer of the building, but for the selection of the concessionaire; thereafter, the property could be transferred as a means of performing the concession. Article 31(1) of the Law on Concessions requires the concession documents to contain all information on the conditions and procedures for awarding the concession, while Article 31(2) requires the establishment of requirements for preparing applications and tenders, grounds for exclusion, qualification requirements and the procedure for their assessment. This means that, when submitting the matter to the council, the municipality must prepare not merely a political decision, but also a procedurally proper model enabling economic operators to understand the operating conditions and compete. Article 3(2) of the Law on Concessions, as set out in Article 2 of the Law Amending and Supplementing the Law on Concessions, links a concession to permission to conduct economic and commercial activity connected with the management, use or maintenance of infrastructure facilities, or to provide public services in the specified areas. The Government document concerning amendments to Articles 2 and 3 of the Law on Concessions emphasises that transferring state or municipal property to a concessionaire may enable the rational use of property where the concessionaire assumes all or a substantial part of the risk associated with the activity. Article 6 of the Law on the Burial of Human Remains shows that the future operator will have to organise cremation in accordance with the regime governing requests and documents; consequently, the legal risk does not end with the transfer of property: the service provider will have to ensure that cremation is carried out only upon receipt of the required request and mandatory documents

Consequences. The most realistic legal route under the cited provisions is a municipal council decision approving a concession tender, after which the municipality would prepare documents compliant with Article 31 of the Law on Concessions and select an operator. In that case, the crematorium building itself could be transferred to the concessionaire for the concession period under Article 16(1) of the Law on Concessions, with the contract defining the terms of management, use, risk allocation and return. The alternative, namely transfer to a municipal enterprise under the right of trust, must formally be based on Articles 8 and 12 of the Law on the Management of State and Municipal Property and Article 63 of the Law on Local Self-Government, but such a decision would have to be justified by reference to the principles set out in Article 8¹. The third scenario is delay, whereby the facility remains unused; in that case, the practical issue shifts to the plane of the principles of efficiency and rationality under Article 8¹, because completed municipal property must be preserved, not wasted, and managed with a view to maximising public benefit. The next indicated council meeting is 15 September 2026; therefore, if a draft decision were prepared by then, that would be the first clearly identified procedural opportunity to begin the concession route. The practical significance for the municipality is the legality of property management and the reduction of risk; for operators, the opportunity to participate in a competitive procedure; and for residents, whether cremation services in Kaunas will actually commence

Core issue. The precise legal question is whether religious rites involving the use of cannabis may be protected as the practice of faith and, at the same time, justify non-compliance with rules governing the control of narcotic substances. This question must be assessed under Article 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and Articles 2, 8 and 11 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Religious Communities and Associations. Article 26 of the Constitution protects the right, individually or with others, in private or in public, to profess a religion, perform religious rites and practise faith. However, the same Article 26 permits limitations on the profession and dissemination of religion by law where this is necessary to guarantee public safety, public order, human health, morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. Article 2 of the Law on Religious Communities and Associations restates this rule and further provides that a person’s practised religion or belief may not justify a criminal offence or non-compliance with the law. Accordingly, the core of the dispute is not merely whether the Rastafarian faith is a religion, but whether a specific rite may exceed the limits of public order and health protection established by law

Legal assessment. Under Article 8 of the Law on Religious Communities and Associations, religious rites may be freely performed in places of worship, homes, certain institutions and other public places; however, in public places they may not infringe public order, human health, morals, or the rights and freedoms of others. This provision is significant because the form of a rite is not absolute: even where sacred significance is acknowledged, the state may assess the impact of a specific practice on protected public interests. The sentence in Article 2 of the Law on Religious Communities and Associations concerning a criminal offence or non-compliance with the law is particularly strict, as it leaves no general right for a religious community to create for itself an exemption from the law. Article 26 of the Constitution requires that any limitation be prescribed by law and necessary for one of the aims listed therein; therefore, a court should examine not only the religious belief, but also the legality, necessity and proportionality of the limitation. In its ruling of 29 December 2004 in case No. 8/02-16/02-25/02-9/03-10/03-11/03-36/03-37/03-06/04-09/04-20/04-26/04-30/04-31/04-32/04-34/04-41/04, the Constitutional Court stated that restrictions on human rights are permissible only by law, must be necessary in a democratic society, may not deny the essence of the right, and must comply with the principle of proportionality. The same doctrine was reiterated with reference to the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 26 January 2004, 9 May 2014 and 18 April 2019. Applying this logic, a community has the right to profess Rastafarianism, associate as a religious community and perform rites, but that right weakens where the rites coincide with the use of narcotic substances prohibited by law. Article 11 of the Law on Religious Communities and Associations would allow such a community to acquire legal personality upon registration of its statutes or equivalent documents, but registration would not in itself confer a right to disregard general prohibitions. The material on drug control presented in the sources links public order and health to the risks of use and distribution of narcotic and psychotropic substances: for example, the draft amendment to Article 486 of the Code of Administrative Offences notes that maintaining dens for the use of narcotic substances creates conditions for the use and distribution of such substances. Paragraphs 24.1-24.2 of the Concept for the Control of Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances, Tobacco and Alcohol also address prevention, the formation of a negative attitude, and access to healthcare services for persons with disorders related to the use of such substances. For that reason, the legal assessment cannot be confined to the autonomy of religious rites: it must also encompass the state’s duty to protect public order and human health. Article 18 of the Law on the State of Emergency and Article 145 of the Constitution do not alter the core of this dispute, as they concern a special wartime or state-of-emergency regime and restrictions on specific constitutional rights. Nevertheless, they confirm the broader proposition that, even in exceptional circumstances, restrictions on rights must be clearly justified, proportionate and must not arbitrarily extend to other rights

Consequences. Realistically, the first scenario is that a higher court upholds the refusal to grant a religious exemption if it considers that the drug control rules are statutory, pursue the protection of public order and health, and do not thereby deny the essence of freedom of religion. The second scenario would be narrower: the court could require a more precise assessment of whether the specific practice is a necessary part of professing the religion and whether the prohibition is applied proportionately, but even that would not entail an automatic right to disregard drug control rules. The third route lies within the competence of the legislature, because under the provisions presented, a general exemption from the prohibition cannot be created solely by the will of a court or a religious community. This is practically important for religious minorities, because their rites are protected, but that protection is not permission to breach rules on public order or health protection. It is also important for law enforcement, because the holding of religious beliefs does not in itself remove the duty to apply the law, although its application must remain within the limits of proportionality and the prohibition of discrimination. Finally, it is important for courts, because they must distinguish the content of religion from a legal exemption: the state must not assess the truth of a belief, but it may assess whether a specific practice is lawfully restricted under Article 26 of the Constitution and Articles 2 and 8 of the Law on Religious Communities and Associations

Core issue. The precise legal issue is this: when is a quad bike used by a child or adolescent legally regarded as a motor vehicle requiring the appropriate driving entitlement, minimum age, and technical compliance. This issue is determined under Articles 1, 10, 13, 17¹, 23, and 32 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Road Traffic Safety. Under Article 1(1) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Road Traffic Safety, that law establishes the legal basis for road traffic safety, the duties of institutions, the principal duties of road users, and requirements for the technical condition, technical inspection, and registration of vehicles. Under Article 23(1)(1) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Road Traffic Safety, category AM includes mopeds and light quadricycles, while under Article 23(1)(5), category B1 includes quadricycles. Article 8 of the Law Amending Articles 2, 9, 10, 14, 17, 22, 23, 27-2 and the Annex to Law No. VIII-2043 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Road Traffic Safety and Supplementing the Law provides that the minimum age for category AM is 15 years, for category B1 it is 16 years, and for powerful quadricycles it is 18 years. Accordingly, the legal assessment depends not on whether the quad bike is presented as entertainment or as a children’s product, but on its category, technical characteristics, and whether it is used in traffic

Legal assessment. If the quad bike falls within category AM, Article 23(1)(1) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Road Traffic Safety applies, together with the minimum age of 15 years under Article 8 of the amending law referred to above. If it is a category B1 quadricycle, Article 23(1)(5) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Road Traffic Safety applies, together with the minimum age of 16 years. If it is a powerful quadricycle, the right to drive is linked to the age of 18 years under Article 8 of the amending law. The source “Regarding Draft Law No. XVP-431 Amending Articles 2 and 22 of Law No. VIII-2043 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Road Traffic Safety” states that category AM covers mopeds and light quadricycles whose maximum design speed may not exceed 45 km/h. The same source emphasizes that mopeds and light quadricycles, by their technical characteristics, are not equivalent to motorcycles or cars, which are more powerful, faster, heavier, and more dangerous. This means that the product’s power, speed, and construction are legally relevant in determining whether a child may be permitted to use such a vehicle in public traffic at all. Article 13(1) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Road Traffic Safety prohibits persons who do not hold the relevant entitlement from driving a motor vehicle. The same provision prohibits allowing a vehicle to be driven by persons who do not have the right to drive that vehicle. Therefore, a decision by parents or guardians to allow a child to drive a quad bike unsuitable for the child’s age or category should be assessed legally not merely as a lack of supervision, but also as a risk of breaching the prohibition on transferring a vehicle to a person who does not hold the right to drive it. Article 13(2) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Road Traffic Safety prohibits driving a vehicle that is technically defective or does not comply with technical requirements. Under Article 13(3), the driver must take all necessary measures to ensure the safety of themselves and their passengers during the journey. These duties include not only holding the right to drive, but also actual compliance with requirements concerning the vehicle’s technical condition, conditions of use, and safety measures. From the perspective of institutional competence, Article 10(1)(1) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Road Traffic Safety assigns to the Ministry of Transport and Communications, or institutions authorized by it, the approval of technical requirements for motor vehicles and their trailers, the classification of defects, and the establishment of requirements for manufacture and modification. Under Article 10(1)(11), that ministry or its authorized institutions prepare measures for implementing road safety policy and organize, coordinate, and control their implementation. At the broader level of road safety policy, Article 4(1) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Road Traffic Safety provides that state policy in the field of ensuring road safety is formed by the Government, while its implementation is controlled by the Road Safety Commission. Under Article 4(3), that commission establishes priority directions and measures for improving road safety, coordinates the activities of institutions, analyses the state of road safety, and may form expert groups to determine the causes of particularly serious traffic accidents. If a specific device were classified not as a quadricycle under category AM or B1, but as an electric micromobility device, Article 17¹ of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Road Traffic Safety would be relevant. Under Article 17¹(1), such a device may be used on the carriageway, bicycle lanes, bicycle paths, the roadside, and in residential zones by persons not younger than 16 years, and from the age of 14 only after completing the prescribed training course and holding a school certificate. Under Article 17¹(2), an electric micromobility device must have a functioning brake, an audible warning device, lights, and reflective elements, and all of its drivers must wear and fasten a helmet. This is important because safety obligations depend on the legal type of the device: quadricycles are subject to category and driving entitlement rules, whereas electric micromobility devices are subject to separate rules on age, technical equipment, and helmets

Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is lawful use: a child or adolescent drives only a quad bike of a category for which, under Article 23 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Road Traffic Safety and Article 8 of the amending law, they have reached the minimum age and hold the required driving entitlement. The second scenario is an infringement, where a minor drives a category AM, B1, or powerful quadricycle without having the relevant right or without having reached the prescribed age. In such a case, the prohibition in Article 13(1) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Road Traffic Safety on driving without the right to do so, and on allowing such a person to drive a vehicle, is significant. The third scenario concerns technical compliance: even where the age requirement is met, Article 13(2) prohibits driving a vehicle that is technically defective or does not comply with technical requirements. The fourth scenario is relevant in the event of an accident, because Article 32 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Road Traffic Safety provides that liability applies for breaches of legislation regulating road traffic safety in order to protect human life, health, and property. For parents and guardians, this is practically important because buying a quad bike for a child is not merely a consumer decision: allowing the child to drive a vehicle of an unsuitable category or excessive power may breach the rules on driving entitlement, age, and transfer of a vehicle. For sellers and suppliers, this is relevant insofar as the product’s technical characteristics determine whether it falls under the legal regime applicable to category AM, category B1, or powerful quadricycles. For institutions, this is important because, under the cited provisions, issues of technical requirements, registration, and road safety policy are linked to the competence of the Ministry of Transport and Communications or institutions authorized by it, and to the coordinating role of the Road Safety Commission

Core issue. The precise legal issue is not whether the convicted person “deserves” release, but whether a person serving a fixed-term custodial sentence for offences against the sexual self-determination and inviolability of a minor may be granted conditional release under the applicable sentence-enforcement regime. This issue is determined primarily under Article 82 of the Code of Execution of Sentences of the Republic of Lithuania, which establishes the general grounds for conditional release, and Article 83 of the same Code, which sets out the cases in which conditional release is not applicable. Article 82(1) of the Code of Execution of Sentences permits the conditional release of a convicted person serving a fixed-term custodial sentence only where the risk of his criminal conduct is low or he has made clear progress in reducing that risk, and where the relevant portion of the sentence has been served. However, Article 83(3) of the Code of Execution of Sentences expressly provides that conditional release does not apply to persons serving sentences for offences against the sexual self-determination and inviolability of a minor. Accordingly, under the provisions cited, the essential tension lies between the individual assessment of risk and progress under Article 82 of the Code of Execution of Sentences and the special prohibition under Article 83(3) of that Code

Legal assessment. Article 82 of the Code of Execution of Sentences is structured as a conditional entitlement to seek conditional release, not as a convicted person’s right to be released. Even where the convicted person satisfies the criterion concerning the portion of the sentence served, his risk of criminal conduct or clear progress in reducing that risk must be assessed. Article 85(1) of the Code of Execution of Sentences requires the custodial institution, twenty working days before the possible conditional release, to submit a social inquiry report to the conditional release commission. That report must include data on the resocialisation measures applied, their outcomes, the risk of criminal conduct, and changes in that risk during the serving of the sentence. Under Article 85(2) of the Code of Execution of Sentences, the commission adopts a reasoned decision to grant or refuse conditional release within twenty working days. If the decision or court ruling results in release, Article 87(1) and (2) of the Code of Execution of Sentences provides that the custodial institution releases the convicted person and transfers the documents to the Probation Service. Article 87(4) of the Code of Execution of Sentences is significant because probation and intensive supervision must begin from the moment of release; thus, under the model established by the Code, release does not mean being left without supervision. On the other hand, the special rule in Article 83(3) of the Code of Execution of Sentences, insofar as it applies, precludes the application of conditional release itself to this group of convicted persons. The previous version of Article 158 of the Code of Execution of Sentences also provided that conditional release was not applicable to persons convicted of offences against the sexual self-determination and inviolability of a minor. The legislative materials relating to Draft No. XIP-1446 stated that such an absolute restriction would also cover less serious offences, for example the acts provided for in Articles 151¹ and 153 of the Criminal Code, and therefore raised an issue of proportionality. The same materials emphasised that conditional release is a power of the court, not an obligation, and may be applied only to those convicted persons whose rehabilitation can continue without isolation from society, but under supervision. It was also stated that a person released conditionally remains under supervision, receives social assistance, and is subject to resocialisation measures, whereas, if conditional release is denied, such persons would have to integrate independently after serving the sentence. This legislative position explains why the institution of conditional release is linked not only to the convicted person’s interest, but also to a controlled transition from imprisonment to society. Article 1(2) of the Code of Execution of Sentences confirms this direction through the general purpose of the Code: to establish a procedure for the execution of sentences such that, after serving their sentences, convicted persons pursue their life goals by lawful means and methods

Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is that, if Article 83(3) of the Code of Execution of Sentences applies, a person convicted of offences against the sexual self-determination and inviolability of a minor cannot be conditionally released, because the special prohibition suspends the mechanism under Article 82. The second scenario would arise only where that prohibition does not apply to the particular person: in that case, the decision would depend on the portion of the sentence served, the risk assessment, progress in reducing the risk, and a reasoned decision of the commission or the court under Articles 82, 85 and 87 of the Code of Execution of Sentences. In such a case, the consequence of release would not be the annulment of the sentence, but the execution of the remaining part of the sentence under the supervision of the Probation Service from the moment of release. The third scenario is not early release, but the serving of the sentence until the expiry of its term; under Article 94(1) of the Code of Execution of Sentences, upon expiry of the term of execution of a custodial sentence, the convicted person is released in the first half of the final day of the sentence. This is practically important for victims, because the model chosen determines whether the person is released under probationary control or only upon expiry of the sentence. It is also important for the custodial institution, because it must prepare the social inquiry report and transfer the documents within the prescribed time limits. It is important for the Probation Service because, under Article 87(4) of the Code of Execution of Sentences, supervision must begin no later than the moment of release. Finally, it is important for the legislature because the sources presented reveal two competing regulatory directions: absolute non-application under Article 83(3) of the Code of Execution of Sentences and an individualised conditional-release model based on risk and resocialisation under Articles 82 and 85 of that Code

Core issue. The precise legal issue is not the lawfulness of political labels or criticism, but whether the Government Programme may be regarded as a constitutionally and statutorily significant document if it was registered with the Seimas before the decree of the President of the Republic approving the composition of the Government, and what consequences follow from the Seimas’s approval of such a programme. This issue is to be resolved primarily under Article 1 of the Law on the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, according to which the Government consists of the Prime Minister and ministers, as well as under Article 24(2)(1) and (7) of the Law on the Government, pursuant to which the Prime Minister forms the Government, submits its composition to the President of the Republic, and submits the Government Programme to the Seimas for consideration. Article 101(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania is also relevant, as it establishes parliamentary control over the Government and ministers, as is Article 101(3)(1), under which the Government must resign if the Seimas twice in succession refuses to approve the programme of a newly formed Government. The substance of Government activity after approval of the programme is assessed under Article 22(3) of the Law on the Government, which obliges the Government to implement the Government Programme and approve a plan for implementing its provisions. The form of decision-making is relevant under Article 95 of the Constitution and Article 40 of the Law on the Government: matters of state administration are decided at Government meetings by adopting resolutions by a majority vote of all members of the Government, while draft acts are prepared, coordinated and considered in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Government

