Whether the Druskininkai infrastructure projects publicly presented by the mayor, the selection of the operator for the Palace of Culture and Congresses, and the benefits under the “Druskininkai Resident Card” are merely matters of political communication, or decisions subject to the municipal property, budgetary and accountability regime.
Article 27 of the Law on Local Self-Government makes the mayor accountable to the municipal council and the community for his or her own activities and those of the municipality, and also entrusts the mayor with organising the preparation and implementation of the budget, submitting the budget and the annual set of reports, and administering municipal property and other financial resources. Accordingly, facilities such as the Palace of Culture and Congresses, with halls seating 1,200, 530 and 157 people, its operator “Universali infrastruktūra”, the possible granting of naming rights for the Palace to companies, and the multifunctional bus station complex opening in the autumn are not, in legal terms, merely city image projects. They fall within the sphere of municipal property, financial resources and activities administered by the mayor and requiring explanation to the council and the community.
The principles set out in Article 2 of the Law on Local Self-Government further narrow the scope of discretion: economic autonomy allows a municipality to choose its local development model, but the principles of legality, social justice, transparency and accountability require it to demonstrate why a particular decision on an operator, benefits or monetisation of property serves the community.
The stronger argument here is not that “the mayor has a broad political mandate and may therefore shape the resort model himself”, but that “the mayor’s political discretion must be traceable through council decisions, the budget, property administration documents and reports”. In practice, a journalist or lawyer should seek not a general description of achievements, but specific documents: the terms and outcome of the operator tender, council decisions on the management of the Palace, the possible naming-rights model, budget lines and annual reports. For the “Druskininkai Resident Card” benefits, the relevant risk lies in substantiating social justice and legality: if discounts are linked to declared place of residence, the municipality should clearly show by which council decision, and on the basis of which public-interest criterion, they are granted.
It is precisely the documented link between the use of municipal property, the budgetary impact and the benefit to the community that turns a political narrative into something legally verifiable.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not the substance of the mayor’s political assessments, but the extent to which the Mayor of Druskininkai, when speaking publicly about municipal projects, tourism directions, relations with institutions and residents’ privileges, acts within the limits of mayoral competence, accountability and legality. This must be assessed under Article 1, Article 21(1) and (2), and Article 25(1), (3) and (4) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as Articles 4, 15, 23 and 30 of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania. Under Article 1 of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, a municipality is a public legal person, and local self-government is the self-organisation and self-action of the community within the competence defined by the Constitution and laws. Accordingly, the matters of culture, transport, tourism, infrastructure and residents’ participation referred to in the mayor’s interview must legally be assessed as areas of municipal activity, and not merely as matters of the mayor’s personal discretion. Article 25(1) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania provides that the mayor is directly and personally responsible for the implementation, within the municipal territory and in matters assigned to his competence, of laws, Government decisions, municipal council decisions and his own decisions. Article 21(1) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania further establishes the mayor’s accountability to the municipal council and the community for municipal activity. This accountability is reinforced by the principles of the mayor’s accountability to the council, responsibility to the community, legality, residents’ participation, openness of activity and transparency, enshrined in Article 4(3), (4), (5), (8) and (9) of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania
Legal assessment. The mayor’s statements concerning the Culture and Congress Centre, the bus station, tourism markets, infrastructure adapted for persons with disabilities and the “Druskininkai Resident Card” fall within the field of municipal development, economic, cultural, social and investment programmes, because Article 25(4)(2) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania entrusts the mayor with ensuring that such projects are prepared in a timely and proper manner and that their implementation is monitored. However, this provision does not imply unilateral governance by the mayor: Article 15(2) of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania assigns exclusive competence to the municipal council in matters such as approval of the rules of procedure, formation of commissions and other council decisions. Article 21(2)(1) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania confers on the mayor procedural authority to plan the council’s activities, prepare agendas, submit draft decisions, convene council meetings and chair them. Therefore, when publicly presenting projects, the mayor may shape the political and administrative agenda, but the legality of decisions depends on whether they are adopted in accordance with the competence of the council and the procedures of municipal institutions. As regards cooperation with other municipalities, state or foreign institutions, Article 21(2)(2) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania applies, under which the mayor represents the municipality, or authorises other persons to represent it, in accordance with the procedure laid down in the rules of procedure. This is relevant when assessing the mayor’s remarks about previous cooperation with Grodno: legally, such communication is possible only as representation of the municipality within the prescribed competence, and not as an independent mayoral policy detached from municipal institutions. The mayor’s criticism of the Ministry of the Economy and Innovation or “Travel Lithuania” should primarily be regarded as political opinion; however, the protection under Article 25(3) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania is expressly formulated in respect of opinions expressed at meetings of the municipal council, its committees, commissions or the municipal college. The same Article 25(3) provides that the mayor is liable in accordance with law for insult, defamation, and dissemination of information degrading honour and dignity or not corresponding to reality. Since the interview refers to the expected opening of the bus station in autumn 2026 and anticipated cultural events at the end of 2026, the legally significant point is not the forecast itself, but whether the municipality informs the public about the projects openly and transparently in accordance with Article 4(8) and (9) of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania. In terms of residents’ participation, Article 25(4)(3) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania obliges the mayor to ensure appropriate conditions for local residents to participate in the management of public municipal affairs. To the extent that the “Druskininkai Resident Card” is linked to residents who have declared their place of residence in the municipality and to discounts, it must be assessed through Article 4(7) of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania: decisions adopted in the interests of the community must not infringe the rights of individual residents guaranteed by law. If a question arose concerning the compliance of the mayor’s actions with the oath or with the performance of powers established by law, Article 251(1)–(4) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania provides for the procedure by which a councillor-mayor may lose his powers by decision of the municipal council. Such a submission may be made by a group comprising not less than one third of the council members, and it must be in writing and submitted no later than one month from the day on which the grounds became known. The institutional significance of the Ethics Commission arises from Article 23(1) of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, under which the council establishes an Ethics Commission for the duration of its term of office, observing the principle of proportional representation of the majority and minority. Article 30 of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania is also relevant to issues of continuity of the mayor’s activities: the mayor is substituted by a deputy mayor appointed by him when the mayor is temporarily absent from office or when his powers have been suspended by a court order
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is the ordinary one: the mayor’s interview remains a form of political accountability, while municipal projects continue to proceed through council agendas, draft decisions, implementation by the administration and public information. The second scenario is possible if council members or the community were to dispute that specific declarations by the mayor correspond to municipal decisions, budgetary commitments or programme obligations; in that case, the mayor’s accountability established in Article 21(1) and Article 25(1) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania would become central. The third scenario is the activation of political and legal responsibility under Article 251 of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, but this is possible only where at least one statutory ground exists and the one-month submission deadline is observed. The fourth scenario would be institutional continuity if the mayor were temporarily unable to perform his duties or if his powers were suspended: under Article 30 of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, the functions would be assumed by the deputy mayor or by a council member appointed by the council. This situation is practically important for the residents of Druskininkai because the principles of local self-government require that projects and benefits be implemented in the interests of the community, transparently and without infringing the rights of individual residents. It is also important for the council, because the council remains the principal representative institution of local self-government, while the mayor, although holding a direct political mandate and executive duties, is not, under the cited provisions, exempt from oversight by the council and the community
The specific question is which classification in this case determines the actual custodial sentencing range: possession/disposal of excise goods and smuggling, or possession/disposal of a large quantity of narcotic substances under Article 260 of the Criminal Code. This matters because the news report states that the case concluded on 16 July 2026 and that the charges covered several acts, but “many years in prison” are legally explained less by the duration of the proceedings or recusal tactics than by the classification based on the quantity of narcotic substances and the purpose of distribution.
Article 260(2) of the Criminal Code provides that the manufacture, acquisition, possession, transportation or sending of a large quantity of narcotic or psychotropic substances with the intent to sell or otherwise distribute them is punishable by imprisonment for a term of eight to ten years. If the quantity were classified as very large, Article 260(3) sets an even stricter range: ten to fifteen years, and in the cited provision that paragraph no longer links liability to a separately proven intent to distribute. Article 2601(3) punishes smuggling of narcotic substances with intent to distribute by imprisonment for two to ten years; therefore, when comparing sanctions, it is precisely the classification under Article 260 involving a large or very large quantity that serves as the stronger sentencing “anchor”.
The excise-goods episode under the cited Article 1992 of the Criminal Code depends on value thresholds: above 150, 400 or 900 MGL, the applicable sanctions are up to four, six or eight years respectively. Accordingly, without the specific value of the goods, that episode cannot explain the strictest sentencing range as clearly as the narcotics episode can.
In professionally assessing this judgment, the key point is not the general label “smuggling”, but the quantity of narcotic substances established in the judgment and whether the court found an intent to distribute. For the defence on appeal, the strongest line of attack would not be an abstract narrative about delay in the proceedings or recusal episodes, but the factual basis that allowed the act to be classified under Article 260(2) or 260(3) of the Criminal Code. For the prosecution and the court, the stronger argument is the structure of the sanctions: where circulation of a large quantity of drugs with intent to distribute is proven, the eight-year minimum under Article 260(2) of the Criminal Code substantially narrows the scope for a lenient sentence.
The practical risk for commentators, therefore, is to miscentre the case on excise goods or procedural conduct, even though, under the cited provisions, the severity of the sentence is most likely driven by the narcotics classification.
Core issue. The legal issue is under which provision of the Criminal Code the conduct of the Venslauskas brothers should be classified and how the period of their pre-trial detention must be credited against the custodial sentence imposed. In relation to excise goods, Article 1992 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania applies; it links liability to the unlawful acquisition, possession, transportation, sending, use or disposal of such goods and to different value thresholds: more than 150 MGL, 400 MGL or 900 MGL. The sources also set out an earlier version of Article 199-2 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, under which the threshold for liability was a value of goods exceeding 250 MGL, and the penalty was a fine or imprisonment for up to seven years. In relation to narcotic substances, the essential provisions are Articles 260 and 2601 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania: the former covers unlawful possession or control of narcotic or psychotropic substances with intent to distribute them, or a very large quantity; the latter covers their smuggling across the state border. Procedurally, the relevant provisions are Articles 119, 120 and 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania concerning coercive measures and detention, as well as Article 66 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania concerning the crediting of detention against a sentence
Legal assessment. If the court established unlawful possession or control of excise goods, the severity of the penalty under Article 1992 of the Criminal Code depends on the value of the goods: where it exceeds 150 MGL but does not exceed 400 MGL, a fine or imprisonment for up to four years may be imposed; where it exceeds 400 MGL but does not exceed 900 MGL, imprisonment for up to six years; and where it exceeds 900 MGL, imprisonment for up to eight years. If the act created a real threat to human life or health, to the activities of an undertaking important to national security, to safe transport traffic, or caused substantial property damage, Article 1992(4) of the Criminal Code provides only for imprisonment from two to eight years. In the narcotics episode, classification is determined not merely by the fact of possession or control, but also by the quantity and the intent to distribute: under Article 260(2) of the Criminal Code, possession or control of a large quantity with intent to distribute is punishable by imprisonment from eight to ten years, while under Article 260(3), a very large quantity is punishable by imprisonment from ten to fifteen years. If narcotic or psychotropic substances were transported or sent across the state border of the Republic of Lithuania without presenting them for customs control, by evading such control, or without authorisation, Article 2601 of the Criminal Code applies; a large quantity under paragraph 4 of that article is punishable by imprisonment from four to twelve years. The status of the substances and the category of quantity are not matters of free assessment: Article 269 of the Criminal Code provides that narcotic and psychotropic substances are those included in the lists approved by the Ministry of Health, while quantity thresholds are determined according to recommendations approved by the Ministry. Coercive measures were significant in this case because detention under Articles 119 and 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is one of the measures intended to secure participation in the proceedings, unhindered examination of the case, enforcement of the judgment, and prevention of new criminal offences. Under Article 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, detention is permissible only where there is a reasonable belief that the suspect will abscond, obstruct the proceedings, or commit new specified offences. In the context of delay in the proceedings, it is important that, under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, participants in the proceedings may submit items and documents relevant to the case, while Articles 99 and 100 set out the specific purpose and rules for calculating procedural time limits. Under Article 100(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, detention periods are calculated from the moment of actual detention; therefore, the brothers’ detention from autumn 2022 until 23 January 2024 and 1 February 2024 becomes directly relevant to the execution of the sentence. Article 66 of the Criminal Code requires the court to credit detention against the sentence imposed, equating one day of detention with one day of imprisonment. The penal order procedure under Article 418 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be limited for the core of allegations of this kind, because it does not apply where the criminal offence is punishable only by a fixed-term custodial sentence, and Articles 260(1)–(3) and 2601(3)–(4) of the Criminal Code provide precisely for imprisonment
Consequences. In practical terms, the most important consequence of the judgment is not only the number of years imposed, but also the extent to which the actual custodial sentence will be reduced by detention already served under Article 66 of the Criminal Code. For Rokas Venslauskas, the relevant period runs until 23 January 2024; for Matas Venslauskas, until 1 February 2024, because according to the information provided, those dates mark their release from detention. If the court found a large or very large quantity of narcotic substances, the legal centre of gravity of the case shifts to the sanctions under Articles 260 and 2601 of the Criminal Code, which provide for substantial minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment. The excise goods component is practically important because of the MGL thresholds: they determine whether liability falls within the lower, intermediate or strictest sanction tier under Article 1992 of the Criminal Code. Legislative sources concerning amendments to Articles 199, 1991, 1992 and 200 of the Criminal Code show that the aim in this area was to reduce the gap between administrative and criminal liability, eliminate systemic deficiencies, and increase liability. Accordingly, this case is practically significant not merely as a reputational event, but as an example in which the value thresholds for excise goods, classification of quantities of narcotic substances, indicia of smuggling, and crediting of detention intersect. The further course will depend primarily on the specific qualifying provisions established in the judgment, the aggregation of the sentences imposed, and the crediting of detention already served. If the court imposed imprisonment under the stricter narcotics provisions, the practical significance of sentence enforcement will remain substantial even after crediting more than a year of detention
Could restrictions on the use of generative AI in schools in Lithuania be based directly on the EU AI Act, or would separate national education regulation be required to establish binding rules for pupils, teachers and schools?
Article 4 of the Law Amending the Republic of Lithuania Law on Information Society Services merely supplements the annex to the law with a reference to Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, i.e. the Artificial Intelligence Act, but the provision cited does not reveal any direct rule concerning the use of AI in the classroom. The stronger conclusion from this provision is therefore not that schools are already required to prohibit AI, but that the AI Act is being incorporated into the national legal context as a source of EU regulation, the application of which in the educational process will still depend on specific national rules. The cited commencement provisions of the amendments to the Law on Education illustrate the usual legislative technique: where obligations within the education system are amended, the law sets an effective date and requires the minister or the authorities exercising the rights of the owner of educational institutions to adopt implementing acts.
This is important in the context of the Norwegian model, because an age-differentiated prohibition for pupils aged 6-13, 14-16 and 17-19 in Lithuania could not reliably be replaced by merely recommendatory guidelines if the aim were to establish a mandatory and enforceable regime.
In practice, the stronger argument today is that AI policy in Lithuanian schools remains a matter of national education policy, rather than a prohibition arising automatically from the EU AI Act. For a lawyer or journalist, it is worth citing not a general statement about “EU regulation”, but the distinction between the inclusion of the EU AI Act in an annex to a national law and the absence of a specific education provision: that distinction separates the direction of AI literacy from a mandatory classroom ban. If Lithuania were to follow Norway, the risk would lie not only in the political choice, but also in the form of implementation: a vaguely formulated prohibition left to schools’ internal rules would create inconsistent practice and disputes over pupil assessment, teachers’ supervisory duties and permissible exceptions.
The professional practical conclusion is therefore as follows: until a specific national act is adopted, it is safer to speak of recommendatory governance and academic integrity rules, rather than a legally binding AI prohibition regime.
Core issue. The precise legal question is not whether Lithuania must replicate Norway’s ban, but by what national and EU-law measures a regime for the use of generative AI in schools could be established where pupils’ data are processed, teaching resources are used, and an institutional framework for AI governance is being developed. This question must first be assessed under Article 4(2) GDPR, which defines “processing”; Article 25(1) GDPR on data protection by design and by default; Article 9(j) GDPR concerning research or statistical purposes; recital 73 GDPR concerning lawful and proportionate restrictions; and Articles 32(1), 32(3), 32(4), and Article 63(1)(2) and 63(1)(5) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Copyright and Related Rights. The issue of institutional competence is linked to the document “Regarding the Draft Law No. XVP-925 Amending Articles 3, 9-1 and 9-2 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Public Administration No. VIII-1234”, which states that a separate draft law is being prepared concerning Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, including the competence of Lithuanian state institutions implementing the Artificial Intelligence Act and the rights and obligations of other entities. The same source expressly refers to Article 40 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 on harmonised standards; therefore, rules on the use of AI in schools cannot be assessed in isolation from the future national implementation architecture
Legal assessment. If a school permitted or restricted the use of generative AI in a manner involving the collection, recording, storage, use, or other processing of pupils’ data, this would constitute processing under Article 4(2) GDPR. In that case, the school or another responsible institution, when determining and applying the means of use, would be required under Article 25(1) GDPR to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures, including the effective implementation of the data minimisation principle. This means that the legally relevant issue is not merely the fact of prohibition or permission, but whether the chosen model is designed from the outset so that pupils’ data are processed only to the extent necessary for the educational purpose. Recital 73 GDPR permits certain restrictions to be laid down in Union or Member State law, but only where they are necessary and proportionate in a democratic society, including for the protection of the data subject or the rights and freedoms of others. Accordingly, age-based restrictions similar to the Norwegian model described in the report could, on the basis of the sources provided, be legally defensible only as a proportionate measure serving a clearly defined objective of protecting children’s rights and data protection, rather than as an abstract distrust of the technology. If the use of AI were connected with teaching materials, databases, or parts thereof, Article 32(4) of the Law on Copyright and Related Rights would apply, permitting the use of a publicly disclosed database as an example for teaching or scientific research purposes, provided the source is indicated and the use is justified by a non-commercial purpose. Article 63(1)(2) of the same law permits a lawful user, without the authorisation of the maker of the database, to make available a substantial part of the contents of the database as an example for teaching or scientific research in various fields, provided the source is indicated and the use is justified by a non-commercial purpose. More specifically, Article 63(1)(5) permits educational institutions to transfer or re-use a database so that its digital copy is used solely for illustration for teaching, where the use takes place under the responsibility of the educational institution, on its premises or in other locations, or within a secure electronic network accessible only to teachers, lecturers, and learners. These provisions do not confer a general authorisation for the uncontrolled use of any data in AI systems, but they show that educational institutions already have specially defined rights to use certain database elements for teaching purposes. Contractual terms that prevent the acts referred to in Article 32(1), 32(5), 32(6), and 32(7) of the Law on Copyright and Related Rights are null and void under Article 32(3), meaning that the limits of permitted use for teaching purposes cannot ordinarily be eliminated by contract. From an institutional perspective, it is important that the source concerning Draft Law No. XVP-925 on the Law on Public Administration states that the Ministry of the Economy and Innovation is preparing a separate draft law that will define the competence of state institutions implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 and the rights and obligations of relevant entities. The implementation plan for the programme of the Twentieth Government of the Republic of Lithuania provides that, by Q4 2026, an institutional framework and an AI regulatory sandbox are to be established in implementation of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act. Therefore, as of 17 July 2026, the practical regulatory position in Lithuania, according to the sources provided, is transitional: the institutional implementation of the AI Act still has to be formed by Q4 2026. The sources provided contain no case law, and this analysis therefore does not rely on judicial decisions
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that Lithuania does not yet amend the rules on AI use in schools through mandatory regulation, but waits for the national implementation framework for Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, which, under the Government’s plan, must be established by Q4 2026. The second scenario is that sector-specific education guidelines emerge before general statutory regulation; however, their legal quality would have to be assessed under Article 25(1) GDPR and by reference to whether the use of teaching resources complies with the conditions set out in Articles 32 and 63 of the Law on Copyright and Related Rights. The third scenario is that, following the adoption of the national law implementing the AI Act, rights, obligations, and supervisory competence would be allocated more precisely among schools, suppliers of AI tools, and public administration bodies. The practical significance for schools would be the obligation to define in advance which pupils’ data are processed, by what means they are protected, and for what educational purposes digital resources are used. For teachers, the important point is that the right to use databases for illustration for teaching is not absolute: indication of the source, a non-commercial purpose, and a secure environment controlled by the educational institution are required. For pupils and their parents, the key issue would be whether the chosen model of restricting or permitting AI genuinely reduces data-processing risks and is proportionate to the educational objective pursued. For suppliers of AI tools, this practically means that the education market will depend not only on technological benefit, but also on the ability to comply with requirements concerning data protection by design, lawful use of teaching resources, and future institutional supervision of AI
The specific question is whether the resignation announced by the minister and the prime minister during a government reshuffle in itself brings their offices to an end, or whether the legal consequence arises only after the constitutionally prescribed formal steps have been taken. This distinction matters because the news item refers to M. Fedorov’s statement on Telegram and a conversation with V.
Zelensky as describing a political decision, whereas the evidence presented indicates that, in an analogous Lithuanian system, the decisive factor would not be public communication but a written resignation, a submission, and an act of the President.
Article 84 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania provides that the President of the Republic “accepts the resignation of ministers and may instruct them to continue in office until a new minister is appointed”, while Article 92 of the Constitution provides that ministers are appointed and dismissed by the President upon the submission of the Prime Minister. Article 10(2) of the Law on the Government sets out this sequence in more detail: a minister notifies the Prime Minister in writing; the Prime Minister submits the resignation to the President within no more than five working days; and, under Article 10(4), the resignation is accepted by the President. Accordingly, under the Lithuanian legal model presented, the stronger argument would be that a minister’s public statement is a political signal, but not the final legal moment at which the office comes to an end.
If the Prime Minister resigns, Article 9(1)(3) of the Law on the Government moves the matter to the level of the Government as a whole, because the Government must resign when the Prime Minister resigns.
The practical conclusion for a professional is not to infer too quickly from a minister’s public statement that he has already lost his powers: under the provisions cited, Articles 84 and 92 of the Constitution and Article 10 of the Law on the Government should be cited, because they link the termination of office to a formal decision of the President. If the reshuffle also includes the resignation of the prime minister, the legally more significant issue becomes not the replacement of an individual defence minister, but the status of the Government as a whole, because in an analogous Lithuanian situation this would trigger the mandatory resignation of the Government. A further risk would be that, if more than half of the ministers are replaced, Article 8(4) of the Law on the Government would require the Government to obtain a new mandate from the Seimas; failing that, under Article 9(1)(5), the Government would be required to resign.
Thus, the stronger legal argument is not “reshuffle as political discretion”, but “reshuffle as a sequence of procedural thresholds”, in which the consequences of replacing a minister, the prime minister, and more than half of the ministers are different.
Core issue. The precise legal question is not whether the resignation of Ukraine’s Minister of Defence is valid under Ukrainian law, but whether such a political change alters the duties of Lithuanian institutions in providing support to Ukraine, conducting defence cooperation, and implementing restrictive measures
Legal assessment. The departure of the Ukrainian minister described in the report is not, in itself, a legal fact that would terminate or suspend Lithuania’s support, sanctions, or defence cooperation mechanisms under the Lithuanian legal provisions cited
Consequences. The legal significance of the report for Lithuania therefore lies not in the procedure for the Ukrainian minister’s resignation, but in the continuity of Lithuanian support, defence cooperation, sanctions enforcement, and institutional relations under the cited Lithuanian legal rules
Whether an air carrier’s practice of treating cabin baggage as non-compliant solely because shoulder straps, pockets or belts protrude from the baggage sizer, and of requiring an additional charge of up to EUR 75 during an expedited check under threat of denied boarding, should be regarded as an unfair commercial practice towards consumers. The disputed point here is not merely the physical dimensions of the backpack, but whether the measurement procedure and the economic pressure placed on the passenger leave any real opportunity to challenge the staff member’s decision immediately before boarding.
Article 3(1) and (2) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Prohibition of Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices prohibits commercial practices that fail to meet the requirements of professional diligence and materially distort or are likely to materially distort the economic behaviour of the average consumer. It follows from that provision that the carrier’s mere right to prescribe cabin baggage dimensions does not, by itself, answer the question of lawfulness: it is necessary to assess whether the manner in which the rule is applied, particularly an expedited gate check and the threat of denied boarding, renders the passenger’s choice to pay EUR 70-75 effectively compulsory. Article 3(4) of the same law is important because the practice need not be misleading only; it may also be unfair as an aggressive practice, or as another practice inconsistent with professional diligence, if it in fact distorts the consumer’s decision.
Article 12¹ provides that consumers harmed by an unfair commercial practice may claim damages, a price reduction or termination of the contract, so the outcome of an investigation would be significant not only for sanctions against the airline, but also for individual passengers’ monetary claims.
The stronger argument for the regulator is not that shoulder straps “should not be counted” as part of the baggage, since the evidence provided contains no such rule, but that the measurement and charging model may systematically distort consumers’ economic behaviour. A particularly significant circumstance is the incentivisation of staff for identifying baggage that does not comply with the prescribed dimensions: together with expedited gate checks, this strengthens the argument that the decision-making process may be directed not at the objective application of the rules, but at the collection of additional fees. In practice, passenger complaints and the authority’s investigation should record not only a photograph of the backpack in the sizer, but also the time, location, the staff member’s wording regarding denied boarding, whether the passenger was or was not allowed to have the baggage measured again, and the amount paid.
For air carriers, the risk arises precisely from the standardisation of the procedure: even if some baggage formally exceeded the permitted dimensions, the risk of sanctions may be created by an unclear, rushed and economically coercive enforcement practice.
Core issue. The legal issue is not the measurement of the backpack itself as a security measure, but whether an air carrier may, under its tariff application rules, classify a passenger’s cabin baggage as chargeable baggage where the dispute concerns protruding shoulder straps. It is to be resolved under Article 68(1) of the Law on Aviation of the Republic of Lithuania, which assigns the determination of the conditions and procedure for the carriage of passengers, cargo, baggage and mail to the Minister of Transport and Communications, and Article 68(2), under which the carrier determines the tariffs for the carriage of passengers, cargo and baggage and the procedure for applying them. Article 68(3) of the Law on Aviation is also applicable, because information on the prices, tariffs and conditions of application of air services is governed by Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008. The legal regime for air services within the European Union and the European Economic Area is defined by Article 43(1) of the Law on Aviation, which refers to Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008. This dispute must also be distinguished from customs controls under Article 49(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 and from aviation security screening under points 45.1, 52 and 53 of the National Civil Aviation Security Programme
Legal assessment. Under the cited provisions, an air carrier has the right to establish baggage tariffs and the procedure for applying them, but that right is not an end in itself: it must be exercised as part of the conditions for the carriage of passengers and baggage under Article 68 of the Law on Aviation. If the carrier’s rules prescribe cabin baggage dimensions, the practical dispute turns on whether shoulder straps form part of the baggage dimensions or are merely an accessory that the passenger could press down, remove or otherwise adjust before a final decision is made. On the basis of these sources, an instruction by the carrier’s staff to pay an additional fee, failing which boarding is denied, should be assessed as an act of tariff application, not as a customs control or aviation security screening measure. Article 49(1) of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 links customs controls of cabin and hold baggage on intra-Union flights only to cases provided for in customs legislation, while Article 49(2) separately preserves checks relating to security, safety, prohibitions and restrictions. Point 45.1 of the National Civil Aviation Security Programme refers to passenger screening requirements; point 52 regulates the protection of passengers and cabin baggage until their handover to the air carrier; and point 53 concerns the duties of air carriers from the handover of screened passengers and their baggage until the aircraft’s departure. Accordingly, the use of a baggage sizer for the purpose of imposing an additional fee must be distinguished from mandatory security procedures: the shoulder straps of a passenger’s backpack do not, in themselves, turn the situation into a security screening measure under the cited points. The model of passenger rights and obligations in other modes of transport is reflected in Article 21(1)(2) and Article 21(2)(1) and (3) of the Road Transport Code, as well as Article 34(1)(2) and Article 34(2)(1) and (3) of the Inland Waterways Transport Code: a passenger may carry baggage of the prescribed size, but must pay for carriage and comply with the established procedure. Article 33(1) of the Railway Transport Code links the conditions for passenger and baggage carriage, as well as rights, obligations and liability, to the relevant legislation, while Article 34(1) and (2) show that the charge for baggage carriage may be set by the carrier or under the rules applicable to international transport. These provisions do not alter the aviation regulatory framework, but they demonstrate the general logic of the cited sources: a baggage fee is lawful only where it is applied under pre-established conditions of carriage applicable to the passenger. From the perspective of institutional competence, Article 73(3) of the Law on Aviation assigns to the LTSA the supervision of compliance by air carriers and aircraft operators with civil liability insurance requirements, while Article 70¹(2) assigns to it supervision of compliance with Regulation (EC) No 1107/2006 on flights from and to airports of the Republic of Lithuania. On the basis of the cited sources, these LTSA competences are not directly equivalent to the consumer rights investigation initiated by the Polish authority concerning cabin baggage fees. As regards time limits, the cited aviation provisions expressly mention only the 20-working-day time limit in Article 43(4) of the Law on Aviation for examining an application for designation, but that time limit applies to the allocation of traffic rights, not to a passenger dispute concerning a cabin baggage fee
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is that the investigation confirms that the air carrier’s measurement and fee-application procedure complies with its established tariffs and with the regime governing information on prices and tariff conditions under Article 68(2) and (3) of the Law on Aviation. In that case, the key point for passengers would be that the fee for a backpack with protruding shoulder straps remains a matter of applying the carrier’s tariffs, rather than automatically constituting an unlawful refusal to carry. The second scenario is that the carrier’s practice is found to be applied so hastily or unclearly that the passenger cannot realistically understand which tariff condition has been breached; in that event, the issue would focus on the information regime concerning prices, tariffs and their conditions of application referred to in Article 68(3) of the Law on Aviation. The third scenario is that the carrier retains the dimensions themselves but changes the procedure: it allows the passenger to adjust the shoulder straps before a final decision, records the measurement result more clearly, and separates the commercial baggage check from security screening. This is practically important for passengers because the clarity of the procedure determines whether the fee is perceived as the application of a contractual condition or as a disputed additional charge at the gate. For air carriers, this matters because of the limits of their right to set tariffs under Article 68(2) of the Law on Aviation: the more discretion left to the staff member at the sizer, the greater the risk that the application of the tariff will be assessed as insufficiently clear. For airports and security entities, the distinction under points 52 and 53 of the National Civil Aviation Security Programme is important, because a commercial check of baggage size must not be confused with the protection regime for passengers and cabin baggage. The ultimate significance of this situation lies not in the amount of EUR 70 or EUR 75 as such, but in whether the air carrier’s established procedure for applying the baggage tariff is clear to the passenger, verifiable, and applied in such a way that the decision to impose an additional fee is not merely an instantaneous assessment by a staff member at the boarding gate
The specific question is whether the Court of Appeal’s conviction of P. Isoda, in itself, removes him from the office of mayor, even though he still intends to appeal the decision and even though the municipal council has not carried out a separate procedure for the loss of powers. On the facts presented, the stronger argument is that the mandate terminates automatically: the news report states that, under the Electoral Code, a final conviction results in the termination of a mayor’s powers.
The centre of the dispute is therefore not the council’s political assessment of whether the “receipt” conduct is incompatible with office, but the formal legal consequence following a final conviction.
Article 13 of the Law on Local Self-Government regulates a different mechanism: the loss of powers of a municipal councillor or mayor by decision of the municipal council for acts contrary to the Constitution or laws, where the procedure may be initiated by at least one third of the councillors. This means that the provision creates a political-constitutional accountability procedure within the council, but it is not a necessary intermediate step where the loss of the mandate is linked to a final conviction under the Electoral Code, as stated in the news report. Article 19(1) of the Law on Local Self-Government provides that where a mayor’s powers terminate before the end of the term, new mayoral elections are to be held; however, the news report itself identifies a special exception, namely that, with less than one year remaining before the February-March 2027 municipal elections, early elections in Marijampole will not be organised.
Article 17(1) of the Law on Local Self-Government is also relevant to the interim governance phase: a council meeting is lawful only if more than half of the elected councillors are present, so the appointment of an acting mayor will first have to satisfy the quorum requirement.
The practical conclusion is that P. Isoda’s intention to appeal the decision is not, in itself, a sufficient argument to suspend action by the Central Electoral Commission if the legal consequence is tied to a final conviction. For professionals, it is worth distinguishing three layers: the deliberate falsification, established in the criminal case, of 37 expense summaries and reports and the unlawful receipt of almost EUR 2,500; the electoral-law consequence for the mandate; and the procedure ensuring continuity of municipal governance.
The stronger citation line is not Article 13 of the Law on Local Self-Government, but the automatic termination of the mandate described on the basis of the Electoral Code; Article 13 would be the wrong basis for explaining the Central Electoral Commission’s decision as a matter of council discretion. In civil “receipt” claims, the risk for politicians is broader than repayment of funds: the same indicators, such as payments with numerous different cards, fuel purchases during quarantine, or receipts for the wrong type of fuel, may in a criminal case become the basis for proving intent rather than an accounting error.
Core issue. The legal issue is whether a final conviction of a mayor results in the early termination of his powers, and which institution, and under what procedure, must ensure continuity in the functions of the head of the municipality. It must be assessed under Article 3(3) and (6), Article 19(1) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, Articles 13, 31 and 69 of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as the submitted provisions of the draft Electoral Code concerning decisions of the Central Electoral Commission and loss of mandate. Article 3(3) of the Law on Local Self-Government defines the mayor as the executive institution of the municipality and the head of the municipality. Accordingly, loss of the mayoral mandate is not merely a matter of personal status, but also a question of continuity of municipal executive authority. Article 19(1) of the same law provides that the mayor is elected directly for the term of office of the municipal council, and that where the mayor’s powers terminate before the expiry of that term, new mayoral elections are held. The official material submitted in relation to the amendment of the Law on Local Self-Government states that the grounds for termination of the mayor’s powers include a final conviction by a court. This situation should therefore be classified as termination of powers before the expiry of the term
Legal assessment. The appellate court’s decision is described in the report as a conviction by which P. Isoda was found guilty and was sentenced to a fine and a three-year prohibition on being elected or appointed to state and municipal institutions, bodies, enterprises and non-governmental organisations. If that conviction is final, then, according to the submitted material on the amendment of the Law on Local Self-Government, the mayor’s powers terminate not as a result of a discretionary political decision of the council, but on the basis of an autonomous legal ground. This must be distinguished from the procedure under Article 13 of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, which applies where a municipal council decides on the loss of powers of a council member or mayor for acts contrary to the Constitution or laws. Under Article 13(2)–(5), such a procedure is initiated by no fewer than one third of the council members; the submission must be in writing, reasoned, and filed within one month from the date on which the relevant ground became apparent. In the present case, the report describes not such a process initiated by the municipal council, but the consequence of a final decision of a criminal court. Article 31 of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government regulates the suspension of the mayor’s powers by court order, but that provision is relevant only to a temporary suspension regime, not to the final termination of powers following a conviction. Accordingly, interim governance after the removal of the mandate must be based on the rule in Article 19(1) of the Law on Local Self-Government, under which the mayor’s duties are temporarily performed by a council member elected by a majority vote of the council members participating in the council meeting. In this respect, the competence of the municipal council is not to annul the legal consequence of the conviction itself, but to appoint a person who will temporarily perform the duties of mayor. The draft Electoral Code material states that, in certain cases, the Central Electoral Commission adopts, within five working days, a decision recognising that a municipal council member or mayor has lost the mandate, and publishes that decision on the Commission’s website and in the Register of Legal Acts. The same material emphasises the terminological distinction between a mandate and powers: before the oath is taken, the issue is loss of mandate; after the oath is taken, it is termination of the mayor’s powers. In its ruling of 1 July 2004 in case No. 04/04, referred to in the submitted sources, the Constitutional Court explained analogous logic in relation to a member of the Seimas: an elected person who has not taken the oath does not yet have the full rights of a representative, and his powers cannot terminate because they have not yet been acquired. That case-law is relevant to this situation insofar as it substantiates the distinction between a mandate as the result of an election and powers as the body of duties exercised after the oath. Since P. Isoda held office as mayor, the practical consequence should be described as termination of the mayor’s powers, while the action of the Central Electoral Commission should be understood as formalising the legal status of the mandate in the field of electoral law. Article 69(2) of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government means that decisions of the municipal council and the mayor, adopted within their competence, are binding on the municipal administration and other entities. The appointment of an acting mayor must therefore ensure the uninterrupted implementation of binding municipal decisions
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the Central Electoral Commission adopts a decision on loss of mandate, and the Marijampolė Municipal Council, at its next meeting, elects by majority vote of the participating members a council member to temporarily perform the duties of mayor. Such an acting mayor assumes the performance of the functions of the head of the municipality, because under Article 3(3) of the Law on Local Self-Government the mayor is responsible for the direct implementation of laws, Government resolutions and municipal council decisions. The second scenario concerns the issue of new mayoral elections: Article 19(1) of the Law on Local Self-Government establishes the general rule that, where the mayor’s powers terminate before the expiry of the term, new mayoral elections are held. However, the report states that less than one year remains until the next municipal council and mayoral elections, and therefore early elections will not be organised in Marijampolė; within the limits of the submitted sources, the practical emphasis falls on the appointment of an acting mayor. The third scenario is that P. Isoda’s disagreement with the decision does not alter the rule on continuity of local self-government if the legal consequence is linked to a final conviction. For the municipality, this is practically important for the work of the administration, the implementation of council decisions and continuity in leadership functions. For council members, it is important because their vote on the acting mayor becomes the principal institutional act of local self-government after the termination of the mayor’s powers. The role of the Central Electoral Commission is practically important for formalising and publicly announcing the status of the mandate, while the role of the municipal council is to appoint a temporary head of the municipality. For other participants in the “receipt” cases, this situation is significant as an example that a criminal conviction and civil claims brought in defence of the public interest may produce different consequences: in one case, the issue concerns powers and mandate; in the other, the possible recovery of municipal funds allegedly paid without basis
Whether the public publication of a list of 66 persons, accompanied by wording that Russia “could remove” those people and that this would be “rewarded”, is merely a threatening political post, or already amounts to assisting another state in acting against the Republic of Lithuania within the meaning of Article 118 of the Criminal Code.
Article 118 of the Criminal Code criminalises conduct by a person who “assisted another state or its organisation in acting against the Republic of Lithuania” in relation to its sovereignty, territorial integrity, defence or other essential interests. Accordingly, pro-Russian or shocking content alone is not sufficient: it must be shown how the post objectively facilitated, or was intended to facilitate, another state’s action against Lithuania. In this situation, the legally significant issue is not merely an opinion about Russia’s actions, but a specific list containing the names and surnames of 66 Lithuanian citizens, linked to a proposal that Russia should “remove” them and to a promise of reward.
Articles 117 and 120 of the Criminal Code illustrate the boundary: treason requires the context of war or martial law, collaboration requires occupation or annexation, whereas Article 118 requires neither. For that reason, this qualification is practically more attractive to the prosecution. If the account operator were a foreign national without permanent residence in Lithuania, Article 6 of the Criminal Code would still allow Lithuanian criminal law to be applied to offences against the Lithuanian state provided for in Articles 114-128 of the Criminal Code.
The prosecution’s stronger argument under Article 118 would not be the threatening tone itself, but the fact that the post creates a practical list of targets or persons to be subjected to reprisals, addressed to a state described in the news item as preparing lists of military targets in the Baltic states. The strongest defence line would be to require proof of a real element of “assistance”: that the list was not merely provocative rhetoric, but had a functional connection with Russia’s, or its organisation’s, action against Lithuania’s sovereignty or defence interests. From a professional perspective, this case may turn not on whether the post is immoral or dangerous, but on the evidential threshold between public incitement and an offence against state security.
The practical risk for social media administrators is that compiling and publishing “lists”, where they are linked to the actions of a hostile state, may be assessed not as expression of opinion, but as operational assistance within the meaning of Article 118 of the Criminal Code.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether a public social media post which, in the context of Russian actions against the Baltic States, proposes compiling a list of persons to be removed from Lithuania and publishes a list of 66 Lithuanian citizens, bears the elements of the public incitement to violate the sovereignty of the Republic of Lithuania by violence under Article 122 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania and of aiding another state to act against the Republic of Lithuania under Article 118(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Under Article 122 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, criminal liability arises for anyone who publicly incites the violent violation of the sovereignty of the Republic of Lithuania, including incitement to encroach upon independence, violate territorial integrity, or commit other offences provided for in that chapter which are directed against the Lithuanian state. Under Article 118(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, criminal liability arises for anyone who assists another state or its organisation in acting against the Republic of Lithuania, its constitutional order, sovereignty, territorial integrity, defence capacity, or economic power. An additional procedural issue is what data may be collected during the pre-trial investigation and what procedural consequences may arise under Articles 98, 99, 100, 119, 120, and 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania
Legal assessment. The central considerations for the application of Article 122 of the Criminal Code in this situation are publicity, the nature of the incitement, and its connection with a violent encroachment upon the Lithuanian state. The post was published on a social network and, on the facts provided, is therefore to be assessed as a publicly disseminated text, which directly corresponds to the “publicly incited” element of Article 122 of the Criminal Code. The wording concerning a list of persons whom Russia could remove from Lithuania, and the promise of payment for “each head,” must be assessed not in isolation but together with the published video concerning Russian military targets being prepared in the Baltic States. In this factual context, the legally material question is whether the text constitutes incitement to contribute to acts that would violently encroach upon Lithuania’s sovereignty, independence, or territorial integrity, since these are precisely the interests protected by Article 122 of the Criminal Code. For Article 118(1) of the Criminal Code, the decisive issue is not merely public speech, but the fact of assisting another state or its organisation in acting against the Republic of Lithuania. The compilation and publication of a list of persons in the context of possible Russian actions against Lithuania may be investigated as potentially facilitating another state’s action against Lithuania’s sovereignty, defence capacity, or territorial integrity; however, the final legal classification depends on the evidence collected during the pre-trial investigation. The version of Article 118 set out in Article 2 of the amending law provides for stricter liability where the act is committed by taking advantage of an emergency situation, a state of emergency, or mobilisation; however, according to the information provided, the prosecutor’s office refers to the elements of Article 118(1) of the Criminal Code. The same amending law provides for the possibility of releasing from criminal liability a person who has committed an act provided for in Article 118(1) or 118(2) of the Criminal Code, if, before being recognised as a suspect, that person confessed and actively cooperated in identifying representatives of a foreign state or its organisation and their activities against the Republic of Lithuania. If material acts were committed abroad, Article 5 of the Criminal Code provides for the liability under that Code of citizens of the Republic of Lithuania and other persons permanently residing in Lithuania, while Article 6 provides for the liability of foreigners who do not have permanent residence in Lithuania for offences against the Lithuanian state provided for in Articles 114 to 128 of the Criminal Code and committed abroad. This means that, in the sources provided, the territorial application of Articles 118 and 122 of the Criminal Code is linked not only to the place where the act was committed, but also to the fact that the act was directed against the Lithuanian state. Procedurally, it is significant that, under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, objects and documents relevant to the investigation and examination of a criminal offence may be submitted not only by participants in the proceedings but by any natural or legal person. Accordingly, the post itself, the video, account administration data, the circumstances of compiling the list, and other documents or data may be relevant to the investigation, provided they are material to the elements of Articles 118 or 122 of the Criminal Code. Under Article 99 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, procedural time limits determine the time of commencement, performance, or completion of acts having procedural significance, and, in cases provided for by law, they may be set by a pre-trial investigation officer, prosecutor, judge, or court. Under Article 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, time limits are calculated in hours, days, and months, excluding the hour and day on which the time limit begins; where a time limit expires on a non-working day, the next working day is deemed to be the final day of the time limit. If, during the investigation, it becomes necessary to secure the suspect’s participation, ensure that the investigation is not obstructed, or prevent new criminal offences, Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines the purpose of remand measures, while Article 120 sets out their types, including detention, intensive supervision, house arrest, bail, seizure of documents, an obligation to register with a police authority, and a written undertaking not to leave
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is the continuation of the investigation through the collection of data as to whether the public post constituted only public incitement within the meaning of Article 122 of the Criminal Code, or also amounted to assisting another state in acting against the Republic of Lithuania under Article 118(1) of the Criminal Code. The second scenario is the specification of suspicions under one of these provisions, or under both, if the data substantiate both the elements of public incitement to violently encroach upon the state and the elements of actual assistance to another state. The third scenario is the termination of the pre-trial investigation under Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the investigation does not gather sufficient data substantiating the suspect’s guilt in the commission of a criminal offence. For the account administrator, the practical significance is the risk of criminal liability: Article 122 of the Criminal Code carries a penalty of imprisonment for up to five years, while Article 118(1), based on the version set out in Article 2 of the amending law, carries imprisonment from two to seven years. For the persons included in the list, the practical significance lies in the possibility provided by Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to submit objects and documents relevant to the investigation, if they possess data concerning the threat, dissemination of the post, or its impact. For the state and the investigating authorities, this case is significant because Articles 118 and 122 of the Criminal Code protect not the subject matter of a private dispute, but the sovereignty, territorial integrity, defence capacity, and independence of the Republic of Lithuania. The final direction of the proceedings will depend on whether the collected data allow the public text to be legally connected with a violent encroachment upon the Lithuanian state and with assistance to another state in acting against the Republic of Lithuania
Whether the issuing of prescriptions for reimbursable medical aids without assessing the patient’s condition and in the absence of medical need should be treated merely as an administrative or contractual breach, or as criminally relevant failure to perform official duties under Article 229 of the Criminal Code, where substantial pecuniary damage has been caused to the CHIF budget.
The cited Article 57 of the Code of Administrative Offences indicates the lower threshold for administrative liability: the submission of incorrect data concerning reimbursable medical aids to the National Health Insurance Fund or territorial health insurance funds gives rise to liability where damage of less than EUR 300 is caused to the CHIF budget. Article 54 of the Code of Administrative Offences separately provides for the non-performance or improper performance of duties by personal healthcare professionals and prescribes a fine of EUR 140 to EUR 300. These provisions are important not as an alternative in every case, but as a threshold: a formal breach of professional duty or minor damage to the CHIF does not, in itself, explain the application of Article 229 of the Criminal Code.
In the reported case, the criminal-law threshold is grounded precisely in the fact that six doctors prescribed aids without a medical basis, some prescriptions were issued without the patients’ knowledge, and damage exceeding EUR 330,000 was caused to the CHIF budget.
In similar cases, the stronger defence argument is now not that “the prescription was incorrect”, but that “there is no substantial damage relevant to criminal liability, nor a causal link between such damage and the actions of the particular doctor”. Prosecutorial decisions concerning 24 doctors show that breaches not involving substantial damage are left outside the scope of criminal proceedings, while in the cases of two doctors it was also material that the damage to the National Health Insurance Fund could be recovered by civil-law means from the healthcare institution linked by contractual relations. In practice, for the National Health Insurance Fund, prosecutors and defence counsel, the critical evidential issue will be not only the prescription’s non-compliance, but the individualised damage to the CHIF, the absence of the patient’s medical need, and whether civil recovery from the institution renders criminal proceedings excessive.
Bribery episodes must be assessed separately: even unlawful benefits of EUR 140 or EUR 160 resulted in court penal orders, fines and, in one case, deprivation of the right to work as a doctor for two years; accordingly, the corruption element significantly weakens the argument that the case is merely an error in the administration of reimbursement.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether physicians’ issuance of prescriptions for reimbursable medical aids without assessing the patient’s condition and medical need constitutes failure to perform official duties under Article 229 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, or merely an administrative breach of duties under Articles 54 and 57 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 229 of the Criminal Code applies where a civil servant or a person equivalent thereto, through negligence, fails to perform his or her duties or performs them improperly and, as a result, the State, a legal person, or a natural person suffers major damage. Article 54 of the Code of Administrative Offences covers the failure by professionals engaged in personal health care activities to perform, or the improper performance of, duties established by laws and other legal acts. Article 57 of the Code of Administrative Offences specifically links liability to the submission of incorrect data to the National Health Insurance Fund or territorial health insurance funds concerning reimbursable medical aids issued, where damage of less than EUR 300 is caused to the budget of the Compulsory Health Insurance Fund. A physician’s right to issue prescriptions is not an independent and unlimited discretion: point 10.2 of MN 7:2022 links it to the procedure established by Order No. 112 of the Minister of Health of 8 March 2002
Legal assessment. On the facts presented, the principal distinction between criminal and administrative liability lies in the scale of the damage and the significance of the breach of duties. In the case of six physicians, it is stated that State-reimbursed absorbent gel dressings were prescribed without assessing the patients’ health condition and medical need, causing damage of more than EUR 330,000 to the budget of the Compulsory Health Insurance Fund. This set of facts corresponds to the logical structure of Article 229 of the Criminal Code: a duty to act in accordance with the prescription-issuing procedure, improper performance of that duty, negligence, and major pecuniary damage to a State-financed fund. A physician’s right to issue a prescription under point 10.2 of MN 7:2022 also entails the duty to comply with the rules on writing prescriptions and issuing reimbursable medical aids; accordingly, a prescription issued without medical need is not, in legal terms, merely a technical error. If prescriptions were issued without the patients’ knowledge, the breach of duties is aggravated, because the basis for reimbursement of a medical aid is linked to the specific patient’s health care need. Where the breaches did not cause major damage, as stated in respect of 24 physicians, the condition for applying Article 229 of the Criminal Code relating to major damage is no longer apparent; therefore, the procedural refusal to open a pre-trial investigation is consistent with the structure of that provision. In such a case, the matter remains within the sphere of administrative liability: Article 54 of the Code of Administrative Offences for improper performance of a specialist’s duties, and Article 57 for the submission of incorrect data concerning reimbursable medical aids. The excerpt of Article 57 of the Code of Administrative Offences clearly shows a EUR 300 damage threshold; therefore, that provision is best suited to minor losses to the Compulsory Health Insurance Fund budget, rather than damage amounting to hundreds of thousands of euros. Article 59 of the Code of Administrative Offences regulates breaches of requirements concerning the safety, quality, functioning, use, and market placement of medical devices; on the facts presented, it is therefore not the principal provision for assessing the prescribing of medical aids without medical need. Article 681 of the Code of Administrative Offences concerns breaches of procedures for entering diseases, medicinal products, and medical aids on reimbursement lists; accordingly, it applies to the liability of members of commissions and appeal commissions, not to the issuance of an individual prescription by a physician. The civil recovery aspect in procedural decisions is linked to the contractual relationship between the National Health Insurance Fund and the health care institution: this explains why part of the damage may be directed against the institution as a contractual party. However, the possibility of civil recovery does not, in itself, negate Article 229 of the Criminal Code where there is major damage and improperly performed duties. As regards the termination of investigations concerning two physicians, the relevant point is the procedural assessment that there is no evidence that recovery of the damage by civil means from the health care institution has been made more difficult. The sources provided do not allow the bribery episodes to be independently classified under specific articles of the Criminal Code; therefore, their legal significance in this analysis is limited to the consequences stated in the report: fines, restrictions on the right to practise, and recovery of amounts obtained by criminal means
Consequences. In practical terms, these decisions establish a three-tier approach: prescription-related breaches causing major damage are assessed under Article 229 of the Criminal Code; cases involving lesser damage or breaches of duties may remain within Articles 54 and 57 of the Code of Administrative Offences; and compensation for damage may be pursued by civil means through the relationship between the health care institution and the National Health Insurance Fund. For physicians, the key point is that the right to issue prescriptions under point 10.2 of MN 7:2022, as well as analogous provisions of other medical standards, is linked to an established procedure and a medical basis. For health care institutions, this situation is significant because of potential liability to compensate damage caused to the Compulsory Health Insurance Fund budget where they have contractual relations with the National Health Insurance Fund. For the National Health Insurance Fund, the practical route is twofold: in criminal proceedings, to rely on the element of major damage; and where criminal liability does not apply, to seek compensation for damage by civil means. For patients, this case is important because a reimbursable medical aid is legally linked to their actual health condition and need, not merely to a formal prescription entry. In the future, similar cases are likely to be distinguished by reference to the amount of damage, the existence of a basis for issuing the prescription, and whether the data submitted to the health insurance funds were accurate. Therefore, when assessing this report on 17 July 2026, the main legal significance lies not in the nature of the reimbursable aid itself, but in the failure to perform the duty to verify medical need and in the resulting damage to the budget of the Compulsory Health Insurance Fund
Can the criminal misdemeanour under Article 259(2) of the Criminal Code for a small quantity of cannabis, although not resulting in a criminal record, constitute an independent impediment to impeccable reputation or employment?
Article 259(2) of the Criminal Code expressly provides that a person who unlawfully acquired, possessed, transported or sent a small quantity of narcotic or psychotropic substances without intent to distribute “has committed a criminal misdemeanour” and may be punished by community service, restriction of liberty, a fine or arrest. Accordingly, the legally decisive distinction is not “one joint” or the social triviality of the act, but its classification: up to the 5 grams of cannabis referred to in the article, the matter concerns a criminal misdemeanour, whereas a larger, though not yet large, quantity may, according to the explanation in the news item, already amount to a crime and entail a criminal record. Article 259(3) of the Criminal Code further shows that the legislature provides only a narrow route to exemption from liability: voluntarily seeking medical assistance or surrendering the substances to a state authority.
This weakens the argument that a small quantity should, in itself, be treated as insignificant in the context of employment law or professional reputation.
In practice, the stronger argument in regulated professions is not “there is no criminal record”, but “whether the specific special rule links the impediment specifically to a criminal misdemeanour”. Article 7(6) of the Law on the Bar, cited in the news item and explained by G. Sakalauskas, also covers intentional criminal misdemeanours; therefore, in the context of admission to the Bar, a candidate’s defence based solely on the fact that Article 259(2) of the Criminal Code does not give rise to a criminal record would be weak.
For private employers, the risk is different: if the position is not linked to impeccable reputation or lawful checking of the register, the fact of a criminal misdemeanour should not automatically be equated with a criminal record. For a professional, the key is to examine not only the penalty, but three separate matters: the classification of the act under Article 259(1) or 259(2) of the Criminal Code, whether the entry is visible in the Register of Suspects, Accused and Convicted Persons, and whether the reputation filter applicable to the specific position includes criminal misdemeanours.
Core issue. The legal issue is not whether cannabis use, in the abstract, “ruins a career,” but when unlawful possession of a small quantity of narcotic or psychotropic substances without intent to distribute gives rise to criminal liability, and when such a fact falls within the scope of special requirements of impeccable reputation. This issue is primarily determined under Article 259(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, because the review of case law states that criminal liability for the manufacture, processing, acquisition, possession, transportation, or sending of a small quantity of narcotic or psychotropic substances without intent to distribute is provided for specifically in that paragraph. At the same time, the boundary between administrative and criminal liability is significant: the same review states that administrative liability for the unlawful acquisition and possession of a small quantity without intent to sell or otherwise distribute was established in Article 44(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences, and therefore, where a small quantity and absence of intent to distribute are established, the issue arises of the dividing line between forms of liability. In the legislative materials provided, this boundary is further explained through Draft Law No. XIVP-95 amending Article 71 of the Code of Administrative Offences and supplementing it with Article 483-1, and Draft Law No. XIVP-96 amending Article 259 of the Criminal Code: the proposal to insert the words “a quantity greater than a small quantity” into Article 259(1) of the Criminal Code was assessed as redundant, because once administrative liability is provided for a small quantity, Article 259(1) of the Criminal Code would inherently cover a quantity greater than a small quantity. The issue of career restrictions is not resolved by one general rule, but by special regimes governing impeccable reputation: for example, under the Description of the Procedure for Organising Competitions for the Selection of Public Water Suppliers, persons convicted of a serious or very serious crime, or of an offence against the economy and business order, the financial system, or the civil service and public interests, are not regarded as persons of impeccable reputation; nor are persons convicted of an intentional crime if the conviction has not expired or been expunged
Legal assessment. If the “joint” referred to in the report is legally classified as the unlawful acquisition or possession of a small quantity of a narcotic or psychotropic substance without intent to distribute, then, according to the case-law review provided, Article 259(2) of the Criminal Code is relevant, rather than any reputational assessment as such. This means that what is legally significant for an employer is not the social assessment itself, but the specific procedural and substantive outcome: what conduct has been established, whether it is criminal or administrative, whether there is a conviction, and whether the law links the specific position to impeccable reputation. The special regimes are not uniform: Article 61 proposed in Draft Law No. XIVP-2990 on the Fundamentals of Youth Policy imposes qualification and impeccable reputation requirements on youth workers, and loss of impeccable reputation is linked, among other things, to a final conviction for sexual offences and other intentional serious or very serious crimes. Therefore, a situation falling under Article 259(2) of the Criminal Code, insofar as the sources provided describe it as possession of a small quantity without intent to distribute, cannot be mechanically equated with a reputational impediment under every special law. On the contrary, the reputation rule in the description governing competitions for public water suppliers shows a differentiated model: serious and very serious crimes, as well as offences in certain fields, are relevant irrespective of whether the conviction has expired, whereas other intentional crimes are relevant where the conviction has not expired or been expunged. In Draft Law No. XIVP-3358(3) amending the Law on Gambling No. IX-325, reputation criteria are also linked to the gravity and field of the offence and to the period following expiry or expungement of the conviction: an eight-year threshold is mentioned for serious or very serious crimes, and a five-year threshold for minor or less serious crimes in certain fields. This is important because special regulation generally does not allow an employer to extend a reputation criterion beyond what is expressly established in that regime. In the civil service context, the source provided concerning draft laws supplementing the Law on the Civil Service with Article 3-1 shows that the proposed criterion relating to abuse of alcohol, narcotic, toxic, or psychotropic substances raised the question of the procedure and documents by which such a fact would be established. This means that a mere everyday or employer assumption about use is not the same as a reputational impediment established by legislation. In the area of financial markets and credit unions, institutional competence is also formalised: under Article 8 of the Law on Central Credit Unions, authorisation to establish a central credit union is issued by the supervisory authority, which examines the documents within three months and may refuse authorisation if the documents do not comply with the requirements of the law or legal acts of the supervisory authority, if not all data have been submitted, or if the data are incorrect. Article 43(2) and (5) of the Law on the Bank of Lithuania indicate another important limitation: information obtained for financial-market supervision purposes may not be publicly disclosed or transmitted, and the Bank of Lithuania may use it only in performing its assigned functions, including checking compliance with legal acts and applying enforcement measures. Accordingly, even where the reputation of a candidate or manager is relevant for licensing or supervision, the use of data is procedurally limited. Paragraph 3 of the Rules on the Production of Hemp Products establishes, in another field, that only legal persons of impeccable reputation that have premises and have obtained authorisation may conduct such activity where, during production, intermediate products are formed in which the THC content exceeds the 0.2 percent threshold. This regulation is relevant not to ordinary employee recruitment, but to permitted economic activity, where reputation and authorisation become conditions for commencing activity. The wording of the case-law review concerning Article 259(2) of the Criminal Code and Article 44(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences in similar situations emphasises not moral assessment, but the classification boundary between administrative and criminal liability where a small quantity is established and there is no intent to distribute
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is that possession of a small quantity without intent to distribute is classified under Article 259(2) of the Criminal Code, and the consequences in the labour market depend on whether a special requirement of impeccable reputation applies to the particular position. The second scenario is a special sector in which reputation is defined more strictly: in the regulation of public water suppliers, gambling, youth work, financial supervision, or hemp-product production, what becomes decisive is not the employer’s general beliefs, but the precise criteria set out in the law or description. The third scenario is institutional verification, where a supervisory authority or authorising body assesses the submitted data within its competence; under Article 8 of the Law on Central Credit Unions, such assessment has a clear three-month decision period in the case of authorisation to establish a central credit union. The fourth scenario is restriction of information: under Article 43 of the Law on the Bank of Lithuania, data obtained for supervisory purposes are not freely published or transmitted, and therefore a reputation check cannot turn into uncontrolled dissemination of information. For an employee or candidate, the key point is that a single cannabis-related fact may have different legal consequences in different fields: in some, it will be relevant only as a matter of criminal liability; in others, as an impediment to authorisation, reputation, or holding a position. For an employer, it is important to distinguish precisely between lawful application of special requirements and excessive data collection or reputational assessment without a clear normative basis. The legally sustainable conclusion is this: a “joint” may affect a career not in itself, but only through the specific classification of the conduct under Article 259(2) of the Criminal Code and through the rules on impeccable reputation, authorisations, or supervisory procedures established in special legislation
Does the sale of a PlayStation digital game as a licence allow the trader subsequently to restrict access in such a way that the consumer’s protection is confined to the licence terms, rather than the consequences for failure to supply digital content provided for in the Civil Code?