Legal assessment. The cited provisions show that the Government Programme is not an independent political text, but part of the constitutional and statutory procedure for forming the Government, submitted to the Seimas by the Prime Minister under Article 24(2)(7) of the Law on the Government. Therefore, the date of registration alone is not the final legal criterion: what is decisive is whether the programme was submitted to the Seimas for consideration by an entity competent to do so, and whether the Seimas adopted a decision on it. According to the facts reported, the Seimas approved the programme by 72 votes; accordingly, in the situation presented, the legal focus shifts from the moment of registration to the Seimas’s approval and the Government’s duty to implement the programme under Article 22(3) of the Law on the Government. Had the Seimas refused to approve the programme twice in succession, Article 101(3)(1) of the Constitution would have required the Government to resign, but the reported facts indicate the opposite: the programme was approved. As regards the composition of the Government, Article 1 of the Law on the Government clearly links the Government with the Prime Minister and ministers, while Article 24(2)(1) defines the Prime Minister’s role as forming the composition and submitting it to the President of the Republic for approval. This means that criticism concerning a programme of “unknown authorship” would be legally well-founded only to the extent it were shown that the programme was submitted to the Seimas by an entity not authorised to do so, or that the Seimas decided on a document other than the one on which, by law, it was required to vote. The sources provided do not support such a conclusion. In its ruling of 10 January 1998, “On the compliance of the Resolution of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania of 10 December 1996 ‘On the Programme of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania’ with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania,” the Constitutional Court stated that the Government is a collegial institution of general competence occupying a special place within the system of executive power. This case law is important because the Government Programme should be assessed as the basis for the activity of a collegial executive authority, not as the declaration of a single minister or political group. The source concerning Draft No. XIIP-1155 also states that the Government’s powers derive from the Constitution and laws, and that everything the Government does within its established competence constitutes the resolution of matters of state administration. Consequently, after the Seimas approves the programme, the Government may implement its political objectives, including in the fields of security or public health, only through the powers granted to it: Article 22(1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Law on the Government, resolutions provided for in Article 95 of the Constitution, and the relevant draft laws. In the context of health and demographic measures, Article 60(1), (3), (4) and (5) and Article 106(2), (4), (5) and (6) of the Law on the Health System are applicable, as they define the Government’s competence to approve health programmes, coordinate inter-institutional activity, prepare draft legal acts and adopt legal acts within its competence. The parliamentary opposition and other members of the Seimas retain instruments of control: under Article 101(1) of the Constitution, the Government or ministers must account to the Seimas for their activities upon request. If more than half of the ministers were replaced, Article 101(2) of the Constitution and Article 8(4) of the Law on the Government would require renewed authorisation from the Seimas. The most severe consequences of the political responsibility of the Government or a minister are also established in Article 101 of the Constitution: no confidence in the Government or the Prime Minister may be expressed by a majority vote of all members of the Seimas by secret ballot, while a minister must resign when more than half of all members of the Seimas express no confidence in that minister

Consequences. The most realistic scenario under the sources provided is that, following the Seimas’s approval, the programme becomes the basis for the Government’s activity, and the Government must implement it through a plan for implementing the programme’s provisions under Article 22(3) of the Law on the Government. The dispute concerning the earlier registration date may be used politically as an argument of pressure, but the cited provisions attach decisive importance to submission by the Prime Minister, consideration by the Seimas and the Seimas’s decision. For the Seimas, the most practically important mechanisms remain the instruments of control: the requirement to account under Article 101(1) of the Constitution, no-confidence procedures, and the need for renewed authorisation if more than half of the ministers are replaced. For the Government, it is practically important that each objective of the programme be translated into resolutions, draft laws or an implementation plan consistent with its competence, because Article 95 of the Constitution requires collegial decision-making at a meeting. For the Prime Minister, it is important to maintain coherence between the programme and the activities of ministers, because under Article 24(1) of the Law on the Government the Prime Minister directs the activities of the Government, and, according to the source concerning Draft No. XIIP-1155, the Government is collectively accountable to the Seimas for its overall activity. For the public and the administration, the practical significance is that political promises concerning security, public health or birth rates are to be assessed not by rhetoric, but by whether they are implemented in legal acts, programmes, draft budgets and decisions submitted to the Seimas

Core issue. The precise legal issue is not whether Lithuania politically acknowledges the existence of a CIA prison, but how the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights is being enforced where that judgment found a violation of rights attributable to Lithuania’s jurisdiction and awarded compensation

Legal assessment. According to the information provided, the ECtHR found that Abd Al Rahim Hussein Al Nashiri was unlawfully detained in 2005-2006 in an American facility operating in Lithuania, awarded EUR 30,000 in compensation, and directed the Lithuanian Government to request assurances from the United States that the death penalty would not be imposed on him

Consequences. The most immediate realistic scenario is payment of EUR 30,000 from appropriations provided in the State budget, administered under Article 2(1) of the Law on Compensation for Damage and Representation of the State by the Ministry of Justice

Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the threats described in the report to kill, detonate an explosive, commit arson, threaten employees’ children, or respond with armed force should be classified as a threat to kill or cause serious bodily harm under Article 145(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, or as terrorising a person under Article 145(2) of the Criminal Code. A related issue concerns the employer’s duties: whether a company, being aware of real threats against managers and employees, is required to take preventive safety measures under Article 11(1)–(2) of the Law on Safety and Health at Work of the Republic of Lithuania and Article 30(1)–(2) of the Labour Code. If the threats escalated into physical violence, Article 140 of the Criminal Code concerning the causing of physical pain or minor impairment of health would also be relevant. The boundary of the employer’s liability should be assessed under Article 176 of the Criminal Code and the submitted amendment to Article 176, which provides for liability of an employer or its authorised person for breach of occupational safety and health requirements where this results in a serious or fatal accident at work or other serious consequences. Articles 98, 99, 118–120 and 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania are also procedurally important: they define the submission of relevant objects and documents, calculation of procedural time limits, the possibility of compensation for damage, the purpose and types of coercive measures, and the grounds for termination of a pre-trial investigation

Legal assessment. Under Article 145(1) of the Criminal Code, a statement that the head of a specific company will be killed is legally relevant where there were sufficient grounds to believe that the threat could be carried out. The entries into the building, the attempt to detonate an explosive at a residence, the manifesto calling for attacks against AI leaders, and threats against employees’ children mentioned in the report are circumstances directly connected with terrorising by threatening to detonate an explosive, commit arson, or commit another act dangerous to life, health, or property, as referred to in Article 145(2) of the Criminal Code. Where the conduct consists not of a single message but of systematic intimidation, doxing, coordinated harassment campaigns, and psychological coercion, the legal centre of gravity shifts to the element in Article 145(2) of the Criminal Code consisting of systematic intimidation of a person through psychological coercion. Under Article 145(3) of the Criminal Code, liability for these acts is possible where there is a complaint by the victim, a statement by the victim’s legal representative, or a prosecutor’s request. The submitted regulatory source concerning Article 145 of the Criminal Code also indicates a boundary: if a person does not merely threaten but begins preparing for the offence, searches for means, recruits accomplices, draws up an action plan, or attempts the offence, liability arises not only for the threat but for preparation or attempt to commit the relevant offence. Under Article 11(1) of the Law on Safety and Health at Work, the employer must ensure safe and healthy working conditions in all work-related respects, and the employees’ duties do not extinguish this employer duty. Article 11(2) of the same law allows this duty to be specified through technical, legal, organisational, and other preventive measures; accordingly, security personnel, cameras, access control, procedures for reporting danger, and the designation of responsible persons are consistent with the logic of the cited provisions. Article 31 of the Law on Safety and Health at Work gives the employer the right to issue orders on occupational safety and health, require employees to comply with mandatory safety documents, and obtain information from state institutions and inspection materials from the State Labour Inspectorate. Under Article 33(1)(4) of that law, employees must immediately notify responsible persons of any situation at workplaces, work premises, or other company locations which, in their view, may pose a threat to employee safety and health. Article 30(1) of the Labour Code requires the employer to create a working environment in which employees are not subjected to aggressive, abusive, or intimidating conduct directed at their physical or psychological integrity. Article 30(2) of the Labour Code is relevant to the risk of both physical and psychological impact, because violence and harassment are prohibited at workplaces, including public and private places where the employee is under the employer’s authority or performs duties under an employment contract. If a violent incident caused an employee physical pain or a minor impairment of health, the act could be assessed under Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code. If the employer or its authorised person, knowing of a real risk, breached occupational safety and health requirements, the issue of liability could be raised under Article 176 of the Criminal Code; under the submitted amendment, the strictest criminal liability is linked to a serious or fatal accident at work or other serious consequences. From a procedural perspective, under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, companies, managers, employees, or other persons may submit threat messages, manifestos, video recordings, access-control data, or other documents relevant to the investigation of the criminal act. Under Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, coercive measures may be imposed to ensure the suspect’s participation in the proceedings, an unobstructed investigation, and the prevention of new criminal acts; Article 120 lists among them detention, house arrest, bail, seizure of documents, periodic registration at a police institution, and a written undertaking not to leave

Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that proceedings are commenced under Article 145(1) of the Criminal Code for a specific threat to kill or cause serious bodily harm, provided there is a complaint by the victim, a statement by the legal representative, or a prosecutor’s request. The second scenario is that, where the threats involve detonating explosives, arson, intimidation of children, or coordinated psychological pressure, the case shifts toward terrorising a person under Article 145(2) of the Criminal Code, where the degree of dangerousness is higher and the maximum sanction is more severe. The third scenario is that, if the threats turn into physical action, the possibility of applying Article 140 of the Criminal Code also arises; and if the employee safety system was inadequate and serious consequences occurred, the liability of the employer or its authorised person under Article 176 of the Criminal Code may also be assessed. For companies, it is practically important not only to react after an incident, but also formally to establish preventive measures, because Articles 11 and 31 of the Law on Safety and Health at Work link the organisation of safety to the employer’s actions, instructions, control, and financing. For employees, it is important that they have a clear duty to report dangerous situations under Article 33 of the Law on Safety and Health at Work, and such reports may also become data relevant to the investigation under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. For victims, it is important that the issue of compensation for damage may be raised in the proceedings, and Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the possibility, in cases established by law, of compensating damage from state funds where the accused or the persons materially liable for the accused’s actions lack the funds to compensate the damage. The investigation may also end in termination under Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for example where insufficient data are collected to substantiate the suspect’s guilt; however, that outcome would depend on the collected messages, action plan, physical proximity to the target, means, and other evidence submitted

Core issue. The legal question is not whether the political discussion is “closed,” but whether the presence of allied nuclear weapons on Lithuanian territory for collective defence purposes would be compatible with Article 137 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, which provides that weapons of mass destruction and military bases of foreign states may not be located on the territory of the Republic of Lithuania. This question must be resolved by applying, in conjunction, Article 135 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, under which the Republic of Lithuania, in its foreign policy, seeks to ensure the security and independence of the country; Article 139 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania concerning the duty to defend the State and the organisation of national defence by law; and the regulation in Chapter 7, as set out in Article 1 of the Law on the Fundamentals of National Security of the Republic of Lithuania, concerning universal and unconditional defence. Article 12 of the Law on the Organisation of the National Defence System and Military Service of the Republic of Lithuania is also relevant, because paragraph 2 establishes the task of the armed forces, during martial law or armed defence, to defend the Lithuanian State by force of arms independently and together with allied armed forces, while paragraph 3 permits cooperation with NATO institutions and the armed forces of other NATO states pursuant to international treaties or international agreements of the Ministry of National Defence. In procedural terms, Article 4 of the Law on Martial Law of the Republic of Lithuania is important, in particular the rules in paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 concerning the Seimas, the President of the Republic, and the arrival and use of military units of other states for collective defence purposes. The boundary of constitutional review follows from Article 105 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania: the final determination of the conformity of laws, acts of the Seimas, acts of the President of the Republic and the Government with the Constitution, as well as the constitutionality of international treaties, falls within the competence of the Constitutional Court

Legal assessment. Article 137 of the Constitution is formulated as a prohibition, and therefore any model involving the presence of a weapon of mass destruction on Lithuanian territory must first be assessed by reference to the text of that provision. Nevertheless, the sources provided show that Lithuania’s defence system is not an isolated national scheme: Chapter 7 of Article 1 of the Law on the Fundamentals of National Security provides that the defence of Lithuania is coordinated with the implementation of NATO collective defence principles, and that Lithuania is defended by force of arms by the armed forces of the State and of NATO allies. In the second section of the same regulation, Lithuania’s defensive capability is linked to the assistance and solidarity provided by NATO allies; accordingly, the participation of allied forces is not treated as an external phenomenon in relation to the defence system itself. The regulation of the tasks of the armed forces confirms this: under Article 12(2) of the Law on the Organisation of the National Defence System and Military Service, during martial law or armed defence the Lithuanian Armed Forces act together with allied armed forces. Under Article 12(3) of that Law, cooperation in peacetime with NATO institutions and the armed forces of other NATO states is also possible where it is based on international treaties or international agreements of the Ministry of National Defence. The concept for the anticipated legal regulation of mobilisation and host nation support states that the foundation of Lithuania’s defence system is the principle of universal and unconditional defence, implemented with regard to the principle of NATO collective defence. The same concept describes the content of collective defence under the NATO Treaty as the obligation of member states to maintain individual and collective capacity to resist an armed attack and, in the event of an attack, to provide assistance, including the use of armed forces. Therefore, the legally decisive circumstance would not be solely the type of weapon, but also whether the decision was formalised as a collective defence measure under treaties, agreements or joint decisions of the collective defence parties. Article 4(4)(5) of the Law on Martial Law shows that an act introducing martial law may determine whether military units of other states are permitted to enter the territory of the Republic of Lithuania and be used for collective defence or another operation, if such a decision has not previously been adopted. In the event of an armed attack, under Article 4(2) of the Law on Martial Law, the President of the Republic immediately adopts a decision on defence against armed aggression, introduces martial law, and submits the decisions for approval by the Seimas at its next sitting. This means that collective defence measures cannot be merely a political declaration: they must be incorporated into the system of decisions of competent institutions and international obligations. In its ruling of 24 September 2009 in case No. 16/2009, as presented in the sources, the Constitutional Court emphasised that, under Article 139 of the Constitution, the duty to defend the State and to perform military or alternative national defence service falls on citizens of the Republic of Lithuania, and that the legislature must establish regulation ensuring the proper preparation of citizens for that duty. This case law does not directly resolve the question of nuclear weapons, but it reinforces the conclusion that, in the Constitution, defence of the State is understood as a real system of duties and institutional measures organised by law. In the Constitutional Court’s conclusion of 24 January 1995, as cited in the sources, it is stated that in many cases the content of a specific constitutional provision cannot be interpreted in isolation from other provisions of the Constitution. Accordingly, Article 137 of the Constitution should be interpreted together with Articles 135 and 139 of the Constitution, but such a systematic interpretation does not in itself eliminate the prohibition in Article 137

Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario would be that a decision concerning the presence or use of allied forces would be based on NATO collective defence obligations, Lithuania’s international treaties, agreements, and acts of competent institutions. The second scenario is that, if an act of the Seimas, the President of the Republic or the Government were adopted, its constitutionality could be reviewed within the competence of the Constitutional Court established in Article 105 of the Constitution. The third scenario concerns a situation of armed attack: under Article 4 of the Law on Martial Law, the decision of the President of the Republic would have to be submitted immediately to the Seimas, and the Seimas would approve or annul it. The fourth scenario would involve the broader application of host nation support and mobilisation regulation, since in the sources provided defence preparation is linked to national and NATO collective defence plans. This is important for the Lithuanian Armed Forces because of the joint action with allies provided for in Article 12 of the Law on the Organisation of the National Defence System and Military Service. It is important for citizens because Article 139 of the Constitution and Chapter 7 of Article 1 of the Law on the Fundamentals of National Security define defence as universal, unconditional and not replaceable solely by allied assistance. It is important for political decision-makers because a public legal assessment does not replace the function of the Constitutional Court established in Article 105 of the Constitution and does not remove the duty to act within the competence prescribed by law. Therefore, the legal conclusion arising from the sources provided is narrow: the participation of allies in the defence of Lithuania is clearly entrenched, but the compatibility of the presence of a specific weapon of mass destruction on Lithuanian territory with Article 137 of the Constitution would depend on its legal regime, the basis in collective defence, and the acts adopted by competent institutions

Core issue. The legal issue is the national legal basis on which Lithuania may support a project commemorating victims of totalitarian regimes and which institutions, under Lithuanian law, have competence in historical memory activities of this kind. This issue is primarily to be assessed under Article 4 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania, which sets out the Centre’s tasks in the fields of historical research and the restoration of historical justice. Article 11 of the same law is also relevant, as it provides that memorialisation functions are performed by a public institution authorised by the Government. The financing and project supervision aspects should be assessed under Article 11(2)(1)–(3) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania. The temporal application of these provisions is affected by Article 2 of the Law Amending Law No. VIII-238 of the Republic of Lithuania on the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania, under which the law entered into force on 1 October 2024, while the Government was required to adopt implementing legislation by 30 September 2024

Legal assessment. On the facts presented, the memorial in Brussels is a project for the perpetuation of historical memory, as it seeks to honour the victims of totalitarian regimes and strengthen European historical memory. Article 4(1)(e) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania covers research into the actions of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, Nazi and communist parties against Lithuanian society, the persecution of the population during the Soviet and Nazi occupations, and the resistance of Lithuanian society in Lithuania and abroad. Lithuania’s institutional interest in such a project is therefore linked not only to cultural representation, but also to the statutory task of restoring historical justice. Under Article 11(1), memorialisation functions are performed by a Government-authorised institution whose legal form is that of a public institution. Under Article 11(2)(1), that institution conducts public competitions for the selection of memorialisation projects, and under Article 11(2)(2) it grants state support to projects selected by public competition. Under Article 11(2)(3), the same institution supervises the implementation of projects to which it has granted state support. This means that Lithuania’s EUR 70,000 contribution is legally consistent with a model in which a memorialisation project is supported from state funds, while selection and supervision are linked to a public competition and state-support procedure. The excerpt from the Government resolution concerning draft law No. XIVP-2343(2) and draft Seimas resolution No. XIVP-3380 provides that the functions of the Government-authorised institution are financed from state budget appropriations allocated to the Centre and/or other funds. The same excerpt establishes the provision of information by the Centre, cooperation with the Government-authorised institution in the fields of research, publishing and the perpetuation of historical memory, and the exchange of relevant information and data. Government Resolution No. 912 of 30 October 2024 confirms the practical institutional reorganisation: the Fund for the Research of Genocide and Resistance of Lithuanian Residents and for the Support and Commemoration of Victims was reorganised into a public institution, and its name corresponds to the Fund for the Research and Commemoration of Genocide and Resistance of Lithuanian Residents. Earlier Government practice shows continuity: Government Resolution No. 1600 of 8 October 2002 approved the 2003–2008 programme for memorial signs, symbols and monuments to victims of genocide and repressed persons. Paragraph 3 of that resolution instructed the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania to approve annually the measures for implementing the programme, taking into account state budget funds, while paragraph 4 instructed the Ministry of Finance, together with the Centre, to provide for funds for the programme in the draft budget. Paragraph 2 of Government Resolution No. 466 of 22 May 2014 also shows that historical memory measures may be coordinated through agreements on the use of budgetary funds with the entities implementing those measures. The European-level direction is confirmed by excerpts from paragraph 18.2 of the Government’s 2013 activity report: the “European Remembrance” strand of the “Europe for Citizens” programme was also intended to commemorate the victims of totalitarian regimes, including through memorials. The same report states that, through Lithuania’s efforts, the totalitarian communist regime was included within “European Remembrance”; accordingly, the political content of the Brussels memorial is consistent with Lithuania’s previously established direction of action at EU level. The excerpt from the Government’s 2011 activity report further shows that the assessment of totalitarian regimes at EU level and Lithuania’s historical memory were treated as matters of state activity, and that the Platform of European Memory and Conscience was established in 2011

Consequences. In practical terms, the most immediate legal path for the project is the coordination of financing, administration of contributions, permits and implementation supervision among Lithuania, other contributing states, the Platform of European Memory and Conscience, and local authorities in Brussels. For Lithuania’s participation, it is important that the allocation of state funds to a memorialisation project comply with the public competition, state support and supervision model established in Article 11(2)(1)–(3) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania. Since today is 20 July 2026, the objective of opening the memorial during Lithuania’s Presidency of the Council of the EU in 2027 leaves limited time to finalise permits, contractual commitments and the mobilisation of funding. If contributions from states and other supporters are secured, the project could become an EU-level historical memory measure consistent with the “European Remembrance” direction described in the Government’s 2013 activity report. If contributions or permits stall, the realistic scenario is not the collapse of the project’s legal basis, but an adjustment of its scale, timeline or implementation phases. For Lithuanian institutions, this matters because of the use of budgetary funds and the supervision of memorialisation projects; for society and affected communities, it matters because of the international implementation of the statutory task of restoring historical justice

Core issue. The precise legal issue is not competition in “AI devices” in general, but whether an undertaking’s legitimate interests in trade secrets and confidential hardware information have been infringed through acts of unfair competition, and what remedies it may seek. Under Article 16(1) of the Law on Competition of the Republic of Lithuania, such an undertaking may bring proceedings before a court for cessation of unlawful acts, compensation for damage, refutation, or confiscation or destruction of measures related to unfair competition. The procedural protection of trade secrets is governed by Article 21 of the Law on Competition of the Republic of Lithuania, which requires the Competition Council and its employees to protect commercial or professional secrets learned in the course of supervision. According to the sources provided, the artificial intelligence aspect is linked to Articles 1, 2 and 8 of the Law Amending the Law on Technology and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania: the provisions of that law have been aligned with Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, and other terms are to be understood as defined in that Regulation. Accordingly, the legal core of the dispute is the protection of trade secrets and fair competition, not merely the development of artificial intelligence technology itself

Legal assessment. If a company alleges that former employees disclosed or used its confidential information concerning hardware development, supply chains, manufacturing or technological research, its procedural axis under Article 16(1) of the Law on Competition of the Republic of Lithuania would be a claim for cessation of unlawful acts and compensation for damage. The same provision also permits a request for the confiscation or destruction of specific measures directly related to unfair competition, where infringements cannot otherwise be remedied. This is practically significant in the AI device market, because a dispute over files, prototypes, suppliers or internal processes is not merely reputational: it may determine whether a competitor can use a particular development path. Article 21(1) of the Law on Competition establishes a separate layer of protection in institutional proceedings: the Competition Council may use commercial or professional secrets learned by it only for the purposes for which they were provided, and it has no right to access information constituting attorney-client privilege. Under Article 21(2) and (3) of the Law Amending the Law on Competition, an undertaking submitting information to the Competition Council must clearly identify which information is to be treated as a trade secret; if it fails to do so within the prescribed time limit, the information is not regarded as constituting a trade secret. Article 21(2) of the Law on Competition also permits the disclosure of commercial or professional secrets to entities suspected of an infringement for the purposes of the right of defence, where necessary to prove the infringement, but before doing so the entity must be granted a period of at least three working days to submit explanations. Thus, even the protection of trade secrets is not absolute: it is balanced against evidentiary needs and the suspected entity’s right to defend itself. The artificial intelligence regulatory line in this situation is broader: Article 8 of the Law Amending the Law on Technology and Innovation adds Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 to the annex to that law, while Article 2 links the law’s concepts to that Regulation. The sources state that the Ministry of the Economy and Innovation is preparing a separate draft law that will define the competence of Lithuanian state institutions implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, as well as the rights and obligations of other entities. The implementation plan for the Government Programme provides for the creation, by Q4 2026, of an institutional framework promoting the development of artificial intelligence and the activation of an artificial intelligence sandbox. However, these provisions do not provide grounds for treating the development of an artificial intelligence device as unlawful in itself; they indicate that AI development is regulated and promoted at the institutional level. Therefore, the boundary of legality in this dispute would not turn on the fact that “OpenAI” is developing hardware, but on whether protected trade secrets of another undertaking were used in doing so

Consequences. The first realistic scenario under Article 16(1) of the Law on Competition would be a claim to cease acts associated with the alleged use of confidential information and to compensate the damage caused. The second scenario would be a dispute over the status of specific documents, files or technical measures: whether they constitute protectable trade secrets and whether they may be used in the proceedings. The third scenario, relevant to institutional supervision, would be the trade secret protection procedure under Article 21 of the Law on Competition, including the obligation to precisely identify the information to be protected and its possible disclosure for defence purposes. The practical significance for “Apple” would be the ability to prevent a competitor from benefiting from allegedly misappropriated hardware information; the practical significance for “OpenAI” would be the right to defend itself against the allegations and to dispute whether specific information is necessary to prove the infringement. For former employees, the practical risk lies in the boundary between transferable professional skills and the use of specific documents, data or trade secrets. For the AI market, this case is significant insofar as it shows that competition in AI devices will also be assessed through the classic law of unfair competition and trade secret protection. According to the sources provided, Lithuania’s regulatory direction is twofold: artificial intelligence is treated as a priority area, while an institutional framework for implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 is also being developed. As a result, in future AI hardware disputes, it will be important for businesses not only to innovate, but also to document what information constitutes a trade secret, to whom it is provided, and for what purpose it may be used

Core issue. The precise question is whether the knowledge identified by Apple concerning technologies, processes, and products that have not yet been released should be regarded as a trade secret, and whether its acquisition, use, or disclosure could give rise to civil liability and, where qualified conditions are met, criminal liability as well. The principal substantive rule is Article 1.116 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania: a trade secret must be secret, have actual or potential commercial value because it is secret, and the person lawfully controlling it must take reasonable steps to preserve its secrecy. Article 1.97 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania is also relevant, as it provides that information is an object of civil rights. The issue of damages should be assessed under Article 6.263 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, which establishes the duty to act so as not to cause harm to another person and the principle of full compensation for damage. The procedural mechanism for protecting trade secrets would be determined under Article 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania

Legal assessment. Apple’s assertions regarding the collection of confidential data through employees and recruitment processes do not, in themselves, amount to a sufficient legal classification. Under Article 1.116(1) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, it would first be necessary to establish that the specific information was not generally known or readily accessible in the relevant technological environment. The second required element would be commercial value arising specifically from secrecy; accordingly, it is material whether the information concerns technical solutions, processes, or hardware direction for unreleased products capable of conferring a competitive advantage. The third element would require an assessment of Apple’s internal rules, access controls, employee exit procedures, and other reasonable measures taken to preserve secrecy. If the information was merely marked as confidential but did not satisfy these three elements, it would not constitute a trade secret under Article 1.116(2)(1) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Nor would manifestations of experience, skills, abilities, or knowledge honestly acquired by employees be regarded as trade secrets, as expressly provided in Article 1.116(2)(3) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania. The core issue in the dispute would therefore not be the fact that former employees worked for a competitor or partner, but whether they transferred protected secret information rather than lawfully acquired professional experience. If internal information was encouraged to be disclosed during recruitment processes, its legal significance would depend on whether that information met the criteria set out in Article 1.116(1) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania. If it were proven that OpenAI obtained and used such information in developing a consumer device, this could support a claim to cease use and compensate damage under the principle of full compensation established in Article 6.263 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania. The amount of damage could not be abstract: under the summaries provided of Articles 6.249 and 6.250 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, compensation must cover damage actually incurred, while non-pecuniary damage is recoverable only in cases prescribed by law. The submitted review of the case law of the Supreme Court of Lithuania in criminal cases concerning offences against the economy and business order states, with respect to Article 211 of the Criminal Code, that criminal liability for disclosure of a trade secret is linked to a causal connection between the disclosure and substantial pecuniary damage. The same review notes that disclosure of a trade secret is an intentional criminal offence, committed with either direct or indirect intent. The review also distinguishes between types of liability: civil liability is ordinarily applied for compensation of damage, while criminal law applies only where the dangerousness of the act reaches the threshold required for criminal liability. Procedurally, if genuine information constituting, or potentially constituting, a trade secret were submitted in the case, Article 101(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania would allow the court, by reasoned ruling, to restrict the circle of persons entitled to access such case material. Under paragraph 3 of the same article, such restriction may not be broader than necessary to ensure the right to judicial protection and a fair hearing of the case

Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the court finds that the disputed information satisfies the elements set out in Article 1.116(1) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, in which case the principal dispute shifts to proof of unlawful acquisition, use, causation, and the amount of damage. The second scenario is that part of the information is classified only as confidential, but not as a trade secret, with the result that the scope of the claims would narrow under Article 1.116(2) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania. The third scenario is a finding that the disputed knowledge constitutes experience or abilities honestly acquired by former employees, which under Article 1.116(2)(3) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania would weaken Apple’s position. The fourth scenario is that a civil dispute concerning damages and injunctions could exist separately from the issue of criminal liability, because the Supreme Court of Lithuania’s case-law review links criminal liability to the threshold of substantial pecuniary damage and intent. For Apple, the practical significance would be the ability to protect information as an object of civil rights under Article 1.97 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania and to seek full compensation for damage under Article 6.263 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania. For OpenAI, the key point would be to contest at least one of the elements set out in Article 1.116(1) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, or to show that the information fell within the sphere of employees’ honestly acquired professional experience. For former employees, the practical risk would arise from the boundary between lawfully usable skills and disclosure of a protected trade secret. For the court, the case would be procedurally sensitive, because under Article 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania it would have to reconcile the protection of secrets with the parties’ right to participate effectively in the proceedings

Core issue. The precise issue is whether the conduct of a 23-year-old driver who drove a Toyota while intoxicated at a blood alcohol level of 2.18 per mille and collided with the fence of a private house falls within Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. This provision applies to a person who drove a motor vehicle while intoxicated where a blood alcohol level of 1.51 per mille or higher is established, and provides for a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. The limits of liability are also determined by Article 2(3)–(5) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania: liability arises only where there is culpability, only where the act corresponds to the statutory elements provided by law, and penalties and penal measures may be imposed only pursuant to law. The damage to the fence separately raises the issue of compensation for damage under Article 69(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, because the damage was caused to property. Article 281 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania would be relevant only if the consequences specified therein were present, for example minor or serious impairment of another person’s health or substantial property damage under Article 281(2)–(4)

Legal assessment. The stated blood alcohol level of 2.18 per mille exceeds the threshold of 1.51 per mille established in Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania; therefore, the basis for criminal liability arises from the very fact of driving while intoxicated. This set of statutory elements does not require that a person be injured or that substantial property damage be caused, because Article 281¹(1) criminalises driving at the established level of intoxication. Article 281¹(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania further provides that a person is also liable where the act was committed through negligence. By contrast, Article 281(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania links intoxication, a breach of road traffic safety or vehicle operation rules, and specific consequences, namely minor impairment of health or substantial property damage. The reported knocked-down fence and entry into a private yard primarily substantiate the issue of damage to property, but under the provisions provided they do not, of themselves, change the classification under Article 281¹ into Article 281(2). Sources of administrative liability also indicate the boundary: Article 423(3) and Article 427(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania are associated with intoxication up to 1.5 per mille, whereas the level established here is 2.18 per mille. Accordingly, under the legal regulation provided, the case properly tends toward criminal proceedings rather than merely administrative liability. During the pre-trial investigation, relevant objects and documents may be submitted pursuant to Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. Procedural time limits are calculated under Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania: time limits may be set by a pre-trial investigation officer, prosecutor, judge, or court, and a time limit calculated in days expires at twenty-four hundred hours on the final day. If necessary to secure the suspect’s participation in the proceedings, prevent obstruction of the investigation, or prevent new offences, coercive measures may be applied under Articles 119 and 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, including a written undertaking not to leave, an obligation to register with a police authority, bail, seizure of documents, house arrest, or detention. If the issue of expert examination were to arise in the case, the prosecutor, upon receiving the expert examination report, would, according to the provided excerpt from the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, notify the participants in the proceedings where and when they may examine it. The pre-trial investigation could be discontinued only on the grounds specified in Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, for example where insufficient data are collected to substantiate the suspect’s guilt

Consequences. The most realistic course is a pre-trial investigation under Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, after which a decision would be made on the charge and on the penalty from among the alternatives provided in that provision: a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. If the court were to find that the criminal act caused damage to the property of the owner of the private house, compensation for or elimination of property damage could be ordered under Article 69(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Under Article 69(3) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, the damage would have to be compensated for or eliminated within the time limit set by the court, which may not exceed three years. In practical terms, it is important for the injured property owner to collect and submit documents substantiating the amount of damage, because Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania allows participants in the proceedings and other persons to submit, on their own initiative, objects and documents relevant to the case. For the driver, the most important practical point is that the 2.18 per mille reading does not fall within the administrative intoxication range of up to 1.5 per mille, but within the threshold for criminal liability under Article 281¹ of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. If the additional consequences specified in Article 281 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania were not established in the case, the principal legal dispute would remain focused on the statutory elements of Article 281¹ and culpability. The final consequences will depend on what data are collected during the pre-trial investigation, what procedural position is adopted by the prosecutor, and what penalty or time limit for compensation for damage is set by the court under the provisions provided

Core issue. The precise legal question is not whether the social and environmental objectives of the Programme of the Twenty-First Government are politically justified, but whether, in converting them into budgetary commitments, the rules of medium-term fiscal discipline and budget planning would be observed. This question must be assessed under Article 6 of the Law on the Budget Structure of the Republic of Lithuania, Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Law on Fiscal Discipline of the Republic of Lithuania, and Article 2(2) and (4) of the Law Amending Law No. I-430 on the Budget Structure of the Republic of Lithuania. Since, from 1 March 2024, the new wording of the Law on the Budget Structure applies to the preparation, approval, implementation, assessment and control of budgets for 2025-2027 and subsequent years, as of today, 20 July 2026, the commitments discussed as commencing “next year” must be assessed within the framework of the 2027 budget and the medium-term budgetary framework. Article 6(3) of the Law on the Budget Structure of the Republic of Lithuania requires that laws and other legal acts affecting the revenue, appropriations and state debt of the relevant budget year be adopted no later than the law approving the budget for that year. Article 6(4) of the same law provides that indicators, coefficients and other amounts used to calculate planned appropriations must be established for a period of not less than three budget years. Article 1(1) of the Law on Fiscal Discipline of the Republic of Lithuania links these rules to the long-term sustainability of general government finances and stable economic development

Legal assessment. The increases in child benefits, indexation of old-age pensions, social assistance pensions and broader social support referred to in the Programme would, in legal terms, entail a need for permanent or recurring appropriations and are therefore subject to the regime laid down in Article 6(3) and (4) of the Law on the Budget Structure of the Republic of Lithuania. The Government cannot treat such measures merely as programme commitments if the legal acts required for their implementation would alter budget revenue, appropriations or state debt. Such legal acts must be aligned with the law approving the budget for the relevant year in both timing and substance, rather than left for a later political decision without budgetary coverage. The role of the Minister of Finance is technical but significant: under Article 6(2) of the Law on the Budget Structure of the Republic of Lithuania, the Minister establishes the methodology for the preparation and implementation of the state and municipal budgets to the extent that it is not established by laws and Government resolutions. Article 2(1) of the Law on Fiscal Discipline defines fiscal discipline as the totality of measures intended to ensure that general government debt, including commitments arising from demographic change, does not exceed 60 per cent of GDP over several decades. Accordingly, the risk identified by the economist concerning population ageing and future commitments falls legally within the very concept of fiscal discipline, and is not merely an economic policy argument. Article 3(1) of the Law on Fiscal Discipline sets the general objective that, over the medium term, the general government sector should be in surplus, except in years in which exceptional circumstances arise or there is a negative output gap relative to potential. If the average of the general government balance indicators for the last five completed calendar years were negative, then, under Article 3(2) of that law, the annual growth in the aggregate of state budget appropriations, State Social Insurance Fund expenditure and Compulsory Health Insurance Fund expenditure could not exceed the established limit. It follows that the scale of increases in social benefits and pensions would depend not only on the Government Programme, but also on the conditions for applying the numerical expenditure growth rule. Article 2(4) of the Law Amending Law No. I-430 on the Budget Structure of the Republic of Lithuania further establishes an undistributed part of the aggregate appropriations limit, amounting in the first budget year to 0.5-1 per cent, in the second year to not less than 2 per cent, and in the third year to not less than 3 per cent of the relevant limits. This means that new commitments must be coordinated not only with a specific expenditure line, but also with the reserve-type structure of the appropriations limit. The significance of judicial practice is apparent from the ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 7 March 2014, “On the Interpretation of Certain Provisions of the Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 6 February 2012”, in which it was stated that the state’s financial capacity is also determined by commitments relating to financial discipline and the imperative of balancing state budget revenue and expenditure. The Government’s position on the draft concerning pension increases, No. XIIP-1361(5), also indicates the direction of application: social insurance pensions, state pensions and social assistance benefits are to be increased responsibly and rationally, taking into account the capacities of the State Social Insurance Fund budget and the state budget, as well as commitments already assumed

Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the Government converts the programme objectives into draft legal acts together with the 2027 budgetary decisions and demonstrates their impact on revenue, appropriations and debt. In that case, the practical dispute would shift to whether the indicators and coefficients established for the three-year planning period allow the benefit increases to be financed without breaching the rules laid down in Article 3 of the Law on Fiscal Discipline. The second scenario is limited implementation: some social measures are postponed, reduced or linked to budgetary capacity, as provided in the Government’s position on the draft concerning pension increases, No. XIIP-1361(5). The third scenario is legal tension if legal acts increasing expenditure were adopted without alignment with the law approving the budget or without compliance with medium-term fiscal limits. For the environmental component, the practical consequence is different: programme statements concerning pollution measurement, the deployment of technologies or the financing of institutions do not in themselves create a budgetary legality issue until they are converted into legal acts affecting appropriations, revenue or debt. This is of practical importance for the Ministry of Finance and the Minister of Finance, whose competence includes the methodology for budget preparation and implementation, as well as for social security institutions, whose projects to increase benefits must fit within the overall appropriations regime. For residents, this message matters to the extent that the Programme’s promises become not declarations, but rights to higher benefits approved in the budget and compliant with fiscal discipline rules

Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the fight that occurred on Laisvės Alėja was properly classified as minor bodily harm committed for hooligan motives under Article 138(2)(8) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania and, concurrently, as a breach of public order under Article 284 of the Criminal Code. Under Article 138(1) of the Criminal Code, minor bodily harm is associated with injuring a person or causing illness where the victim loses a small part of working capacity or suffers a prolonged illness, while under Article 138(2)(8) liability is aggravated where the act is committed for hooligan motives. Under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code, separate criminal liability arises for demonstrating disrespect for others or the environment in a public place through insolent conduct, threats, mockery, or acts of vandalism, where public peace or order is thereby disturbed. The issue of sentencing must be determined under Article 55 of the Criminal Code, since a person tried for the first time for a negligent offence or for a minor or less serious intentional offence is generally to be given a sentence not involving arrest or fixed-term imprisonment, and where imprisonment is imposed the court must give reasons for that decision. The basis for suspending execution of the sentence must be assessed under Article 75(1) of the Criminal Code, which permits the suspension of execution of a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding four years for one or more minor or less serious intentional offences, where the court considers that the purposes of punishment will be achieved without actual service of the sentence. The significance of time spent in pre-trial detention or temporary detention follows from Article 66(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code: the court must credit that time against the imposed sentence, treating one day as equivalent to one day of imprisonment