Article 6.22822 of the Civil Code provides that, where a trader fails to perform the obligation to supply digital content or a digital service, the consumer must first require the content to be supplied and, if it is not supplied without undue delay or within an expressly agreed additional period, may unilaterally terminate the contract. The same provision permits immediate termination where the trader has stated, or it is clear from the circumstances, that the content will not be supplied. Article 6.22823 of the Civil Code links such termination to reimbursement: all sums paid must be refunded or, where the content was supplied for a certain period, a proportionate part of the price must be refunded for the period during which the content was not of proper quality or for the remaining period during which it was not supplied.
Accordingly, the wording “the purchaser acquires a licence” does not in itself extinguish the consumer’s claim for the supply of the content, if the actual economic substance of the transaction was access to a specific game.
The stronger argument would not be abstract rhetoric about “ownership of the game”, but rather that the digital model brings the dispute within the regime of Articles 6.22822 and 6.22823 of the Civil Code: whether the access promised to the consumer was in fact supplied. The greatest risk for Sony or a distributor would lie in standard terms allowing unilateral termination or restriction of access without a clear consumer right to restoration, termination or a refund, because the cited rule on unfair terms presumes unfairness where the consumer’s rights are improperly restricted following the trader’s failure to perform its obligations, or where the trader’s performance depends solely on its own will. In practice, the assessment should cover not only the abandonment of discs, but also the sales screen, account rules and contract confirmation text: whether they clearly state what is being purchased, how long access remains valid, when it may be restricted and what refund procedure applies.
Article 6.22812 of the Civil Code is additionally important for immediate downloads, because the loss of the right of withdrawal must be based on the consumer’s prior express consent and acknowledgement in the contract confirmation; therefore, the mere technical start of a “download” should not be regarded as sufficient if those elements were not clearly recorded.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether, by offering a consumer digital access under a licence instead of a physical PlayStation game disc, the trader ensures the quality and availability of the digital content, clear contractual terms, and remedies for the consumer. It should primarily be assessed under Article 6.22819 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, which sets out quality requirements for digital content and digital services, and Article 6.22822 of the Civil Code, which regulates consumer rights in cases of non-supply or lack of conformity. The consumer’s rights to information, choice and redress should be assessed under Articles 3 and 20 of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection of the Republic of Lithuania. The limits of licensing terms are relevant under the rule on unfair terms in consumer contracts set out in Article 4 of the Law Amending and Supplementing the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania. The issue of ownership and restrictions on it should be assessed under Article 4.39 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, while the intellectual property protection context should be assessed under Article 1.53 of the Civil Code and paragraph 18 of the Strategy for the Digitisation of Lithuanian Cultural Heritage, Preservation of Digital Content and Access
Legal assessment. Under the cited provisions, a digital game is, in relation to the consumer, digital content or a digital service, and the trader must therefore supply it as provided for in the contract: under Article 6.22819(2) of the Civil Code, it must correspond to the description, quantity, quality, functionality, compatibility, interoperability and other characteristics provided for in the contract. If, at the time of purchase, the consumer is promised long-term access, downloading, operation on a specific console, updates or support, those elements become legally relevant under points 1, 3 and 4 of Article 6.22819(2) of the Civil Code. Under point 1 of paragraph 3 of the same article, the content must also be fit for the purposes for which digital content of the same type is normally used; therefore, the mere use of the term “licence” does not in itself remove the obligation to provide a game that can actually be used. Article 3(1)(3) of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection gives the consumer the right to receive correct and comprehensive information in the state language about goods sold and services provided, and therefore terms concerning account blocking, duration of access, removal of content, download restrictions or updates must be presented clearly. Under Article 3(1)(2) of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection, the consumer has the right to goods or services of appropriate quality, while Article 3(1)(9) protects the consumer’s economic interests. If a licence provided that the consumer must perform the contract while the trader’s obligation to grant access depended solely on the trader’s own discretion, such a term would fall within the logic of terms presumed to be unfair under Article 4 of the Law Amending and Supplementing the Civil Code. Points 2, 3 and 6 of paragraph 2 of that article are particularly relevant: they presume unfairness where the consumer’s rights are improperly limited in the event of the trader’s non-performance, where the trader’s obligation depends solely on its own will, or where the trader is granted a unilateral right of termination without an equivalent right for the consumer. If the digital game is no longer supplied, Article 6.22822(1) of the Civil Code provides for the consumer’s first course of action: to require the trader to supply the digital content or service. If, following such a request, the content is not supplied without undue delay or within an additional period expressly agreed, the consumer has the right to terminate the contract unilaterally. Under Article 6.22822(2) of the Civil Code, the consumer may terminate the contract immediately if the trader has declared, or it is clear from the circumstances, that the trader will not supply the content, or if the agreed time of supply was of essential importance to the consumer and was not complied with. A physical disc and a digital licence are not identical from the perspective of consumer control, but Article 4.39(1) of the Civil Code permits ownership rights to be restricted by the owner’s will, by law or by a court decision. Paragraph 2 of the same article is important in the event of a dispute: where there is doubt as to a restriction of ownership rights, ownership is deemed not to be restricted. From the perspective of intellectual property, Article 1.53(1) of the Civil Code provides that the law of the state in which protection of those rights is sought applies to intellectual property rights and their enforcement. Paragraph 18 of the Strategy on the Preservation of and Access to Digital Content confirms the general principle that works or objects of related rights may be reproduced and communicated to the public only with the permission of the rights holder, except in cases provided for by law. Accordingly, the consumer’s right to use the game must be reconciled with the permissions of rights holders, but that does not eliminate the trader’s obligations under the consumer contract. Article 31 of the Law on Electronic Communications of the Republic of Lithuania, as presented in the text, regulates conditional access systems for digital radio and television services, and therefore does not directly resolve the issue of PlayStation game licences. The case law provided contains no direct case concerning digital games; the ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 31 May 2006, referred to in the concept of the Law on Services of the Republic of Lithuania, relates to principles governing the regulation of economic activity, but it is not necessary to derive a specific rule for this dispute from the text provided
Consequences. In practical terms, Sony or another trader, when expanding digital distribution, should clearly define what the consumer acquires: unlimited or time-limited access, a download right, use tied to account terms, or another model for supplying digital content. If the access granted to the consumer operates as described in the contract, and the terms concerning restrictions were clearly presented, no principal legal dispute would arise under the cited provisions merely because a physical disc was replaced by a digital format. If access is withdrawn, the game is not supplied, or its use is restricted in breach of the contract, the consumer may rely on Article 6.22822 of the Civil Code and first require the content to be supplied, and, in the prescribed cases, terminate the contract. If the contractual terms allowed the trader, at its discretion, to withdraw access, refuse refunds or avoid liability for improper supply, their assessment would move into the field of unfair terms in consumer contracts under Article 4 of the Law Amending and Supplementing the Civil Code. The consumer could defend their rights by applying to the seller or service provider, to an out-of-court consumer dispute resolution body, or to a court under Article 20(1) of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection. The episode involving the executive’s sale of shares is not, under the cited provisions, an independent infringement of consumer rights; what would be legally relevant is not the fact of the share disposal itself, but whether the digital content sold to consumers conforms to the contract and whether their rights are not unfairly restricted
The specific issue is not merely whether the violence in Marijampolė Poetry Park satisfies the elements of a breach of public order, but whether the twelve-year-old suspect can be a subject of criminal liability at all under the Criminal Code. This is particularly important because reports refer to several dozen blows with hands, feet and a telephone, public filming, and the dissemination of the recording on social media; however, age may preclude criminal liability irrespective of the brutality of the act.
Article 13(1) of the Criminal Code establishes the general rule that a person is liable under criminal law from the age of 16, while Article 13(2) permits liability from the age of 14 only for exhaustively listed offences. Breach of public order is not included in that list of exceptions applicable from the age of 14; therefore, on the facts presented, a twelve-year-old cannot be held criminally liable. In such a case, Article 13(3) of the Criminal Code points not to punishment, but to educational measures or other measures provided for by law.
The juvenile liability regime under Articles 80, 90, 91 and 93 of the Criminal Code is relevant only where the minor is already a subject of criminal liability; in the case of a twelve-year-old, the age threshold applies first.
The article’s statement that the investigation is being conducted into a breach of public order is incomplete if it gives readers the impression that this automatically entails the twelve-year-old’s criminal liability. The wording of Article 284 of the Criminal Code links this offence to a public place, brazen conduct, taunting or threats, the demonstration of disrespect towards others or the environment, and the disturbance of public peace or order. A more precise formulation would be: a pre-trial investigation has been opened into a possible offence under Article 284 of the Criminal Code in relation to the circumstances of public violence, but the question of the twelve-year-old’s criminal liability is limited by the age threshold set out in Article 13 of the Criminal Code.
It is also not stated that classifying the violence as a public-order offence does not, of itself, resolve the assessment of other potentially legally significant consequences, particularly where the victim was taken to a medical facility after the incident.
In practice, the stronger argument at this stage is not that “brutality means criminal liability”, but the age limit in Article 13 of the Criminal Code: criminal liability is not possible in respect of a twelve-year-old, even if the incident is being investigated as a possible breach of Article 284 of the Criminal Code. For professionals, it is worth citing Article 13(1)–(3) specifically and distinguishing the procedural fact that an investigation has been opened from the substantive criminal-law question of who may be punished under the Criminal Code. The risk for journalists and commentators is prematurely to personalise the “suspect’s” criminal liability when the actual legal route for a twelve-year-old may be educational measures or other non-criminal measures.
For law enforcement, it is practically important to record not only the blows and the public location, but also the age and conduct of each participant, because filming, encouragement or participation by older persons may have a different legal significance from the conduct of the twelve-year-old.
Core issue. The precise legal question is what minimal or medium supervision measures may be applied to a twelve-year-old who, according to the report, used violence against a minor, and what institutional procedure applies where the child has not yet reached the age of criminal liability. This question is governed by Articles 4, 7, 10, 12, 17 and 18 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Minimal and Medium Supervision of the Child, as well as Article 43 of the Republic of Lithuania Code of Administrative Offences. The key provision is Article 10(1)(1) of the Law on Minimal and Medium Supervision of the Child: minimal supervision measures may be imposed on a child who has committed an act bearing the characteristics of a crime or criminal misdemeanour, but who, at the time of the act, had not reached the age of criminal liability established in the Criminal Code. The Concept Paper on the Law on Minimal and Medium Supervision of Minors states that, under Article 13(3) of the Criminal Code, a person who had not reached the age of 14 before committing a dangerous act may, in accordance with the procedure established by law, be subject to educational or other measures. Therefore, in relation to the twelve-year-old, the legal focus under the sources provided is not punishment, but the mechanism of minimal supervision, or, in exceptional cases, medium supervision, intended to correct the child’s behaviour
Legal assessment. The conduct described, namely several dozen blows with hands, feet and a telephone to the head and body, is legally relevant under Article 10(1)(1) of the Law on Minimal and Medium Supervision of the Child if it is assessed as an act bearing the characteristics of a crime or criminal misdemeanour. Since the alleged perpetrator is stated to be twelve years old, the most relevant basis under the applicable regulation is the imposition of minimal supervision rather than ordinary criminal liability. Article 4 of the Law on Minimal and Medium Supervision of the Child requires every decision to be based on the priority of the best interests of the child, the hearing of the child, individualisation and respectful treatment of the child during the process. This means that even in a case of highly dangerous violence, the authorities must assess not only the seriousness of the act, but also the child’s age, maturity, mental and physical characteristics, needs and social environment. According to the Concept Paper provided, minimal supervision measures may include the work of a social worker, social pedagogue or curator at the child’s place of residence, psychological, pedagogical and social assistance, individual programmes, counselling, therapy, development of social skills or other alternative activities. Under the definition set out in points 4-5 of the Concept Paper, the essence of these measures is to achieve positive changes in the minor’s behaviour, and minimal supervision is generally carried out without separating the child from the family or guardians. Procedurally, under Article 12(1) of the Law on Minimal and Medium Supervision of the Child, applications for the imposition of measures, insofar as not regulated by that law itself, are submitted and examined in accordance with the procedure established by the Law on Public Administration. Under Article 12(2)(1) of the same law, an interinstitutional cooperation coordinator, the child’s legal representatives, a territorial police authority, a school, an eldership, a prosecutor, a court, and an authority examining an administrative offence case out of court may apply to the mayor of the municipality of the child’s permanent place of residence regarding minimal supervision. In this situation, the practically significant point is that the police, the prosecutor, the school or the child’s legal representatives may apply; therefore, the opening of a pre-trial investigation does not preclude the initiation of child supervision measures. If medium rather than minimal supervision were considered, Article 7(2) of the Law on Minimal and Medium Supervision of the Child sets a stricter threshold: it may be imposed on a child who has reached the age of 14, while for a child under 14 it may be imposed only in exceptional cases where the child’s behaviour poses a real danger to his or her own life, health or property or to that of other persons. Article 7(1) of the same law also sets time limits: a medium supervision measure may be imposed for up to one year and extended in accordance with the procedure established by law, but the total period of stay in a child socialisation centre may not exceed three years and may not continue beyond the child reaching the age of 18. If minimal supervision measures are imposed on a child, Article 17(1) provides that the child retains the right to education, a safe educational environment, qualified educational, social, health-care and other assistance, as well as the right to submit requests or complaints to the municipal mayor, the case manager, the interinstitutional cooperation coordinator, child rights protection authorities, law-enforcement authorities and other institutions. At the same time, Article 17(2) obliges the child to comply with the imposed measures, participate in the preparation of the individual plan for implementing minimal supervision, respect other children and adults, refrain from violating their rights, and observe generally accepted standards of conduct. Under Article 18(1), the child’s legal representatives have the right to receive information about the child’s education, progress, attendance and behaviour, as well as the implementation of the imposed measures. However, under Article 18(2), they must participate in preparing and implementing the individual plan for the child’s minimal supervision measure, participate in the implementation of the measures and provide the necessary information to the coordinating institutions. Article 43(2) of the Code of Administrative Offences reflects the same individualisation approach in juvenile cases: when imposing impact measures, it is necessary to take account of age, personality, living conditions and upbringing. Article 43(3) also allows a court or an authority examining an administrative offence case out of court to refrain from imposing an administrative penalty and an administrative impact measure, and instead to apply for minimal or medium supervision of the child. As regards the young people who were present and filming, the sources provided allow assessment only of the supervision and individualisation aspects concerning minors, not their separate criminal classification
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the data from the pre-trial investigation become the basis for the police, prosecutor, school or another entity specified in Article 12 to apply to the municipal mayor for the imposition of minimal supervision measures on the twelve-year-old. In that case, the practical focus would fall on an individual plan, educational, social, psychological and health-care assistance, while the child’s legal representatives would assume the duties of participation and provision of information established in Article 18. The second scenario is that, if the authorities assessed that the child’s behaviour poses a real danger to the health of other persons, medium supervision under Article 7(2) would be considered, although for a child under 14 it is possible only exceptionally. The third scenario is that, if the case file contained administrative offence aspects concerning other minors, Article 43 of the Code of Administrative Offences would allow account to be taken of their age, personality, living conditions and upbringing and, where appropriate, an application to be made for minimal or medium supervision instead of an administrative penalty. For the victim, this course is practically important because the principles of dignity and the best interests of the child under Article 4 require the safeguarding of physical and mental integrity, while Article 17(1) emphasises the child’s right to be educated in a safe environment. For the suspect’s family, this is important because, under the regulation provided, the process is not exhausted by a law-enforcement investigation: it may become the implementation of supervision measures coordinated by the municipality, in which passivity by parents or guardians is incompatible with Article 18(2). For the school and the municipality, this is important as a situation requiring an interinstitutional response, because Article 12 gives several entities the right to initiate measures, while Article 4 requires decisions to be based on an individual assessment of the child’s needs and risks. The ultimate legal course under the sources provided would depend on whether minimal supervision in the community or exceptional medium supervision is chosen, but in both cases the purpose of the measures is not public condemnation, but a legally managed change in the child’s behaviour and the safeguarding of other children’s safety
Is the violence used against a minor in Marijampolė Poetry Park properly classified under Article 284 of the Criminal Code as a breach of public order, where the facts also indicate individual violence against a specific child victim?
Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code applies where, in a public place, disrespect for others or the surroundings is demonstrated through insolent acts, threats or mockery, and public peace or order is disturbed; the sanction extends to imprisonment for up to two years. This provision explains why the prosecutor’s office may have opened the investigation specifically under Article 284: the attack took place in a public park, in the presence of a group of people, was filmed, and the violent footage spread on social media that same evening. However, Article 284 does not displace the assessment of individual violence, since the initial information indicates several dozen blows with hands, feet and a phone, after which the victim was taken to a medical facility.
Article 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure indicates that, in relation to Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code, a pre-trial investigation is generally linked to a complaint by the victim, an application by a legal representative, or a prosecutor’s request; the news report states that the minor’s relatives contacted law enforcement, so no procedural obstacle to assessing the individual violent episode is apparent from the facts provided. Article 80 of the Criminal Code is relevant not to classification, but to consequences: if the perpetrator is a minor, liability must be aligned with age, social maturity and educational measures, meaning that the public demand to “punish her like an adult” is not compatible with the model of juvenile liability described.
At this stage, the stronger initial argument for law enforcement is not that the incident is “only” a breach of public order, but that Article 284 of the Criminal Code allows the public display of violence, the group’s reaction and the disturbance of public peace to be captured as an independent object of criminal-law protection. The weak point would be to leave the classification solely under Article 284 if medical evidence and the victim’s testimony confirmed physical pain or impairment of health under a violent-offence provision, because public order would then fail to address the principal harm caused to the specific child. For practitioners, this case shows that two issues must be distinguished: the public scene of violence and its filming support Article 284, while the number of blows, the means used and the fact of attendance at a medical facility must be examined as a separate episode of violence against a person.
In public communications, it would be a mistake to claim that a request not to publish minors’ faces amounts to “concealing” the case: on the facts provided, it does not alter the criminal classification, but it reduces additional harm to children and does not prevent law enforcement from collecting evidence stored on phones.
Core issue. The precise question is whether the violent acts committed against a minor in a public place, Marijampolė Poetry Park, on 15 July 2026, while being observed and filmed by a group of persons, satisfy the elements of the offence of disturbance of public order under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. This provision requires three essential elements: conduct in a public place; insolent acts, threats, mockery, or acts of vandalism demonstrating disrespect for others or for the environment; and the consequence, namely a disturbance of public peace or order. The question also has a procedural aspect: under Article 167(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, certain acts are investigated only upon receipt of a complaint from the victim or an application by the victim’s legal representative, but Article 284 of the Criminal Code is not included in that list. Therefore, proceedings for disturbance of public order are not dependent solely on the private initiative of the victim. Since the report states that the minors involved in the conflict have been identified, Article 80 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania is also relevant; under that provision, juvenile liability must correspond to the minor’s age and social maturity, restrict the use of imprisonment, and expand the availability of educational measures. Procedurally, Article 1891(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is important, as it requires the authorities, immediately after the first questioning of a minor suspect, to apply for an individual assessment. Accordingly, the legal assessment cannot be confined to public outrage or the dissemination of the recording: it is necessary to determine whether the specific act caused the disturbance of public peace or order referred to in Article 284 of the Criminal Code, and how the proceedings must be conducted where both the victim and potential participants in the proceedings are minors
Legal assessment. The initial information that the victim was struck several dozen times with hands, feet, and a telephone in a public park may, under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code as presented, legally be assessed as insolent acts in a public place. For the offence of disturbance of public order, the decisive issue is not merely that the violence was directed against a specific person, but also whether such acts demonstrated disrespect for others or for the environment and disturbed public peace or order. In this respect, it is relevant that the incident took place in a park, in the presence of and under observation by a group of persons, and that the violence was filmed and disseminated on social networks that same evening. The legislative opinion on Draft Law No. XIIIP-988(2) amending Article 310 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania states that, in case-law, filming or photographing a criminal act in the victim’s presence is recognised as an indicator disturbing public peace and order, or as an indicator of hooligan motives or of an especially cruel or tormenting nature. The same opinion emphasises that insolent acts or malicious mockery in a public place, where disrespect for others or for the environment is demonstrated and public peace or order is disturbed, constitute the disturbance of public order referred to in Article 284 of the Criminal Code. Therefore, the initial classification by law enforcement under Article 284 of the Criminal Code does not in itself mean that the violence is regarded as insignificant: this provision covers public aggressive conduct whose consequences go beyond the limits of a private conflict involving only the victim. At the same time, the sanction under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code provides for community service, a fine, restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment for up to two years, and therefore this is not merely an administrative or disciplinary response. According to the report, the proceedings were initiated by the prosecutor’s office, and the investigation is being conducted by officers of the Marijampolė County Chief Police Commissariat; this is consistent with the structure of Article 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because Article 284 of the Criminal Code is not among the acts requiring a victim’s complaint. The application by the victim’s relatives remains procedurally relevant as a source of information, but the initiation of an investigation under Article 284 of the Criminal Code is not limited solely to the existence of such an application. Under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, video recordings and photographs may be submitted by any natural or legal person as objects or documents relevant to the investigation and examination of a criminal act. Therefore, the police request not to disseminate the images publicly is not inconsistent with their use in the proceedings: relevant material should be transmitted to the investigation, not multiplied on social networks. If temporary detention were applied during the proceedings, Article 140(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits the detention of a person caught in the act of committing a criminal offence or immediately thereafter, while Article 140(4) provides that temporary detention may not last longer than necessary and, in any event, may not exceed forty-eight hours. Measures of restraint under Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may be imposed to secure participation in the proceedings, the unobstructed conduct of the investigation and trial, and the prevention of new criminal acts, while Article 120(2) also provides, in the case of a minor, for placement under the supervision of parents, guardians, or other persons caring for children. After the first questioning of a minor suspect, Article 1891(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires an immediate application to the state child rights protection authority for an individual assessment, which must be provided no later than within twenty-five working days of receipt of the application. If the case reaches court, Article 272(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits a psychologist and a representative of the state child rights protection authority to be invited to participate in the questioning of a minor accused
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the investigation continues under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code: video recordings are collected, participants and observers are questioned, and an assessment is made as to whether the public violence, filming, and reactions of those present amounted to a disturbance of public peace or order. The second scenario is that, once the evidence has been gathered, the pre-trial investigation may be terminated on the grounds set out in Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for example if insufficient evidence is collected to substantiate the suspect’s guilt in committing a criminal act. The third scenario is that, if the case is referred to court and guilt is established, the penalties available under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code range from community service or a fine to imprisonment for up to two years; however, in the case of minors, Article 80 of the Criminal Code requires liability to be aligned with age, social maturity, and the possibilities for educational measures. For the victim, it is practically important that the proceedings may cover not only the determination of guilt but also the issue of damage: Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that, in cases established by law, damage may be compensated from state funds if the accused or the persons materially liable for the accused’s actions lack the funds to compensate the damage. For persons who filmed the violence or possess recordings, Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is practically important: the content should be provided to the investigation as potential evidence, rather than used for the public exposure of minors’ identities. For parents and guardians, it is important that a minor’s procedural status may entail an individual assessment, special guarantees during questioning, and measures of restraint adapted to minors. Public outrage may explain the public significance of the incident, but the procedural outcome will be determined by proof of the elements of Article 284 of the Criminal Code and by the procedure established in the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning investigation, time limits, evidence, and the protection of minors
Whether a dozen or so blows inflicted on a minor in a public park, while other young people nearby filmed the incident, should be classified primarily as a breach of public order under Article 284 of the Criminal Code, or as an offence against human health under Article 140 or Article 138 of the Criminal Code, depending on the medically established extent of the injury.
Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code requires not merely violence in a public place, but also that disrespect for those present or for the surrounding environment be demonstrated through brazen conduct, threats, bullying or vandalism, and that public peace or order be disturbed. In this situation, the strongest argument for Article 284 is not the motive related to social media comments itself, but the public context of Poetry Park, the dozen or so blows with hands, feet and a telephone, and the fact that other persons observed and filmed the incident. Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code covers beating or other violence causing physical pain or minor injury, while Article 138 applies only where a non-minor impairment of health is established, for example prolonged illness or a minor loss of working capacity.
Under Article 141 of the Criminal Code, the elements of these impairments of health are determined by the rules for assessing the extent of health impairment; therefore, the likelihood of reclassification mentioned by the prosecutor will in practice depend on the medical conclusion, not on the emotional impression created by the video recording.
At present, classification under Article 284 of the Criminal Code appears procedurally stronger, because the investigation does not yet have evidence of more serious injuries, but it does have facts relating to a public place, demonstrative violence and the involvement of bystanders. For the defence, it would be rational to narrow the case to an interpersonal conflict arising from comments on a social network, as this would weaken the element of disturbance of public peace; however, that argument is complicated by the filming and the subsequent spread of the incident in the public sphere. For the victim’s side, the key point is not to assert “serious” injuries, but to ensure an accurate medical classification in line with the logic of Article 141 of the Criminal Code, because it is precisely that classification which may move the case from Article 284 into the scope of Article 140 or Article 138, or justify an additional classification.
Separately significant is the fact that the girl alleged to have committed the violence is stated to have been born in 2012: under the cited Article 80 of the Criminal Code, juvenile liability requires an assessment of age and social maturity, while imprisonment must be restricted by expanding the possibilities for applying educational measures.
Core issue. The precise issue is not merely “who started the conflict”, but whether violence in a public park in Marijampolė, observed and filmed by other persons, should be classified under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania as a breach of public order, under Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code as causing physical pain or a minor impairment of health, or, if more serious consequences are established, under Article 138 of the Criminal Code as a non-serious impairment of health. Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code requires a public place, brazen conduct, a demonstration of disrespect towards others or the environment, and a disturbance of public peace or order. Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code applies to a person who, by beating or otherwise using violence, caused physical pain or slightly injured or briefly caused illness to another person. Article 138(1) of the Criminal Code is relevant only where, as a result of the injury, the victim lost a small part of working capacity or was ill for a prolonged period. Since it is stated that the girl who allegedly used violence was born in 2012, the model of liability must additionally be assessed under Article 80 of the Criminal Code, Article 189¹ of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and Article 87 of the Criminal Code
Legal assessment. The initial classification under Article 284 of the Criminal Code appears legally explicable by the fact that the violence occurred in Poetry Park, in the presence and view of several young people, and the conduct is described as involving numerous blows with hands, feet, and a telephone. A public place and physical violence do not in themselves complete the elements of Article 284 of the Criminal Code; accordingly, the investigation will have to establish whether such brazen conduct demonstrated disrespect towards others or the environment and actually disturbed public peace or order. The cited source concerning the draft amendment to Article 310 of the Criminal Code is important from a systemic perspective: it states that the filming of criminal acts in the victim’s presence has been recognised in case-law as conduct, or as indicia, disturbing public peace and order, demonstrating hooligan motives, or showing a particularly cruel character. Therefore, the fact that persons nearby observed and filmed the incident, and that the recording spread on social media, may be significant not as an independent moral detail, but as part of the proof of the elements of Article 284 of the Criminal Code. At the same time, physical violence against a specific victim may also satisfy the elements of Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code if the causing of physical pain, slight injury, or a brief illness is confirmed. According to the excerpt from the Government report provided, forensic medical experts draw a conclusion on the causing of physical pain on the basis of case materials confirming the fact of beating or other violence, while minor impairment of health is linked to a health impairment lasting no longer than 10 days or a 5 per cent loss of working capacity. If medical data showed prolonged illness or the loss of a small part of working capacity, the axis of classification could shift to Article 138(1) of the Criminal Code. If the circumstances referred to in Article 138(2) of the Criminal Code were established, for example acting with hooligan motives or by torture or otherwise with particular cruelty, they would be relevant to classification under the more serious paragraph of that article. As regards Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code, Article 167(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a pre-trial investigation is initiated only upon the victim’s complaint or the statement of a lawful representative, and the report provided states that the girl’s relatives contacted law enforcement authorities. The same Article 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows an investigation to be initiated upon a prosecutor’s request where the act is of public significance or where harm has been caused to a person who, for important reasons, is unable to defend his or her interests. Article 284 of the Criminal Code is not included in the list in Article 167(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure; therefore, from the perspective of that specific provision, an investigation into a breach of public order is not linked to the condition of a victim’s complaint. According to the report, the pre-trial investigation is being conducted by police investigators, while the prosecutor organises and supervises it; such a procedural situation is consistent with the fact that the investigation is still establishing the number of blows, the extent of the injuries, and the role of other participants. If the minor were questioned as a suspect, Article 189¹(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure would require the officer or prosecutor to apply immediately to the child rights protection authority for an individual assessment. Under the same provision, the pedagogical psychological service must provide data within ten working days, and the individual assessment must be carried out and submitted in writing no later than twenty-five working days from receipt of the request. Article 80 of the Criminal Code requires that juvenile liability correspond to the juvenile’s age and social maturity, limit deprivation of liberty, and increase the possibilities for applying educational measures. One such measure is the restriction of conduct provided for in Article 87 of the Criminal Code, lasting from thirty days to twelve months, including an obligation to be at home at specified times, to study, to participate in social education or rehabilitation measures, or a prohibition on associating with persons exerting a negative influence. Temporary detention, if it were considered at all, could not under Article 140 of the Code of Criminal Procedure last longer than necessary to establish identity and carry out procedural acts, with the maximum period being forty-eight hours
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the classification remains under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code if the investigation confirms the totality of a public place, brazen conduct, a demonstration of disrespect, and disturbance of public peace or order. The second scenario is an additional or alternative assessment under Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code if the medical and other case data confirm physical pain or a minor impairment of health, but not consequences of the degree required by Article 138 of the Criminal Code. The third scenario is reclassification under Article 138 of the Criminal Code if prolonged illness or the loss of a small part of working capacity is established. The practical significance for the victim and her relatives is that their referral is especially important if the act is assessed under Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code, for which Article 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure links the initiation of an investigation to a complaint, a statement by a lawful representative, or a prosecutor’s request. The practical significance for the suspected minor is that, even where there is a basis for criminal proceedings, the objective of juvenile liability enshrined in Article 80 of the Criminal Code applies, while Article 189¹ of the Code of Criminal Procedure introduces a mandatory individual assessment procedure. For the other young people present at the scene, it is important that the investigation may assess not only the person who delivered the blows, but also the conduct of each participant, especially if observing, filming, or other behaviour is relevant to the elements of Article 284 of the Criminal Code. The ultimate direction of the case will depend not on the cause of the conflict that arose on social media, but on the established extent of the injuries, the indicia of disturbance of public order, the procedural assessment of the minors, and the prosecutor’s decision on the legal classification
Whether several dozen blows inflicted on a minor in a public park, where the incident is observed, filmed and disseminated on social media, should at this stage more properly be classified as a breach of public order under Article 284 of the Criminal Code, or as causing physical pain or a minor health impairment under Article 140 of the Criminal Code.
Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code requires not merely violence in a public place, but brazen acts demonstrating disrespect for others or the surrounding environment and disturbing public peace or order. Poetry Park is a public place, and several dozen blows delivered with hands, feet and a telephone, in the presence of bystanders and with the video recording spreading, specifically strengthens the element of disturbance of public order. Accordingly, an initial investigative direction under Article 284 of the Criminal Code is not a formal error.
At the same time, Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code covers beating or other violent conduct causing physical pain, minor injury or short-term illness; this is directly connected to the report that the victim felt unwell after the incident and was taken to a medical facility. The aggravated offence under Article 140(2) of the Criminal Code is not yet apparent on the basis of the text provided, because the provision refers to a young child or torture, while the news report mentions only a minor, not her precise age.
The stronger initial argument at present is that there is a dual field of possible classification: Article 284 of the Criminal Code supports the public and demonstrative nature of the violence, while Article 140 of the Criminal Code will depend on medical evidence concerning physical pain, minor health impairment or short-term illness. For a professional audience, it is important not to stop at the formulation “breach of public order”, because medical facility records may shift the centre of gravity of the case towards offences against human health. As regards the persons who filmed the incident, mere presence nearby or making a recording does not in itself constitute complicity under Article 26 of the Criminal Code: it must be proved that their intent covered the perpetrator’s conduct and that they acted as organisers, instigators or accessories.
However, the fact of filming and public dissemination may itself be relevant to the constituent elements of Article 284 of the Criminal Code, because it indicates the demonstrative nature of the incident, the bullying context and the scale of the disturbance to public peace.
Core issue. The legal issue is whether the beating of a minor in a public place, observed and filmed by other persons, is to be classified as a disturbance of public order under Article 284 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, or whether the question of liability also arises under Article 140 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania for causing physical pain or a minor impairment of health. Under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code, it is necessary to establish a public place, brazen conduct, a demonstration of disrespect towards those present or the surroundings, and a disturbance of public peace or order. Under Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code, what is material is whether, by beating or otherwise using violence, physical pain was caused to the victim, she was slightly injured, or she was made ill for a short period. If the victim were a young child, Article 140(2) of the Criminal Code would have to be assessed; however, under Article 141(3) of the Criminal Code, a young child is a person under the age of fourteen, and therefore the mere fact of minority does not of itself satisfy that element. The elements of impairment of health under Article 141(1) of the Criminal Code are determined on the basis of the rules for determining the extent of impairment of health approved by the Government or an institution authorised by it
Legal assessment. The initial classification under Article 284 of the Criminal Code is reasonably linked to the fact that the violence took place in Marijampole Poetry Park, that is, in a public place, and that the conduct was described as repeated blows with hands, feet, and a telephone. Such conduct may be assessed as brazen conduct demonstrating disrespect towards those present, if the investigation confirms that it disturbed public peace or order. The legal source provided concerning Article 284 of the Criminal Code emphasises that criminal liability under this article is specifically linked to dangerous consequences, namely a disturbance of public peace or order. This is important because violence against a person in itself also encompasses the aspect of health or physical pain, whereas a disturbance of public order requires an additional public-order element. The source provided concerning the amendment of Article 310 of the Criminal Code identifies a trend in case law whereby filming or photographing a criminal act in the victim’s presence may be recognised as an act or element disturbing public peace and order, or as indicating hooligan motives or an especially cruel or tormenting nature. Accordingly, the circumstance that other persons observed and filmed the incident, and that the video recording spread on social media the same evening, is legally significant not as an independent moral circumstance but as a possible part of the assessment of disturbance of public order and the brazen nature of the act. For the application of Article 140 of the Criminal Code, it is significant that the victim felt unwell after the violence and was taken to a medical institution, because this may be connected with establishing physical pain, minor injury, or short-term illness. The source provided concerning Article 140 of the Criminal Code explains that a finding of causing physical pain is made on the basis of case data confirming beating or other violence, while minor impairment of health is linked to health impairment lasting no longer than 10 days or a 5 percent loss of capacity for work. The relatives’ referral to law enforcement is consistent with the practical logic of initiating proceedings, since the same source states that an act under Article 140 of the Criminal Code entails liability upon a complaint by the victim, a statement by the victim’s lawful representative, or a prosecutor’s request. If several participating persons are identified, Article 26 of the Criminal Code limits the liability of accomplices only to those acts of the perpetrator that were covered by their intent. This means that mere presence nearby or filming is not, in itself, equated with commission under the provisions provided; however, the role of an organiser, instigator, or aider would be assessed under Article 26(4) of the Criminal Code. When imposing punishment on accomplices, Article 58 of the Criminal Code requires consideration of the type, form, role, and nature of participation. If the suspects were minors, Article 80 of the Criminal Code would require liability to be aligned with their age and social maturity, to restrict deprivation of liberty, and to increase the possibility of educational measures. In such a case, Article 90 of the Criminal Code would limit the list of possible penalties for minors to community service, a fine, restriction of liberty, arrest, and fixed-term imprisonment, subject to special limits on the severity of those penalties. Procedurally, video recordings, a telephone, or other data may be submitted under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, since objects and documents relevant to an investigation may be submitted by the victim, the victim’s representatives, and any natural or legal person. The significance of procedural time limits is established by Article 99 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and their calculation by Article 100; therefore, procedural time limits calculated in hours, days, or months apply to specific pre-trial investigation acts. Coercive measures, if necessary, are applied in accordance with the purpose set out in Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: to ensure participation in the proceedings, an unobstructed investigation and hearing of the case, and to prevent new criminal acts. Article 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that, as a coercive measure, a minor may be placed under the supervision of parents, guardians, or other persons caring for children
Consequences. Realistically, the investigation may remain within Article 284 of the Criminal Code if the principal proven element is that public peace or order was disturbed by brazen conduct in a public place. Another scenario is to assess Article 140 of the Criminal Code concurrently, if medical and other case data confirm the causing of physical pain, minor injury, or short-term illness. If it were established that the victim is under fourteen years of age, Article 140(2) of the Criminal Code would become relevant because the act was committed against a young child. The investigation may also be discontinued in the cases provided for in Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for example where insufficient data are collected to substantiate the suspect’s guilt, or where the grounds under the Criminal Code specified therein apply. For the victim and her relatives, the most practically important evidence will be medical data, video recordings, and witness testimony, because these determine both the extent of impairment of health and the proof of disturbance of public order. For the suspects, the most important issue is whether their specific role will be classified as direct violence, complicity, or merely being present at the scene. If the accused or the persons materially liable for his or her actions lacked the funds to compensate the damage, Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the possibility, in the cases and according to the procedure established by law, of compensating damage from state funds. The publicly circulated recording is practically important not because of publicity as such, but because it may become a document relevant to the investigation within the meaning of Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and may also substantiate the elements of Article 284 of the Criminal Code
The specific question is whether, in investigating an episode of violence involving minors in a public park, the municipality may process and disclose video surveillance data in a manner that does not amount to excessive disclosure of minors’ personal data.
Article 18 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Legal Protection of Personal Data requires the processing of video data to be set out in a written document of the data controller, specifying the purpose and scope of video surveillance, the retention period, access conditions and deletion procedure. The same provision requires that video data be processed only by authorised persons who have been familiarised with data protection rules and have undertaken in writing to comply with them. Accordingly, the legally material issue is not whether there were enough cameras in Poetry Park, but whether the municipality’s specific use of the video recordings after the incident falls within a purpose defined in advance and whether access to them is restricted under a documented procedure.
The stronger argument in this situation is the municipality’s caution in relation to minors’ data, rather than a public interest in commenting as widely as possible on the details of the incident. In practice, the greatest risk for the municipality would not be the “insufficiency” of cameras, but uncontrolled access to the recordings or excessive public commentary about them, because Article 18 requires specific discipline regarding access, retention and deletion. For a lawyer or journalist, it would be advisable to request not the recordings themselves, but confirmation of whether the recordings were provided to the police or the prosecutor’s office under the municipality’s approved video surveillance procedure, who had access to them, and for what legal purpose they were reviewed.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether municipal video surveillance in a public park, the use of minors’ image data, and the municipality’s family-support measures comply with Articles 16, 20 and 1 of the Law Amending the Republic of Lithuania Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data, Article 24 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data, Article 30 and Recital 19 of the GDPR, and Articles 52 and 60 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child. Article 16 of the Law Amending the Republic of Lithuania Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data permits video surveillance for the protection of public security, public order, life, health, property and other rights only where other measures are insufficient or inappropriate and the interests of the data subject do not override those purposes. Article 20(1) of the same law imposes an obligation to provide, clearly and before entry into the monitored area, information on the video surveillance and the details and contact information of the controller. Article 1(1) and (2) of that law indicate that the assessment is primarily a matter of inviolability of private life and the lawfulness of personal data processing. Article 52(1) of the Law on Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child confers on the municipality powers not of punishment, but of services, assistance, analysis, planning and cooperation in the field of child-rights protection. Article 60(1) of the same law links child-rights protection in municipalities with municipal councils, municipal executive institutions, child-rights protection services, police juvenile affairs inspectors, schools and other institutions implementing preventive measures
Legal assessment. The municipality’s assertion that the camera network in the park is used for public order and security is, in itself, consistent with the purposes identified in Article 16 of the Law Amending the Republic of Lithuania Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data; however, lawfulness also requires proportionality: other measures must be insufficient or inappropriate, and the interests of minors as data subjects must not outweigh the purpose of the surveillance. This means that the presence of cameras in Poetry Park cannot be justified solely by the convenience of identifying persons after an incident; a connection with the protection of public security and public order must be maintained. If the area is monitored, the controller must, under Article 20(1), ensure that clear information is provided before entry into the monitored location, including the fact of surveillance itself and the controller’s contact details. Article 20(2) permits additional information to be provided, such as the purpose of the video surveillance; in the case of a public park, such information would be material in assessing whether data subjects are in fact informed about the processing. Video material disseminated by minors themselves does not extinguish the municipality’s obligations under Articles 16 and 20 as a potential controller of data from its own cameras. If the municipality or another institution processes video recordings in its possession, Article 1(2) of the Law Amending the Republic of Lithuania Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data covers such processing as automatically processed personal data. Article 30(3) and (4) of the GDPR further emphasise that records of processing activities must be kept in writing, including in electronic form, and made available to the supervisory authority upon request. If data processing moves into the sphere of investigation of a criminal offence, Recital 19 of the GDPR states that the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences is governed by a specific Union legal act; therefore, municipal communication should not be equated with the data-processing regime of pre-trial investigation authorities. The municipality’s meetings with the police and child-rights protection representatives are consistent with Article 52(1)(3) of the Law on Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child, because the municipality must cooperate with the State Child Rights Protection and Adoption Service or its territorial divisions and with other institutions. Statements concerning assistance by psychologists and other specialists to both families accord with Article 52(1)(1) and (4), under which the municipality organises and finances access to services for the child and family, initial informational and consultative assistance, social services and other assistance to the family. Children’s summer occupation measures are legally relevant insofar as they fall within Article 52(1)(2), concerning analysis of the state of child welfare, planning and implementation of child-rights protection measures. Nevertheless, the cited provisions do not give rise to a municipal obligation physically to monitor every location in the park or to ensure the continuous presence of officers at every point of public space. Article 69(2) of the Law on Local Self-Government permits decisions of the municipal council and mayor, adopted within the limits of their competence, to be binding on the municipal administration, institutions and residents; accordingly, preventive rules or organisational decisions may have binding effect only within the limits of competence. If the matter were considered by a committee of the municipal council, Article 21(1) of the Law on Local Self-Government confers on such committees competence to adopt recommendatory decisions, while Article 21(3) establishes the requirement to publish agendas and give notice no later than two working days before the start of the meeting. Under Article 24(1) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data, a data subject may lodge a complaint with the State Data Protection Inspectorate concerning possible infringements of the GDPR, other European Union legal acts or laws governing the protection of personal data and privacy, and, under Article 24(2), with the Inspector of Journalist Ethics where the complaint falls within that authority’s competence
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is institutional: the municipality transfers, or enables the responsible authorities to use, the video data in its possession, while in its public communication preserving the protection of minors’ data and disclosing no more than is necessary. The second scenario is data-protection oversight: if a minor data subject or another applicant referred to in Article 24 considers that video data have been processed or published unlawfully, the dispute may be brought before the State Data Protection Inspectorate or the Inspector of Journalist Ethics. The third scenario is prevention at the local-government level: the municipality may assess the state of children’s welfare, plan measures, finance services, organise assistance to families and cooperate with the child-rights protection service under Article 52 of the Law on Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child. The fourth scenario is political and administrative consideration within the municipality, where committees may adopt recommendatory decisions, and decisions of the council or mayor become binding within the limits of competence under Articles 21 and 69 of the Law on Local Self-Government. This is practically important for the family of the injured child and for the families of other minors, because under the cited provisions their interests are protected in two directions: through the system of assistance to the child and family, and through the personal-data protection complaints mechanism. For the municipality, this is important because of the obligation to justify the use of cameras by reference to the criteria in Article 16, properly inform persons about surveillance under Article 20, and document data processing so that, if necessary, it can respond to the supervisory authority under Article 30 of the GDPR. For public communication, the most important boundary is that the seriousness of the incident and the public interest do not eliminate the protection of minors’ data; therefore, a lawful course of action must be based not on the public disclosure of identities, but on action by competent authorities and the municipality’s organisation of assistance
Whether FIFA’s official secondary ticketing market may withhold, until the final stage of purchase, the identity and address of the commercial seller, the seat locations and the final price, where this is combined with a short purchase deadline and the automatic allocation of more expensive seats.
Article 3 of the Lithuanian Law on the Prohibition of Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices prohibits commercial practices that are contrary to the requirements of professional diligence and are likely materially to distort the economic behaviour of the average consumer. Article 4 specifies that misleading commercial practices include not only false statements, but also misleading omissions of information. Accordingly, FIFA’s legally weakest position is not the 15 per cent commission charged to both buyer and seller as such, but the information architecture: the seller’s identity, address, stadium location and final price are data determining the risk and comparability of the transaction, and must be provided before the consumer effectively makes a decision.
Article 12¹ is significant because, once such a practice is found to be unfair, it may lead not merely to an injunction against its continuation, but also to individual consumer claims for damages, a price reduction or termination of the contract.
The interim injunction of the Frankfurt Regional Court, as described in the news report, indicates that the court considered important not an abstract criticism of the secondary market, but the obligation to disclose the seller’s identity and address in advance, before confirmation of the transaction. This strengthens the argument that an official platform cannot defend itself solely by saying that it merely administers resale infrastructure, where it itself determines the purchase flow, charges commission to both sides and controls the timing of information disclosure. Since the decision is interim and applies only in Germany, it does not yet support any conclusion as to a uniform European practice, but it does provide a clear procedural direction for a future dispute in Switzerland, given the jurisdiction of FIFA’s headquarters.
In practice, the stronger argument is now not against high resale prices, but against the combination of “drip pricing” and concealment of identity with pressure mechanisms, such as a six-minute deadline and the automatic selection of the most expensive seats. For a lawyer, it is worth citing precisely the non-disclosure framework: if the final price or the seller’s status appears only at the end of checkout, the consumer’s economic decision may already have been distorted. For platforms, the greatest risk is that a transparency breach may be characterised as an unfair commercial practice even where the resale itself, or the price mark-up, is lawful in the relevant state.
The procedural logic of a competitor such as Ticombo is also not solely consumer protection: under the model of Article 16 of the Law on Competition, an undertaking whose legitimate interests are harmed by acts of unfair competition may seek cessation of the unlawful acts and damages, meaning that concealment of information in the official market may also become a dispute about competitive advantage.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether the organisation of official and secondary ticket sales for the World Cup, where the buyer is not informed of the seller’s identity, address, seat details or final price before confirmation of the transaction, could be qualified as an abuse of a dominant position and an infringement of consumer interests. This issue should primarily be assessed under Article 3(1) of the Law on Competition of the Republic of Lithuania concerning the “relevant market”, Article 3(11) of the Law on Competition of the Republic of Lithuania concerning a “dominant position”, and Article 7 of the Law Amending the Law on Competition of the Republic of Lithuania No. VIII-1099 concerning the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position. Article 16(1) of the Law Amending the Law on Competition of the Republic of Lithuania No. VIII-1099 is also relevant, as it provides for the right of an economic operator to apply to a court for the termination of unlawful actions and compensation for damage. According to the source provided, the consumer information aspect is linked to Articles 5 and 6 of the Law on Consumer Protection of the Republic of Lithuania and Articles 6.2286 and 6.2287 of the Civil Code, which impose an obligation to provide consumers with necessary, accurate, comprehensive and non-misleading information about the service and to comply with fair business practices
Legal assessment. Under Article 3(1) of the Law on Competition of the Republic of Lithuania, the first step would be to define the relevant market as the market for a particular product within a particular geographic area; therefore, a general assertion concerning ticket resale alone is insufficient. Under Article 3(11) of the Law on Competition, a dominant position is a position in the relevant market where an economic operator faces no direct competition or is able to exert unilateral decisive influence by effectively restricting competition. The same provision establishes market share presumptions: generally 40 per cent, 30 per cent for retail operators, and, in the case of several largest operators, 70 or 55 per cent respectively. However, the legislative sources provided emphasise that market share is not the sole and conclusive criterion for dominance, as the distribution and stability of market shares, barriers to entry, and the ability to act sufficiently independently of competitors, suppliers, buyers and consumers must also be assessed. Accordingly, FIFA’s legal risk under these provisions would arise not from its significant role in the ticketing system as such, but from specific conduct if a dominant position were established and used in a manner harmful to competition or consumers. Article 7 of the Law Amending the Law on Competition of the Republic of Lithuania No. VIII-1099 prohibits, inter alia, the direct or indirect imposition of unfair prices or other purchase or sale conditions, the restriction of trade to the detriment of consumers, discriminatory conditions, and the imposition of supplementary obligations unrelated to the subject matter of the contract. The conduct referred to in the news item is legally closest to the categories of unfair sales conditions and infringement of consumer interests: disclosure of the final price only at the final stage, non-disclosure of the seller’s identity, and an extremely short purchase window may be assessed as control over conditions that determine the consumer’s decision-making. However, according to the sources provided, abuse is not presumed: as stated in the source concerning the draft Law on Electronic Communications, a restrictive effect on competition, unjustified restriction of other economic operators’ opportunities, or infringement of consumer interests must be proven. The sources concerning amendments to Article 3 of the Law on Competition also emphasise that unfair prices or conditions are not in themselves deemed an infringement solely because of market power; it is necessary to establish a restriction of competition, barriers to market entry, an exclusionary objective against competitors, or another form of constraint on competition. Ticombo, as a competing ticket resale platform, could in an analogous situation seek the termination of unlawful actions and compensation for damage under Article 16(1) of the Law Amending the Law on Competition of the Republic of Lithuania No. VIII-1099. Organisations representing the interests of economic operators or consumers could also, under Article 16(2), seek the termination of unlawful actions, retraction of information, or removal of measures directly related to unfair competition. The competence of the Competition Council under Article 22(1)(3) of the Law Amending the Law on Competition of the Republic of Lithuania No. VIII-1099 includes the investigation of abuse of a dominant position, and under Article 22(1)(5), the investigation of unfair competition in the cases provided for in Article 16(4). Under Article 16(4), the Competition Council investigates acts of unfair competition only where they infringe the interests of multiple economic operators or consumers; therefore, an individual dispute concerning a single buyer’s ticket would not be sufficient to ground that competence. Under Article 22(2), the investigation is conducted by authorised administrative staff of the Competition Council, and under Article 22(3), applicants and suspected entities are notified of decisions concerning the investigation within the time limits established in the Competition Council’s rules of procedure
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is a court-imposed obligation to discontinue a specific ticket sales practice, such as the requirement mentioned in the news item to clearly disclose the commercial seller’s identity and address before confirmation of the transaction. The second scenario would be a competition supervision investigation if it were alleged that such a system infringes not only the interests of individual consumers, but also those of many consumers or ticket resale platforms. The third scenario is a civil dispute concerning the termination of unlawful actions or compensation for damage, the procedural basis for which in the sources provided is Article 16(1) of the Law on Competition. The fourth scenario would be consumer rights enforcement on the basis of insufficient, inaccurate or misleading information about the service, relying on Articles 5 and 6 of the Law on Consumer Protection and Articles 6.2286 and 6.2287 of the Civil Code referred to in the source. From FIFA’s perspective, the principal risk is not the commission system itself or the existence of an official secondary market, but whether the conditions applied in a dominant position restrict competition, impede the operation of other platforms, or infringe consumer interests. For Ticombo and similar platforms, this is significant because of the possibility of challenging a closed or non-transparent sales infrastructure as a barrier to operating in the market. For fans, the practical significance lies in knowing in advance who is selling the ticket, what the final price is, and which seats are being acquired. The broader consequence is that, by the 2030 World Cup, the legal assessment of such ticketing systems may shift from individual consumer complaints to a competition law issue concerning the use of market power and transparent sales conditions
Whether the events in Josvainiai described in the news item are correctly classified under Article 140(1) and Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code, particularly as regards the applicable sentencing ranges and additional consequences.
Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code establishes liability for a person who, by beating or otherwise using violence, causes physical pain to another person or causes a minor injury or short-term illness. The sanction in this provision is closed-ended: community service, restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. Therefore, the 53-year-old woman’s intoxication level of 3.03 per mille is not, in itself, a separate qualifying element under the text of Article 140 as provided; the essential issue is proof of physical pain, minor injury, or short-term illness.
Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code criminalises driving where an intoxication level of 1.51 per mille or more is established; accordingly, the 3.15 per mille level recorded for the 39-year-old BMW driver falls within the threshold for criminal liability.
The article inaccurately states that a fine may be imposed for causing physical pain or a minor health impairment. Under Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code, a fine is not provided for: the precise formulation should be that community service, restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year may be imposed. As regards the driver, it would be more accurate to say not “higher than 1.51 per mille” but “1.51 per mille or more”, because that is how the threshold is defined in Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code.
The statement concerning confiscation of the vehicle does not follow from the provided text of Article 2811: that provision refers to a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year, so confiscation would need to be based on a separate provision, which is not included in the evidence provided.
The stronger argument here is not the general “severity of intoxication”, but the specific elements of the relevant Criminal Code offences and the wording of the sanctions. In the violence episode, one should not, in practice, automatically repeat a fine as a possible penalty under Article 140(1), because that contradicts the provision as provided and may mislead readers about the range of options available to the prosecutor or the court. In the driving episode, criminal liability appears more robust, because 3.15 per mille clearly exceeds the threshold in Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code; however, the risk of confiscation can be professionally identified only where a separate basis for confiscation is specified.
The practical error would be to conflate, in a single text, the criminal sanction and additional proprietary consequences that the specific provision under analysis does not itself provide for.
Core issue. The legal issue is twofold: whether the actions of the 53-year-old woman in the yard of a detached house constitute causing physical pain or minor impairment of health under Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, and whether the driving of the 39-year-old BMW driver with a blood alcohol concentration of 3.15 per mille falls within Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Under Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code, a person who, by beating or otherwise using violence, causes another person physical pain or slightly injures that person or causes short-term illness is subject to criminal liability. Article 141 of the Criminal Code is also relevant to the application of this provision, as it states that the characteristics of health impairments are defined by the rules for determining the degree of health impairment. Under the regulatory framework provided, minor impairment of health is associated with an impairment lasting no longer than 10 days or a 5 percent loss of professional or general capacity for work. In the case of the BMW driver, the principal provision is Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code, under which liability arises for a person who drove a motor vehicle when found to have a blood alcohol concentration of 1.51 per mille or more. Article 10 of the Criminal Code is relevant to the level of classification, as criminal acts are divided into crimes and criminal misdemeanours
Legal assessment. In the violent incident, the decisive issue will not be merely that the suspect was intoxicated, but whether her actions caused the victim physical pain, minor injury, or short-term illness, as required by Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code. The fact that the 34-year-old woman contacted the authorities is procedurally significant, because the cited source states that this act gives rise to criminal liability upon a complaint by the victim, an application by the victim’s legal representative, or a prosecutor’s request. A blood alcohol concentration of 3.03 per mille does not in itself alter the elements of the offence under Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code, but it may be relevant in assessing the factual circumstances of the act and organising procedural steps. If only physical pain is confirmed, without a longer-term health impairment, liability may still arise under Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code, because this provision covers not only minor injury but also the causing of physical pain. If more serious consequences were established, the sources provided allow a distinction from minor impairment of health: non-serious impairment of health is defined as impairment lasting more than 10 days or a loss of capacity for work exceeding 5 percent but less than 30 percent. Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows the victim, the suspect, defence counsel, and other persons to submit, on their own initiative, objects and documents relevant to the investigation and examination of the criminal act. A summons to appear for questioning before the prosecutor is consistent with the requirement that procedural time limits and acts be carried out under Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: time limits are calculated in hours, days, and months, and in specified cases may be set by a pre-trial investigation officer, prosecutor, judge, or court. If, during the proceedings, there were grounds to secure the suspect’s participation in the process or to ensure an unobstructed investigation, Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines the purpose of remand measures, while Article 120 sets out their types, including a written undertaking not to leave, an obligation to register with a police institution, bail, house arrest, or detention. In the driver’s case, a blood alcohol concentration of 3.15 per mille clearly exceeds the 1.51 per mille threshold set out in Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code; therefore, the very circumstance of driving while intoxicated falls within the scope of criminal, not merely administrative, liability. The sources concerning amendments to Article 427 of the Code of Administrative Offences indicate that the threshold for repeated drink-driving is more than 0.4, or not less than 0.41, per mille, but not more than 1.5 per mille; accordingly, a situation involving 3.15 per mille must be classified under Article 281¹ of the Criminal Code. Article 281¹(2) of the Criminal Code additionally provides that a person is also liable where the act provided for in paragraph 1 of that article is committed through negligence. Article 281 of the Criminal Code would be relevant only where, while driving, traffic safety rules or rules on the operation of a vehicle are breached and this results in a traffic accident with the health-related or property damage consequences specified in that article; no such consequences are described in the information provided. Accordingly, on the facts provided, the legal core of the driver’s case is not Article 281 of the Criminal Code, but the specific provision on drink-driving, Article 281¹ of the Criminal Code
Consequences. In the violence case, the actual course of proceedings will depend on whether the investigation confirms the elements of Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code: violence, physical pain, minor injury, or short-term illness. For this act, Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code provides for possible penalties of community service, restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. If insignificance were established, Article 37 of the Criminal Code allows the court to release a person from criminal liability where, due to the amount of harm, the object of the criminal act, or other characteristics, the act is recognised as insignificant. The pre-trial investigation may also be terminated on the grounds provided for in Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, including where insufficient data are collected to substantiate the suspect’s guilt, or where insignificance is recognised under Article 37 of the Criminal Code. Under Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code, the driver faces a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. In practical terms, the most important point is that the 1.51 per mille threshold is already the threshold for criminal liability, and the established level of 3.15 per mille exceeds that threshold by more than double. For the victim in the violent incident, it is important to actively exercise the right under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to submit relevant objects and documents, because the factual data will determine whether the element of physical pain or impairment of health is substantiated. For the suspects in both incidents, remand measures are practically important: they may be applied not as punishment, but to ensure participation in the proceedings, an unobstructed investigation, the hearing of the case, and enforcement of the judgment under Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. From an institutional perspective, both incidents entail the course of criminal proceedings in which the police and the prosecutor collect and assess data, while the final issues of criminal liability, release from such liability, or termination of the case are resolved under the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure
The specific question is whether the Facebook post of 1 July 2026, containing a list of 66 Lithuanian citizens and wording concerning their removal for the benefit of Russia, should primarily be assessed as an offence against state security, rather than merely as a threat or incitement to hatred against specific individuals.
The submitted version of Article 170 of the Criminal Code criminalises incitement to hatred, discrimination or violence against a group of persons, or a person belonging to such a group, on the basis of expressly enumerated characteristics: age, sex, nationality, language, origin, social status, beliefs or other specified grounds. In this case, the list was not compiled on the basis of a single protected characteristic, but rather by reference to the identity of publicly known Lithuanian individuals and their alleged significance for Russian actions against Lithuania. On the information available, the Article 170 classification therefore appears weaker.
Procedurally, Article 212(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is important: a pre-trial investigation is discontinued where insufficient data are collected to substantiate the suspect’s guilt. This means that the present stage is not a confirmation of the legal classification, but only a sufficient initial basis for examining the elements of Articles 122 and 118 of the Criminal Code, which the Prosecutor’s Office itself identified in its statement.
The stronger practical argument at this stage is not “hate speech”, but the state security context: the post was linked to a video concerning Russia’s preparation of target lists for the Baltic States, and beneath it a specific list of 66 Lithuanian citizens was published, together with the motif of a reward for a “head”. For professionals, it is worth citing not only the threatening phrases, but also their context: the narrative of Russia’s military campaign, the compilation of the list, and its public address in both Russian and Lithuanian. For the persons included on the list, a separate practical avenue is Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: if they have suffered pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage as a result of the alleged criminal offence, they may bring a civil claim in the criminal proceedings.