Legal assessment. The essence of the convicted persons’ appeals, as reported, is the denial of hooligan motives; accordingly, the dispute concerns not only the violence itself but primarily the qualifying element under Article 138(2)(8) of the Criminal Code. If the hooligan motives remain, the act falls within the more severe sanction under Article 138(2) of the Criminal Code, namely imprisonment for up to five years, rather than within the limits of Article 138(1), which provides for restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment for up to three years. The public-place element is particularly important in this case from the perspective of Article 284 of the Criminal Code, since Laisvės Alėja, according to the reported circumstances, is a public space, and a fight there may be assessed through the elements of insolent conduct and disturbance of public peace or order. Article 284 of the Criminal Code does not require only health-related consequences: its focus is the demonstration of disrespect for others or the environment and an actual disturbance of public peace or order. Therefore, Article 138(2)(8) and Article 284 of the Criminal Code protect different legal interests in this situation: the former protects personal health in cases of qualified violence, while the latter protects public order. The cited source concerning the draft amendment to Article 310 of the Criminal Code states that insolent conduct or malicious mockery in a public place, where disrespect is demonstrated and public peace or order is disturbed, may be classified under Article 284 of the Criminal Code either independently or as a concurrence of offences. The same source refers to case law in which the commission of criminal acts in the presence of children or filming in the victim’s presence has been recognised as indicating a disturbance of public peace and order or hooligan motives. Although the report contains no information concerning children or filming, this reference to case law is relevant insofar as it shows that the assessment of hooligan motives and breach of public order is linked to the demonstrative nature of the violence, the setting, and its impact on public peace. When imposing actual custodial sentences ranging from four months to one year, the court of first instance had to comply with the requirement under Article 55 of the Criminal Code to state reasons for choosing a custodial sentence if the persons fell within the scope of that provision. The suspension of execution of the sentences imposed on L. Ščerbinskas and V. Zakarževskis is consistent with the structure of Article 75(1) of the Criminal Code, since the imposed one-year term of imprisonment does not exceed the four-year threshold, and the court may suspend execution for a period of one to three years. The obligations imposed by the court to participate in a behavioural correction programme, not to leave the place of residence, and to work mean in practical terms that the custodial sentence has not been annulled, but that its execution is linked to the convicted persons’ conduct during the suspension period. For those convicted persons whose sentences were deemed served because of time spent in detention or pre-trial detention, Article 66 of the Criminal Code applies, since crediting such time is not a matter of judicial discretion; it is mandatory. From a procedural standpoint, the convicted persons’ appeals correspond to the accused’s right under Article 16(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to appeal a court judgment and rulings. The role of the prosecution also follows from Article 23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, under which the indictment is the prosecutor’s document concluding the pre-trial investigation and describing the act, the evidentiary material, and the criminal law provision. If participants in the proceedings submit additional objects or documents, the rule in Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is relevant, allowing the accused, defence counsel, the victim, and other participants in the proceedings to submit, on their own initiative, documents or objects relevant to the case. As regards time limits, Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provide that procedural time limits define the commencement, performance, or completion of procedural acts and are calculated in hours, days, and months, excluding the day on which the time limit begins

Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the appellate court upholds the classification under Article 138(2)(8) and Article 284 of the Criminal Code if it considers both the bodily harm and the hooligan motives and disturbance of public order to have been proven. The second scenario is that the court finds that hooligan motives have not been proven, in which case the severity of liability under Article 138 of the Criminal Code would be reduced from the scope of paragraph 2 to the scope of paragraph 1. The third scenario is that the assessment of breach of public order under Article 284 of the Criminal Code remains even if the classification of the bodily harm is challenged, provided that insolent conduct in a public place and a disturbance of public peace or order are proven. The fourth scenario is that the sentences may be increased or reduced in light of the arguments raised in the appeals, but the cited sources permit only the conclusion that the imposition of imprisonment must be reasoned under Article 55 of the Criminal Code, while suspension of execution is possible under Article 75(1). In practical terms, the most important issue for the convicted persons is whether the qualifying element of hooligan motives remains, since it determines the higher sentencing range under Article 138 of the Criminal Code and a more serious legal assessment. For the victims and the public interest, it is important whether violence in a public urban space will be assessed not only as bodily harm but also as a breach of public order under Article 284 of the Criminal Code. If the judgment became final and were later challenged in cassation, then under Articles 24 and 25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the case would fall within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Lithuania as an appeal against a final judgment or ruling

Core issue. The precise legal question is whether the act of the Seimas approving the Programme of the Twenty-First Government led by Mindaugas Sinkevičius, as “another act adopted by the Seimas”, is compatible with the Constitution in light of the procedure for submitting and considering the Government Programme. It must be assessed under Article 105 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, which entrusts the Constitutional Court with examining whether laws and other acts adopted by the Seimas are compatible with the Constitution, and under Article 106 of the Constitution, which identifies the entities entitled to apply to the Constitutional Court. The procedural route is grounded in Article 63 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, under which the Constitutional Court hears cases concerning the conformity of laws and other acts of the Seimas with the Constitution; Article 65, which grants such a right to the Government, a group of not less than one-fifth of all Members of the Seimas, and courts; and Article 66, which defines the contents of an application. The provisions of Article 101 of the Constitution are also substantively relevant: the Government must obtain the powers of the Seimas anew, and if the Seimas twice in succession refuses to approve the programme of a newly formed Government, the Government must resign. Article 19 of the Law Amending the Law on Strategic Governance No XIII-3096 supplements this regime insofar as it provides that the Government Programme is prepared and approved in accordance with the Law on the Government, that its implementation is coordinated by the Government, and that monitoring of implementation and preparation of reports are organised by the Office of the Government

Legal assessment. An application by the opposition would be legally possible only if submitted by a group of not less than one-fifth of all Members of the Seimas, as expressly provided by Article 106 of the Constitution and Article 65(1)(1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court in respect of acts adopted by the Seimas. Under Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, such an application would have to identify precisely the contested act of the Seimas concerning the Government Programme, indicate the provisions of the Constitution and the Law on the Constitutional Court conferring the right to apply, formulate the request, and provide legal reasoning. An application by a group of Members of the Seimas would have to be signed by all Members of the Seimas submitting it; they would have to designate their representative, and the signatures would have to be certified by the signature of the Speaker of the Seimas or a Deputy Speaker. Under Article 63 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court could examine either the entire act of the Seimas concerning the Programme or part of it. Article 106 of the Constitution also provides that the Constitutional Court has the right to refuse to accept a case where the application is based on non-legal grounds; accordingly, political dissatisfaction with the adoption of the Programme would not in itself be sufficient. The applicants’ essential argument should not be whether the Programme is politically appropriate, but whether the Seimas lawfully conferred authority on the Government to act through the procedure for considering and approving the Programme. In its ruling of 10 January 1998 “On the conformity of the Resolution of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania of 10 December 1996 ‘On the Programme of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania’ with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania”, the Constitutional Court emphasised that the Government is a collegial institution of general competence occupying a distinct place within the system of executive authorities. The same constitutional doctrine states that conferring authority on the Government to act, and exercising control over its activities, constitute an important area of the Seimas’s competence. This doctrine is particularly important because a dispute over the Programme is not merely a formal question of document registration: it concerns whether the Government received the political and constitutional mandate of the Seimas in the manner required by the constitutional interaction between the Seimas and the Government. If the Constitutional Court were to hold that submission of the Government Programme to the Seimas includes its presentation at a sitting of the Seimas and its consideration, the mere fact of registration could not substitute for that procedure. Conversely, if it were recognised that, as a matter of law, formal submission of the Programme as an act is sufficient, the basis of the contested decision of the Seimas would be strengthened. Article 94 of the Constitution shows that the functions of the Government are broad: it administers the affairs of the country, implements laws and resolutions of the Seimas, coordinates the activities of ministries, and prepares draft budgets and legislation. The outcome of the dispute would therefore affect not only the text of the Programme, but also the basis of the powers of the Government as an institution of general competence. Nevertheless, Article 106 of the Constitution provides that the validity of an act is suspended by a submission of the President of the Republic to the Constitutional Court or by a resolution of the Seimas requesting examination of the act’s conformity with the Constitution, and not merely by an application from a group of Members of the Seimas

Consequences. The first scenario is that the Constitutional Court accepts the application and finds that the act of the Seimas concerning the Government Programme is not contrary to the Constitution; in that case, the basis of the Government’s authority remains unchanged. The second scenario is that the Constitutional Court finds a conflict with the Constitution, in which case practical attention would shift to how the Seimas and the Government must restore a lawful procedure for approving the Programme. The third scenario is that the Constitutional Court refuses to accept the case if the application does not meet the requirements of Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court or is based on non-legal grounds, as permitted by Article 106 of the Constitution. For the Government, this is practically significant because, under Article 19 of the Law on Strategic Governance, the Government Programme is the basis for coordinating its implementation, preparing an implementation plan, carrying out monitoring, and reporting on progress. For the Seimas, it matters as a test of its constitutional competence to confer authority on the Government and to control its activities. For the opposition, it is a procedural instrument, but one that must be used precisely in accordance with Article 106 of the Constitution and Articles 65 and 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court. From an institutional perspective, the greatest risk would arise if it were recognised that the Programme had been approved in breach of the constitutional logic governing the conferral of authority: in that event, the question would concern not only a single resolution of the Seimas, but the very basis on which the Government acts

Core issue. The precise legal question is as follows: whether, following violence by a minor against a peer, the child minimum or medium supervision system must be activated, and how the chain of preventive work by municipal and state institutions must be assessed. This question is to be resolved under Articles 4, 11, 12, 18, 21 and 27 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Child Minimum and Medium Supervision, as well as Articles 1, 10, 11, 12 and 29 of the Law Amending Law No. X-1238 of the Republic of Lithuania on Child Minimum and Medium Supervision. Under Article 1(1) of the Law Amending Law No. X-1238 of the Republic of Lithuania on Child Minimum and Medium Supervision, the purpose of this system is not merely to punish the child, but to create a system of measures consistent with the child’s rights, legitimate interests and public safety needs, aimed at the socialisation, education and assistance of a child with behavioural problems. If a child has committed an act bearing the characteristics of a criminal offence or misdemeanour but has not reached the age of criminal responsibility, minimum supervision measures may be imposed pursuant to Article 10(1)(1) of the Law Amending Law No. X-1238 of the Republic of Lithuania on Child Minimum and Medium Supervision. In assessing institutional prevention, the principal provision is Article 11 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Child Minimum and Medium Supervision, because it assigns to the municipal administration’s preventive work coordination group the coordination of the implementation of preventive programmes, inter-institutional cooperation and the activities of school preventive work groups

Legal assessment. The clarification sought by the Prime Minister from heads of institutions is legally linked not to a political meeting as such, but to the statutory duty to coordinate prevention at the municipal level. Under Article 11(2) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Child Minimum and Medium Supervision, the preventive work coordination group must be composed of representatives of the territorial police institution, the child rights protection service, social services, education, health and other institutions participating in prevention. Therefore, following the incident described in Marijampolė, the legally relevant issue is not to state in the abstract that prevention failed, but to establish whether the municipality had functioning mechanisms for collecting information, coordinating programmes and ensuring inter-institutional cooperation, as required by Article 11(3)(1)–(3) of the same law. An application for the imposition of minimum supervision measures under Article 12(2)(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Child Minimum and Medium Supervision may be initiated by the inter-institutional cooperation coordinator, the child’s legal representatives, the territorial police institution, the school, the eldership, the prosecutor, the court, or an institution examining an administrative offence case out of court. Under Article 12(1) of the Law Amending Law No. X-1238 of the Republic of Lithuania on Child Minimum and Medium Supervision, the child’s legal representatives, the police, the school, the inter-institutional cooperation coordinator, the eldership, the prosecutor and the court may also apply for the imposition of a minimum or medium supervision measure. The measures are imposed not by the prosecutor’s office or the police, but by the director of the municipal administration of the child’s permanent place of residence; this is expressly established in Article 11 of the Law Amending Law No. X-1238 of the Republic of Lithuania on Child Minimum and Medium Supervision. In another version provided, Article 9 of the Law Amending the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Child Minimum and Medium Supervision specifies that measures are imposed on the proposal of the municipal administration’s child welfare commission, and that certain minimum supervision measures and medium supervision require court authorisation. Any response in respect of the child must be individualised: Article 4(1)–(4) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Child Minimum and Medium Supervision requires priority to be given to the best interests of the child, that the child be heard, that the child’s age, maturity, mental and physical characteristics, needs and social environment be assessed, and that the child be treated with dignity. Article 4(4) of the Law Amending the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Child Minimum and Medium Supervision additionally emphasises the education of the child to fulfil duties and to feel responsibility for his or her actions in the family, educational institution, workplace and social environment. This means that the fact of violence may constitute a legal basis for considering supervision measures, but the content of the measure must be linked to behavioural change, socialisation, assistance and the development of responsibility, as indicated in Article 3 of the Law Amending the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Child Minimum and Medium Supervision. If minimum supervision measures were applied, the child’s legal representatives would acquire the right to receive information from the school and the case manager, and to submit requests or complaints to the municipal mayor, the inter-institutional cooperation coordinator, child rights protection, law enforcement and other institutions under Article 18(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Child Minimum and Medium Supervision. The same representatives would have a duty to participate in preparing and implementing the individual plan for the execution of the minimum supervision measure, to participate in the implementation of the measures, and to provide information to the responsible entities under Article 18(2) of that law. Under Article 29(1)(1), (3), (4) and (5) of the Law Amending Law No. X-1238 of the Republic of Lithuania on Child Minimum and Medium Supervision, the inter-institutional cooperation coordinator plans, coordinates and evaluates the implementation of measures, analyses information on violence and other social risk factors, submits proposals for improving services and reports once a year to the director of the municipal administration. At ministerial level, responsibility does not consist in the direct investigation of a specific incident: under Article 27(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Child Minimum and Medium Supervision, ministries participate in shaping policy, organising, coordinating and supervising its implementation, and submit proposals for improving legislation. If a measure went beyond minimum supervision and medium supervision were considered, the role of the child socialisation centre under Article 21(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Child Minimum and Medium Supervision would be education, resocialisation, social integration, protection of the child’s rights and ensuring safety

Consequences. The first realistic scenario is a municipal-level procedure: a competent entity submits an application, the municipal administration system collects information, assesses the child’s situation and decides on minimum supervision measures. The second scenario is a broader prevention assessment, in which the inter-institutional cooperation coordinator and the preventive work coordination group analyse which factors of violence, bullying or social risk in the municipality were not managed. The third scenario is adjustment of state policy: under Article 27 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Child Minimum and Medium Supervision, ministries may submit proposals to the Government or other institutions concerning services, access to assistance and improvement of legislation. In practical terms, for the victim and her representatives, it is important that the institutional response not remain solely in the shadow of the criminal investigation, because the cited legal sources also provide mechanisms for child welfare, safety and services. For the minor who committed the violence, it is important that the measures must be selected according to her age, maturity, needs and social environment, while also being directed towards understanding responsibility for her actions. For the school, the police, the eldership, the prosecutor and the child’s representatives, what is practically important is their right to initiate the imposition, amendment or revocation of supervision measures under Article 12 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Child Minimum and Medium Supervision and Article 12 of Law No. X-1238 amending that law. For the municipality, this incident is a test of institutional functioning, because Article 11 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Child Minimum and Medium Supervision and Article 29 of Law No. X-1238 amending that law turn prevention into a concrete duty of coordination, analysis, reporting and submission of proposals

Core issue. The legal issue is whether the submission of expense reports by a member of the Varėna District Municipal Council, indicating allegedly incurred fuel expenses, constitutes a concurrence of criminal offences under Articles 182, 228 and 300 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Under Article 182(1) of the Criminal Code, fraud is associated with the acquisition, by deception, of another’s property or property right for one’s own benefit or for the benefit of others, while Article 182(5) provides that liability for the acts specified in paragraphs 1 and 4 arises upon a complaint by the victim, an application by the victim’s representative, or a prosecutor’s request. Under Article 228(1) of the Criminal Code, abuse of office consists of abuse of official position or exceeding official powers by a civil servant or a person equivalent thereto, where this causes major harm to the State or to a legal or natural person; Article 228(2) treats more severely an act committed for the purpose of obtaining pecuniary or other personal benefit, in the absence of elements of bribery. Under Article 300(1) of the Criminal Code, criminal liability arises for producing a false document, falsifying a genuine document, or possessing, transporting, sending, using or realising a document known to be false or a genuine document known to have been falsified. The context of a municipal council member’s duties and remuneration is assessed under Articles 10 and 12 of the Law on Local Self-Government: a council member has the duties specified by law, and is remunerated for working time spent performing the duties of a council member in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 12

Legal assessment. If the 36 expense reports referred to in the charge were genuine documents containing data that did not correspond to reality, the central issue of document falsification would be the falsification of a genuine document and its use by submitting it to the municipal accounting department, as provided for in Article 300(1) of the Criminal Code. In this situation, the significance of the document is not merely formal: according to the charge, the report was the means used to substantiate a compensable expense related to the council member’s activities and to trigger the disbursement of municipal funds. In assessing fraud under Article 182 of the Criminal Code, the decisive issue would be whether the municipality was misled as to the reality of the fuel expenses and their connection with the council member’s activities, and whether, as a result of that deception, the accused acquired approximately EUR 2,200 of another’s property for his own benefit. Although Article 183 of the Criminal Code is mentioned in the sources, it is not the principal basis for legal classification here, because the description of the charge emphasises not the misappropriation of property entrusted to, or in the possession of, the accused, but compensation obtained by deception. The issue of abuse of office under Article 228 of the Criminal Code would be broader than the receipt of money: the court would have to assess whether the status of a council member and the right to receive compensation for activity-related expenses were used contrary to the purpose of public service. Article 228(1) requires the element of major harm, meaning that the amount of funds alone does not exhaust the assessment; the charge additionally refers to diminished trust in the office of council member and damage to the reputation of the municipality and the council, which is legally relevant specifically for substantiating this element. If it were proven that the act was committed for the purpose of obtaining pecuniary benefit and that there were no elements of bribery, Article 228(2) of the Criminal Code would be relevant to the legal classification. Article 10 of the Law on Local Self-Government defines the public duties of a council member, including participation in meetings, committee work, declaration of conflicts of interest, reception of residents and accountability to residents; this shows that the activities of a council member are regulated within a system for the performance of public functions. Article 12 of the Law on Local Self-Government is important because a council member’s remuneration is linked to the time actually worked in performing council member duties and to the calculation procedure established in the regulations; therefore, the lawfulness of payments depends on their connection with actual council member activity. Procedurally, the case has already moved from the pre-trial investigation stage to the trial stage, because, according to the report, the prosecutor’s office has referred it to the Alytus District Court. Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows the accused, defence counsel, the victim, the civil claimant, the civil defendant and other persons to submit objects and documents relevant to the investigation and examination of a criminal offence; accordingly, the expense reports, accounting data and other documents constitute the principal evidentiary material. Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are relevant to the court proceedings insofar as procedural acts must be performed within prescribed time limits, and those time limits are calculated in hours, days and months, excluding the day on which the time limit begins. If the proceedings involve determining measures to secure the accused’s participation, Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure sets out the purpose of remand measures, while Article 120 lists their types, including a written undertaking not to leave, bail, seizure of documents, house arrest and detention. In the context of compensation for damage, Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that where the accused or persons materially liable for the accused’s actions do not have funds to compensate the damage, such damage may, in the cases and according to the procedure provided by law, be compensated from State funds allocated for that purpose