The main mistake would be to assess this episode in isolation as an offensive social media comment; the weight of the legal classification derives from the function of the list within an alleged scheme of hostile-state action against Lithuania.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether a public social media post dated 1 July 2026, referring to the “removal from Lithuania” of persons for the benefit of Russia and providing a list of 66 Lithuanian citizens, may be classified as a public incitement to violate the sovereignty of the Republic of Lithuania by violence under Article 122 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 19(1)(1) of the Law on the Provision of Information to the Public of the Republic of Lithuania is also relevant to the assessment, as it prohibits the publication in public information media of information calling for the forcible violation of the sovereignty of the Republic of Lithuania, encroachment on its independence, or violation of its territorial integrity. Since the post was published publicly, Article 170 of the Criminal Code is additionally relevant insofar as it would be necessary to assess whether the published text incites violence or physical reprisals against a group of persons or a person belonging to such a group on the grounds listed in that article. Article 3(1) of the Criminal Code is also applicable, under which the criminality and punishability of an act are determined by the criminal law in force at the time the act was committed. An individual’s criminal liability is linked to Article 13(1) of the Criminal Code, under which a person is liable under that Code if he or she had reached the age of sixteen before the commission of the criminal act
Legal assessment. Article 122 of the Criminal Code protects the sovereignty, independence, constitutional order, and territorial integrity of the State against public calls to violate them by violence. For the application of this provision, what is decisive is not merely the political or provocative form of the post, but whether, by its content, the text constitutes a public call to act violently against the Republic of Lithuania or to commit other offences provided for in this chapter that encroach upon the Lithuanian State. The instruction to begin preparing a list of people whom Russia “could remove from Lithuania,” and the promise of payment “for each head,” are legally significant because they are linked to the actions of a foreign state in relation to Lithuania’s territory and its citizens. On the facts presented, the element of publicity arises from the fact that the text was posted on a social media account together with a video recording and a list of persons. The sanction provided for in Article 122 of the Criminal Code is imprisonment for up to five years; accordingly, the investigation is directed not at a civil dispute concerning honour and dignity, but at a possible offence against the Lithuanian State. In this situation, Article 19(1)(1) of the Law on the Provision of Information to the Public operates as a content-prohibition rule: information calling for the forcible violation of the sovereignty of the Republic of Lithuania may not be published in public information media. Article 19(1)(3) of the same Law is relevant only insofar as the text would be assessed as incitement to hatred or violence against a group of persons or a person belonging to such a group on the grounds specified by law. The visible part of Article 170(3) of the Criminal Code criminalises public incitement to violence or physical reprisals against a group of persons or a person belonging to such a group on grounds of age, sex, sexual orientation, disability, race, nationality, language, origin, social status, faith, religion, convictions, or views. Therefore, the mere naming of 66 specific individuals is not, in itself, the centre of this provision; what matters is whether the incitement to violence is connected to a protected characteristic, such as views or another ground specified by law. Article 3(1) of the Criminal Code means that, in assessing the post of 1 July 2026, reliance must be placed on the criminal law in force at that time, rather than on any later, stricter regulation. Article 3(2) of the Criminal Code would allow the application of a more lenient law, or a law decriminalising the act, if such a law became relevant at a later stage of the proceedings. According to the institutional framework set out in the report, the pre-trial investigation is led by the Department for Organised Crime and Corruption Investigation of the Prosecutor General’s Office, while investigative actions have been assigned to the Lithuanian Criminal Police Bureau. The practical task of the investigation will be to identify the author of the post or the administrator of the account, the circumstances of publication, the text’s connection with the video recording, the circle of addressees, the purpose of compiling the list, and whether the wording should be regarded as a call to action rather than merely an assessment or threatening rhetoric
Consequences. If the evidence collected confirms the elements of Article 122 of the Criminal Code, the case could proceed as an offence against the Lithuanian State, carrying a maximum penalty of imprisonment for up to five years. If it were established that the substance of the post is incitement to violence or physical reprisals against persons on the grounds specified in Article 170 of the Criminal Code, the application of that provision could also be considered. If the investigation remained only at the level of a prohibition on public-information content, the legal significance would primarily be linked to the prohibition established in Article 19 of the Law on the Provision of Information to the Public against publishing information of this nature. For the persons included in the list, the practical significance is that the publication of their names and surnames alongside statements about removal and payment for a “head” may be assessed not in isolation, but in the overall context of the post. For the account administrator, the principal risk arises from the public nature of the post, the naming of specific individuals, and the linking of the text to possible Russian actions against the Baltic States. For the State, this case is important as a boundary between public political speech and a public call to act by force or violence against Lithuania’s sovereignty. Further developments will depend on the evidence collected during the pre-trial investigation: it may substantiate suspicions under criminal provisions protecting state security, or it may alter the legal assessment of the act in light of a more precise determination of the post’s content, purpose, and addressee
Whether the finding of 3.23 per mille intoxication in the driver of a stopped Renault Megane Scenic, where the news report does not mention a traffic accident or damage, should be classified under Article 2811 of the Criminal Code as a standalone offence of drink-driving, rather than under Article 281 of the Criminal Code.
Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code criminalises the very act of driving a motor vehicle where intoxication of 1.51 per mille or more is established, and provides for a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. Accordingly, the 3.23 per mille reading in the episode described is not merely “severe intoxication” in ordinary or administrative terminology, but directly exceeds the threshold for criminal liability by more than double. By contrast, Article 281 of the Criminal Code links liability to a breach of road traffic safety or vehicle operation rules that results in a traffic accident and causes bodily injury or substantial property damage; the news report does not indicate any such consequences.
Article 19 of the Criminal Code further closes off the defence argument that intoxication itself negates liability: a person who commits an act while intoxicated by alcohol is not exempt from criminal liability, unless specific circumstances of involuntary intoxication are established, which are not present here.
In practice, the stronger and cleaner qualification argument is to rely on Article 2811 of the Criminal Code, because that provision requires neither an accident, nor an injured party, nor property damage; the fact of driving and intoxication of 1.51 per mille or more is sufficient. The news report’s reference to Article 281 of the Criminal Code is a risky formulation: on the wording of the provisions provided, Article 281 would apply only if additional consequences were being proved, and such consequences are absent from the described stop in Buknaičiai. For the defence, a more realistic line would not be “I was very drunk”, but procedural and evidential issues concerning the intoxication test, the fact of driving, and the reliability of the measurement result; the level of 3.23 per mille alone does not remove liability under the logic of Article 19 of the Criminal Code.
As regards confiscation of the vehicle and disqualification from driving, the news report identifies these as possible consequences, but the excerpts of the provisions provided do not contain an independent basis for applying them, so in a professional text these consequences should be distinguished from the penalties expressly specified in Article 2811 of the Criminal Code.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether the conduct of the sixty-year-old driver, who drove a Renault Megane Scenic with a recorded blood alcohol level of 3.23 per mille, satisfies the elements of the offence provided for in Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. This provision applies to a person who drove a motor vehicle while intoxicated, where a blood alcohol level of 1.51 per mille or more was established, and provides for a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. Criminal liability is based on Article 2(1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania: the act must be prohibited by the criminal law in force, the person must be culpable, the act must correspond to the statutory elements of the offence, and a penalty or measure of penal effect may be imposed only in accordance with law. Article 1(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania explains that the Code defines criminal acts, penalties, measures of penal effect, and the conditions of criminal liability. Although the report refers to the wording of Article 281 of the Criminal Code, within the system of the sources provided, simple driving with a blood alcohol level of 1.51 per mille or more, without a specified traffic accident, is classified under Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code. Article 281(1)-(4) of the Criminal Code is linked to a traffic accident and its consequences, such as minor or serious impairment of another person’s health or substantial property damage, whereas no such consequences are indicated in the report. The thresholds under Article 427(1) and Article 423(3) of the Code of Administrative Offences cover intoxication up to 1.5 per mille; therefore, a reading of 3.23 per mille falls within the scope of criminal, rather than administrative, liability
Legal assessment. The factual circumstance that the driver drove a motor vehicle on the Ežerė-Mažeikiai road corresponds to the object and conduct element of the offence under Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code. A blood alcohol level of 3.23 per mille exceeds the 1.51 per mille criminal liability threshold by more than double; therefore, no additional traffic accident or injured person needs to be established for the offence to be made out. Article 281¹(2) of the Criminal Code is relevant in that liability is also possible where the act provided for in paragraph 1 of that article is committed through negligence. The driver’s procedural position is linked to the status of a suspect: under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the suspect, defence counsel, and other participants in the proceedings may submit objects and documents relevant to the investigation and examination of the act. If expert examination is used to establish intoxication or other circumstances, under the cited provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the prosecutor, upon receiving the expert report, must notify the suspect, defence counsel, and other specified participants in the proceedings in writing of where and when they may examine it. Procedural time limits would be calculated under Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: they define the commencement, performance, or completion of procedural actions, and time limits are calculated in hours, days, and months. Importantly, Article 100(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure links the time limits for detention and other specified measures to the actual moment when they are applied. The issue of remand measures is determined under Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as such measures are intended to secure the suspect’s participation in the proceedings, ensure an unobstructed pre-trial investigation, examination of the case, and enforcement of the judgment, and prevent new criminal acts. Under Article 120(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, possible remand measures include detention, house arrest, bail, seizure of documents, an obligation to register with a police institution, and a written undertaking not to leave. The role of the institutions is apparent from the procedural rules provided: in cases prescribed by law, time limits may be set by a pre-trial investigation officer, prosecutor, judge, or court, while the prosecutor performs the function of notifying participants of the expert report. The sources concerning amendments to the rules on establishing intoxication state that they apply to vehicle drivers and to persons whom the police, pre-trial investigation institutions, the prosecutor’s office, or the court refer for a medical examination
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is the continuation of the pre-trial investigation and referral of the case for determination of liability under Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code, because the stated blood alcohol level of 3.23 per mille exceeds the threshold established in that provision. In that case, the applicable sentencing range would be a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year, as those are the penalties provided for in Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code. The second scenario is termination of the pre-trial investigation only on the grounds set out in Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for example if insufficient data are collected to substantiate the suspect’s guilt, or if one of the Criminal Code grounds listed in that article applies. The route of administrative liability under the cited amendments to Articles 423 and 427 of the Code of Administrative Offences is not central to this factual situation, because the intoxication described in those provisions is limited by an upper threshold of 1.5 per mille. The practical significance for the driver is that the matter concerns not only the risk of a financial sanction, but also the risk of arrest or imprisonment for up to one year. The practical significance for the police and the prosecutor’s office is the duty to base the proceedings on data concerning the driving, the nature of the vehicle, the level of intoxication, and compliance with procedural time limits. For the defence, the key issues would be to submit relevant objects and documents under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and to examine the expert report, if one has been obtained in the proceedings. For the public and other road users, this case is significant insofar as Article 1(2) of the Criminal Code links criminal law to the protection of human rights and of the interests of society and the state against criminal acts
Can a state- or municipal-level emergency regime be used not only to manage pollution at the Kazokiškės landfill, but also to compel the redistribution of Vilnius region mixed municipal waste streams to other treatment capacities, where the crisis arose from a contractual dispute between VAATC and Energesman over the operation of the MBA facilities.
Article 32 of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection links the declaration of an emergency situation not to political or economic inconvenience, but to the consequences of an emergency event that meet, or are reasonably forecast to meet, the criteria established by the Government. Article 33 indicates that a municipal-level emergency situation is primarily a governance regime of the mayor and the municipal operations centre: the mayor convenes the operations centre, decides on the declaration, and mobilises the forces and material resources located within the municipality. Article 20 is important because the Ministry of Environment is not a mere external observer: ministries carry out prevention within their areas of competence, while the National Crisis Management Centre coordinates prevention by state institutions.
The concept of “necessary tasks” in Article 2 allows the regime to be linked to specific urgent works, the non-performance of which could cause harm to residents, the environment or property. Accordingly, the termination of VAATC’s contract with Energesman is not, in itself, a sufficient basis; however, the facts of waste accumulation, above-limit hydrogen sulphide pollution, and 14,000 tonnes of semi-combustible waste already create a clearer civil protection argument.
At present, the stronger argument is not a general right of Vilnius City Municipality unilaterally to divert the entire region’s waste to Kazokiškės, but the establishment of specific necessary tasks under an emergency regime, provided that the institutions substantiate a threat to residents, the environment or property. The position of the Mayor of Elektrėnai, namely that decisions of another municipality do not automatically have effect within his municipality, is legally strong under the cited provisions unless and until there is a higher-level or properly declared civil protection regime and clearly assigned tasks to be performed. The practical risk for VAATC and state institutions is that the declaration of an emergency situation cannot become a procedural substitute for the contractual dispute with Energesman: if the termination of the contract is challenged in court, public safety measures will have to be distinguished from contractual liability.
For that reason, what should be cited is not an abstract “waste crisis” narrative, but the combined operation of Articles 32 and 2: an emergency regime is lawfully justified only to the extent necessary to carry out specific urgent works and to eliminate a real threat arising from waste, pollution or residents’ interests.
Core issue. The legal issue is not merely a contractual dispute between VAATC and Energesman, but rather which entity is legally required to ensure the uninterrupted operation of the Vilnius region municipal waste management system when the operation of MBT facilities is disrupted and it becomes necessary to divert waste to the Kazokiškės landfill. This is to be resolved primarily under Article 25 of the Law on Waste Management of the Republic of Lithuania, which assigns municipalities the responsibility to organise municipal waste management systems, ensure their functioning, and administer the provision of municipal waste management services. Article 28(1)-(3) of the Law on Waste Management is also applicable, because municipal waste prevention and management plans must establish measures ensuring the availability of a service that meets environmental, technical-economic, and hygiene requirements for all persons within the municipality’s territory. Article 30(1)-(3) of the Law on Waste Management is relevant insofar as several municipalities in a region may act through an administrator of the municipal waste management system and entrust that administrator with functions relating to tenders, verification of contractual performance, and supervision. From the perspective of crisis management and civil protection, Articles 20 and 33 of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection of the Republic of Lithuania apply: ministries carry out prevention within their respective fields, the National Crisis Management Centre coordinates prevention by ministries, and the mayor, where a municipal-level emergency situation is imminent or has arisen, convenes the operations centre and decides whether to declare an emergency situation
Legal assessment. The statement by the Minister of the Environment that waste management is a municipal responsibility directly corresponds to the model established in Article 25 of the Law on Waste Management: the municipal waste system is, first and foremost, a system organised by municipalities and whose functioning is ensured by them. This does not mean that municipalities must perform all activities themselves in an operational sense, because Article 30(1) of the Law on Waste Management allows several or all municipalities in a region to cooperate and establish an administrator. However, under Article 30(2), the administrator’s duties depend on the founding documents, an agreement with the municipality, or an administrative act; therefore, the dispute between VAATC and Energesman alone does not eliminate the municipalities’ duty to ensure the functioning of the system. If VAATC acts as an administrator mandated by the municipalities, Article 30(3)(2) and (3) includes the right and obligation to inspect and control the performance of contractual obligations with the waste manager. Accordingly, the termination of the MBT facility operation agreement is legally only one link in crisis management, not the final solution concerning the continuity of an essential service for residents. Under Article 31(1) of the Law on Waste Management, municipal councils must approve waste management rules ensuring that services comply with environmental and public health safety requirements, and under Article 31(2), municipal institutions control the implementation of those rules. The decision of Vilnius City temporarily to transport mixed municipal waste to the Kazokiškės landfill should be assessed through the requirement in Article 28(2) of the Law on Waste Management to ensure service availability, but it cannot be separated from the limits set by regional and municipal plans and rules. Paragraph 95 of the State Strategic Waste Management Plan approved by the Government provides that municipal waste generated within a municipality’s territory should be managed in the infrastructure facilities of that waste management region. This supports a regional decision-making model, but also explains why a decision by one municipality concerning a facility located in the territory of another municipality raises questions as to the limits of competence. The position of the Mayor of Elektrėnai regarding the Kazokiškės landfill is connected with Article 33(1) of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection, under which the mayor, in the event of a municipal-level emergency situation, mobilises forces and material resources to eliminate the threat and decides on other management actions. Since an emergency situation due to pollution has already been declared in Elektrėnai, any increase in waste flows to the same facility must be coordinated with the environmental and public health safety requirements referred to in Article 31(1) of the Law on Waste Management. Under Article 20(1) of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection, the role of the Ministry of the Environment is to carry out prevention of crises and emergency situations in the field assigned to it, and under Article 20(6), ministers coordinate prevention by mayors, institutions, economic operators, and operators of activities within their assigned areas of governance. Therefore, the Ministry’s involvement does not in itself constitute a takeover of municipal functions, but rather the exercise of prevention, coordination, and sectoral responsibility. The role of the National Crisis Management Centre also has a normative basis: under Article 20(6) of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection, it coordinates prevention carried out by ministries and other state institutions. The Government’s conclusion on draft Law on Waste Management No. XIIIP-2157 referred to the doctrine of the Constitutional Court’s rulings of 24 December 2002 and 13 December 2004, according to which municipal autonomy and freedom of activity within the competence defined by law are constitutional principles. This doctrine is important because decisions by state institutions concerning waste flows cannot negate the competence assigned by law to municipalities; however, municipalities likewise cannot withdraw from the duty established in Article 25 to ensure the functioning of the system
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the municipalities of the Vilnius region, through their plans, rules, administrator, and contractual control, stabilise the use of the MBT facilities or alternative regional infrastructure facilities, thereby keeping the matter at the municipal self-government level. The second scenario is that, if the threat remains within the framework of a municipal-level emergency situation, the mayor acts under Article 33 of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection through the municipal operations centre, warnings, and the mobilisation of forces and resources. The third scenario is that the Ministry of the Environment and the National Crisis Management Centre intensify coordination under Article 20 of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection, particularly if the decisions of the municipalities and the administrator no longer ensure continuity of service. The practical significance for residents is continuity of service and compliance with hygiene and environmental requirements, because Article 28(2) of the Law on Waste Management orients the system toward service availability for all persons within the municipality’s territory. For municipalities, this situation is important as a test of competence and responsibility: they may cooperate regionally, but they cannot transfer the duty under Article 25 solely to an administrator or a private operator. The practical significance of the dispute between VAATC and Energesman is that the legality of the contract may determine the allocation of liability among economic operators, but the duty to ensure the public service under the cited provisions remains at the level of the municipal system. For Elektrėnai Municipality, the key point is that the use of the Kazokiškės landfill to receive waste flows must be coordinated with the management of the emergency situation already in force and with the safety requirements established in waste management rules and plans
Would a ruling of the Constitutional Court declaring a Government act, or an act underpinning the formation of the Government, contrary to the Constitution or laws invalidate earlier Government actions retroactively, or would it merely preclude further application of that act.
Article 71 of the Law on the Constitutional Court indicates that the Constitutional Court does not formally decide the abstract “lawfulness of the Government”, but rather the conformity of a specific legal act, or part thereof, with the Constitution or laws, and must precisely identify in its ruling the basis of the inconsistency. Article 72 establishes the key consequence: a Government act, or part thereof, may not be applied from the date of official publication of the Constitutional Court’s ruling. This means that the stronger legal argument is not that “everything done by such a Government is automatically null and void”, but that “from the publication of the ruling, reliance may no longer be placed on the act declared unconstitutional or unlawful”.
The same provision also guards against continuing effects: decisions that have not yet been implemented must not be carried out if they are based on an act declared contrary to the Constitution or laws.
In practice, the critical point is to distinguish the political formulation of the proposition that “the Government is unlawful” from the procedurally available outcome before the Constitutional Court: a ruling concerning a specific act. In a dispute, a lawyer should cite Articles 71 and 72 and construct the argument by reference to the prohibition on applying the act from the publication of the ruling, rather than by asserting the automatic collapse of all past decisions. The greatest risk would be to rely on an overly broad conclusion as to retroactivity: on the text of Article 72 as presented, what is directly affected is the further application of the act and unimplemented decisions based on it, but not, of itself, all governmental acts that have already occurred.
If, in a specific case, a court of general jurisdiction were to face a question as to the constitutionality of an applicable act, Article 67 implies the procedural route: the proceedings are stayed and the matter is referred to the Constitutional Court, so the practical weight of the dispute shifts to whether the contested act must in fact be applied in the particular case.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not an abstract “unlawfulness of the Government”, but whether a specific act of the Government, or a part thereof, is contrary to the Constitution or to laws. Under Article 102 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, the Constitutional Court decides whether acts of the Government are not in conflict with the Constitution or laws. Under Article 107 of the Constitution, such an act may not be applied from the date of official publication of the Constitutional Court’s decision. Article 71 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania provides that the ruling must state clearly whether a legal act is contrary to the Constitution or to laws, and must specify the particular provisions with which it conflicts. Article 72 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania defines the principal consequences: an act of the Government, or part thereof, ceases to be applicable from the date of official publication, and rulings of the Constitutional Court are binding on all institutions, officials and citizens
Legal assessment. If the Constitutional Court were to examine a dispute concerning the Government, it would assess not political confidence, but the conformity of a legal act with the Constitution or laws. In the sources provided, the constitutional status of the Government is defined as that of an executive authority: in its ruling of 29 November 2001, the Constitutional Court noted that the Government performs the function of state administration within the competence assigned to it, and that its powers derive from the Constitution and laws. In its ruling of 10 January 1998, the Constitutional Court stated that the Government is a collegial institution of general competence, composed of the Prime Minister and ministers. Accordingly, a legal “gap” would arise where decisions of state administration were based on an act which the Constitutional Court no longer permits to be applied. Under Article 110 of the Constitution, where a judge has grounds to believe that a legal act applicable in a case is contrary to the Constitution, the judge must suspend the case and apply to the Constitutional Court. Article 59 of the Law on the Constitutional Court and Article 107 of the Constitution mean that a decision of the Constitutional Court is final and not subject to appeal. Article 17 of the Law on the Constitutional Court protects that decision from political or institutional pressure: the Court and its judges are independent, and interference with their activities is prohibited. Under Article 72 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, state institutions would be required to repeal their subordinate legal acts, or provisions thereof, based on the act found to be unconstitutional. The same provision establishes that unexecuted decisions based on an unconstitutional act or on an act contrary to laws must not be executed. However, the ruling of the Supreme Court of Lithuania of 22 June 2017 in civil case No. 3K-3-281-695/2017, as provided, shows that the question of consequences may depend on the content of the specific act and its relationship with earlier Government resolutions. In that case, the court assessed whether Government Resolution No. 438 of 2 May 2016 restored the validity of earlier provisions, and relied on the provisions of the Constitutional Court’s ruling
Consequences. The first scenario would be narrow: the Constitutional Court finds only a specific part of a Government act to be contrary to the Constitution or laws, and, under Article 71 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the ruling precisely distinguishes which part remains valid and which part may no longer be applied. The second scenario would be broader: if a greater number of subordinate legal acts or unexecuted decisions were based on an unlawful basis, Article 72 of the Law on the Constitutional Court would require institutions to remove them or refrain from executing them. The third scenario concerns individual rights: under Article 107 of the Constitution, Article 156(2)(13) of the Law on Administrative Proceedings, and Article 366(1)(10) of the Code of Civil Procedure, a decision of the Constitutional Court in an individual petition case may constitute grounds for reopening proceedings. The practical significance would fall first on the courts, since they could no longer apply the act found to be unlawful. It would also affect the Government and institutions subordinate to it, because their derivative decisions would have to be brought into conformity with the Constitutional Court’s ruling. Finally, it is important for individuals and economic operators whose rights or obligations were determined on the basis of such a Government act, because from the date of official publication of the ruling the applicable legal basis would change
Can the diversion of mixed municipal waste from the Vilnius region to the Kazokiskes landfill be based solely on a decision of Vilnius City Municipality, where Elektrenai Municipality objects and an emergency situation due to pollution is already in force in its territory.
Article 25 of the Law on Waste Management provides that municipalities organise municipal waste management systems necessary specifically for the management of municipal waste generated in their territories, and ensure the operation of those systems. This strengthens the argument of the Mayor of Elektrenai that decisions by one municipality cannot, in themselves, create an obligation for another municipality’s territory to accept waste from the entire region. On the other hand, Article 30 permits several or all municipalities in a region to cooperate and establish a common system administrator, whose functions derive from founding documents, contracts or administrative acts.
The decisive issue would therefore not be Vilnius’s political decision, but what has been assigned to VAATC under the regional model. The logic of Articles 27 and 29 likewise indicates that regional waste flows must be based on regional planning, not on an ad hoc diversion by a single municipality, particularly where all eight municipalities in the VAATC region are concerned.
At present, the stronger argument appears to be not Vilnius Municipality’s unilateral decision, but the competence of Elektrenai and the need for regional coordination: the provisions cited impose on a municipality a duty to manage waste from its own territory, but do not confer a clear power to shift the burden to another municipality without a legal basis at regional or state level. In practice, a state-level emergency regime declared by the Government or the NKVC would be attractive precisely because the ordinary waste-law regime provides only weak support for the compulsory redistribution of sorting or disposal capacity across Lithuania. For professionals, it is important to distinguish two risks: the dispute over the termination of the contract between VAATC and Energesman will determine who is responsible for the disruption of the MBA facility, but it does not automatically resolve the question whether Kazokiskes is obliged to accept all mixed waste.
An additional risk is that, since 24 March, an emergency situation has already been in force at the Kazokiskes landfill due to excessive hydrogen sulphide pollution and non-compliance with a mandatory instruction issued by the Environmental Protection Department. Accordingly, diverting additional waste flows to this facility without a clear legal regime may become not only a matter of administrative coordination, but also a problem of compliance with environmental obligations.
Core issue. The legal issue is not limited to the contractual dispute between VAATC and Energesman, but concerns who is required to ensure the operation of the Vilnius region municipal waste management system when the operation of MBT facilities is disrupted and waste is temporarily redirected to the Kazokiškės landfill. It is to be resolved primarily under Article 25 of the Law on Waste Management of the Republic of Lithuania, under which municipalities organise municipal waste management systems and ensure their functioning. Article 30 of the Law on Waste Management, which regulates cooperation between several municipalities and the functions of the administrator of a municipal waste management system, is also applicable. The duty of municipal councils to establish local waste management rules and the control exercised by municipal institutions arise from Article 31 of the Law on Waste Management. The issue of a municipal-level emergency situation is to be assessed under Article 33 of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection of the Republic of Lithuania
Legal assessment. Article 25 of the Law on Waste Management imposes on municipalities an obligation in the nature of an obligation to achieve a result: a necessary system must operate for municipal waste generated in their territories, rather than merely a formal service model. Accordingly, the Minister of the Environment’s statement that waste management is a municipal responsibility is consistent with that provision. At the same time, Article 30(1) of the Law on Waste Management permits several or all municipalities of a region to cooperate and establish a legal person, namely an administrator of the municipal waste management system. Under Article 30(2), the duties of such an administrator must be set out in its founding documents, in an agreement with the municipality, or in another administrative act. Under Article 30(3)(2) and (3), the administrator, where so authorised, may inspect and control contractual obligations between the administrator and the waste manager. The dispute between VAATC and Energesman is therefore legally relevant to the extent that it affects the municipalities’ obligation to ensure the functioning of the system and the performance of the functions entrusted to the administrator. The position of residents in this chain is limited: under Article 30¹(2) of the Law on Waste Management, owners of immovable property or authorised persons must pay a levy or enter into a service agreement, but the organisation of final waste treatment itself falls within the municipal system. This is also consistent with the Government’s position that residents cannot influence the waste treatment process and have no legal relationship with final waste managers. Paragraph 111 of the State Strategic Waste Management Plan additionally assigns municipalities responsibility for a justified service price, long-term operation of infrastructure, its renewal, and reduction of environmental pollution. Paragraph 230 of the Plan confirms that the functions of organising the municipal waste management system and controlling the provision of the service remain with municipalities. Paragraph 261 of the Plan requires the system to be organised so that waste is properly prepared for reuse and recycling; therefore, large-scale diversion to landfill may only be a temporary system-stabilisation measure, not a substitute for the ordinary model. Paragraph 95 of the Plan is also relevant to the position of Elektrėnai Municipality, as it establishes the policy direction that municipal waste generated within a municipal territory should be managed in that region’s infrastructure facilities. Nevertheless, the validity of decisions of Vilnius City Municipality in the territory of another municipality must be reconciled with the fact that, under Article 31 of the Law on Waste Management, each municipal council approves its own waste management rules, and compliance with them is controlled by municipal institutions. The already declared municipal-level emergency situation in Elektrėnai Municipality due to pollution is legally connected with Article 33 of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection: where such a situation threatens or arises, the mayor convenes the operations centre and decides on declaration of the situation, warnings, mobilisation of forces and material resources, and the need for evacuation. This provision gives the mayor crisis-management instruments, but it does not eliminate the municipalities’ obligation, laid down in Articles 25 and 30 of the Law on Waste Management, to maintain the operation of the waste management system
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the Vilnius region municipalities and their administrator restore the operation of the MBT stage or find a temporary allocation of waste flows that is compatible with legislation and plans, while maintaining the municipal responsibility model under Article 25 of the Law on Waste Management. The second scenario is that the contractual dispute with Energesman moves to court, but that in itself does not release the municipalities and the administrator from the obligation to ensure waste acceptance, control, and continuity of service. The third scenario is that the emergency regime in Elektrėnai Municipality remains significant because of pollution at the Kazokiškės landfill, while the mayor continues to use the municipal-level measures provided for in Article 33 of the Law on Crisis Management and Civil Protection. The fourth scenario is that municipal institutions, through their waste management rules and control mechanisms under Article 31 of the Law on Waste Management, challenge or restrict practical waste diversion decisions if they are not coordinated with local procedures. The practical significance for residents is continuity of service and the reasonableness of the levy or fee; for municipalities, the duty to organise and control the system; for VAATC, the performance of entrusted administrative and contractual supervision functions; and for Energesman, contractual liability and the outcome of the dispute over termination of the contract. Legally, the most important point is that crisis-management measures may help manage the consequences, but, according to the sources provided, the centre of responsibility for the municipal waste system remains at municipal level
Can the section of state-significance road No. 4636 in Telšiai be transferred into municipal ownership solely on the basis of a cooperation agreement, or must it first be removed from the list of roads of state significance and only then become a road of local significance. The essential point of dispute is not the financing of repairs, but the moment at which the ownership and management regime changes.
Article 4(2) of the Law on Roads provides that roads of state significance belong to the State by exclusive ownership and are managed under the right of trust. Accordingly, the formulation that the streets “belong” to “Via Lietuva” should be legally clarified as trust management, not ownership. Article 4(3) of the same law assigns public roads and streets of local significance to municipal ownership.
Under the amended wording of Article 4(4), a road of state significance, or a section thereof, is removed from the list of roads of state significance upon a submission by the Ministry of Transport and Communications where the road’s socio-economic significance changes, traffic intensity decreases, or other specified preconditions arise. Therefore, the Municipality’s undertaking to take over the road within one year after implementation of the project is material, but it does not replace the statutory condition: until the section is removed from the list of roads of state significance, it cannot be regarded as municipal property.
In practice, the stronger argument is not that the Municipality already in fact maintains the streets in summer, but that the road section within the city, by its function, is moving closer to that of a street of local significance, for which decisions on maintenance, traffic management and repairs are more rationally taken by the Municipality. Nevertheless, until the transfer takes place, two regimes must be distinguished: the repair of the carriageway, valued at EUR 712,000, is financed by the trustee of the state road, while the Municipality carries out the pedestrian path works, valued at approximately EUR 700,000; this allocation of financing is not, in itself, a transfer of ownership. After the transfer, the centre of permitting and approvals will also change: under Article 20 of the Law on Roads, permits for oversized or heavy vehicles using public roads of local significance are issued in accordance with the procedure established by municipalities.
Accordingly, the practical risk for the Municipality is not limited to the preliminary EUR 17,000 cost of winter maintenance, but also includes the fact that, together with ownership, it will assume administrative responsibility for decisions concerning maintenance, traffic restrictions and special use of roads.
Core issue. The legal issue is the procedure by which a section of road of national significance No. 4636 in the city of Telšiai may cease to be an object of exclusive State ownership and become a local road owned by the municipality. It is governed by Article 4(2) of the Law on Roads of the Republic of Lithuania, which provides that roads of national significance belong to the State by exclusive ownership and are managed under the right of trust by the public limited liability company Lithuanian Road Administration. The provisions of Article 4(3) of the Law on Roads of the Republic of Lithuania are also applicable, under which public local roads and streets are owned by municipalities. The transfer mechanism is specifically defined in Article 4(4) of the Law on Roads, as set out in Article 1 of the Law Amending Articles 4, 5 and 10 of Law No. I-891 on Roads of the Republic of Lithuania: a road of national significance or a section thereof is removed from the list of roads of national significance upon the proposal of the Ministry of Transport and Communications, transferred into municipal ownership with the consent of the municipal council, and entered in the list of local roads. Accordingly, a cooperation agreement between the company and the municipality alone does not constitute a basis for the transfer of ownership; it operates as a preparatory undertaking, while the change in ownership requires the public administration acts specified by law
Legal assessment. As long as the road section remains on the list of roads of national significance, its owner is the State, and it is managed, used and disposed of under the right of trust by the public limited liability company Lithuanian Road Administration pursuant to Article 4(2) of the Law on Roads of the Republic of Lithuania. This explains why the financing and organisation of carriageway repairs is attributed in the report to the State road manager: the content of management includes use and disposal of the road under the right of trust, but does not permit the replacement of exclusive State ownership with municipal ownership without the procedure laid down in Article 4(4) of the Law on Roads. The municipality’s repair works on the pedestrian path do not in themselves alter the legal affiliation of the road, because Article 4 of the Law on Roads links ownership not to the actual performance of maintenance works, but to the road’s significance, the relevant lists, and the transfer procedure. Under Article 3(2) of the Law Amending the Law on Roads, roads of national significance also include their continuations, namely the carriageway of streets; therefore, a section of an urban street may form part of a road of national significance until it is removed from the relevant list. Under Article 3(3) of the same law, local roads are used for local traffic, and streets in residential areas are classified as public local roads if they are not classified as roads of national significance. Thus, the decisive legal moment of transition is not the completion of repairs as a matter of fact, but the removal of the road of national significance or its section from the list of roads of national significance and its entry in the list of local roads. Article 4(4) of the Law on Roads also establishes the substantive preconditions for such removal: the construction of a new road or bypass, a change in the road’s socio-economic significance, a reduction in traffic intensity, the straightening of sections, or the construction of a section of a road bearing the same name in a new location. The bypass direction and the nature of the urban section mentioned in the report are legally relevant to the extent that they fall within these statutory preconditions; the final proposal under the provision is made by the Ministry of Transport and Communications. The consent of the municipal council is a necessary condition, because Article 4(4) of the Law on Roads links the transfer into municipal ownership specifically to the consent of the council of the relevant municipality. Following consent and transfer, the road is transferred not in isolation, but “together with all structures and technical traffic regulation devices belonging to them”; therefore, the practical object of transfer would include not only the pavement, but also elements of the road infrastructure. For the formalisation of the transfer of State assets, paragraph 21 of the Description approved by Resolution No. 16 of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania of 5 January 2001 is relevant, under which the transfer of State assets is formalised by a transfer-acceptance act. Paragraph 20.1 of the same Description indicates that the transfer of State-owned immovable property referred to in Article 4(4) of the Law on Roads is subject to a special regime, because certain general provisions of the Description do not apply in such a case. Government Resolution No. 760 of 22 September 2021 concerning the taking over and transfer of a local road provides an example of administrative practice showing that the transfer of roads is formalised by a Government resolution, taking into account the decision of the municipal council and the procedure for transferring State assets. When the road becomes a public local road, Article 20 of the Law Amending the Law on Roads will also change the competence for issuing permits for oversized or heavy vehicles: for roads of national significance, permits are issued in accordance with the procedure established by the Ministry of Transport and Communications, whereas for public local roads they are issued in accordance with the procedure established by municipalities
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that, after completion of the repair stage referred to in the fourth quarter of 2026 and completion of the remaining works in 2027, the Ministry of Transport and Communications initiates the removal of the section from the list of roads of national significance, the municipal council gives its consent, and the road is transferred into the ownership of Telšiai District Municipality by a transfer-acceptance act. In that case, the legal status of the road changes: it becomes a public local road entered in the list of local roads pursuant to Article 4(4) of the Law on Roads. In practical terms, this is important for the municipality because the owner’s competence in respect of the maintenance, organisation of repairs, and regulation of use of the public local road passes to it within the limits of municipal competence. It is also important for road users and carriers because, following the change in status, the procedure for permits to drive oversized or heavy vehicles would be linked to the procedure established by the municipality under Article 20 of the Law Amending the Law on Roads. The second scenario is that, if the decisions provided for in Article 4(4) of the Law on Roads are not adopted by the time the repair works are completed, the road remains an object of exclusive State ownership, and the one-year term provided for in the cooperation agreement operates only as a contractual organisational undertaking. During such period, the municipality’s actual maintenance or financing does not extinguish the State ownership and right-of-trust regime, because under Article 4(2) of the Law on Roads the road of national significance continues to be registered as State-owned and managed under the right of trust by the public limited liability company Lithuanian Road Administration. The third scenario concerns the scope of the transfer: if the entire urban section of road No. 4636 referred to in the report is transferred, the municipality takes over the integrated management of local street infrastructure, and the function of the State road manager in that section comes to an end. The practical value of such transfer is not abstract “efficiency”, but alignment of competences: the streets, their maintenance, and local transport decisions pass to the entity to which public local roads and streets belong under Article 4(3) of the Law on Roads
Should the City Municipality of Šiauliai’s invitation to submit, via a form, proposals for municipality-owned or municipality-maintained objects requiring improvement be regarded as a formal local residents’ poll, or merely as consultation subject to a duty to assess and publish the results?
Article 4(8) of the Law on Local Self-Government provides that municipalities must create conditions for residents to participate directly in the planning and implementation of municipal decisions, while Article 4(9) enshrines the principle of openness and transparency of municipal activities. The cited version of Article 42, concerning the conditions for residents’ participation, breaks this duty down more specifically: the municipality not only informs and consults, but also assesses and publishes the results of consultations, and involves residents in decision-making. On the other hand, Article 42 of the Law on Local Self-Government, insofar as it concerns a decision to announce a poll, links the mandatory announcement of a poll to formal grounds: the required number of signatures, a demand by a group comprising at least one quarter of council members, or the assessment of an initiative by an elder.
The news item indicates only an administrative invitation to complete a form concerning public spaces, paths, squares, parks, playgrounds, lighting and other common-use objects. The stronger conclusion, therefore, is that this is a consultation measure rather than a formal statutory poll.
In practice, the greatest risk for the municipality would be to communicate this initiative as an open-ended collection of ideas with no subsequent trace: under the participation model set out in Article 42, consultation results must be assessed and made public. For a lawyer or journalist, the important distinction here is between political priority-setting and a legally binding poll: residents’ proposals do not in themselves oblige the municipality to repair first the object mentioned most often, but the municipality should be able to show how the proposals were linked to the budget, municipal competence, and whether the objects fall within municipal ownership or responsibility. The municipality’s request not to propose private objects, the interiors or exteriors of apartment buildings, or private courtyards is legally significant, because it confines the consultation to the limits of the municipality’s competence and maintenance responsibilities.
The stronger argument is therefore not “residents voted, so the municipality is obliged”, but rather “the municipality itself initiated a consultation, and must therefore transparently show how it assessed the results.”
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the invitation by Šiauliai City Municipality, through a form, to submit proposals concerning objects owned or maintained by the municipality constitutes a form of local residents’ participation in the management of municipal affairs, and what obligations this creates for the municipality. This issue is assessed under Article 3(2)-(4), Article 4(8)-(9), Article 42 on the conditions for local residents’ participation, Article 43 on information provision, and Article 27 on control over the use of municipal property and budget of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania. If such an invitation were classified as a formal survey of local residents, Article 42 of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, “Adoption of a Decision to Announce a Survey”, would also be relevant, as it establishes the grounds for announcing a survey, the one-month time limit, and the mandatory elements of the decision. However, the notice indicates not the announcement of a formal survey, but the collection of proposals concerning priorities for public spaces, pavements, paths, parks, squares, lighting, and other objects of common use
Legal assessment. Under Article 3(2) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, local self-government means the municipality’s right to manage its own affairs independently, in accordance with the Constitution and laws, through the municipal council and the institutions formed by it. Article 3(3) of the same law identifies the municipal council and the director of the municipal administration as municipal institutions responsible for implementing the right of self-government and municipal functions in the interests of the community. Accordingly, the collection of proposals does not alter the allocation of competences: residents may initiate the identification of needs, but decisions on works, priorities, and resources are made by municipal institutions. This boundary is accurately reflected in the position set out in the source concerning draft laws No. XIP-2852 and No. XIP-2853, namely that residents’ opinions may and should influence decisions of municipal institutions, but residents may not assume the powers of the municipal council. Article 42 of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania obliges the municipality to create conditions for local residents to participate in the management of municipal affairs by informing, consulting, assessing and publicising the results of consultations, and involving them in decision-making. The same logic of participation is also reflected in Article 36 of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania concerning public municipal affairs. An invitation to submit proposals concerning city objects falls directly within the field of consultation and involvement, because the municipality is collecting information on infrastructure needs identified by residents before adopting specific management decisions. Article 43 of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania provides that information must be published in such a way that all local residents have the opportunity to obtain it, and that groups of residents directly affected must be informed on the municipality’s own initiative. The same Article 43 requires information to be published in at least two ways, one of which is the municipality’s website; therefore, from a legal perspective, a mere link to the form must be assessed together with the information channels chosen by the municipality. Article 43 also requires comprehensible text, accessibility for persons with disabilities, and contact details for obtaining additional information; accordingly, the lawfulness of the consultation depends not only on the existence of the form, but also on its accessibility and explanation. Article 4(8) of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania establishes the principle of residents’ participation, while Article 4(9) establishes the principle of openness and transparency of activities. Consequently, the assessment of collected proposals cannot remain merely an internal administrative act. The source concerning draft law No. XIVP-794 emphasises that residents’ participation is an important form of direct democracy, but cannot become mandatory, as that would negate its voluntary nature. This means that the municipality may invite residents to submit proposals, but may not lawfully treat residents’ passivity as consent to a specific list of object priorities. Article 27 of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania is important because the municipal controller supervises whether municipal property and the municipal budget are managed lawfully, efficiently, economically, and effectively. Therefore, even an object actively supported by residents cannot be managed by circumventing requirements governing property management, budget execution, and the justification of expenditure
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is that the municipality collects proposals, assesses them, and publicises the results of the consultation, as required by Article 42 of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania. The second scenario is that the proposals are used to form a list of priorities for draft decisions of municipal institutions or administrative actions, but the list itself does not become a binding decision by virtue of residents’ will. The third scenario is that, if the matter were raised as a formal survey, the procedure laid down in Article 42 of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania would have to be followed: the decision or order would have to specify the question, territory, method, date, place, and composition of the survey commission. For the municipality, this is important from the perspective of legality, openness, and accountability: it must show how residents’ opinions were used or why certain proposals did not result in decisions. For residents, this is important because, under the invitation itself, proposals concerning private objects, the interiors or exteriors of apartment buildings, and private courtyards fall outside the subject matter of this consultation. For the municipal council and the director of the municipal administration, this is important because they remain the decision-making institutions, while residents’ participation is a means of substantiating decisions and setting priorities. For the municipal controller, this may become relevant where municipal financial resources begin to be used or municipal property is managed on the basis of the proposals. The ultimate legal significance of this initiative is not that residents themselves decide what is to be repaired, but that the municipality is obliged transparently to incorporate their views into the process of managing public objects falling within municipal competence
When introducing a four-day week, a shorter working day, flexible working hours or hybrid remote work, may an employer treat this merely as an organisational practice, or must it amend the working time norm, working time regime and remote-work arrangement defined in the employment contract and workplace rules?
Article 112 of the Labour Code establishes the key boundary: the working time norm, i.e. the amount of time the employee must work for the employer on average, must be set out in the employment contract, and the standard norm is 40 hours per week, unless a reduced norm applies or part-time work is agreed. A four-day week therefore does not in itself mean shorter working time: if the 40-hour norm remains, the issue is one of allocation of working time; if the hours are actually reduced, this must be a contractual change to the norm. Article 116 of the Labour Code on flexible working schedules does not give the employer the right simply to “dissolve” working time: the employer sets fixed hours during which the employee must work, and only the non-fixed hours may be chosen by the employee before or after those hours.
Article 52 of the Labour Code defines remote work as a form of work organisation applied at the employee’s request or by agreement of the parties, and an employee’s refusal to work remotely cannot constitute a lawful reason to terminate the contract or change working conditions.
The stronger argument for an employer now is not “we provided flexibility”, but “we clearly distinguished between the working time norm, the working time regime and the place where work is performed”. In a four-day week model, the first point to document is whether the employee is still working 40 hours per week or whether their working time norm is being reduced; otherwise, in a dispute it will be easier for the employee to argue that unrecorded additional work was introduced under the label of a “shorter week”. In the case of a flexible schedule, the critical mistake would be to retain only a general statement about flexibility without defining fixed hours and the procedure for changing them, because Article 116 of the Labour Code makes precisely that element the core of the regime.
In the case of hybrid remote work, the employer should not rely solely on an internal policy: under Article 52 of the Labour Code, an employee request or agreement between the parties is required, so a compulsory move to a remote or hybrid model would be a weaker position than a clear individual agreement.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether an employer, when introducing a four-day week, a shorter working day or a flexible schedule, lawfully changes the working time norm and its distribution without infringing the employee’s interests in remuneration, rest and clarity. It is assessed under Article 112 of the Labour Code of the Republic of Lithuania on the working time norm, Article 113 on working time arrangements, and Article 116 on flexible working schedules. Article 1(2) of the Labour Code is relevant insofar as such models concern not only the individual employment relationship, but also collective labour relations, disputes and supervision of compliance with the law. Article 2 of the Labour Code establishes the principles of legal certainty, protection of legitimate expectations, safe and healthy working conditions, stability of employment relations, fair remuneration for work and equality of employees, which limit formal but in fact unclear working time experiments. Where work is performed within the territory of the Republic of Lithuania, Article 8 of the Labour Code determines the application of Lithuanian labour law rules, and in the case of employees posted by a foreign employer, Article 108 of the Labour Code is additionally relevant
Legal assessment. Under Article 112(1) of the Labour Code, the working time norm must be set out in the employment contract; therefore, the employer cannot confine itself to an internal notice stating that a four-day week or shortened working day will apply from now on. Article 112(2) of the Labour Code permits the norm to be expressed in hours per week, per day or another reference period, but this must be done without breaching maximum working time and minimum rest requirements. Under Article 112(3) of the Labour Code, the standard norm for an employee is forty hours per week, unless labour law rules provide for a reduced norm or the parties agree on part-time work. A four-day week may therefore mean not a shorter norm, but only a different distribution of that norm, if the employee is still required to work the agreed number of weekly hours. A shorter working day that reduces the total number of weekly hours must be assessed through the lens of Article 112(3) of the Labour Code as reduced working time, where it is established by labour law rules, or as part-time work, where the parties so agree. Article 113(1) of the Labour Code defines working time arrangements as the distribution of the working time norm over a day, week, month or another reference period, which may not exceed three consecutive months. Article 113(2) of the Labour Code permits the employer to establish working time arrangements for one employee, a group of employees or all employees, unless labour law rules or the employment contract provide otherwise. The same provision expressly identifies arrangements relevant to the models described in the notice: fixed daily working time and number of working days per week, aggregate recording of working time, and flexible working schedules. Under Article 116(1) of the Labour Code, the essence of a flexible schedule is that the start and/or end of the working day is determined by the employee, but only in compliance with the rules set by the employer. Under Article 116(2) of the Labour Code, the employer determines fixed hours of the working day during which the employee must work at the workplace, and those hours may be changed by notifying the employee no later than two of the employee’s working days in advance. Under the same paragraph, non-fixed hours are worked at the employee’s choice before or after the fixed hours, meaning that flexibility is not the employer’s right to require the employee’s availability at any time. Article 116(3) of the Labour Code permits, with the employer’s consent, non-fixed hours not worked to be transferred to another working day, but only without breaching maximum working time and minimum rest requirements. Article 113(1) of the Labour Code also establishes an obligation to grant certain employees’ requests to work under their preferred working time arrangements where the request is made by a pregnant, recently confined or breastfeeding employee, an employee raising a child under eight years of age, an employee raising alone a child under fourteen years of age or a disabled child under eighteen years of age, as well as an employee whose request is based on a conclusion of a healthcare institution or on the need to care for a family member. This obligation is not absolute, because the same provision makes it subject to the condition that the employer does not incur excessive costs due to production necessity or the specific features of work organisation. In the case of reduced working time, Article 112(4) of the Labour Code and paragraph 4 of the description approved by amendment to Government Resolution No. 496 of 21 June 2017 are relevant; that paragraph sets, for certain teachers, a weekly working time norm not exceeding 36 hours. Paragraph 9 of the same description provides that employees working reduced working time are paid for reduced working time as for full-time work. If an undertaking uses temporary agency workers, Article 78(1) of the Labour Code obliges the user undertaking, before work begins, to inform them in writing of the working conditions, workplace rules and other legal acts regulating their work. For employees posted by a foreign employer, Article 108(2) of the Labour Code ensures the application of Lithuanian rules in the areas of maximum working time, minimum rest, remuneration, including increased pay for overtime work, occupational safety and health, and prohibition of discrimination. The role of the State Labour Inspectorate under the Ministry of Social Security and Labour is reflected in the amendment to Article 6(12) of the Law on the Implementation of the Labour Code, under which it monitors implementation of the Labour Code and assesses, among other matters, breaches of rules on working time recording, information and consultation, and remuneration
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is lawful implementation of the model: the employment contracts clearly establish the working time norm under Article 112 of the Labour Code, the working time arrangement is selected under Article 113 of the Labour Code, and, in the case of a flexible schedule, fixed and non-fixed hours are established under Article 116 of the Labour Code. The second scenario is that the employer retains the forty-hour norm but redistributes it over four days or another reference period; the principal legal assessment would therefore be whether such distribution breaches the maximum working time and minimum rest requirements referred to in Articles 112, 113 and 116 of the Labour Code. The third scenario is that the employer in fact reduces working hours but fails to distinguish reduced working time from part-time work; this is important for remuneration, because paragraph 9 of the description approved by amendment to Government Resolution No. 496 provides, for certain reduced working time, payment as for full-time work. The fourth scenario is that a flexible schedule becomes continuous availability after fixed hours, which conflicts with the logic of Article 116 of the Labour Code, under which the arrangement of non-fixed hours depends on the employee’s choice and must be compatible with rest requirements. For employees, this is practically important for clarity of the working time norm, remuneration and the right to plan rest; for employers, it is important for work organisation, working time recording and dispute risk. For temporary agency workers and posted workers, this is additionally important because Articles 78 and 108 of the Labour Code provide for separate obligations to inform them of conditions and to apply Lithuanian rules in the areas of working time, rest and remuneration. If the new arrangement is introduced inconsistently, its legal weakness will lie primarily not in the idea of flexibility itself, but in an undefined norm, an unclear arrangement, a failure to distinguish fixed hours, and insufficiently documented working conditions
The specific issue is the date from which a church marriage produces civil legal effects: the date of the church ceremony or the date on which it is entered in the records of the civil registry office. This is relevant for Panevėžys because, in 2025, of 431 registered marriages, around 50 were church marriages, and the news item stresses that there is generally no need to apply to the Civil Registry Division unless a paid extract is sought.
Article 3.24(2) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage contracted in accordance with the procedure established by a church produces the same legal consequences as a civil marriage only if the conditions set out in Articles 3.12-3.17 of the Civil Code have not been breached, the marriage was contracted in accordance with the canons of a state-recognised religious organisation, and it has been entered in the records of the civil registry office. Article 3.304(1) of the Civil Code imposes the obligation to submit the notification within 10 days not on the newlyweds, but on an authorised person of the religious organisation. The key rule is found in Article 3.304(2)-(3): if the notification is submitted on time, the marriage is deemed to have been contracted on the date of the church registration; however, if the 10-day deadline is missed, the marriage is deemed to have been contracted only from the date on which it is entered in the records of the civil registry office.
In practice, the stronger argument is not the formal proposition that “a church marriage is automatically equivalent to a civil marriage”, but the conditional one: its civil effect depends on a proper and timely record-entry step. For a lawyer, it is important to verify not only the date of the ceremony, but also whether the religious organisation’s notification was submitted within 10 days, because this may determine the date of marriage for purposes of inheritance, property regimes, obligations, or the status of foreign nationals. The statement by Panevėžys Municipality that a church marriage is registered within one working day after submission of the documents does not remove the 10-day threshold laid down in the Civil Code: the risk arises precisely where the documents are submitted late to the civil registry office.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not which day of the week is “most suitable” for marriage, but under what conditions a civil registry office may register a marriage, record a church marriage, and what significance attaches to the chosen office, date, and procedural time limits. This issue is governed by Articles 2.19, 3.24, 3.303 and 3.304 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, Articles 8, 19 and 20 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Registration of Civil Status Acts, as well as the regulation set out in paragraphs 374-375 of the resolution “On the Approval of the Report on the Implementation in Lithuania of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.” Article 2.19(1) of the Civil Code establishes the fundamental rule that civil status acts are registered by civil registry offices by making the relevant entry and issuing a certificate of the act record. Accordingly, the role of the Panevezys Civil Registry Division in this context is not that of an organiser of a celebration, but that of an institution performing a public registration function. Article 8 of the Law on the Registration of Civil Status Acts is central to the question of territorial choice, because a person may apply for the registration of civil status acts to any civil registry office
Legal assessment. The core of civil marriage registration is formed by Article 3.303 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania and Article 19 of the Law on the Registration of Civil Status Acts: a marriage is registered in the presence of the persons wishing to marry and two witnesses, and before registration the civil registry office must verify whether the conditions for entering into marriage set out in Articles 3.12-3.17 of the Civil Code have been met. This means that Friday, Saturday, or any other working day is not, in itself, a legal condition; what is legally decisive is the presence of the persons, the witnesses, verification of the conditions for entering into marriage, and the drawing up of the marriage record. Article 19(3) of the Law on the Registration of Civil Status Acts clearly links completion of registration to the marriage record, while Article 3.303(3) of the Civil Code links it to the issuance of a marriage certificate. Paragraph 374 of the resolution supplements the temporal aspect of the procedure: marriage is registered no earlier than one month after the date on which the application to register the marriage is submitted. The same paragraph 374 also provides for an exception: the head of the civil registry office may, for important reasons and at the request of the persons wishing to marry, allow the marriage to be registered before one month has elapsed. Therefore, the recommendation to reserve the desired date as early as possible has practical significance, but no independent substantive legal significance: it helps align the chosen time with the mandatory minimum period and the office’s work organisation. Paragraph 374 of the resolution also provides that an application to register a marriage ceases to be valid if at least one of the applicants fails to appear at the appointed time for registration of the marriage or if the application is withdrawn. Article 8 of the Law on the Registration of Civil Status Acts supports the possibility mentioned in the notice of applying to a civil registry office of one’s choice, since the right to apply is not linked to the declared place of residence. However, under Article 19(2) of the Law on the Registration of Civil Status Acts, the registration ceremony itself is organised in accordance with the procedure established in the Rules for the Registration of Civil Status Acts, so issues of place, time and form of ceremony form part of procedural organisation. In the case of a church marriage, Article 3.24 of the Civil Code applies: such a marriage produces the same legal consequences as a civil marriage only if the conditions in Articles 3.12-3.17 of the Civil Code have not been breached, it has been concluded in accordance with the canonical procedure of religious organisations registered in Lithuania and recognised by the State, and it has been recorded by a civil registry office. Article 20(1) of the Law on the Registration of Civil Status Acts imposes an obligation on the religious community or association, within ten days after the marriage is concluded, to submit to the civil registry office of the place where the marriage was concluded a notification in the form established by the Minister of Justice. Under the same provision, upon receiving the notification and documents, the civil registry office records the church marriage on its own initiative. Article 3.24(3) and (4) and Article 3.304(2) and (3) of the Civil Code determine the consequences for the date: if the notification is submitted on time, the marriage is deemed to have been concluded from the date of the church marriage; if it is not submitted within ten days, from the date on which it is recorded by the civil registry office
Consequences. The first practical scenario is that the couple submits the application in time, both prospective spouses and two witnesses attend, the civil registry office verifies the conditions under Articles 3.12-3.17 of the Civil Code, draws up the marriage record, and issues a certificate under Article 3.303 of the Civil Code. In that case, the chosen day, including Friday or another working day, operates legally only as the agreed time of registration. The second scenario is that the application has been submitted, but at least one person fails to appear at the appointed time or the application is withdrawn; under paragraph 374 of the resolution, such an application ceases to be valid, so a new procedural basis would be required in order to register the marriage. The third scenario is that the couple chooses a church marriage: the legal consequences are equivalent to those of a civil marriage only where the conditions under Article 3.24 of the Civil Code and Article 20 of the Law on the Registration of Civil Status Acts are met. The fourth scenario concerns missing the deadline in the case of a church marriage: if the notification is not submitted within ten days, the commencement date of the marriage, under Article 3.24(4) and Article 3.304(3) of the Civil Code, shifts to the date on which it is recorded by the civil registry office. This is practically important for the spouses themselves, because family relations arise from the moment the marriage is concluded under Article 3.28 of the Civil Code, and the right of spouses to choose a surname arises under Article 3.31 of the Civil Code. It is also important for civil registry offices, because their duty is not merely to reserve a date, but to verify the statutory conditions, draw up the record, and ensure that the civil status act is properly registered
Could Lithuania, on the basis of the currently proposed legal framework for AI, impose a mandatory age-differentiated restriction on the use of generative AI in schools, analogous to the Norwegian model?
Article 8 of the amendment to the Law on Technology and Innovation merely adds Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, i.e. the AI Act, to the annex of EU legal acts being implemented, while Article 1 provides that the provisions of the law are aligned with it. This means the creation of an alignment and national implementation framework, but not an independent obligation for schools to prohibit or permit AI according to pupils’ age. Article 7 of the Law on Technology and Innovation links the progress of the state to the promotion of creativity, technological knowledge and innovation activity; therefore, on the basis of the provisions provided, the stronger argument is not for prohibition, but for regulated AI literacy and the integration of innovation.
The functions of the institution set out in Article 14 are likewise directed towards programmes, funding, innovative procurement and the assessment of economic operators, rather than the imposition of mandatory restrictions on the educational process for schools.
In practice, the implementation of the AI Act through the Law on Technology and Innovation alone would not be sufficient for Lithuanian institutions to justify a Norwegian-type ban as a directly arising obligation for schools. The stronger position today would be that any mandatory restriction should be established by a separate education policy decision or by specific rules in the field of education, rather than inferred from general technology and innovation regulation. For schools and their advisers, the risk lies in overstating the effect of the EU AI Act: according to the news item provided, it does not regulate how AI must be used in schools, although it does establish the direction of AI literacy.
Therefore, in the absence of strict national rules, the more legally robust practical document would be not an absolute prohibition, but a clear internal policy on age, teacher supervision, forms of assessment and disclosure of AI use.