Consequences. The first realistic scenario is a conviction on all or some of the charges, if the court finds proven the deception, the use of falsified documents, the pursuit of pecuniary benefit and the element of major harm required for abuse of office. In that case, the limits of the sanctions would be determined by the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code: under Article 182(1), a fine, restriction of liberty, arrest or imprisonment for up to three years may be imposed; under Article 300(1), penalties of the same type, including imprisonment for up to three years, may be imposed; and under Article 228(2), a fine or imprisonment for up to seven years may be imposed. The second scenario is that the court may find document falsification or fraud proven, but not abuse of office, if all elements established in Article 228 of the Criminal Code are not substantiated. The third scenario is acquittal in respect of those offences whose constituent elements the court does not find proven, since each of the cited provisions protects a different legal interest and requires distinct factual elements. In practical terms, this case is important for the municipality as a potentially injured manager of funds, because the core of the dispute is the justification for the disbursement of municipal money. It is also important for council members because, in the context of Articles 10 and 12 of the Law on Local Self-Government, it shows that remuneration for council member activities and the declaration of expenses related to those duties are not merely matters of internal accounting. For the accused, the most important procedural point is that the outcome of the case will be determined not by the public description of the charge, but by the documents examined in court, their content, the circumstances of their use and their connection with the municipal funds received

Core issue. The legal issue is not the abstract “legality of the Government”, but whether the contested legal act concerning the formation of the Government or the approval of its programme complies with the requirements of the Constitution, under which the Government consists of the Prime Minister and ministers, and its powers derive from the Constitution and laws. The assessment should primarily be linked to Article 5(1), Article 91 and Article 94 of the Constitution, since the sources provided state that the Government is one of the institutions exercising state authority, that it consists of the Prime Minister and ministers, and that its powers are established in the Constitution and laws. The applicant would be not less than one-fifth of the members of the Seimas, as indicated in the materials concerning the draft amendment to Article 106 of the Constitution, where “not less than one-fifth of the members of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania” are identified among the eligible applicants. The petition itself would have to comply with Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania: it must specify the exact title, number and date of adoption of the contested act, the grounds for hearing the case, the applicant’s position and the legal reasoning supporting it. Under Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, a petition by a group of members of the Seimas must be signed by all members of the Seimas submitting it, must designate a representative, and the signatures must be certified by the signature of the Speaker of the Seimas or a Deputy Speaker

Legal assessment. The facts provided indicate that the dispute would focus on the chronology of the formation process: the Government programme was registered on 3 July 2026, while the decree of the President of the Republic concerning the composition of the Cabinet of Ministers was signed on 7 July 2026. The opposition’s position, insofar as it can be assessed from the sources, would rest on the argument that the programme must be linked to a Government already formed and approved by the President of the Republic, rather than to a composition of ministers not yet approved. The Prime Minister’s counterargument would be procedurally significant: according to the report, the programme was submitted to the Seimas only after the decree of the President of the Republic, and therefore the mere moment of registration does not necessarily coincide with the constitutionally significant moment of submission to the Seimas. Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court is particularly important here, because the applicants would have to challenge a specific legal act, not merely a political situation or a doubt concerning the procedure for preparing documents. If the Seimas resolution approving the Government programme were challenged, the petition would have to identify that act precisely and substantiate why the procedure for its adoption failed to comply with Article 5(1), Article 91 or other specified constitutional provisions. Article 26 of the Law on the Constitutional Court provides for a special preliminary procedure in cases where a Seimas resolution is received requesting an examination of whether a law or another act adopted by the Seimas is in conformity with the Constitution: within three days, a preliminary examination of the materials is carried out and a decision is made on whether to accept the petition for consideration. The same provision of Article 26 states that, once such a petition is accepted for consideration, the President of the Constitutional Court announces this and submits a notice to the administrator of the Register of Legal Acts concerning the suspension of the validity of the contested act under Article 106 of the Constitution. However, this suspension rule is directly linked to a submission by the President of the Republic or a resolution of the Seimas, and therefore the procedural consequences of a petition by a group of members of the Seimas must be assessed according to the form of application applicable to them and the requirements of Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court. In preparing a case, a justice of the Constitutional Court may, under Article 9 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, request documents and information from state institutions, obtain explanations from officials, question witnesses and use expert consultations. In practical terms, this means that the documentary sequence of registration, submission, presidential approval and Seimas approval of the programme could become the subject of the case investigation. Institutionally, it is also important that, under Article 17 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court and its justices are independent of state institutions, members of the Seimas, political parties and other persons, and therefore political statements concerning a future application cannot determine the legal assessment. The Constitutional Court case law provided shows that, in its ruling of 10 January 1998 “On the compliance of the Resolution of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania of 10 December 1996 ‘On the Programme of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania’ with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania”, the Government was described as a collegial institution of general competence occupying a special place in the system of executive power. That case is significant because it confirms the constitutional importance of the Government programme and permits a dispute of this kind to be framed not as a technical issue of document registration, but as a question concerning the formation of the constitutional mandate of the executive branch

Consequences. First scenario: if not less than 29 members of the Seimas duly sign the petition and it complies with the requirements of Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court could proceed to examine the dispute concerning the conformity of a specific act with the Constitution. Second scenario: if the petition did not precisely identify the contested legal act, its date of adoption, the legal grounds and the legal reasoning, a procedural obstacle would arise even before any substantive assessment of the formation of the Government. Third scenario: if the Constitutional Court were to assess the Seimas resolution approving the programme and apply the suspension mechanism provided for in Article 26 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the issue of the validity of the contested act would become directly relevant to the stability of the Government’s activities. Fourth scenario: if it were found that the contested act is not contrary to the Constitution, this would be officially announced under Article 26 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, and the political uncertainty surrounding the formation procedure would diminish. The practical significance primarily concerns the Government and the Seimas, because the powers of the Government, as stated in the sources, derive from the Constitution and laws, while the programme is connected with the basis for the operation of the collegial executive authority. It is also important for the institution of the President of the Republic, because the core of the dispute concerns the sequence between the Government approved by the President and the programme submitted to the Seimas. For the group of members of the Seimas, the most important point is to formulate not a political question, but a petition concerning the constitutionality of a specific act that complies with Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court. The final effect would depend on whether the Constitutional Court viewed the dispute as a constitutionally significant violation in the formation of the Government’s mandate, or as a procedural issue concerning the movement of documents that does not negate the legal consequences of the programme approved by the Seimas on 14 July 2026 and the oaths of the ministers

Core issue. The precise legal question is how to classify the deliberate demolition, by crane, of churches and adjacent property where the conduct is directed against a religious community. The principal provisions would be Article 187 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, concerning the destruction of or damage to another person’s property, and Article 312, concerning the desecration of another place of public respect. If it were proven that the act was committed in order to express hatred toward the Christian religious group, Article 60(1)(12) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania would also be relevant. The public dissemination of false accusations or calls for violence could be assessed under Article 170 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, particularly the incitement to hatred, discrimination, or violence on grounds of faith, religion, or beliefs provided for in paragraphs 1-3 thereof. The disruption of religious rites could fall within Article 171 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania only insofar as services, rites, or ceremonies were disrupted by insolent acts, threats, or other indecent conduct. Because the report emphasizes the demolition and burning of churches, rather than the interruption of services, the core issue of legal classification concerns property and the protection of a place of religious respect

Legal assessment. The demolition of churches by crane primarily falls within the logic of Article 187 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, because another person’s property was destroyed or damaged. If the churches are to be regarded as objects of significant scientific, historical, or cultural value, or if damage of high value was caused, the stricter threshold would be Article 187(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, which provides for imprisonment of up to five years. The use of a crane against buildings in a riot environment could also make relevant the category, mentioned in Article 187(2), of a generally dangerous method, if the demolition could have caused injury to persons. Churches, as objects of worship and public respect of a religious community, should additionally be linked to Article 312 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 312(1) criminalizes the desecration of another place of public respect, while Article 312(2) treats vandalistic acts or desecration committed for religious motives more severely. The report states that the attacks arose against Christians and that several churches were destroyed; accordingly, the issue of religious motive would be essential both under Article 312(2) and under Article 60(1)(12). Article 60(1)(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania would also be relevant if the specific act was committed by a group of accomplices. Article 60(1)(8) could be relevant where violence is committed by taking advantage of a public calamity or another person’s misfortune, because the riot situation increases the vulnerability of the victims. Under Article 14 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, the form of guilt must be intent or negligence; on the facts presented, the demolition of a church by crane is most closely associated with intentional conduct. Article 188 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, concerning negligent destruction of property, would be secondary in this situation, because the report describes targeted demolition rather than an accidental breach of safety rules. The video recording and expert confirmation procedurally correspond to the purpose of Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, because objects and documents relevant to the investigation and adjudication of a criminal act may be submitted by any natural person. This means that the recording made by a local resident would be significant not merely as an account of the event, but as an independent item of evidence to be assessed by the court concerning the person’s conduct. The acquittal of twelve other accused persons due to insufficient evidence is consistent with the principle set out in Article 212(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, namely that proceedings cannot be continued where sufficient data to substantiate guilt have not been collected. Criticism of law enforcement for improper evidence-gathering is directly connected to the procedural duty to collect reliable data, because the general context of riots alone is insufficient to establish the guilt of a specific person. Witness intimidation is practically important for the application of pre-trial measures, because Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania permits such measures in order to ensure an unobstructed pre-trial investigation and hearing of the case in court. Under Article 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, such measures may include detention, house arrest, bail, seizure of documents, an obligation to register with a police authority, or a written undertaking not to leave. As to time limits, Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania provide that procedural time limits are linked to the commencement, performance, or completion of procedural acts and are calculated in hours, days, or months

Consequences. The further course of the case would depend on whether individualized evidence is collected against specific persons, rather than merely confirmation of the general scale of the riots. For a person whose actions are captured on video and confirmed by experts, the most realistic consequence is a conviction for destruction of property, desecration of a place of religious respect, and consideration of aggravating circumstances. For persons in respect of whom there is insufficient data, the realistic scenario is acquittal or termination of the investigation under Article 212(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. For the affected religious community, the practically most important issues are compensation for damage, identification of the responsible persons, and protection of witnesses from pressure. If the convicted person, or persons materially liable for that person’s actions, lacked the funds to compensate the damage, Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania provides for the possibility, in the cases and according to the procedure established by law, of compensating damage from state funds. For the institutions, this case is important as a case concerning evidence-gathering and substantiation of a religious hatred motive: the number of destroyed churches demonstrates the consequences, but liability requires a link between the specific accused person’s acts, guilt, and motive

Core issue. The precise legal question is not whether the conduct between pupils may be described as a “conflict”, but who is legally required to respond, protect the child and compensate damage where a minor allegedly injures other pupils at school. This question must first be assessed under Article 6.275 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania if the child who caused the damage is under fourteen years of age, and under Article 6.276 of the Civil Code if the child is between fourteen and eighteen years of age. In the context of parental liability, Article 6.277 of the Civil Code is also relevant, as it links the liability of parents whose parental authority has been restricted to the consequences of improper exercise of parental authority. Duties relating to child protection and institutional response arise from the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child, as identified in the sources, as well as from Article 49 thereof, cited in the Review of Court Practice in Criminal Cases concerning Domestic Violence. Duties within the educational environment must be assessed under Articles 46, 47 and 59 of the Law on Education of the Republic of Lithuania, which the sources associate with pupils’ rights and duties, parents’ duties to report violence, and the competence of the head of the school

Legal assessment. If, on 28 April 2026, a minor injured other pupils at Marijampole “Suduvos” Gymnasium, the applicable model of civil liability depends on the minor’s age at the time the damage was caused. Under Article 6.275(1) of the Civil Code, the parents or guardians of a minor under fourteen years of age are liable for damage caused by that minor unless they prove that the damage did not arise through their fault. Under Article 6.275(2) of the Civil Code, if such a child caused damage while under the supervision of an educational institution, that institution is liable for the damage unless it proves that the damage did not arise through its fault. If the pupil who caused the damage is between fourteen and eighteen years of age, Article 6.276(1) of the Civil Code establishes the pupil’s own liability on general grounds. However, under Article 6.276(2) of the Civil Code, where such a minor has no property or earnings from which to compensate the damage, the relevant part of the damage may have to be compensated by the parents, curator, or the educational institution supervising the minor at the time, unless they prove the absence of fault. Article 6.276(3) of the Civil Code links the end of such supplementary obligation to the minor reaching majority or acquiring sufficient property or earnings before reaching majority. Article 3.178 of the Civil Code is important where the dispute assumes the nature of a dispute concerning children: in hearing such disputes, the participation of the state child rights protection institution is mandatory, and that institution submits an opinion to the court. Under the same provision, the court assesses not only the institution’s opinion, but also the child’s wishes and other evidence submitted by the parties. Article 47 of the Law on Education, as indicated in the source provided, includes the parents’ duty, where a child is using violence or experiencing violence, to attend a consultation with the child at the time specified by a psychologist, and the duty to inform the head of the school of a known case of violence in an educational institution. Article 59(5) of the Law on Education, as presented in the source, links the actions of the head of the school to the competence established by law, the institution’s regulations and the job description; accordingly, the head’s liability may arise specifically for failure to perform, or improper performance of, those duties. The Review of Court Practice in Criminal Cases concerning Domestic Violence, in interpreting Article 163 of the Criminal Code, emphasises that parents and other lawful representatives are responsible for ensuring the rights of the child, and that discipline must not turn into corporal punishment or other violence. The same review, relying on Article 49 of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child, states that corporal punishment includes the use of physical force to cause physical pain, even minor pain. Accordingly, a blow, kick or other physical impact at school cannot be legally neutralised merely because the act was committed by a minor or because it occurred between pupils. The submitted report on the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child repeats the same civil liability framework: up to fourteen years of age, liability lies with the parents, guardians or the supervising institution; from fourteen to eighteen years of age, the child is personally liable, with a possible obligation on the parents, guardians or institution to compensate the damage. Another source provided states that a natural or legal person who becomes aware of a child in need of assistance has a duty to notify the police, the child rights protection authority, or another competent institution. This means that the duties of the school, parents and other informed persons are not merely a matter of internal discipline: they include notification, child protection, organisation of assistance, and possible compensation for damage

Consequences. The first practical scenario is a civil claim for compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage suffered by the injured pupils, applying Article 6.275 or Article 6.276 of the Civil Code according to the age of the minor who caused the damage. The second scenario is a dispute over the allocation of liability between parents, curators and the school, because an educational institution may be liable where the damage was caused while the child was under its supervision and the institution fails to prove that the damage did not arise through its fault. The third scenario is the involvement of the child rights protection authority, particularly if a dispute concerning children reaches court or if the need for assistance to a child becomes apparent. The fourth scenario is an assessment of the actions of the head of the school under the competence defined in Article 59(5) of the Law on Education, if it is alleged that the incident of violence was not properly managed. In practical terms, this is important for the families of the injured children, because they may seek compensation for damage and an institutional response, rather than merely an informal apology. It is also important for the parents of the child who caused the damage, because the child’s age does not eliminate legal consequences: it only determines whether liability falls primarily on the child or on the child’s representatives and the supervising institution. For the school, this matters because its liability is assessed not by whether the incident was labelled a conflict, but by the performance of duties relating to supervision, notification, assistance and the competence of the head of the school. The ultimate legal significance is this: violence between pupils at school creates not only a disciplinary situation, but also one involving civil liability, protection of the rights of the child, and institutional performance of duties

Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the public statements of the Mayor of Druskininkai concerning municipal projects, tourism directions, cooperation and municipal achievements constitute the exercise of the mayor’s representative and accountability functions, and what limits apply where such statements are connected with municipal decisions. This must be assessed under Article 21(1), Article 21(2)(1)–(3), and Article 25(1), (3) and (4) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as under Article 3(1) and (3), Article 4, Article 15(2) and Article 23 of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania. The essential premise is that a municipality is a public legal person, and local self-government is exercised through the council and mayor elected by residents, as provided in Article 1(1)–(3) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania and Article 3(6) of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government. Accordingly, the mayor’s interview is to be assessed legally not as a private account of a political biography, but, insofar as he speaks about municipal activity, as communication by the head of the municipality to the community and external actors. At the same time, this issue also concerns the boundary between the mayor’s executive powers and the exclusive competence of the municipal council, because Article 3(1) of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government provides that the mayor may not take over, interfere with or exercise the exclusive competence of the council

Legal assessment. Under Article 25(1) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, the mayor is directly and personally responsible for the implementation, within the municipal territory and in matters assigned to his competence, of laws, Government decisions, municipal council decisions and his own decisions. For that reason, the mayor’s statements concerning the Culture and Congress Centre, the bus station, tourism markets, adaptation of infrastructure for persons with disabilities and a card intended for local residents fall within the sphere of accountability to the community established in Article 21(1) of the Law on Local Self-Government and Article 4(4) of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government. The mayor also has a representative function: under Article 21(2)(2) of the Law on Local Self-Government, in accordance with the procedure laid down in the regulations, he represents the municipality or authorises other persons to represent it in cooperation with legal and natural persons, other municipalities, and state or foreign institutions. Therefore, statements concerning previous cooperation with Grodno, new tourism markets and the presentation of the municipality abroad may be linked to the mayor’s representative function, but only insofar as they do not turn into decisions requiring the competence of the council or other institutions. The statement that the centre will be managed by the company that wins a tender and that proposals concerning the centre’s name are being considered does not, on the basis of the sources provided, imply an independent decision-making power of the mayor: the competence of the municipal council is both exclusive and ordinary, and the mayor may not take over exclusive competence under Article 15(1)–(2) and Article 3(1) of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government. If such matters are assigned to the council under the municipal regulations or council decisions, the mayor’s role would be to form agendas, submit draft decisions, convene meetings and preside over them under Article 21(2)(1) of the Law on Local Self-Government. Informing municipal residents about projects and adopted decisions is also consistent with the principles of publicity and transparency in local self-government, since Article 4(8) and (9) of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government requires residents to be informed about activities, draft decisions and adopted decisions. At the same time, Article 4(7) requires the interests of the municipal community and individual residents to be reconciled; therefore, benefits for residents or adaptation of infrastructure must legally be implemented in such a way that decisions adopted in the interests of the municipal community do not infringe the rights of individual residents guaranteed by law. The mayor’s criticism of the Ministry of the Economy and Innovation or the public institution “Travel Lithuania” is not prohibited in the sources provided merely because of its critical content; Article 25(3) of the Law on Local Self-Government directly protects the mayor from persecution for opinions expressed at meetings of the municipal council or its committees, commissions or college, while liability for insult, defamation or the dissemination of information degrading honour and dignity and inconsistent with reality arises in accordance with the procedure established by law. Since the statement under consideration was made in a media interview, and not at a council meeting, this special protection does not directly cover the entire situation; however, the provision itself shows that the mayor’s political opinion is distinguished from liability for the unlawful dissemination of information. If members of the municipal council considered that the mayor’s actions, and not merely political assessments, were contrary to the Constitution or laws, Article 251(1)–(4) of the Law on Local Self-Government provides for a procedure for loss of powers: it may be initiated by a group of no fewer than one-third of council members, a written submission must be made no later than one month from the day on which the ground became apparent, and the grounds are breach of oath or failure to exercise the powers established by law. From an ethics perspective, it is significant that, under Article 23(1) of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government, the municipal council forms an Ethics Commission for the duration of its term of office, observing the principle of proportional representation of the majority and minority

Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is the ordinary one: the interview remains a form of the mayor’s accountability and presentation of the municipality, while actual decisions concerning projects, management, names, benefits or programmes continue to be adopted in accordance with the council’s competence, the regulations and draft decisions submitted by the mayor. The second scenario is relevant to the council: if public statements were followed by specific decisions or actions exceeding the mayor’s competence, the council could assess whether its exclusive competence under Article 3(1) and Article 15 of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government had been infringed. The third scenario is the liability procedure under Article 251 of the Law on Local Self-Government, but it would be connected not with the mayor’s long term of office or a critical view of the tourism policy of state institutions, but with specific actions contrary to the Constitution or laws, breach of oath or failure to exercise powers. For residents, this situation is important because Article 4(8)–(9) of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government gives them a basis to expect public information about municipal activity and the opportunity to participate in the management of municipal affairs. For businesses and project managers, the key point is that the mayor’s public openness to proposals does not in itself alter the mandatory procedure for adopting municipal decisions. For the municipal council, this message is a practical reminder of institutional balance: the mayor is the head and executive institution of the municipality, but the council’s exclusive competence remains non-transferable

Core issue. The legal issue is not an abstract dilemma of “who owns the roads,” but whether Vilnius District Municipality and other institutions, having received residents’ requests concerning the status and maintenance of roads, acted in accordance with their public administration duties. It is to be assessed under Article 1(1) of the Law on Public Administration of the Republic of Lithuania, which guarantees the right to challenge actions, omissions, or administrative decisions of public administration entities, as well as the right to lawful and objective examination of requests and complaints. Also applicable are the principles set out in Article 3(1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Law on Public Administration of the Republic of Lithuania: responsibility for decisions taken, efficiency, supremacy of law, and comprehensiveness. The position of the institutions in this situation is defined by Article 4 of the Law Amending the Law on Public Administration of the Republic of Lithuania: municipal institutions and their civil servants are municipal administration entities, while ministries and the National Land Service act as state administration entities. Articles 11(1)–(3) of the Law on Public Administration of the Republic of Lithuania and points 1, 14, 17, 18, 24, 33, and 34 of the Rules for the Examination of Persons’ Requests and Complaints by Public Administration Entities are relevant to the procedure for accepting and examining requests and complaints

Legal assessment. Residents’ submissions concerning the inclusion of streets in the municipal list, responsibility for maintenance, and institutional inaction have the characteristics of a request or complaint and therefore should have been accepted and examined in accordance with Article 11(1) of the Law on Public Administration and point 1 of the Rules. Under Article 11(2) of the Law on Public Administration, such submissions could be made by electronic means of communication, by post, through the E. Delivery system, in person, or through a representative; accordingly, an institution may not narrow the permissible means of submission. If some responses were provided only during conversations, that is relevant only to the extent that, under points 17 and 18 of the Rules, an oral request may be resolved immediately or no later than the next working day. Where the matter concerns the status of roads, lists, and institutional competence, its content plainly requires administrative assessment, not merely an oral explanation. Point 24 of the Rules provides that requests and complaints, except for simple cases answered immediately or on the next working day, must be examined within the time limits specified in Article 10(4) of the Law on Public Administration. If the municipality lacked documents or data, point 34 of the Rules required it to contact the person in writing within 5 working days to request the necessary information and notify them of the suspension of the examination, rather than leaving the person uncertain as to who should be regarded as the road user or the responsible entity. Article 3(4) of the Law on Public Administration requires administrative decisions relating to persons’ rights and obligations to be based on law; therefore, a refusal to include roads in the list must be reasoned by reference to specific legal grounds, not merely the institution’s assessment that the situation is “complex.” The principle of responsibility for decisions taken, under Article 3(1) of the Law on Public Administration, means that the municipality, having adopted a partial decision concerning three streets and having refused in respect of four, must assume responsibility for the consequences of that administrative decision. The principle of efficiency under Article 3(3) of the same law implies a duty to organise the examination in such a way that correspondence between several institutions genuinely assists in adopting a decision, rather than becoming a reason for not adopting one. Where the municipality itself contacted ministries and the National Land Service, such action is consistent with the principle of official cooperation established in Article 3(5) of the Law Amending the Law on Public Administration of the Republic of Lithuania. However, that same principle is not a basis for disclaiming competence: if the municipality examines a request concerning the list of local roads and streets approved by it, it must adopt its own administrative decision, assessing the information received under the applicable legal rules. Article 11(3) of the Law on Public Administration permits a request or complaint not to be examined only in specific cases, for example where it is impossible to identify the applicant, the content is non-specific, the same issue has already been answered without new data, or the dispute is being examined by a court or pre-trial authority. The described situation shows that the residents raised a specific issue concerning seven streets and later the status of the remaining four roads; therefore, the complexity of the issue alone is not, under Article 11(3) of the Law on Public Administration, an independent ground for declining to examine it. Point 33 of the Rules would be relevant only if the submission did not have the characteristics of a request or complaint and merely drew attention to a situation. Here, the residents sought a specific administrative outcome, so such a submission cannot be reduced to a general notification. The issue of institutional responsibility is supplemented by Article 42 of the Law Amending the Law on Public Administration, under which a public administration entity that breaches the requirements of that law is liable in accordance with the procedure established by law, and damage caused by unlawful acts is compensated in accordance with the Civil Code and other laws

Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is a new or revised examination of the residents’ request by the municipality, in which it must clearly state the legal basis on which three streets were included, and four were not included, in the list. The second scenario is a challenge against the municipality’s administrative decision, inaction, or incomplete response, based on the right established in Article 1(1) of the Law on Public Administration to challenge actions, omissions, and administrative decisions of public administration entities. The third scenario is inter-institutional gathering of information, but this is relevant to residents only insofar as it leads to a reasoned administrative decision, because Article 3(1) and (4) of the Law on Public Administration do not permit responsibility for a decision to be replaced by the forwarding of opinions. If the institution considered that data to be provided by the applicants were missing, it should apply point 34 of the Rules and request the necessary documents in writing within 5 working days, suspending the examination until they are received. For residents, this course of action is important because a clear administrative decision determines whether they can challenge the refusal, require a comprehensive response, or rely on the responsibility of the public administration entity under Article 42 of the Law Amending the Law on Public Administration. For the municipality, this is important because its position on the status of the roads must be formulated as a decision based on legal rules, not as an indefinite statement that assessment by several institutions is required

Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether a vulnerability in the paid iCloud+ “Hide My Email” feature, which could have disclosed a user’s real email address, constitutes a personal data security issue giving rise to an obligation for the controller to inform data subjects and enabling users to bring legal claims. This issue must primarily be assessed under Article 34(1)–(2) of the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679, as those provisions establish the obligation to notify the data subject where a personal data breach is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons. The basis for judicial remedy must be assessed under Article 79(1)–(2) GDPR, which grants the data subject the right to bring proceedings against a controller or processor where the data subject considers that his or her rights have been infringed as a result of the processing of personal data. If the dispute were linked to inaccurate or incomplete user data, Article 16 GDPR would also be relevant; however, in this case its weight is narrower, because the reported matter concerns not an error in the content of the data but the failure of a protective function. For the aspects relating to a corporate group and the international nature of the matter, Recital 37 GDPR, Article 47(2)(d) and (e) GDPR, and Article 50(a)–(d) GDPR are relevant

Legal assessment. On the facts presented, the real email address is, from a data protection perspective, a significant item of identification or contact data; accordingly, the failure of a feature intended to conceal it must be assessed through the lens of GDPR security requirements and data subject rights. If the vulnerability was likely to result in a high risk to users’ rights and freedoms, Article 34(1) GDPR requires the controller to notify the data subject without undue delay. Under Article 34(2) GDPR, such notification must be clear and plain, describe the nature of the breach, and provide at least the information and measures referred to in Article 33(3)(b), (c), and (d) GDPR. Accordingly, a claim seeking, at minimum, clear information to consumers regarding the limitations of the feature is legally linked directly to the logic of Article 34 GDPR, provided that the condition of high risk is established. The report states that researcher Tyler Murphy discovered the vulnerability in June 2025, and that in March 2026 the company announced a fix which, as later alleged, did not eliminate the possibility of exploiting the flaw. This is procedurally significant not in itself, but insofar as it indicates a possible period during which the controller knew of the risk and was required to assess its obligation to notify data subjects under Article 34 GDPR. Article 79(1) GDPR allows every data subject to pursue effective judicial remedies; therefore, an individual claim by a paying iCloud+ user may be based on the assertion that his or her data were processed in breach of the GDPR. Article 79(2) GDPR lays down a jurisdictional rule for the courts of Member States; however, the report describes a United States lawsuit, so this provision is relevant here only to the European judicial-remedy structure modelled by the GDPR. From the perspective of case law, the CJEU jurisprudence cited in Bulletin No. 49 of the administrative law practice of the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania emphasises that any processing of personal data must comply with the principles in Article 5 GDPR, the lawfulness conditions in Article 6 GDPR, and the data subject rights set out in Articles 12–22 GDPR: Latvijas Republikas Saeima, C-439/19, Valsts ieņēmumu dienests, C-175/20, and Meta Platforms Ireland, C-757/22. This interpretation means that the commercial presentation of a security feature does not relieve the service provider of the obligation actually to respect data subject rights where personal data are processed in the provision of the service. If data are transferred or processed within a corporate group, Article 47(2)(d) and (e) GDPR indicate that binding corporate rules must reflect security measures, data subject rights, and the right to lodge a complaint with the competent supervisory authority. Article 50 GDPR is relevant to mechanisms for international cooperation with third countries, including assistance in investigations, referral of complaints, and exchange of information

Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is that the court assesses whether the facts alleged by the claimant substantiate an infringement of data subject rights and whether judicial remedies may be applied according to the logic of Article 79 GDPR. The second scenario is that, if a high risk to users’ rights and freedoms is established, the centre of the dispute shifts to the notification obligation under Article 34 GDPR: when the company became aware of the vulnerability, what it communicated, and whether it did so without undue delay. The third scenario is that a request to remedy the flaw or clearly inform users is assessed as a measure reducing the continuing infringement of data subject rights. For the prospects of a class action, the idea set out in paragraph 16 of the Class Action Concept is relevant: such a procedure is intended for large groups united by a common factual and legal basis, where individual handling of complaints would be uneconomical and inefficient. Paragraph 25 of the same document also reflects the defendant’s interest: a single case may provide greater legal certainty than many identical individual cases. For consumers, the case is significant because a paid privacy feature may give rise not only to a contractual expectation, but also to the exercise of data subject rights under Articles 34 and 79 GDPR. For the service provider, the case is significant because of the obligation to substantiate that the security risk was assessed, users were informed, and the technical measures corresponded to the actual purpose of the service. For supervisory authorities, the practical significance arises from the logic of international and intra-group data protection coordination reflected in Articles 47 and 50 GDPR. The final outcome would depend on whether the court recognises a sufficient common factual and legal basis for multiple users, and whether the vulnerability is qualified as having created a risk of the kind that activates the obligations under Article 34 GDPR

Core issue. The legal issue is whether an attorney who has entered into a legal services agreement with a client may avoid disciplinary liability on the grounds that part of the services was in fact provided by other attorneys as subcontracted providers. This issue is determined under Article 2(1) and (2), Article 4(2) and (3), Article 5(3), (5) and (6), Article 39(1) and (2), Article 51(1) and (2), and Article 59(2)(2) and (8) of the Law on the Bar of the Republic of Lithuania. Under Article 2(1) of the Law on the Bar, legal services include legal consultations, the preparation of documents having legal significance, representation on legal matters, defence, and representation in proceedings. Article 2(2) of the same law provides that such services may be provided by attorneys, assistant attorneys, or a professional partnership of attorneys. Accordingly, legal services are not an ordinary commercial mandate that an attorney may transfer without retaining the link of professional responsibility toward the client. Article 4(2) of the Law on the Bar enshrines a person’s right to choose an attorney, while Article 4(3) defines the attorney’s activity as the provision of legal services. The attorney chosen by the client therefore remains the subject of professional duties toward the client, even where other persons are engaged to perform the services

Legal assessment. Article 5(5) of the Law on the Bar identifies loyalty to the client and avoidance of conflicts of interest as one of the fundamental principles of attorneys’ professional activity. Article 5(3) requires the lawfulness of attorneys’ activity, while Article 5(6) requires impeccable conduct. These general provisions are particularised in Article 39(1) of the Law on the Bar, under which an attorney must perform his or her duties honestly, comply with the requirements of the Lithuanian Code of Ethics for Attorneys, and act honourably and civically. Article 39(2) further obliges an attorney to observe, in his or her professional activity, the attorney’s oath and the law. In its ruling of 17 July 2026 in civil case No. e3K-3-109-421/2026, the Supreme Court of Lithuania interpreted these duties as meaning that the engagement of third parties as subcontracted service providers does not, in itself, remove disciplinary liability from the attorney who entered into the services agreement. This means that subcontracting does not alter the primary professional relationship: the client chose the attorney, not an abstract service outcome lacking a responsible professional subject. The attorney must not merely organise the performance of services in a formal sense, but must also remain loyal to the client, cooperate with the client, honestly perform the attorney’s duties, and act in the client’s best interests. The Supreme Court also emphasised that disciplinary liability in this case was imposed not solely because of the subcontractors’ actions, but also because of breaches of the attorney’s professional activity and professional ethics committed by the attorney himself. Accordingly, the causal link between the attorney’s personal conduct and disciplinary liability was not severed merely because part of the work had been delegated to other attorneys. Institutionally, it is significant that Article 59(2)(2) of the Law on the Bar assigns to the General Meeting of Attorneys the election of three members of the Court of Honour of Attorneys, while Article 59(2)(8) assigns to it the approval of the procedure for hearing attorneys’ disciplinary cases. In the context of disputes concerning legal services, Article 51(1) of the Law on the Bar gives the client the right to apply to the Lithuanian Bar Association or to a court. Article 51(2) provides that such disputes between clients and attorneys are examined within the Lithuanian Bar Association by the Council of the Bar or by a body formed by it, which adopts recommendatory decisions. Where a dispute concerns the unfairness of standard terms in a contract concluded for consumer purposes, Article 51(3) provides for a special commission whose decision enters into force and becomes binding if it is not appealed to the Vilnius Regional Court within thirty days of service. The most significant conclusion of the Supreme Court in this case is that even an error made in relation to a single client may be sufficient from the perspective of professional discipline, because the standards governing attorneys’ activity protect not a statistical average of services, but each individual client’s trust in the profession

Consequences. The first practical consequence is that attorneys who enter into agreements with clients will not be able to rely on the engagement of subcontracted providers as an independent ground for excluding disciplinary liability. The second consequence is that, for the client, what matters is not only who physically prepared the document or performed a specific act, but also which attorney assumed the professional relationship under the legal services agreement. The third consequence is that, when assessing an attorney’s conduct, the disciplinary bodies of the Lithuanian Bar Association may examine separately both the attorney’s own actions and whether the attorney properly ensured loyalty, honest cooperation, and compliance with professional standards when engaging other providers. The fourth consequence is that a reprimand, as the disciplinary measure applied in this case, may in the Supreme Court’s assessment be proportionate even where individual, rather than widespread, breaches are established. The fifth consequence is that, in practice, this ruling strengthens the significance of Articles 5 and 39 of the Law on the Bar: loyalty to the client and the honest performance of duties are not delegable obligations. The final outcome of the case also means that the assessment upheld by the Supreme Court’s ruling of 17 July 2026 in civil case No. e3K-3-109-421/2026 becomes a reference point for analogous disputes concerning an attorney’s liability where several professional persons participate in the provision of services

Core issue. The legal issue is not an abstract assessment of “combating climate change”, but rather how a possible easing of the EU ETS would alter the obligations of Lithuanian operators to obtain permits, monitor GHG emissions, hold and surrender emission allowances, and the duty of state authorities to apply the rules established by the EU. It is to be assessed under Article 6(1)–(3), Article 9(1)–(4), and Article 15(1)–(2) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Climate Change Management, as well as Article 7(1)–(3) and Article 31(1) of the Law Amending Law No. XI-329 of the Republic of Lithuania on Climate Change Management. The systemic context is provided by Article 3(1)–(3) of the Law on Climate Change Management, since national policy covers environmental protection, energy, taxes and finance, industry, transport and other areas, and is implemented through the National Climate Change Management Agenda. As today is 20 July 2026, it is important that the general entry into force on 15 July 2024 referred to in Article 2(1) of the amending law, and the entry into force on 1 January 2026 referred to in Article 2(2), are already relevant, whereas the date of 1 January 2030 referred to in Article 2(3) has not yet arrived

Legal assessment. Under Article 6(1) of the Law on Climate Change Management, operators must obtain a permit to emit GHGs, and under Article 6(2) they must carry out GHG monitoring, accounting and reporting in accordance with EU legal acts and the procedure established by the Minister of Environment. Under Article 6(3), operators that have obtained a permit must open an account in the Union greenhouse gas registry, acquire emission allowances and, each calendar year by the deadline set by the Minister of Environment, surrender a quantity of such allowances corresponding to the CO2 emitted in the previous year, expressed in tonnes of CO2 equivalent. Accordingly, on the basis of the sources provided, an easing of the EU ETS would not in itself abolish the national structure of obligations: its content would change only to the extent that the EU legal acts, European Commission requirements, decisions or recommendations to which national law directly refers would change. Article 9(1) of the Law on Climate Change Management confers competence on the Minister of Environment to establish the procedure for allocating emission allowances, taking into account the requirements, decisions and recommendations established by the European Commission. Article 9(2) requires the allocation, cancellation and surrender of allowances to be recorded in the Union registry; Article 9(3) provides that allowances are valid indefinitely; and Article 9(4) links the cancellation of allowances to an application or cessation of activities. Article 7(1) of the amending law separately regulates the list of EU ETS participants receiving free emission allowances: it is prepared and approved by the Minister of Environment or an institution authorised by the Minister, in accordance with EU legal acts and the position of the European Commission. Under Article 7(2), the draft list is published for public consultation, and Article 7(3) provides for submission of the list to the European Commission for each five-year period. This means that if the easing were connected with a larger volume of free allowances, longer transitional periods or a narrower scope of obligations, the Lithuanian administrative procedure would have to proceed through the procedure established by the Minister, publication of the draft list, and submission of the list to the Commission. Article 31(1) of the amending law defines the activities falling within the EU ETS, including fuel combustion in installations with a total rated thermal input exceeding 20 MW, oil refining, coke production, metal ore processing, pig iron or steel production, and other industrial activities. Therefore, the practical effect of any easing would primarily fall on the types of activities included in that list, rather than on all economic operators generally. Article 15(1) of the Law on Climate Change Management provides that allowances and related units belonging to the Republic of Lithuania and to operators registered in its territory are recorded in Union registry accounts under Lithuanian jurisdiction, while Article 15(2) assigns management of registry accounts to a national administrator appointed by the Minister of Environment. Consequently, even a more lenient system would continue to be administered through the Union registry, rather than solely through national internal accounting arrangements. Article 14(2)(2) of the amending law demonstrates financial dependence on the EU ETS, because one source of financing for the Climate Change Programme is the revenue received from emission allowances sold at auction. Under Article 14(3)(1), those funds are used, among other things, for energy efficiency improvement projects and other projects enabling GHG reductions in energy, industry, construction, transport, agriculture, waste management and other sectors. Therefore, if the easing affected the volume of allowances sold at auction or their economic value, it would also be legally relevant to the financing chain of the Climate Change Programme. Article 16(1)–(2) of the Law on Climate Change Management ensures that national GHG accounting must be prepared in a timely, transparent, accurate, consistent, comparable and complete manner; therefore, the obligation to measure actual emissions remains essential even where the conditions of the trading regime are relaxed