Core issue. The legal issue is not whether the Norwegian model could as such be transposed to Lithuania, but which Lithuanian institution, and on what legal basis, could set the limits for the use of AI in general education schools. This issue is to be assessed primarily under Article 1, Article 56(1)(1), (4) and (5), Article 57(1), Article 58(1)(1), and Article 63 of the Law on Education of the Republic of Lithuania. The technological aspect of AI is linked to Article 14(2) of the Law on Technology and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania, in particular Article 14(2)(122), as well as Articles 1, 2, 5 and 8 of the Law Amending the Law on Technology and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania, by which that law is aligned with Regulation (EU) 2024/1689. Under the cited provisions, matters concerning general education content and school operations remain matters of education governance, rather than solely matters of technology and innovation policy
Legal assessment. Article 1 of the Law on Education establishes the objectives of the education system, including developing intellect, providing education corresponding to the current level of science and culture, and creating conditions for the development of individuality. Accordingly, the legality of restricting AI in schools should be assessed by reference to whether such restriction is reasonably connected with the quality of education, the development of pupils’ abilities, and the implementation of the objectives of the education system. Article 56(1)(1) of the Law on Education entrusts the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport with forming state education policy and organising, coordinating and controlling its implementation. Under Article 56(1)(4) of the same law, the Ministry is responsible for the quality of education; this competence is therefore central when considering whether AI in schools should be restricted by reference to pupils’ age, stage of education, or teacher supervision. Article 56(1)(5) of the Law on Education allows the Ministry to submit proposals and draft resolutions to the Government concerning the preparation and improvement of laws and other legal acts, meaning that a stricter national regime could be initiated through this procedural channel. Other ministries and Government institutions may, under Article 57(1)(1) and (2) of the Law on Education, participate in working groups, submit proposals, and, together with the Minister of Education and Science, issue legal acts relating to education. The role of municipalities derives from Article 58(1)(1) of the Law on Education: the representative institution of a municipality implements state education policy within the municipality and establishes long-term education development objectives and measures. Thus, if the State were to opt for restrictions on AI use, municipalities would be important in implementing them across the school network, but they would not be the principal institution for formulating a rule applicable throughout Lithuania. The school community is also not excluded: Article 63(1) of the Law on Education allows pupils, teachers, parents and schools to participate in education governance through associations representing their interests. Under Article 63(2), teachers’ associations participate in developing subject content and addressing professional development matters; therefore, a model of AI literacy and supervised use should be aligned with the issue of teachers’ competences. Article 56²(1) of the Law on Education is significant because the Education Management Information System is intended to provide data necessary to analyse the state of education, forecast change, and adopt data-based decisions. This provides a legal basis not merely for declaratively prohibiting or permitting AI, but for relying in education governance on data concerning the quality of education and changes in the education system. Article 8 of the Law Amending the Law on Technology and Innovation includes Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 in the annex to the national law, while Article 1 provides that the provisions of the law are aligned with the EU legal act listed in that annex. Article 2 of the same amending law provides that other concepts used in the Law on Technology and Innovation are to be understood as defined in Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 and in the other specified laws. However, in the cited technology and innovation provisions, the principal expressly identified national function is not the establishment of rules for the use of AI in schools, but the performance, under Article 14(2)(122) of the Law on Technology and Innovation, of the functions of the national competent authority, namely the notifying authority. By point 1 of the Government Resolution “On the Granting of Authorisations for the Implementation of the Law on Technology and Innovation of the Republic of Lithuania”, the Agency for Science, Innovation and Technology is authorised to perform the functions of the authority referred to in Article 14 of the Law on Technology and Innovation, except for the function specified in Article 14(2)(11). Accordingly, the line concerning AI technology conformity and innovation administration runs through the Law on Technology and Innovation, whereas the line concerning restrictions on school use runs through the education policy competence conferred by the Law on Education
Consequences. The most realistic legal scenario in Lithuania would not be the automatic replication of the Norwegian prohibition, but an education policy decision initiated by the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport under Article 56(1) of the Law on Education. Such a decision could differentiate AI use according to stages of education, pupils’ age, teacher supervision, and educational objectives, because education quality and the objectives of the education system are the legal centre of assessment. A second scenario would be a path based on recommendations, methodological support, and strengthening teachers’ qualifications, relying on the participation of the school community and teachers’ associations provided for in Article 63 of the Law on Education. A third scenario would be a broader legislative route, whereby the Ministry submits draft legal acts to the Government under Article 56(1)(5) of the Law on Education, and other institutions participate under Article 57(1). The practical significance for schools would be that AI use would become not merely a matter of internal rules or teacher choice, but part of the implementation of education policy. For teachers, this would mean an obligation to act in accordance with the established model for organising education, while also participating in curriculum and professional development processes. For parents and pupils, the possibility granted by Article 63 of the Law on Education to participate in education governance through relevant associations is important, particularly if restrictions were to affect everyday learning and assessment. For technology providers, it is important that matters concerning the administration of AI product conformity would be linked to Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 and Article 14(2)(122) of the Law on Technology and Innovation, while rules on school use would be formulated through education law instruments. Thus, on the basis of the sources provided, Lithuania has a legal pathway for considering restrictions similar to those in Norway, but such a decision should be adopted through national education policy, data-based education governance, and a clear allocation of institutional competences
Does the sham employment of third-country nationals and their work on a farm, where their choice was driven by the aim of remaining in Lithuania, in itself establish the elements of forced labour under Article 1471 of the Criminal Code, if deception, dependence, vulnerability or other control constraining their will has not been proved?
Article 1471(1) of the Criminal Code criminalises not any unlawful or illegal work, but work where a person is unlawfully compelled to work “by the use of physical violence, threats, deception or other means specified in Article 147 of this Code”. Article 147 of the Criminal Code identifies such means as including, among others, taking advantage of dependence or vulnerability, and deception. It is therefore insufficient for the prosecution merely to show a breach of migration rules or sham employment.
If the facts more closely correspond to the employment of third-country nationals unlawfully present in the Republic of Lithuania, the relevant basis for legal classification may be Article 2921 of the Criminal Code, but that provision is not an automatic bridge to Article 1471. Article 1472 of the Criminal Code, concerning the use of forced labour, likewise depends on establishing the primary means of exploitation: there must be knowledge, or the possibility of knowing, that the work is being performed because of violence, threats, deception or other means referred to in Article 147 of the Criminal Code.
In its ruling of 17 June 2026 in criminal case No. 2K-123-697/2026, the Supreme Court of Lithuania upheld the acquittal delivered by the court of first instance and quashed the conviction entered by the appellate court. The Court regarded it as decisive that the appellate court had not proved the victims’ dependence, vulnerability or material deception, and had not established any control constraining their will.
The practical rule arising from this ruling is a strict evidential threshold between a migration or labour-law breach and criminal exploitation for forced labour: sham employment at UAB “Hegelmann Transporte” and work at ŽŪB “Aviena ir ėriena” do not, without more, prove an offence under Article 1471 of the Criminal Code.
The news report’s wording referring to the “necessary elements of deception, taking advantage of the victims’ dependence and vulnerability” is inaccurate if understood as requiring all of those elements cumulatively. Article 1471 of the Criminal Code sets out alternative means of influence: physical violence, threats, deception or other means specified in Article 147 of the Criminal Code. It would therefore be more accurate to say that, in this particular case, the charge was based specifically on deception, dependence and vulnerability, but that the constituent elements of forced labour generally may also be proved by other means provided for in Articles 1471 and 147 of the Criminal Code.
The stronger argument after this ruling is not that “illegal work means exploitation”, but the opposite: Article 1471 of the Criminal Code requires proof of a specific means of breaking the person’s will or exploiting them, and a causal link between that means and the work. For the defence, it is worth citing the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the sham employment of third-country nationals and possible illegal or undeclared work may fall within the substance of other infringements, but does not provide a basis, in itself, for finding forced labour. For prosecutors and representatives of victims, the risk is that the charge will fail if it rests solely on a migration breach, an economic motive to remain in Lithuania or employer dishonesty, without proof of why the person was in reality unable freely to refuse the work.
Core issue. The legal issue is not whether third-country nationals worked in breach of employment or migration procedures, but whether their work met the elements of exploitation for forced labour under Article 1471 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Under Article 1471(1) of the Criminal Code, this offence requires that a person be unlawfully compelled to work by means of physical violence, threats, deception, or other means specified in Article 147 of the Criminal Code. Those “other means” under Article 147(1) include, inter alia, depriving a person of the ability to resist, taking advantage of the victim’s dependency or vulnerability, deception, or providing a benefit to a person who in fact controls the victim. A derivative issue also arose concerning the application of Article 1472(1) of the Criminal Code: whether other persons used the labour while knowing, or having and being able to know, that it was performed as a result of coercive means used against a person for the purpose of exploitation. Separately, Article 2921 of the Criminal Code is important for classification purposes, as it criminalises acts by an employer or an employer’s authorised person where third-country nationals unlawfully present in the Republic of Lithuania are employed, including employment carried out as a business, the employment of five or more such persons, or employment under particularly exploitative working conditions
Legal assessment. In its ruling of 17 June 2026 in criminal case No. 2K-123-697/2026, the Supreme Court of Lithuania drew the essential line between unlawful or fictitious employment and forced labour within the meaning of criminal law. Under Article 1471(1) of the Criminal Code, disordered employment relations or non-compliance with requirements governing the legal status of foreigners is not sufficient in itself unless unlawful compulsion to work is established through deception, threats, violence, dependency, vulnerability, or another means of overcoming a person’s will specified in Article 147 of the Criminal Code. As reported, the Supreme Court held that the appellate court had not substantiated the victims’ dependency and vulnerability, while its findings on deception were contradictory and unfounded. This means that the application of Article 1471 of the Criminal Code requires not a formal background of illegality, but a specific causal link between the prohibited means used and the person’s decision to work. If the persons were able freely to choose their course of conduct, were satisfied with the initial offer to work on the farm, and made the decision to work essentially independently, the elements of Article 1471 of the Criminal Code are not proved according to the Supreme Court’s assessment. Liability under Article 1472(1) of the Criminal Code likewise depends on the primary fact of exploitation: the use of labour is punishable only where the work is performed as a result of violence, threats, deception, or other means specified in Article 147 of the Criminal Code used against the person for the purpose of exploitation. Accordingly, where the elements of Article 1471 of the Criminal Code are not established, there is also no basis for derivative liability for the use of forced labour under Article 1472 of the Criminal Code. A legal person’s liability under Article 1471(4) and Article 1472(3) of the Criminal Code is possible only for the acts provided for in those respective provisions and therefore cannot be based solely on the company’s involvement in organising work in the absence of the elements of forced labour. On the other hand, the fictitious employment at UAB “Hegelmann Transporte” and the work at the agricultural company emphasised by the Supreme Court may fall within the scope of Article 2921 of the Criminal Code or breaches of the rules on employing foreigners, but that is a different direction of legal classification. Article 57(1) of the Law on Employment treats, for example, failure to submit the required documents on qualifications or work experience and failure to retain or submit to the authorities copies of documents confirming the right to be, reside, or work in the Republic of Lithuania as breaches of the rules on employing foreigners. Procedurally, it is significant that under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, participants in proceedings and other natural or legal persons may, on their own initiative, submit objects and documents relevant to the investigation and examination of a criminal offence. Article 99 of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines the purpose of procedural time limits, while Article 100 establishes how they are calculated in hours, days, and months, including the rule that the day on which a time limit begins is not counted and that a time limit expiring on a non-working day is extended to the first following working day. If, in a similar case, insufficient data were collected during the pre-trial investigation to substantiate the suspect’s guilt, Article 212(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides a ground for terminating the pre-trial investigation
Consequences. Since the cassation court upheld the acquittal, the practical consequence for criminal liability under Articles 1471 and 1472 of the Criminal Code in this case is that the classification as exploitation for forced labour and use of forced labour no longer remains. This is important for employers and their authorised persons, because the Supreme Court clearly distinguishes the risk of unlawful work by foreigners from the more serious classification of forced labour, which requires proof of restriction of a person’s will within the meaning of Articles 147 and 1471 of the Criminal Code. For third-country nationals, this ruling practically means that breaches of the legal status of their work do not in themselves amount to their recognition as victims of forced labour from the perspective of criminal law. For law enforcement authorities and courts, this case is significant in terms of the evidentiary standard: it is necessary to establish not only a breach of employment procedures, but also the specific effect of deception, dependency, vulnerability, or another means specified in Article 147 of the Criminal Code on the person’s decision to work. A realistic further course in similar situations would be to shift the legal classification from Articles 1471 and 1472 of the Criminal Code to Article 2921 of the Criminal Code or to breaches of the rules on employing foreigners set out in Article 57 of the Law on Employment, where the facts correspond specifically to those provisions. For legal persons, the practical message is twofold: they may be liable for forced labour under Article 1471(4) and Article 1472(3) of the Criminal Code, but only where the elements of forced labour itself or of the use of such labour have been proved
Can the exclusion of the IOC and other international sports federations from EU funding programmes be based solely on their political or sanctions-related conduct regarding Russian and Belarusian athletes, where the provisions provided directly regulate only the limits on the use of funds by Lithuanian charity and sponsorship foundations?
Article 1 of the Law on Charity and Sponsorship Foundations of the Republic of Lithuania, as provided, defines a very narrow scope of application: it regulates legal persons whose legal form is that of a charity and sponsorship foundation. Article 2 links a foundation’s activities to the provision of charity, sponsorship or other assistance in areas beneficial to society, including sport, while Article 18(1) permits the transfer of a foundation’s assets and funds only where this implements the objectives set out in the foundation’s statutes. Article 18(2)(2) further prohibits the gratuitous transfer of a foundation’s assets to a third party, except for charity and sponsorship purposes.
Accordingly, only a limited rule can be derived from the provisions provided: financial support in the field of sport is not automatically neutral; it must comply with the legal objectives of the donor and the prescribed conditions for the use of funds. However, these provisions do not, in themselves, provide a basis for determining the eligibility of the IOC or Erasmus+ funding.
The stronger argument in this situation is not that sports organisations are inherently “not entitled” to receive support because of decisions concerning Russian and Belarusian athletes, but that the funding conditions must clearly establish a values-based, sanctions-related or reputational eligibility criterion. For a professional audience, it is important not to transpose the Lithuanian Law on Charity and Sponsorship Foundations directly into the context of EU funding programmes: the provision is useful only as an analogy illustrating the logic of targeted use of funds, not as a legal basis for excluding the IOC from Erasmus+. The practical risk is that a political letter, without a clear basis in programme rules or the EU sanctions regime, may remain merely a recommendation rather than an enforceable funding prohibition.
Therefore, when drafting or challenging such a restriction, the decisive point would be to cite not the general moral purpose of support, but the specific provisions of the EU programme concerning eligibility, sanctions or values-based conditions; these are absent from the present evidentiary material.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not whether the IOC or international sports federations are “worthy” of funding, but whether the provision of public support, or support linked to tax or other reliefs, to organisations that permit the return of Russian and Belarusian athletes can be compatible with the purposes of such support, the duties of support providers, and the implementation of sanctions policy. It must be assessed under Article 1(1)–(3) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on International Sanctions, Article 1(1), Article 3(2)–(3), Article 5(2) and Article 9¹(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Charity and Support, as well as Article 1, Article 2(1), Article 3 and Article 18(1)–(2) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Charity and Support Foundations. Article 1(1) of the Law on International Sanctions links the regulation to national security, foreign policy interests, the EU’s common foreign and security policy, and the maintenance of peace, stability and the rule of law. Article 1(2) of the same law covers the submission of proposals for the imposition of international sanctions and the general conditions for implementing sanctions imposed by the EU, the United Nations and other international organisations in the Republic of Lithuania. Article 3(3) of the Law on Charity and Support identifies sport as a public-benefit purpose, but the same provision also refers to international cooperation, the protection of human rights, national security and defence; accordingly, sports funding is not isolated from the other purposes protected by the law
Legal assessment. If the funding were to be classified as support under the Law on Charity and Support, then, under Article 2(2), it constitutes the voluntary and gratuitous provision of items of support to the support recipients specified in that law, for the purposes and by the means established therein. Under Article 1(1) of the Law on Charity and Support, this regulation is particularly relevant where support providers or recipients benefit from tax and customs reliefs, since in such cases the law also regulates control and accounting. Under Article 3(2) of the Law on Charity and Support, items of support must be provided for the public-benefit purposes set out in the recipients’ articles of association, regulations or other governing rules, and sport is one such field under Article 3(3). Nevertheless, the substance of the proposal is to argue that the decisions of specific sports organisations concerning the return of athletes from aggressor states may conflict not with the purpose of sport as such, but with the compatibility of the purpose of support with national security, foreign policy and human-rights protection objectives, which are likewise identified in Article 3(3) of the Law on Charity and Support. Where a state or municipal company provides support, Article 9¹(1)(1) of the Law on Charity and Support additionally applies: when deciding on support, compliance with the company’s operational objectives, social responsibility policy directions and declared values must be assessed. Under Article 9¹(1)(2), support must be purposeful, that is, it must create value in areas in which the company operates at regional or national level; and under Article 9¹(1)(3)–(4), the assessment of applications must be transparent and impartial. Therefore, political objection to a sports organisation alone does not, in itself, displace the duty to apply clear criteria, but it may form part of the substance of those criteria if linked to the purposes and values enshrined in law. In the case of charity and support foundations, Article 18(1) of the Law on Foundations permits the transfer of foundation funds only where this is aimed at implementing the operational objectives set out in the foundation’s statutes, including charity and support purposes under the Law on Charity and Support. Article 18(2)(2) of the Law on Foundations prohibits the gratuitous transfer of foundation assets to a third party, except for charity and support purposes established in the foundation’s statutes in accordance with the Law on Charity and Support. This logic is also confirmed by the cited explanatory source concerning Article 18 of the Law on Foundations: restrictions on the transfer of assets and funds are intended to ensure the foundation’s purpose, namely the provision of assistance in areas not connected with benefit to itself. From the perspective of Article 1(2) of the Law on International Sanctions, the initiative raised in the states’ letter is closest to the political-legal stage of proposing international sanctions or restrictive measures, rather than to an individual dispute concerning support accounting. In terms of competence, the general conditions for implementing sanctions in the Republic of Lithuania are based on the Law on International Sanctions, while relations concerning the provision, receipt, control and accounting of charity and support are governed by the Law on Charity and Support and, in the case of foundations, by the Law on Charity and Support Foundations. In temporal terms, the relevant provisions are already applicable: the amendments to Article 18 of the Law on Foundations, according to the amending laws provided, are linked to entry into force on 1 January 2018, 1 January 2019 and 1 May 2022, and to the financial reporting for the corresponding reporting periods
Consequences. The first practical scenario is that support providers, especially state or municipal companies and foundations, review their funding criteria and, in their decisions, expressly link any refusal to provide funding to the national security, human-rights protection, international cooperation and sports purposes enshrined in Article 3(3) of the Law on Charity and Support. The second scenario is that the issue is raised as an initiative for sanctions or restrictive measures in line with the logic of Article 1(2) of the Law on International Sanctions, since the communication refers to EU financial and political support, forums and international sports structures. The third scenario is that funding is not terminated automatically, but each provider must justify that the support complies with its applicable criteria, statutes, values, and requirements of purposefulness and transparency. For foundations, this in practice means greater responsibility for governing bodies: the transfer of funds to the IOC or federations would be lawful only to the extent that it complied with the purposes set out in the foundation’s statutes and the restrictions in Article 18 of the Law on Foundations. For state or municipal companies, the most important issue becomes the reasoning of the decision under the principles in Article 9¹(1) of the Law on Charity and Support, because support must be allocated according to uniform, clear and comprehensible criteria. For international sports organisations, the practical risk is not only the loss of money, but also restrictions on participation in public EU formats if their actions are politically and legally linked to tolerance of the interests of aggressor states. For Ukrainian athletes and their organisations, this initiative is important as an argument that the purposes of sports funding must be assessed together with the consequences of war, the protection of human rights and the national-security dimension. In the Lithuanian legal context, the final conclusion is narrow: the provisions cited allow decisions on support and funding to assess the compatibility of aggression, sanctions policy and the purposes of support, but the decision itself must be taken in accordance with the competence, statutes, transparent criteria and applicable restrictive measures relevant to the specific provider
Do assertions that a foreign state stole voter data and may have manipulated electoral infrastructure provide a legal basis for challenging the validity of an election, or do they merely raise issues of cyber incident investigation and preventive registration rules?
Article 7 of Lithuania’s Law on Cyber Security entrusts the National Cyber Security Centre with monitoring, collecting and analysing information on cyber threats, vulnerabilities and incidents, as well as managing incidents under the national plan and issuing warnings to relevant entities. It follows from this provision that facts such as the alleged theft of 220 million voter records would primarily be assessed as a matter of incident identification, verification and management, rather than as an automatic ground for invalidating an election result. Article 29 treats as an infringement not the political statement itself, but non-compliance with the requirements of the law and implementing legislation, or obstruction of the competent authorities in the performance of their functions.
The evidential burden therefore falls not on rhetoric about “stolen elections”, but on a verifiable connection between an incident, vulnerability, data compromise and impact on the electoral process.
The stronger argument for professional analysis at this stage is not Donald Trump’s claim of Chinese interference, but the contrary evidential standard: the news item itself states that the 2021 US intelligence assessment found that China did not carry out interference operations in the 2020 presidential election. In practice, this means that allegations of data theft and non-citizen registration must be distinguished from the question of whether the election result was altered. The conclusion of the Seimas draft project on the risks of election technologies is worth citing: poorly planned and untested technological solutions may become targets for hostile states and undermine confidence in the electoral process.
Thus, the risk lies not only in an actual intrusion, but also in turning institutionally unverified claims into a basis for legislation, for example a proof-of-citizenship requirement under the proposed “SAVE America Act”, without distinguishing a data security problem from a voter’s right to register.
Core issue. The legal issue is not whether D. Trump’s statements are politically well-founded, but which elements of offences under the Lithuanian criminal provisions provided would encompass conduct of this nature. Influencing a voter’s will by psychological coercion, deception, or bribery would be assessed under Article 172 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Forgery of a voter list, vote-counting protocol, ballot paper, or other electoral document, or the use of a forged document, would be assessed under Article 173 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Incorrect counting or recording of votes with the aim of influencing election results falls within Article 174 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, while the destruction, damage, theft, or concealment of electoral documents falls within Article 175. A statement concerning the actions of a foreign state and data collection may be compared with Article 119 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania on espionage; however, that provision protects state or official secrets of the Republic of Lithuania and other information of interest to a foreign state’s intelligence service. The jurisdictional limit is set by Article 6 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania: foreign nationals without permanent residence in Lithuania are liable under Lithuanian criminal law for crimes against the Lithuanian state committed abroad as provided for in Articles 114–128 of the Criminal Code
Legal assessment. If the situation were assessed through the categories of Lithuanian criminal law, a public statement about “stolen” elections would not, in itself, correspond to the acts described in Article 172 of the Criminal Code, because that provision is linked to influence exerted on a specific person entitled to vote, participate in a referendum, or be elected. Under Article 172, as set out in Article 1 of the Law Amending Article 172 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, the necessary elements are psychological coercion, deception, or bribery, and the purpose of influencing a person’s will in exercising, or refraining from exercising, electoral rights. If such acts are organised, carried out systematically, or result in the elections being declared invalid, the stricter rule in Article 172(2) applies, and under paragraph 3 a legal person may also incur liability. Allegations concerning the registration of non-U.S. citizens to vote would be most closely connected not with abstract “interference” but with the legality of voter lists: if a list were forged with the aim of influencing the result, Article 173 of the Criminal Code would apply. Allegations of “hacking” or “manipulation” of electoral infrastructure would acquire criminal-law significance under the provisions provided only where they satisfied a specific offence definition, for example the use of a forged electoral document under Article 173 or incorrect counting and recording of votes under Article 174. Under Article 174, the essential element is the aim of influencing election or referendum results; therefore, a technical vulnerability, without incorrect counting or recording of votes, is not an independent object of assessment within that provision. If electoral documents were destroyed, damaged, stolen, or concealed and the elections were consequently declared invalid, or if this had a significant impact on the results, Article 175 would apply. A statement concerning the taking of 220 million voter data records cannot, on the basis of the sources provided, be directly equated with Article 119 of the Criminal Code, because that provision concerns state or official secrets of the Republic of Lithuania, or other information of interest to a foreign state’s intelligence service, when acting on behalf of another state or its organisation. This limit is reinforced by the provided note regarding Draft Law No. XIVP-3001 amending Articles 114, 119, 120, and 121 of the Criminal Code: it emphasises that overly broad criminalisation of information collection, including publicly available information or “other Lithuanian interests,” would raise the problem of disproportionately severe liability. Article 288 of the Criminal Code would be relevant here only in the narrower situation where a civil servant, public figure, or representative of a political organisation, using influence, interfered with the activities of a civil servant or a person performing public administration functions in order to compel that person to refrain from lawful acts or to perform unlawful acts. The information provided contains no source concerning a court case; accordingly, there is no basis, on the listed sources, for addressing the application of case law
Consequences. The practical consequence under the provisions provided would be as follows: criminal liability cannot be based solely on a political accusation of foreign interference unless the conduct is subsumed under the specific elements of Articles 172, 173, 174, 175, 119, or 288 of the Criminal Code. If influence on voters’ will through deception, psychological coercion, or bribery were established, procedural attention would focus on Article 172 of the Criminal Code, including the consequences relating to organisation, systematic conduct, and the declaration of elections as invalid. If forgery of voter lists or vote-counting documents were established, the conditions of Article 173 would become central, particularly the purpose of influencing election results. If the dispute concerned vote counting, the legally relevant issue would not be the political assessment but the incorrect counting and recording of votes provided for in Article 174. If foreign actors and conduct abroad are at issue, the application of Lithuanian criminal law would be limited by Article 6 of the Criminal Code: in the sources provided, such liability of foreign nationals abroad is linked to crimes against the Lithuanian state provided for in Articles 114–128 of the Criminal Code, while electoral offences under Articles 172–175 do not fall within that range. In practical terms, therefore, this analysis is important for distinguishing a political statement from the criteria of criminal law: each scenario would depend on whether the acts, purpose, consequences, and jurisdictional basis specifically identified in the law are established
Whether M. P.’s account to the police that he had been shot by an unknown person, although he had in fact injured himself at home with an air gun, is to be classified as a report of a knowingly non-existent serious criminal offence under Article 236(1) of the Criminal Code.
Article 236(1) of the Criminal Code criminalises not any falsehood told to the police, but a report of a knowingly non-existent serious or very serious criminal offence, or the denunciation of an innocent person where this leads to that person being prosecuted. What matters here is that, following M. P.’s statement, the authorities investigated a possible serious impairment of health, not merely an abstract public-order incident or the misleading of emergency services.
Article 235 of the Criminal Code is broader and covers false statements or testimony, but Article 236 is the stronger provision in this situation because the falsehood was directed at creating a knowingly non-existent serious criminal offence. Article 285 is a weaker basis here, because the facts reported in the news indicate not a false report of a danger threatening the public, but an allegedly committed individual criminal offence.
The practical conclusion is that it is not enough for the defence simply to argue that “he was only concealing the embarrassing circumstances of his self-inflicted injury” if the content of the report objectively triggers an investigation into a serious criminal offence. The stronger prosecution argument is not the false witness account as such, but the fact that, after being warned, M. P. submitted a statement about an alleged shooting attack while knowing that there had been no attacker.
From the perspective of individualising the sentence, the logic of Article 72(5) of the Criminal Code is important: the court may order participation in alcoholism treatment or other programmes where the offence was committed while intoxicated and that intoxication influenced the criminal act. Accordingly, in analogous cases, practical attention should focus on the seriousness of the reported “offence”, the moment at which the warning about liability was given, and the connection between intoxication not only and the self-inflicted injury, but also and the making of the false report.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether M. P.’s report to the police and repeated testimony concerning an alleged shooting attack constitute a false report of a knowingly non-existent criminal offence under Article 236(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, as set out in Article 91 of the amendment to the Criminal Code. A related issue is the boundary of qualification under Article 235(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, since that provision separately covers a false report concerning a criminal act and false testimony when questioned as a witness or victim. The procedural issue concerning the outcome of the case is determined under Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, which provides for termination of a pre-trial investigation where circumstances relevant to such termination emerge during the investigation or where insufficient data are collected concerning a criminal act. The issue of the penalty and additional obligation is linked to Article 19(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, under which intoxication by alcohol does not exempt a person from criminal liability, and to Article 72^5 of the Criminal Code, which permits an obligation to participate in alcoholism or drug addiction prevention, early intervention, resocialisation, or other programmes and courses
Legal assessment. Under Article 236(1) of the Criminal Code, liability arises for a person who reports a knowingly non-existent criminal offence to an institution or official authorised to initiate criminal prosecution. In this situation, the report was submitted to the police, and the police are plainly an institution whose receipt of a report may initiate criminal prosecution. What is material is not only that the initial account was inaccurate, but that two days later M. P., having been warned of criminal liability, submitted a statement about the alleged attack and, when questioned as a witness, repeated the same circumstances. This indicates not an accidental mistake, but the provision of knowingly false facts concerning a criminal offence which, as was later established, had not been committed against him. Article 235(1) of the Criminal Code is relevant on these facts because it covers false testimony given in the status of a witness or victim; however, the final liability indicated in the report is specifically linked to a false report of a knowingly non-existent criminal offence. Article 235(3) of the Criminal Code would be relevant in cases where a specific person is falsely accused of a serious or very serious crime, but the account provided refers to an unknown attacker rather than an identified innocent person. Accordingly, the core of the legal qualification is not the incrimination of an innocent person, but the misleading of law enforcement as to the fact of a non-existent criminal offence. The termination of the pre-trial investigation into possible serious bodily injury is consistent with the logic of Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: once the investigation established that the injury resulted from M. P.’s own actions at home, there was no longer a basis to continue the investigation into an offence against him. The evidence, witness statements, expert conclusions, and other investigative material in this case performed a threshold function: they not only refuted the version of the alleged attack, but also substantiated M. P.’s separate liability for making a false report. Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits participants in proceedings and other persons to submit objects and documents relevant to the investigation and examination of a criminal act; therefore, the accumulation of procedural material in such a case is directly connected with the verification of competing versions. M. P.’s intoxication by alcohol does not exclude liability, because Article 19(1) of the Criminal Code establishes a clear rule that a person who commits a criminal act while intoxicated is not exempt from criminal liability. On the other hand, the very connection between intoxication and the act permits the application of Article 72^5 of the Criminal Code, because that provision gives the court the right to impose participation in prevention, early intervention, resocialisation, or other programmes where intoxication influenced the commission of the criminal act. The six-month term of the obligation falls within the limit established in Article 72^5 of the Criminal Code, because the term set by the court may not exceed two years. The eight-month restriction of liberty penalty corresponds to the sanction model under Article 236(1) of the Criminal Code as amended, which provides, alongside community service, a fine, and imprisonment for up to two years, for restriction of liberty. Article 285 of the Criminal Code does not become the principal provision here, because it concerns false reports of a danger or major disaster threatening the public, an entity of special importance, or an object of national significance, whereas the situation presented concerns an alleged criminal offence against a specific person
Consequences. In practical terms, the immediate consequence for M. P. is not imprisonment, but the enforcement of an eight-month restriction of liberty and a six-month obligation to participate in programmes or courses designated by the court. Since the report states that he fully admitted guilt and sincerely regretted his actions, the case has already concluded by way of a court penal order, rather than through a broader evidentiary dispute concerning the alleged attacker. For law enforcement, the practical significance of this case lies in the fact that the investigative focus shifted from a possible violent offence against M. P. to an offence against justice, also referred to in the context of Chapter XXXIV of the Criminal Code together with Articles 235 and 236. The diversion of police and pre-trial investigation resources in this case is assessed legally not as an incidental domestic consequence, but as an infringement of the order protected by Article 236 of the Criminal Code. If the person complies with the restriction of liberty and participates in the assigned programmes within the term set by the court, the legal course will be limited to the execution of the imposed measures. If he were not to comply with the imposed obligation, the practical significance would arise at the stage of enforcement of the penalty and penal measure, since Article 72^5 of the Criminal Code itself links this obligation to a specific term set by the court. For other similar cases, this situation demonstrates that a report of a non-existent criminal offence remains criminally significant even where the alleged victim did in fact sustain bodily injury, if the version of its criminal origin was deliberately fabricated
Can a change to the appointment of election commission chairs be presented as strengthening a competence filter if, under the proposed wording, no experience or education requirements at all are imposed on a person nominated by the Chair of the Central Electoral Commission?