Consequences. First scenario: the EU amends the ETS rules, and in Lithuania the Minister of Environment, pursuant to Article 9(1) of the Law on Climate Change Management and Article 7(1) of the amending law, adapts the procedure for allocating allowances and the list of free allowances to the new European Commission requirements. Second scenario: the obligations under Article 6(1)–(3) remain in force, but the quantity of emission allowances that operators must in practice acquire or surrender changes, if this is provided for in EU regulation. Third scenario: the financing flow of the Climate Change Programme changes under Article 14(2)(2) of the amending law, because revenue from allowances sold at auction is one of the programme’s sources. The fourth scenario concerns state obligations outside the EU ETS: under Article 13(1) of the Law on Climate Change Management, the Government may adopt decisions on transactions with other Member States for the acquisition or transfer of annual GHG quota units and absorbed quantity units. In practical terms, this is important for operators in industry, energy, aviation and other sectors falling within the list of activities in Article 31(1), because their need for allowances, registry actions and financial burden depend on the regulatory framework. It is also important for the Ministry of Environment, the national administrator of the Union registry and the Government, because their competence covers the procedure for allocating allowances, approval of lists, registry management, GHG accounting, and transactions involving quota or absorption units

Core issue. The legal issue is not the mere fact of signing the agreement, but whether cooperation in establishing a film studio in Vilnius may become an instrument of state film policy, state funding for cinema, or a state capital investment. It must be assessed under Article 2(3) and (4), Article 6, and Article 9 of the Law on Cinema of the Republic of Lithuania, Article 5 of the Law Amending the Law on Cinema of the Republic of Lithuania, and Articles 14 and 16 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Approval of the Financial Indicators of the 2023 State Budget and Municipal Budgets. A film studio is not, in itself, a “film” or “film production” within the meaning of Article 2(2) and (3) of the Law on Cinema of the Republic of Lithuania, but it may constitute infrastructure for activities in which, under Article 2(4), the film producer is responsible for the creative, organisational, and financial process of film production. Accordingly, the principal dividing line is between general institutional cooperation concerning infrastructure and specific state funding for cinema, which under Article 9 of the Law on Cinema of the Republic of Lithuania must be granted to specified entities, subject to specified conditions and procedure. If the project were financed as a capital investment, Article 14(1)(1) and Article 16 of the 2023 Budget Law concerning the State Investment Programme for 2023-2025 would additionally apply

Legal assessment. Under Article 5(1) of the Law Amending the Law on Cinema of the Republic of Lithuania, the Ministry of Culture formulates state film policy, drafts legal acts in the field of cinema, prepares strategic planning documents, and coordinates the activities of the Lithuanian Film Centre. Under Article 5(2)(2), (3), (5), and (6) of the same law, the Lithuanian Film Centre implements state film policy, organises calls for film projects to receive state funding, allocates state funding to film projects, and supervises the use of such funding and reporting on it. This means that a cooperation agreement signed at the Ministry of the Economy and Innovation, insofar as it relates to the cinema sector, cannot replace the competence of the Ministry of Culture and the Lithuanian Film Centre in the field of state funding for cinema. Article 6(1) of the Law on Cinema of the Republic of Lithuania provides for sources of state funding for cinema, including state budget funds under programmes prepared by the Lithuanian Film Centre, part of value-added tax receipts, licence revenues, targeted Government funding for state commissions, and returned or recovered funds. Article 6(2) of the same law permits additional cinema funding from state budget funds under programmes of the Office of the Chief Archivist of Lithuania and from other lawfully received funds. Article 7(2) of the Law Amending Law No. IX-752 on Cinema of the Republic of Lithuania defines the purposes for which state funding for cinema is granted: development, production, dissemination, distribution, and exhibition of national films, dissemination of film culture, and accumulation, preservation, and exhibition of film heritage. Therefore, the establishment of the film studio itself is not expressly identified as an independent object of state funding for cinema under the visible provisions of that article, unless the funding is linked to specific cinema activities specified by law. Article 9(2) of the Law on Cinema of the Republic of Lithuania limits the circle of recipients: funding is granted only to legal or natural persons whose principal activities include film production, distribution, exhibition, dissemination, dissemination of film culture, or accumulation, protection, and exhibition of film heritage. Article 9(5) of the same law provides that the rules on state funding for cinema are approved by the Minister of Culture, while the form of the contract is approved by the Director of the Lithuanian Film Centre. If the studio project were linked to film production, Article 9(4) would also be relevant, under which no more than 20 percent of funding allocated for film production may be used outside the Republic of Lithuania. In the case of co-production, Article 2(1) of the Law on Cinema of the Republic of Lithuania links it to the obligations of Lithuanian and foreign film producers under a co-production agreement. Under Article 9(3) of the Law on Cinema of the Republic of Lithuania, such films are given priority for state funding for cinema, but that priority applies to films, not to the creation of infrastructure as such. From a budgetary perspective, Article 16 of the 2023 Budget Law approved the State Investment Programme for 2023-2025. Under Article 14(1)(1) of the same law, the Government or an institution authorised by it may allocate and, where there is an additional need or savings, reallocate funds designated in that programme for state capital investments by appropriations managers and investment projects. This would be relevant only if the establishment of the film studio were included in the state capital investment framework as an investment project or programme. Article 6(3) of the Law Amending Law No. I-430 on the Budget Structure of the Republic of Lithuania confirms that its provisions apply to the preparation of draft state and municipal budgets for 2023 and subsequent years; therefore, a budgetary decision cannot be replaced merely by a political or cooperation agreement

Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is institutional: the agreement signed on 20 July 2026 establishes a direction for cooperation, but does not create a right for any recipient of state funding for cinema to receive funds until the conditions set out in Article 9 of the Law on Cinema of the Republic of Lithuania are met and the procedure established by the Minister of Culture and the Lithuanian Film Centre is applied. The second scenario is project-based: if the activities of the film studio were later linked to the production, distribution, exhibition, dissemination of national films, or dissemination of film culture, the funding objectives specified in Article 7(2) of Law No. IX-752 Amending the Law on Cinema of the Republic of Lithuania could become relevant. The third scenario is investment-based: if the State decided to contribute through capital investments, the basis for decisions would have to be Article 14(1)(1) and Article 16 of the 2023 Budget Law, and the funds would have to be allocated or reallocated in accordance with the purpose of the State Investment Programme for 2023-2025. This is practically important for future studio operators and film producers, because their right to receive state funding for cinema would depend not on the place where the agreement was signed or its political presentation, but on whether their activities comply with Article 9(2) of the Law on Cinema of the Republic of Lithuania. For the Lithuanian Film Centre, this is important because of the limits of competence: under Article 5(2) of the Law Amending the Law on Cinema of the Republic of Lithuania, it remains the institution responsible for funding calls, allocation, and supervision. For the State, this is important because establishing a film studio may be an economically significant project, but from a legal perspective its financing route must be distinguished from the funding regime applicable to specific films or film projects

Core issue. The legal issue is not what Mindaugas Balčiūnas himself declares, but on what legal basis and under what procedure of the association’s bodies the powers of the head of the association “Lietuvos krepšinis” would come to an end. This issue must be assessed under Article 1(1) of the Law on Associations of the Republic of Lithuania, since that law regulates the governance and activities of associations. The key provision is Article 12(1) of the Law on Associations of the Republic of Lithuania: an association’s statutes are its founding document, by which the association is guided in its activities. Therefore, the issue of the head’s departure must first be examined by reference to the association’s statutes, in particular under Article 12(2)(8) of the Law on Associations of the Republic of Lithuania concerning the competence of the general meeting of members, the procedure for convening it and the procedure for adopting decisions. If another body has been established within the association that has all or part of the rights of the general meeting of members, Article 12(2)(9) of the Law on Associations of the Republic of Lithuania is also relevant, because the statutes must define the competence of such body, the circumstances in which it is convened and the procedure for adopting decisions. The limits of the head’s authority are linked to Article 11(1) of the Law on Associations of the Republic of Lithuania, under which an association may have and acquire only those civil rights and obligations that do not conflict with its objectives as established in the Civil Code, the Law on Associations and its statutes

Legal assessment. The provisions cited show that a political or public statement about stepping down is not, in itself, a sufficient legal answer if it does not comply with the procedure for termination of the head’s powers set out in the statutes. Article 12(2)(8) and (9) of the Law on Associations of the Republic of Lithuania require the decision-making procedure to be established in the statutes; accordingly, it is the statutes that must indicate which body adopts decisions on the election, removal, acceptance of resignation or appointment of a new head. If the head is a single-person management body of the association, the Government’s assessment of the draft amendment to the Law on Associations No. XIIIP-4448(6) states that such head acts on behalf of the association pursuant to Article 2.82 of the Civil Code and the requirements set out in the association’s statutes, although the proposed additional regulation was considered redundant. This confirms the significance of the statutes: departure from office must be formalised not merely according to the head’s will expressed publicly, but according to the internal governance rules of the legal person. The wording of Article 12(5) of the Law on Associations of the Republic of Lithuania, as set out in Article 5 of the Law amending Articles 2, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15 and 16 of the Law on Associations No. IX-1969, indicates that amended statutes of an established association are signed by the management body or by a person authorised by the general meeting of members. Thus, if the head’s departure created a need to amend the statutes or the data recorded in them, the procedure would have to proceed through the mechanism for amending and signing the statutes. Conversely, if the statutes do not specify the head’s name, a decision of the competent body specified in the statutes on the end of the powers and the appointment of a new head may be sufficient. The cited sources concerning the status of council members allow a comparison of the legal logic: under clause 9.2 of the Regulations of the Council for Disability Affairs and clause 9.2 of the Regulations of the Council for the Welfare of Persons with Disabilities, a person’s powers end upon written resignation or upon recall by the delegating organisation. Clause 12.1 of the implementing regulations of the Law on Sport likewise links departure to written resignation or recall by decision of the delegating institution or organisation. Clause 16 of the Regulations of the National Council of Community Organisations additionally provides for the departure of the chair or deputy chair from the office held and for a decision on removal adopted by a majority vote of council members. These provisions do not directly regulate the dismissal of the head of an association, but they illustrate the models for termination of powers used in the cited legal sources: resignation, recall, loss of office and a decision of a body

Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is the head’s resignation in accordance with the procedure established in the association’s statutes, where the competent body accepts or formalises the end of the powers and decides on a new head. The second scenario is the removal of the head by decision of the competent body of the association, if such right and voting procedure are established in the statutes pursuant to Article 12(2)(8) or (9) of the Law on Associations of the Republic of Lithuania. The third scenario would relate not solely to the head’s departure, but to the broader status of the association: Article 17(1) of the Law on Associations of the Republic of Lithuania provides that associations are reorganised and come to an end in accordance with the procedure established by the Civil Code. If fewer than three members remained in the association, Article 17(3) of the Law on Associations of the Republic of Lithuania would require notification of such reduction in membership to the Register of Legal Entities within thirty days. This is not an ordinary basis for the head’s departure, but it shows that a decline in the number of members may give rise to separate registration obligations. Legally, this is most important for the members of the association, because their rights, obligations and the procedure for decisions of the bodies must be established in the statutes pursuant to Article 12(2)(5), (8) and (9) of the Law on Associations of the Republic of Lithuania. For the head, it is important because of the moment at which the powers come to an end: until the departure is formalised under the applicable procedure, a public statement alone does not, by itself, alter the governance structure established in the statutes. For third parties, it is important because, under Article 11(1) of the Law on Associations of the Republic of Lithuania, the association’s actions must comply with its objectives, the law and the statutes; therefore, the legality of transactions and representation depends on properly functioning bodies. On the basis of the cited sources, the final answer to what “must happen” is as follows: there must be a legal act of resignation, removal or other termination of powers provided for in the statutes, adopted by the body and in accordance with the decision-making procedure established in the association’s statutes

Core issue. The precise legal issue is not whether the NCSC detects incidents more effectively, but whether the vulnerabilities identified in 98 of the 153 important information systems assessed constitute a failure by cybersecurity entities to perform their obligations under Article 14 of the Law on Cybersecurity of the Republic of Lithuania, and whether the NCSC may apply supervisory and enforcement measures under Article 28 of that Law. This issue is also to be assessed under Articles 1, 16 and 19 of the Law on Cybersecurity of the Republic of Lithuania, while the competence of institutions is defined in Articles 5, 6 and 8 of the Law Amending Law No. XII-1428 on Cybersecurity of the Republic of Lithuania. Under Article 1(1) of the Law on Cybersecurity, the Law covers the obligations of cybersecurity entities, checks of their compliance and enforcement measures. Under Article 14(1) of the Law on Cybersecurity, cybersecurity entities must ensure that the networks and information systems used for their activities or services comply with cybersecurity risk management measures. Accordingly, the identification of vulnerabilities is legally relevant both as an issue concerning the implementation of risk management measures and as a potential basis for supervisory action by the NCSC. During the transitional period, Article 2 of the Law Amending Law No. XII-1428 on Cybersecurity is also relevant: the Law entered into force on 18 October 2024, and the NCSC was required by 17 April 2025 to identify the entities and enter them into the Cybersecurity Information System

Legal assessment. Under Article 8(2)(1) of the Law Amending Law No. XII-1428 on Cybersecurity, the NCSC supervises the compliance of cybersecurity entities and the communications and information systems managed by them, and conducts assessments of the state of cybersecurity. Under Article 8(2)(2) of the same Law, the NCSC may issue instructions to provide information necessary for assessing compliance and the state of cybersecurity. Article 14(2) of the Law on Cybersecurity provides that the cybersecurity requirements approved by the Government must be implemented within a period set by the Government, which may not be shorter than 12 months from the registration of the entity in the Cybersecurity Information System. This means that, as of 20 July 2026, any assessment of vulnerabilities must be linked to the date on which the specific entity was registered in the CSIS and to the implementation deadline applicable to that entity. Under Article 14(3) of the Law on Cybersecurity, entities must submit to the NCSC data on the implementation of risk management measures in accordance with the procedure laid down in the CSIS regulations. The purpose of the Cybersecurity Information System under Article 19(1) of the Law on Cybersecurity includes the registration of entities in the register, the processing of data on monitoring the implementation of risk management measures, and the exchange of information on incidents, threats and other security-related information. Under Article 19(2), the manager of this system is the Ministry of National Defence, and its processor is the NCSC. Technical measures are not uniform for all entities: under Article 16(1) of the Law on Cybersecurity, the NCSC installs and manages technical cybersecurity measures in the networks and information systems of essential entities, whereas such measures may be installed in the systems of important entities at their request, with a view to managing cyber incidents. Operators of critical information infrastructure are subject to additional obligations under Article 12(1) of the Law Amending Law No. XII-1428 on Cybersecurity: they must approve incident management plans, submit them to the NCSC, test the measures at least once per calendar year, and enable the NCSC to install and manage technical measures. Organisational requirements also entail ongoing managerial responsibility: under paragraph 8 of the excerpt from the amendment to Government Resolution No. 818, the cybersecurity policy and the documents implementing it must be reviewed at least once a year. Under paragraph 9 of the same excerpt, an assessment of the compliance of state information resources or critical information infrastructure with the requirements must be carried out at least once a year. Under paragraph 17 of the excerpt from the amendment to Government Resolution No. 818, the head of the entity or a person authorised by him or her must ensure that the NCSC is informed through the CSIS of the persons appointed as responsible for cybersecurity. Under paragraph 19, a cybersecurity manager or security officer may not perform network or information system administration functions or hardware and software maintenance functions; therefore, from a legal perspective, the vulnerability issue is also linked to the segregation of responsibilities. If the identified vulnerabilities indicate a breach of requirements, Article 28(1) of the Law on Cybersecurity allows the NCSC to apply one or more measures: to issue a warning, give instructions to remedy deficiencies, cease infringing actions, or ensure compliance with risk management measures within a specified period. The role of the Government under Article 5 of the Law Amending Law No. XII-1428 on Cybersecurity is to approve the strategy, organisational and technical requirements, and the National Cyber Incident Management Plan. Under Article 6 of the same Law, the Ministry of National Defence submits those documents to the Government, approves separate plans and establishes the procedure for the NCSC’s response to incidents

Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is supervisory: relying on its competence under Article 8 of the Law Amending Law No. XII-1428 on Cybersecurity, the NCSC may request information, assess compliance and determine whether the vulnerabilities constitute a breach of Article 14 of the Law on Cybersecurity. The second scenario is corrective: under Article 28(1) of the Law on Cybersecurity, entities may be instructed to remedy deficiencies, correct breaches of requirements and submit implementation reports within the deadlines set by the NCSC. The third scenario is relevant to essential entities, because under Article 16(1) of the Law on Cybersecurity the NCSC itself installs and manages technical measures in their systems to identify threats and incidents. The fourth scenario is relevant to important entities: such measures may be installed in their systems at their request, meaning that incident management will depend more heavily on the entity’s own actions and cooperation with the NCSC. This is practically significant for managers of state information resources, operators of critical information infrastructure and other entities registered in the CSIS, because vulnerabilities become not merely a technical defect, but also a potential issue of compliance, management responsibility and supervisory measures

Core issue. The legal issue is not whether the Prime Minister’s political start is weak, but whether the new Government was formed and received authority to act in accordance with the constitutional procedure, and whether there is a legal basis for either the Government or the Prime Minister to resign. This is assessed under points 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Article 84 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, and Articles 6, 8 and 9 of the Law on the Government. With the approval of the Seimas, the President of the Republic appoints the Prime Minister, charges him with forming the Government, and approves its composition pursuant to point 4 of Article 84 of the Constitution. Ministers are appointed and dismissed upon the proposal of the Prime Minister under point 9 of Article 84 of the Constitution and Article 6 of the Law on the Government. A new Government receives authority to act only when the Seimas, by a majority vote of the members participating in the sitting, approves its programme pursuant to Article 6 of the Law on the Government and Article 92(5) of the Constitution cited in the source

Legal assessment. If Mindaugas Sinkevičius was appointed Prime Minister with the approval of the Seimas, and the President of the Republic approved the Government formed by him, the formal core of the formation process complies with point 4 of Article 84 of the Constitution and Article 6 of the Law on the Government. Article 6 of the Law on the Government sets a clear deadline: no later than within 15 days of appointment, the Prime Minister presents to the Seimas the Government he has formed and the President of the Republic has approved, and submits its programme for consideration. Therefore, any dispute concerning the submission of the programme would first be assessed by reference to whether the programme submitted to the Seimas was specifically that of the Government formed by the Prime Minister and approved by the President. The political content of the programme alone, or the professional background of ministers, is not, according to the sources provided, an independent ground for declaring the formation of the Government unlawful. The source concerning the draft amendment to Article 10 of the Law on the Government states that the Constitution does not even establish a citizenship requirement for persons who may be appointed as members of the Government, and that additional requirements may be laid down by law only to the extent provided for in the Constitution. Accordingly, the criticism mentioned in the report regarding a minister’s competence is a matter of political accountability, not a procedural defect in appointment under the cited provisions. Upon taking office, the Prime Minister and ministers take an oath in the Seimas pursuant to Article 93 of the Constitution cited in the source, but the condition for authority to act is the Seimas’s approval of the programme. In its ruling of 10 January 1998, “On the compliance of the Resolution of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania of 10 December 1996 ‘On the Programme of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania’ with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania,” the Constitutional Court stated that the Government occupies a special place in the system of executive power, is a collegial institution of general competence, and consists of the Prime Minister and ministers. This means that the programme is not merely a political statement: it is the basis for the authority to act granted by the Seimas. After receiving authority, the Government implements the programme and coordinates the activities of ministries and Government agencies under point 3 of Article 22 of the Law on the Government. It also administers national affairs, guarantees public order, implements laws, prepares the draft budget, and submits draft laws pursuant to Article 94 of the Constitution and Article 22 of the Law on the Government. The resignation of the Prime Minister under point 3 of Article 9(1) of the Law on the Government would entail the mandatory resignation of the entire Government. However, the sources provided do not link the mandatory resignation of the Prime Minister to public reports concerning private transactions or political criticism. The legal grounds for the mandatory resignation of the Government are exhaustive: rejection of the programme twice in succession, a vote of no confidence in the Government or the Prime Minister by secret ballot, the resignation or death of the Prime Minister, the formation of a new Government after Seimas elections, or failure to receive authority after more than half of the ministers have changed or after the election of the President of the Republic, pursuant to Article 9(1) of the Law on the Government. If more than half of the ministers change, the Government must obtain authority from the Seimas anew under Article 8(4) of the Law on the Government. The Seimas’s oversight dimension remains: under Article 101 of the Constitution cited in the source, at the request of the Seimas, the Government or individual ministers must account to the Seimas for their activities

Consequences. The first scenario is that the Seimas approves the programme and the Government acquires authority to act pursuant to Article 6 of the Law on the Government; in that case, the legal focus shifts to implementation of the programme, execution of laws, and coordination of ministries under Article 94 of the Constitution and Article 22 of the Law on the Government. The second scenario is that the Seimas rejects the programme by a reasoned resolution; in that case, the Prime Minister must submit a new programme no later than within 15 days from the date of rejection, pursuant to Article 6 of the Law on the Government. The third scenario is that the Seimas rejects the programme of the new Government twice in succession; in that case, the Government must resign under point 1 of Article 9(1) of the Law on the Government. The fourth scenario is that the Seimas, by a majority vote of all members of the Seimas and by secret ballot, expresses no confidence in the Government or the Prime Minister; in that case, mandatory resignation arises under point 2 of Article 9(1) of the Law on the Government. The fifth scenario is that the Prime Minister resigns of his own accord; in that event, the entire Government resigns under point 3 of Article 9(1) of the Law on the Government, and the President of the Republic accepts the resignation pursuant to point 7 of Article 84 of the Constitution and Article 9(7) of the Law on the Government. The practical significance for the Seimas is that it decides on the programme and may use the no-confidence procedure, but it does not assume the function of appointing a minister or the Prime Minister. For the President of the Republic, this is significant because the President approves the composition of the Government, appoints ministers upon the proposal of the Prime Minister, and accepts resignations pursuant to Article 84 of the Constitution. For the Government itself, the key requirement is to comply with the procedures for obtaining authority and for resignation, because only in that way are its decisions grounded in the competence established by the Constitution and the Law on the Government

Core issue. The precise legal issue is twofold: whether the public statement of the Lithuanian Association of Judges concerning the Seimas’s refusal to approve judicial candidates constitutes a permissible opinion or legally significant interference in the formation of the judiciary, and which institutions have decision-making or advisory competence in this process. This issue is to be assessed primarily under Article 112 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, which provides that justices of the Supreme Court are appointed by the Seimas upon submission by the President of the Republic, while judges and the president of the Court of Appeal are appointed by the President of the Republic with the approval of the Seimas. The same provision of Article 112 of the Constitution establishes that a special judicial institution provided for by law advises the President of the Republic on the appointment, promotion, transfer or dismissal of judges. At statutory level, this advisory link is specified in Articles 57 and 73, as well as Article 12(10) and Article 120(7), of the Law on Courts of the Republic of Lithuania, which refer to the advice of the Council of Judges, the consideration of candidacies, and the approval of procedures governing registers of candidates. Article 32(1) of the Law on Courts of the Republic of Lithuania is relevant to the status of the Lithuanian Association of Judges: it provides that judges are united by a public organisation, the Lithuanian Association of Judges, and that judges’ associations have the right to express an opinion concerning their members

Legal assessment. Under Article 112 of the Constitution, the role of the Seimas is not merely the technical confirmation of a candidacy: in the case of justices of the Supreme Court, the Seimas appoints them upon submission by the President of the Republic, while in the case of judges and the president of the Court of Appeal, the approval of the Seimas is a necessary condition for appointment. Accordingly, the Seimas’s refusal to approve a candidacy falls within the constitutionally prescribed mechanism for forming the judiciary, where the office in question is one for which Article 112 of the Constitution provides for appointment or approval by the Seimas. The function of the President of the Republic in this process is likewise independent: under Article 57(3) of the Law on Courts, after receiving the list of candidates drawn up by the Selection Commission, the President generally submits specific candidacies to the Council of Judges for consideration no later than within thirty days. Article 57(4) of the Law on Courts provides that the issue of appointment is generally considered at the nearest meeting of the Council of Judges, while Article 57(5) provides that the Council of Judges advises the President on a specific candidacy and must be provided with the reasons for the selection of the candidate. Article 73 of the Law on Courts applies separately to justices of the Supreme Court; under that provision, a justice is appointed by the Seimas upon submission by the President of the Republic from among persons entered in the register of persons seeking a judicial career, and the President is advised by the Council of Judges. These provisions show that a positive assessment by the selection body, the Council of Judges or a committee of the Seimas does not in itself eliminate the competence of the Seimas under Article 112 of the Constitution to approve, refuse approval or appoint only where there is the relevant political-constitutional will. At the same time, Article 32(1) of the Law on Courts does not permit the Lithuanian Association of Judges to be regarded as entirely legally mute: it is expressly granted the right to express an opinion concerning its members. However, that right is not equivalent either to the advice of the Council of Judges under Article 112 of the Constitution or to the approval or appointment by the Seimas; therefore, the association’s statement has no procedural force to replace or bind the decision of the Seimas. Article 32(1) of the Law on Courts permits an opinion concerning members, but does not grant the right to participate in the appointment procedure as an institution whose approval, advice or conclusion would be necessary. The competence of the Council of Judges is different: under Article 112 of the Constitution, it is the special judicial institution provided for by law that advises the President, while under Article 12(10) of the Law on Courts, the President determines the number of judges in courts on the advice of the Council of Judges. Article 120(7) of the Law on Courts additionally demonstrates the normative-administrative function of the Council of Judges: approving descriptions of the procedures for entering persons on the list of candidates and in the register of persons seeking a judicial career. In its ruling of 20 December 2007, “On the compliance of Decree No. 225 of the President of the Republic of Lithuania of 3 March 2005 ‘On the dismissal of a judge of a district court’ with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and Article 45 of the Law on Courts of the Republic of Lithuania”, the Constitutional Court stated that the judiciary is formed on a professional basis and that the Council of Judges participates in the process of appointing a judge. This position in the case-law reinforces the conclusion that the assessment of professionalism and the participation of the Council of Judges are constitutionally significant, but do not transform the Council of Judges or the association into a decision-making institution in place of the Seimas or the President of the Republic. From the perspective of the independence of courts and judges, the provisions cited in the sources are relevant insofar as judges must be protected from unlawful pressure or influence, including the influence of political and public organisations, as indicated in relation to the constitutional protection of judges’ remuneration and social guarantees and in the assessment of the draft of Article 232 of the Criminal Code. Nevertheless, the cited provisions most clearly protect judges in the administration of justice and against unlawful interference with their status; they do not prohibit any public expression of opinion by a judges’ association concerning its members

Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is that the Seimas’s refusal to approve remains valid as the exercise of the competence provided for in Article 112 of the Constitution, and the candidate is not appointed to the relevant office. The second scenario is that the President of the Republic, following the appointment procedure established by the Law on Courts, may initiate the consideration of other candidacies where a new submission or approval is required for the specific office. The third scenario is that the Lithuanian Association of Judges may continue to express opinions concerning its members under Article 32(1) of the Law on Courts, but such an opinion would remain an act of public assessment rather than a decision in a legislative or appointment procedure. The fourth scenario would be a path of constitutional review concerning judicial self-government or individual provisions of the Law on Courts; however, on the basis of the sources provided, what is clearly apparent is only that Article 112 of the Constitution itself provides for a special judicial institution advising the President. This situation is practically significant for candidates, because successful selection and favourable opinions do not guarantee appointment where the Constitution requires a decision or approval of the Seimas. It is significant for the Seimas, because its decision must be assessed as part of its constitutional competence, while at the same time operating in the context of guarantees of the professionalism and independence of the judiciary. It is significant for the Council of Judges, because its advice is necessary within the statutory sequence, but is not the final act of appointment. It is significant for the Lithuanian Association of Judges, because its right to speak concerning its members has clear limits: an opinion is permissible, but it cannot be presented as a procedurally binding assessment or as one replacing the discretion of the Seimas

Core issue. The precise legal question is whether the driving in Panevėžys by a man born in 1994, with an established blood alcohol concentration of 1.85 per mille, should be classified as an independent criminal offence under Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, or as a violation of road traffic safety rules under Article 281 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania directly covers the driving of a motor vehicle where the driver is found to have a blood alcohol concentration of 1.51 per mille or more, and provides for a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. Article 281(1)–(4) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania links criminal liability to a breach of road traffic safety or vehicle operation rules and to consequences: minor or serious impairment of health, substantial property damage, or a traffic accident. Since the report refers to the fact of drunk driving itself and to the level of 1.85 per mille, but does not describe injuries, damage, or a traffic accident, the principal provision on the facts provided is Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. The threshold for administrative liability under Article 427(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania, as reflected in the amendments provided, is linked to intoxication of more than 0.4 per mille or not less than 0.41 per mille up to 1.5 per mille; accordingly, 1.85 per mille falls not within that administrative threshold but within the criminal threshold

Legal assessment. The driver’s duty in this situation is assessed by reference to the prohibition on driving a motor vehicle at a level of intoxication which, under Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, reaches the threshold of 1.51 per mille or more. The established concentration of 1.85 per mille exceeds that threshold by 0.34 per mille; therefore, for criminal liability under this provision, the mere fact of driving is sufficient, provided it is proven by procedural means. Article 2811(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania is additionally relevant in that liability also arises where the act provided for in paragraph 1 of that article is committed through negligence. Article 19(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania excludes a defence based on the proposition that intoxication itself automatically exempts a person from criminal liability: a person who commits a criminal act while intoxicated by alcohol is not exempt from criminal liability. Article 19(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania provides for exemption only where the person was made drunk or intoxicated against his will and, as a result, was not fully capable of understanding the nature of the act or controlling his actions. The report states that a pre-trial investigation has been opened under Article 281 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, but that provision, on the text provided, would become relevant only if the consequences specified in it arose. If the investigation were to establish that a traffic accident occurred as a result of drunk driving and that another person’s health was mildly impaired or substantial property damage was caused, the applicable provision could be Article 281(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. If serious impairment of health were established, Article 281(3) and (4) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania would be relevant, because paragraph 4 specifically covers the act referred to in paragraph 3 when committed by an intoxicated person. Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania allows the suspect, defence counsel, the victim, and other persons to submit, on their own initiative, items and documents relevant to the investigation and examination of the criminal act. In practical terms, this may include data concerning the driving, the intoxication test, the vehicle, or other circumstances that confirm or refute the elements of Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 99 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania provides that procedural time limits define the commencement, performance, or completion of procedural acts, and that in the cases provided by law they may be set by a pre-trial investigation officer, prosecutor, judge, or court. Article 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania is important for calculating such time limits: a time limit calculated in days expires at twenty-four hundred hours on the final day, and if the act is performed at an institution, the time limit expires at the end of that institution’s working hours. If an expert examination were ordered in the investigation, according to the excerpt from Article 99 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania provided, the prosecutor, upon receiving the expert report, must notify the suspect, defence counsel, and other specified participants in the proceedings in writing where and when they may examine it. Preventive measures under Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania may be imposed to ensure the suspect’s participation in the proceedings, the unhindered conduct of the investigation, the hearing of the case, the enforcement of the judgment, and the prevention of new criminal acts. Under Article 120(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, such measures include detention, house arrest, bail, seizure of documents, an obligation to register periodically with a police authority, and a written undertaking not to leave. The issue of the “Volvo S+V70” vehicle could be assessed under Article 72 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, because property subject to confiscation includes an instrument or means of a prohibited act, and property subject to confiscation that belongs to the offender must, under paragraph 3 of that article, be confiscated in all cases

Consequences. The most realistic further course, on the factual basis provided, is the continuation of the pre-trial investigation into the driving provided for in Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, where intoxication of 1.51 per mille or more is established. If the collected data confirm the fact of driving and intoxication of 1.85 per mille, the person faces the sanctions provided for in that provision: a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. If the investigation were to reveal a traffic accident and the consequences specified in Article 281 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, the classification could shift to that article, under which the sanctions depend on the nature of the harm and the intoxication. If sufficient data substantiating the suspect’s guilt are not collected during the investigation, Article 212(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania provides for termination of the pre-trial investigation. The issue of victims or property damage is not central in this report, but if such an issue arose, Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania provides for the possibility of compensation for damage from state funds in the cases and according to the procedure established by law, where the accused or persons materially liable for his actions lack the funds to compensate the damage. The practical significance for the driver is that the level of 1.85 per mille exceeds the threshold for administrative liability and creates the risk of a criminal case, a criminal conviction, and possible confiscation of property. For the police and the prosecutor’s office, the key issue is to establish precisely the circumstances of the intoxication determination, the driving, and the use of the vehicle, because these are what determine the application of Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. For other road users, this case is practically relevant to the extent that the investigation establishes damage or injured persons, because that would introduce an additional procedural dimension under Article 281 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania and in relation to compensation for damage

Core issue. The precise legal issue is not whether a twelve-year-old is “unpunishable”, but what non-criminal and civil legal consequences apply to a child who has committed a violent act bearing the elements of a criminal offence before reaching the age of criminal responsibility. This issue is governed by Articles 10, 12 and 18 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Minimum and Medium Care of the Child, Articles 6.275 and 6.277 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, and Article 43 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania insofar as it concerns the relationship between administrative measures applicable to minors and supervision. Also relevant are Article 13(3) and Article 82 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, referred to in the Concept of the Law on Minimum and Medium Care of Minors: a child who had not reached the age of 14 before committing a dangerous act may be subject to educational or other measures in accordance with the procedure established by law. Therefore, legally, this situation shifts from the logic of sentencing to the logic of child supervision, assistance, behavioural correction and compensation for damage. The issue of civil liability is addressed separately under Article 6.275 of the Civil Code, because the report concerns a twelve-year-old child, i.e. a minor under the age of fourteen

Legal assessment. Article 10(1)(1) of the Law on Minimum and Medium Care of the Child directly covers a situation where a child commits an act bearing the elements of a crime or criminal misdemeanour but, at the time of committing it, has not reached the age established in the Criminal Code from which criminal liability may arise. This means that minimum care measures may be considered for the twelve-year-old in respect of the described violence, even if no criminal penalty is imposed on her. Under Article 12(1) of the same law, requests for the imposition, extension, replacement and revocation of minimum or medium care measures are submitted and examined in accordance with the procedure established by the Law on Public Administration. Under Article 12(2)(1), the inter-institutional cooperation coordinator, the child’s legal representatives, the territorial police authority, the school, the eldership, the prosecutor, the court and, in relevant administrative offence cases, the authority or official examining the case out of court may apply to the mayor of the municipality of the child’s permanent place of residence regarding minimum care measures for the child. Thus, the institutional route is not left solely to parental discretion: the police, school, prosecutor or inter-institutional cooperation coordinator may initiate a decision by the municipal mayor. According to the sources provided, the content of minimum care is understood as social, psychological, pedagogical and other assistance to the child, without separating the child from the family or guardians, and with the aim of achieving positive behavioural change. Once minimum care measures begin to be applied, the child’s legal representatives acquire not only rights to information but also clear duties: under Article 18(2)(1)–(3) of the Law on Minimum and Medium Care of the Child, they must participate in the preparation and implementation of the individual plan for carrying out the child’s minimum care measure, participate in the implementation of the measures themselves and provide the necessary information to the coordinating institutions. At the same time, Article 18(1) gives them the right to receive information from the school and case manager, to submit requests or complaints to the mayor, coordinator, child rights protection authorities, law enforcement and other institutions, and to receive educational, social, healthcare and other services. As regards civil damage, Article 6.275(1) of the Civil Code provides that parents or guardians are liable for damage caused by a minor under the age of fourteen unless they prove that the damage did not arise through their fault. If the damage was caused while the child was under the supervision of an educational, upbringing, healthcare or guardianship institution, Article 6.275(2) of the Civil Code provides that the institution is liable unless it proves absence of fault. Article 6.277 of the Civil Code is additionally relevant only where parental authority has been restricted due to the parents’ fault: such parents are liable on general grounds for damage caused by their minor children if the child’s actions are a consequence of improper exercise of parental authority, except where a guardian or custodian has been appointed for the child. The episode involving filming and encouragement by children present nearby could be relevant to the factual circumstances under the rules provided, but the legal sources supplied do not reveal any separate special rule that would automatically create civil, administrative or criminal liability for the filming itself. Nevertheless, the Juvenile Justice Programme for 2009–2013 clearly identifies the objective of protecting a minor from the negative impact of disseminating information about an offence and prohibiting the publication of data concerning minor offenders and victims, especially in cases before they are examined in court. Article 43(3) of the Code of Administrative Offences reflects the general model: where a minor’s administrative offence and personality indicate that supervision measures would be more effective, the court or the authority examining the case out of court may refrain from imposing a penalty and apply for minimum or medium care measures

Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the territorial police authority, school, prosecutor or inter-institutional cooperation coordinator applies to the municipal mayor for minimum care measures to be imposed on the twelve-year-old under Article 10(1)(1) and Article 12(2)(1) of the Law on Minimum and Medium Care of the Child. In such a case, the practical burden would fall not only on the child but also on her legal representatives, because under Article 18 they would have to participate in the preparation and implementation of the individual plan and cooperate with the case manager and institutions. The second scenario is that the victim or her representatives seek compensation for damage, in which case the primary addressees of liability under Article 6.275(1) of the Civil Code would be the parents or guardians of the violent twelve-year-old, unless they prove that the damage did not arise through their fault. A third scenario may arise if it becomes clear that the damage was caused while the child was under institutional supervision: in that case, under Article 6.275(2) of the Civil Code, the issue of liability could be raised against the relevant educational, upbringing, healthcare or guardianship institution. The fourth scenario concerns broader correction of the child’s behaviour: under the conceptual regulatory framework provided, minimum care measures are intended not to punish but to provide social, psychological, pedagogical and other assistance in order to achieve positive behavioural change. In practical terms, the most important path for the victim and her family would be compensation for damage and ensuring safety; for the family of the child who committed the violence, participation in care measures and possible civil liability; and for the municipality, school, police and prosecutor, the competence to initiate and implement the minor supervision mechanism. Thus, according to the sources provided, the absence of a criminal penalty for a twelve-year-old perpetrator of violence does not mean a legal vacuum: a system of minimum care, civil liability of parents or guardians and institutional coordination applies