The evidence provided concerning the draft Electoral Code identifies a key rule: “no requirements whatsoever are established for a person nominated by the Chair of the Central Electoral Commission”. This means that the competence criterion is not universal for the office of commission chair, but depends on which entity nominates the person. Article 8(6)(1) of the Law on Local Self-Government shows that the chair of a municipal election commission is not merely a technical organiser: the chair administers the oath of an elected municipal council member or authorises a commission member to do so.
The article’s statement that only a person with electoral experience or higher education may serve as chair of an election commission is incomplete. A more precise formulation would be: those requirements do not apply to all possible cases of appointing a chair, because, according to the assessment of the draft provided, no requirements are established for a person nominated by the Chair of the Central Electoral Commission. The article therefore too strongly implies that the amendment uniformly raises the professional standard for commission chairs.
In practice, the stronger argument is not the abstract claim of “greater professionalism”, but the opposite: the regulation creates an asymmetrical qualification regime in which some candidates are subject to experience or education criteria, while a person nominated by the Chair of the Central Electoral Commission is not. A lawyer or journalist should cite precisely this disproportionality, because it better substantiates doubts about the consistency of the appointment model than a general argument about political influence. The risk is that, in a dispute over the appointment of a commission chair, the competence criterion may be defended selectively, even though the chair of a municipal election commission also performs a formal mandate-legitimising function under Article 8(6)(1) of the Law on Local Self-Government.
Core issue. The legal question is whether the tightening of election administration, political communication, and monitoring described in the amendments to the Electoral Code is compatible with the constitutional right to vote and the guarantees of citizens’ participation in the governance of the State. It should primarily be assessed under Article 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, pursuant to which citizens who have reached the age of 18 on election day have the right to vote, while the right to stand for election is established by the Constitution and electoral laws. In the case of municipal elections, Article 119(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania is also applicable; it provides that members of municipal councils are elected for a four-year term by universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot. Citizens’ right to criticise the work of State institutions or officials, to appeal against their decisions, and the prohibition on persecution for criticism derive from Article 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. From the perspective of local self-government, Article 3(2) and (3), Article 8(1), and Article 72(1), (2), and (8) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania are relevant. As regards institutional control, Article 105 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania is important: under that provision, the Constitutional Court decides whether acts adopted by the Seimas are in conformity with the Constitution and issues conclusions concerning violations of electoral laws in elections of the President of the Republic or members of the Seimas
Legal assessment. If the formation of electoral commissions is in practice narrowed to civil servants or employees working in the administration of the municipal administration director, such a model should be assessed through the lens of Article 3(3) of the Law on Local Self-Government, because the administration director is an executive municipal institution vested with public administration rights and duties. This does not in itself negate local self-government, but it creates legal tension with Article 8(1) of the Law on Local Self-Government, since a member of a municipal council represents the entire municipal community, and election administration must be organised in such a way that issues of political competition within the community are not conflated with the personnel influence of the executive institution. Article 72(2) of the Law on Local Self-Government provides that municipalities are not subordinate to State institutions; therefore, any intervention by the central electoral authority or the legislature in matters relating to municipalities must be reconciled with the Constitution and laws, as indicated in paragraph 1 of the same article. Paragraph 8 of that article additionally requires that draft legal acts related to municipal activities be discussed with municipalities or the Association of Local Authorities in Lithuania in accordance with the established procedure. The expansion of the powers of the Central Electoral Commission in relation to data, campaigning, observers, and interested persons must be assessed not in the abstract, but by reference to whether it turns criticism and participation in the governance of the State, protected by Article 33 of the Constitution, into activity requiring prior permission or carrying administrative risk. The prohibition on persecution for criticism under Article 33 of the Constitution means that election control measures may not be applied merely because of an unfavourable assessment of State institutions, officials, candidates, or political organisations. At the same time, Article 34 of the Constitution permits electoral laws to lay down conditions for passive electoral rights, but that provision does not justify restrictions on active political expression that would in fact prevent voters from forming an opinion. The source concerning draft Electoral Code No. XIVP-1279(2) relies on Constitutional Court ruling No. KT135-N11/2020 of 30 July 2020, which held that constitutional laws should regulate only constitutionally significant areas of social relations. The same source states that detailed regulation by constitutional law of the Central Electoral Commission, the procedural issues of forming and operating other commissions, and issues of political campaign financing is not necessary and has no basis arising from the Constitution. This is directly relevant when assessing the scope of the amendments mentioned in the report: the more granularly campaign accounting, social media accounts, observer status, or the internal structure of commissions are regulated at the level of a constitutional law, the stronger the need to justify that the matter being regulated is indeed constitutionally significant, rather than merely procedural. The source concerning drafts No. XIP-2852 and No. XIP-2853 states that a poll of local residents, by its nature and consequences, is not equivalent to elections or a referendum, and therefore transferring the organisation of such polls to the Central Electoral Commission and electoral commissions was inconsistent with the purpose and powers of those commissions. By analogous institutional logic, this position indicates that any expansion of the competence of electoral commissions must be linked to their electoral purpose, rather than to the administration of any public political communication
Consequences. If the President were to sign the law, the practical centre of gravity would shift to decisions of the Central Electoral Commission and electoral commissions concerning the registration of observers, political advertising, the activities of interested persons, and possible orders to cease campaigning. In that event, the most practically important issue for citizens and civic groups would be to distinguish in advance between criticism protected by Article 33 of the Constitution and activity that would be regarded as a regulated political campaign under electoral law. For municipalities, it is significant that issues concerning the formation of commissions and the participation of administration employees may affect confidence in municipal council elections, which, under Article 119(2) of the Constitution, must be conducted on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage and secret ballot. If the President were to return the law to the Seimas for reconsideration, the legal dispute would focus primarily on the proportion between transparency controls and the guarantees of political participation protected by Articles 33 and 34 of the Constitution. A route of constitutional review is also possible, because under Article 105 of the Constitution the Constitutional Court has competence to decide on the conformity of acts adopted by the Seimas with the Constitution. The practical risk for electoral participants is that, if criticism, campaigning, political advertising, and the activity of an interested person are not clearly distinguished, disputes would arise already during the campaign, when the time available to appeal or correct a restrictive decision is politically extremely costly. These amendments are therefore important not only for candidates or parties, but also for voters, observers, municipal administrations, and civic initiatives, because they determine who may participate in the electoral process, and under what conditions, not as a candidate but in the role of public oversight and political expression
The specific question is whether S. Jasaitis’s claim for a monetary payment upon partition of property may be assessed separately from O. Pikul’s claim to vary the amount or form of maintenance for the minor child.
The report indicates two distinct civil proceedings: a case received on 1 December 2025 concerning variation of child maintenance, and a case received on 18 June 2026 concerning partition from co-ownership in shares. Accordingly, the public argument that the property partition claim is unfounded merely because of alleged prior failure to contribute to child maintenance is legally weaker.
Article 3.116(1) of the Civil Code provides that property constituting the spouses’ joint community property may be divided by court judgment both between married persons and between persons whose marriage has been dissolved, while paragraph 2 applies these rules where there is no spousal agreement on division of common property. Article 3.2 of the Civil Code sets out the rule that property acquired after marriage, income, dividends and other proceeds generally fall within the mass of spouses’ joint community property. On the other hand, Article 3.111(4) of the Civil Code permits the reduction of one spouse’s share by the amount of income not received by the family, where such income was not received due to that spouse’s negligence or was concealed and used for personal needs, but only for a period not exceeding the last five years before the institution of the property division proceedings.
This means that a child maintenance dispute does not in itself preclude a property claim, but may become relevant only if a specific connection is proved with the family property mass, lost income or non-performance of obligations.
In practice, the stronger position would be not to repeat in abstract terms that the former spouse “did not pay for the child”, but to separate the two issues procedurally: in the child maintenance case, to prove variation of the amount or form of maintenance by reference to the child’s needs and the parents’ means; and in the property case, to contest a specific share, contributions, the origin of the property or the conditions under Article 3.111(4) of the Civil Code. For S. Jasaitis, the risk is that if the monetary claim is based only on the formal right of a co-owner, the court will nevertheless assess whether there was income not received by the family, concealed funds or prior failure to contribute to family needs affecting the shares.
For O. Pikul, the stronger argument would not be a moral contrast between “the child’s welfare” and “his money”, but evidence that the payment sought does not correspond to the actual property regime, the shares, or the consequences of prior financial conduct. For a professional audience, the key point is not to cite this story as a single “divorce case”: procedurally, these are two separate cases with different matters to be proved and different legal rules.
Core issue. The legal issue is not whether S. Jasaitis “acted properly,” but whether a former spouse may seek monetary settlement in court in respect of former spousal property, and how that issue is to be distinguished from a separate case concerning modification of child maintenance for a minor child. This issue is to be determined under Article 3.116(1) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, which permits joint marital property to be divided by court judgment both for spouses and for persons whose marriage has been dissolved. The presumption as to the legal regime of property arises from Article 3.2(1)-(2) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania: property, income, and certain payments acquired after marriage are deemed joint marital property unless personal ownership is proven. If a marital agreement existed, Article 3.95(5) and Article 3.105 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania would be relevant, particularly the prohibition on contractually restricting the right to apply to a court or establishing terms that infringe children’s rights. In the separate child maintenance case, the principal criterion of assessment derives from the cited source concerning the priority of the child’s interests: in family-law disputes, the court must be guided first and foremost by the interests of the child
Legal assessment. The information provided indicates two distinct civil cases: O. Pikul’s claim for modification of the amount or form of maintenance awarded for a minor child, received on 1 December 2025, and S. Jasaitis’s claim for partition from co-ownership in shares, received on 18 June 2026. In the property case, S. Jasaitis, as claimant, has the procedural right to seek division of property or a monetary settlement, because Article 3.116(1) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania grants such a right even after dissolution of marriage. O. Pikul, as defendant in that case, may dispute the legal regime of the property, its value, the size of the shares, or the basis for monetary settlement, relying on the presumption and its rebuttal under Article 3.2(2) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania. If it were alleged in the case that the family failed to receive income due to the negligence of one spouse, or that such income was concealed and used for personal needs, Article 3.111(4) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania would apply, allowing one spouse’s share of the joint property to be reduced for a period not exceeding the last five years prior to the commencement of the property-division proceedings. Since the property case was initiated on 18 June 2026, the relevant period under that provision could not precede the five years before the institution of that case. If the division of property were approved by court judgment, Article 3.125 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania would require the fact of property division to be registered in the Register of Marital Agreements. As regards creditors, Article 3.110(1)-(2) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania distinguishes personal obligations incurred before marriage from the claims of joint creditors, which are satisfied from joint property first. The child maintenance case should not be mechanically conflated with the property partition case, because in its ruling of 4 April 2018 in civil case No. 3K-3-121-378/2018, the Supreme Court of Lithuania stated that the subject matter of a claim for child maintenance arrears is recovery of the debt, not a review of the consequences of divorce or of the proprietary relations between spouses. This means that arguments concerning the child’s needs may be decisive in the maintenance case, but in the property case they are relevant only to the extent that the cited sources permit account to be taken of the interests of a minor child, including a possible departure from the principle of equal shares. Public comments by J. Pečeliūnas or statements by O. Pikul do not, in themselves, alter the parties’ rights and obligations under Article 3.116 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, because the decisive factors will be the relief sought in the claims, the evidence, and the circumstances established by the court
Consequences. Realistically, several legal outcomes are possible: the court may uphold S. Jasaitis’s monetary claim, reduce it, dismiss it, or otherwise resolve the division of property according to the established property regime and the parties’ shares. If it were established that certain property does not fall within joint marital property, or that a valid contractual property regime exists, this would directly affect the amount of the payment sought. If the grounds specified in Article 3.111(4) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania concerning unreceived or concealed income were proven, the share of one former spouse could be reduced. In the child maintenance case, the practical significance lies not in the dispute between the former spouses, but in the needs of the minor child and the basis for modifying the amount or form of maintenance. These cases are significant for O. Pikul and S. Jasaitis as former spouses, for their minor child, and also for potential creditors if the division of property affects joint property or performance of obligations. For the public sphere, the relevant point is only that the report describes not a single “monetary conflict,” but two independent civil cases whose subject matter, evidentiary issues, and legal consequences differ
Whether the registration of the draft Government Programme in the Seimas on 3 July 2026, when the Presidential Decree on the composition of the Twenty-First Government was signed only on 6 July 2026, should be regarded as a “submission for consideration” of the Programme that would breach the sequence for forming the Government.
Article 6 of the Law on the Government provides: “No later than within 15 days of his or her appointment, the Prime Minister shall present to the Seimas the Government formed by him or her and approved by the President of the Republic, and shall submit its Programme for consideration.” This wording links two acts within a single procedure: a Government that has already been formed and approved by the President is presented to the Seimas, together with the submission of its Programme for consideration. Accordingly, the strongest legal issue is not merely the date on which the draft was prepared or technically registered, but whether, before 6 July, there was a formal submission of the Programme for consideration as part of the constitutional procedure for approving the Government. Article 22(3) of the Law on the Government further indicates that an approved Programme is not merely a political document: the Government implements it, and, under the proposed wording of the amendment to Article 26, ministers are directly responsible for implementing Programme measures within their respective fields.
The article should refine the opposition’s position, because the bare assertion that the Programme was “submitted before the Cabinet of Ministers had been approved” is too broad. Under the wording of Article 92 of the Constitution as cited and Article 6 of the Law on the Government, what is legally significant is not any circulation or registration of a draft, but the act of the Prime Minister in the Seimas presenting the Government formed by him or her and approved by the President, and submitting the Programme for consideration. It would be more precise to say: the dispute concerns whether the registration on 3 July 2026 amounted to a formal submission of the Programme for consideration, although the Presidential Decree on the composition of the Government was signed on 6 July 2026.
If the Programme was in fact presented at a sitting of the Seimas only after the decree of 6 July, the earlier registration of the draft is not, in itself, an obvious breach of Article 6.
In practical terms, the stronger argument at this stage appears not to be that “any earlier draft is prohibited”, but the narrower question of whether the earlier registration had formal procedural consequences as a submission for consideration. In proceedings before the Constitutional Court, the opposition would need to rely not merely on the date of 3 July, but to show that the procedure for considering the Government Programme in the Seimas was commenced on that very day, in the absence of a Government approved by the President. The Government’s practical line of defence would be to distinguish the technical registration of the draft Programme from the presentation and submission for consideration provided for in Article 6 of the Law on the Government.
The legal risk remains if the documentary sequence in the Seimas showed that, before 6 July, an act of submission with procedural legal significance, rather than a preparatory act, had been carried out.
Core issue. The precise issue is not the abstract “legality of the Government,” but whether a specific act of the Seimas, the President of the Republic, or the Government relating to the formation of the Government and approval of its programme is contrary to the Constitution or laws. The Constitutional Court may decide this issue under Article 102 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and Article 1 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. The applicant entitled to apply depends on the challenged act: under Article 106 of the Constitution, not less than one-fifth of all Members of the Seimas may apply regarding the acts referred to in the first paragraph of Article 105 of the Constitution, regarding the compliance of acts of the President of the Republic with the Constitution and laws, and regarding the compliance of Government acts with the Constitution and laws. For the chain of formation of the Government, the most important provision is Article 84(4) of the Constitution, under which the President of the Republic, with the approval of the Seimas, appoints the Prime Minister, charges him or her with forming the Government, and approves its composition. Article 84(8) of the Constitution is also relevant: where the Government resigns or returns its powers, the President must submit a candidate for Prime Minister to the Seimas within 15 days. If the dispute concerns the reshaping of the Government, the criterion in Article 8(4) of the Law on the Government of the Republic of Lithuania is additionally applicable: where more than half of the ministers change, the Government must again receive powers from the Seimas
Legal assessment. According to the circumstances presented, the draft Government programme was registered in the Seimas on 3 July 2026, while the decree of the President of the Republic approving the composition of the Twenty-First Government was signed on 6 July 2026. What would be legally significant is not merely the date of registration, but which act is being challenged and what procedural significance the Constitution and laws attach to the submission, consideration, or approval of the programme. The sources provided contain no standalone rule directly regulating the moment at which the Government programme is submitted to the Seimas; therefore, the analysis must be based on the competences relating to Government formation and the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. Article 84(4) of the Constitution clearly distinguishes three actions by the President: appointing the Prime Minister with the approval of the Seimas, charging the Prime Minister with forming the Government, and approving the composition of the Government. Accordingly, the opposition’s argument would be strongest if it were asserted that the submission of the programme produced legal consequences before that part of the constitutional chain in which the President approves the composition of the Government. The Government’s argument, assessed solely on the basis of the sources provided, would be that the Constitutional Court should assess a specific act and its legal consequences, not merely a political or organisational step. Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania requires an application to specify the exact title, number, date of adoption, identifying details, the applicant’s position, and the legal reasoning for the challenged legal act, with references to laws. This means that a group of Members of the Seimas could not confine itself to a general assertion that the Government is “unlawful”; it would have to formulate precisely whether it challenges a Seimas act concerning the programme, a presidential decree, or another act. Under Article 106 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court may refuse to accept an application if it is based on non-legal grounds; therefore, the procedural argument would have to be constructed as a breach of legal norms, not as political disagreement. If the challenged act were the decree of the President of the Republic approving the composition of the Government, not less than one-fifth of all Members of the Seimas would have the right to apply regarding its compliance with the Constitution and laws under Article 106 of the Constitution. If the challenged act were a Seimas act concerning the Government programme, the same threshold of one-fifth of all Members of the Seimas is also relevant under Article 106 of the Constitution. Article 106 of the Constitution provides that a submission by the President of the Republic to the Constitutional Court, or a resolution of the Seimas requesting an investigation into whether an act complies with the Constitution, suspends the validity of that act; therefore, automatic suspension would depend on the form of the application, not on a public statement about an intended application. Article 9 of the Law on the Constitutional Court gives a judge of the Constitutional Court the right to request documents, information, and explanations from officials, and to use specialist consultations; therefore, the factual course of the procedure could be assessed in the proceedings. In its ruling of 10 January 1998, “On the compliance of the Resolution of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania of 10 December 1996 ‘On the Programme of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania’ with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania,” the Constitutional Court stated that the Government is a collegial institution of general competence, consisting of the Prime Minister and ministers. This position is important because the issue of the programme is linked not only to the will of the Prime Minister, but to the Government as a collegial institution. Article 22(3) of the Law on the Government provides that the Government implements the Government programme and approves a plan for implementing its provisions; therefore, an approved programme is the practical basis for Government activity
Consequences. The first scenario is that the Constitutional Court refuses to accept the application if it does not meet the requirements of Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court or is based on non-legal grounds under Article 106 of the Constitution. The second scenario is that the application is accepted and the Court examines whether a specific act of the Seimas, the President, or the Government was adopted in compliance with the logic of Government formation and conferral of powers laid down in Article 84 of the Constitution and Article 8 of the Law on the Government. The third scenario is that the Constitutional Court finds that the challenged act is not contrary to the Constitution or laws, in which case the political dispute would essentially lose its legal basis. The fourth scenario is that the Constitutional Court finds a contradiction, in which case the competent institutions would have to adopt decisions in relation to the act found to be inconsistent with the Constitution or laws. The practical significance is greatest for the Seimas, the President, and the Government: for the Seimas, in relation to the procedure for the programme and the conferral of powers; for the President, in relation to the approval of the composition of the Government; and for the Government, in relation to implementation of its programme under Article 22 of the Law on the Government. Until there is a procedural or final decision of the Constitutional Court, the opposition’s mere intention to apply does not in itself extinguish the Government’s functions under Article 22 of the Law on the Government. Therefore, V. Sinkevičius’s statement that the work of the Government need not necessarily stop while awaiting clarification is consistent with the normative framework presented, insofar as no ground for suspension of the validity of an act under Article 106 of the Constitution has occurred
Whether the complaint by the victim’s relatives and the video recording of violence against a minor that circulated on social media constitute a sufficient procedural basis to open a pre-trial investigation under Article 284 of the Criminal Code, without waiting for the final legal assessment of the injuries.
Article 166(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes two independent grounds for opening a pre-trial investigation: a complaint, statement or report concerning a criminal offence, and indications of a criminal offence identified by the prosecutor or pre-trial investigation officer themselves. In this situation, both grounds are engaged: the relatives of the minor victim contacted law enforcement, and there is also a publicly circulated recording which, according to the report, shows violent images. Article 170 of the Code of Criminal Procedure explains why the prosecutor is emphasised in the report: where the investigation is conducted by the police, the prosecutor must supervise the investigation, and only the prosecutor may decide to terminate, separate, join or complete the investigation by drawing up an indictment.
Accordingly, the initial classification under Article 284 of the Criminal Code at this stage is an investigative direction, not a final legal answer as to all possible consequences of the act.
The stronger procedural argument at present is not the precise severity of the injury, which will still depend on medical evidence, but the lawfulness of opening the investigation: Article 166 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits an investigation to be opened once there is a report and indications of a criminal offence. In practice, this means that any defence or public-communication attempt to portray the investigation as having been opened solely because of a social-media reaction would be weak, because the report identifies several independent triggers for the investigation: the relatives’ complaint, several dozen blows, the minor’s admission to a medical institution, and the video recording. For professionals, it is important to cite Article 170 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because it shows that actions taken by the police are not autonomous “fact-gathering” without procedural supervision: the prosecutor will control the decision on whether to maintain or change the classification, or to bring the investigation to an end.
The main risk is to overstate the Article 284 classification too early, because the available facts justify opening an investigation, but do not yet determine whether the later legal assessment will be dominated by breach of public order, impairment of health, or another legal characterisation.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether, following the report of violence against a minor in Marijampolė, the prosecutor had a procedural basis to initiate a pre-trial investigation and under what procedure it must be conducted. This question must be assessed under Article 166(1)(1) and (2), Article 169(1) and (2), and Article 178 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as Article 140 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania insofar as the factual circumstances relate to beating, causing physical pain, or minor impairment of health. Since the report states that the investigation is currently being conducted under Article 284 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, the essential procedural issue is not the necessity of a private complaint, but the general procedure for initiating and directing a pre-trial investigation under Articles 166 and 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 167(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is also relevant, as it shows that, in respect of the offence provided for in Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code, an investigation is generally initiated only upon a complaint by the victim or a statement by the victim’s legal representative; however, that rule applies directly to the offences specifically listed in that provision
Legal assessment. Under Article 166(1)(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a pre-trial investigation is initiated upon receipt of a complaint, statement, or report concerning a criminal offence; accordingly, the approach made by the close relatives of the minor victim constitutes an independent procedural basis for initiation. In addition, Article 166(1)(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits an investigation to be initiated where the prosecutor or pre-trial investigation officer personally identifies indications of a criminal offence; in this respect, the video recordings mentioned in the report and the information concerning blows and the victim’s admission to a medical institution are relevant. Article 169(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes the prosecutor’s duty, upon receiving such a report or personally identifying indications of an offence, to initiate a pre-trial investigation immediately; therefore, the action taken by the prosecutor of the Kaunas Regional Prosecutor’s Office corresponds to the applicable procedural model. Article 169(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits the prosecutor either to conduct the investigation personally or to assign it to a pre-trial investigation institution; accordingly, the arrangement described in the report, whereby the investigation is directed by a prosecutor of the Marijampolė District Prosecutor’s Office and investigative actions are carried out by police officers, is consistent with the statutory allocation of competences. Article 166(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires each instance of initiation of a pre-trial investigation to be registered in accordance with the procedure established by the Prosecutor General, while paragraph 4 requires notification of the person who initiated the investigation. If the elements of Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code were also assessed in the course of the investigation, Article 167(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure would link such an investigation to a complaint by the victim or a statement by the victim’s legal representative; however, the relatives’ approach mentioned in the report satisfies that procedural condition, at least on the apparent factual basis. Article 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is also relevant from the perspective of protecting the minor: where the offence is of public significance or harm has been caused to a person who, for important reasons, is unable to defend their interests, an investigation into the offences listed in that provision must be initiated upon the prosecutor’s demand. This logic is also confirmed by paragraph 364 of the submitted report under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which states that the prosecutor organises and directs the investigation and, upon receiving a report or personally identifying indications of an offence, immediately initiates a pre-trial investigation. Paragraph 365 of the same document explains that, even in the category of private-public prosecution, the prosecutor may initiate proceedings where the offence is of public significance or the victim, for important reasons, is unable to defend their interests. In the investigation, the prosecutor and officers may, under Article 178(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, question the suspect and witnesses, apply procedural coercive measures, and carry out other actions provided for in the Code. Under Article 178(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the victim, her representatives, the suspect, and defence counsel have the right to request in writing that procedural actions be carried out, and the prosecutor must examine such a request within ten days of its receipt or of receipt of the materials, where those materials are necessary for deciding the request. Under Article 178(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, refusal to carry out the requested actions must be formalised by a ruling, which may be appealed to the pre-trial investigation judge within seven days of receipt. Article 149 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is relevant to the seizure of video recordings and telephones: when conducting a search or seizure, the officer announces the court order or ruling, demands the surrender of the specified items or documents, and may seize only those items that may be relevant to the investigation. If persons who were present at the scene or who possess relevant recordings fail to comply with lawful instructions or obstruct the investigation, Article 163(1) and (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits the imposition of a fine and, in cases provided by law, arrest. Temporary detention is possible under Article 140 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: where a person is caught in the act of committing a criminal offence or immediately thereafter, and in other cases only where the exceptional conditions set out in paragraph 2 of that Article are met; the maximum term under Article 140(4) is forty-eight hours. Remand measures under Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may be imposed to ensure participation in the proceedings, the unobstructed conduct of the investigation, the hearing of the case and enforcement of the judgment, and to prevent new criminal offences. Article 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lists measures such as detention, intensive supervision, house arrest, bail, an obligation to register periodically with a police institution, and a written undertaking not to leave; in the case of a minor, placement under the supervision of parents, guardians, or other supervising persons may be applied. If securing compensation for damage were to be considered, Article 152(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure sets out the data that must be specified in a ruling imposing a temporary restriction of ownership rights
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the investigation continues under the general procedure: medical, video, and witness evidence is collected, the participants in the incident are questioned, and decisions are made regarding suspect status and coercive measures. The second scenario is that the participants in the proceedings actively use the request and appeal mechanisms established in Article 178(2) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, particularly in relation to video recordings, witness questioning, or other investigative actions. The third scenario is that, once sufficient data have been collected, the pre-trial investigation may be concluded by an indictment, since under Article 23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure an indictment is the prosecutor’s document by which the pre-trial investigation is concluded and which describes the act, the data, and the criminal law provision. The fourth scenario is that the investigation may be discontinued on the grounds set out in Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for example where insufficient data are collected to substantiate the suspect’s guilt, or where other grounds listed in that Article apply. If the case reaches court, Article 275(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure would, in practical terms, protect the minor: questions to victims and witnesses under the age of eighteen are put only through the presiding judge of the hearing and, where necessary, through a representative. The practical significance for the victim and her representatives lies in the possibility of requesting specific investigative actions, challenging a prosecutor’s refusal, and seeking measures to secure compensation for damage. For the suspect, the practical significance lies in the application of procedural safeguards: the right to defence counsel, to submit requests, to present evidence, and subsequently to be informed of the accusation under Article 21(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. For the institutions, this case is significant as a situation involving a report, a publicly disseminated video recording, and the protection of a minor victim, in which the prosecutor’s direction and the actions carried out by the police must be based on specific provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, rather than on public resonance alone
Does the breach of Novaturas’ financial covenants, acceleration of debts and possible insolvency risk already amount to an infringement of travellers’ rights, or should traveller protection be assessed more narrowly, by reference to the validity, amount and relationship of the specific security for performance of obligations to the existing liabilities owed to travellers?
Article 12(1)-(2) of the Law on Tourism establishes not a general solvency guarantee for a tour organiser, but a specific instrument: valid surety insurance and/or a financial guarantee under which the insurer or financial institution, upon demand by the institution authorised by the Government, pays a justified amount to compensate travellers’ losses. That amount is limited to the sum specified in the guarantee or insurance contract. Accordingly, the legally decisive question is not merely the EUR 1.4 million loss in 2025 or the almost EUR 10 million share issue, but whether the secured amount covers the obligations referred to in Article 15(1) of the Law on Tourism.
Article 15(1) covers the traveller’s repatriation, necessary accommodation until repatriation, reimbursement of money paid for services not provided, and reimbursement where, before the trip has started, it becomes clear that the contract will not be performed. For that reason, the position of the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority that, according to the latest data, the total secured amount is sufficient and fully covers obligations to travellers is currently a stronger legal argument than the deterioration of financial results alone.
In practice, this development does not change the logic of a traveller’s claim: the first point to verify should be not the company’s profitability, but the validity and amount of the security and the currency of the data held by the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority in relation to the specific volume of trips sold. The weak point is dynamic: a failed new share issue, acceleration of creditors’ claims or absence of refinancing may quickly alter the relationship between obligations and security, even though the Authority currently says that the security is sufficient. For a journalist or lawyer, the key point is not to confuse investor risk with traveller protection: a statement about a possible “total loss of invested capital” does not in itself prove that money paid by travellers is not covered by the mechanism in Articles 12 and 15 of the Law on Tourism.
The more precise line of inquiry would be to ask the Authority not abstractly whether the “company is safe”, but as of what date the secured amount was calculated, which traveller liabilities it covers, and when the specific surety or guarantee instruments expire.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not whether Novaturas’ financial indicators are sound, but whether travellers’ paid funds and repatriation are protected if the travel organiser were no longer able to perform package travel contracts. This issue is assessed under Article 1(1), Article 12(1)-(4), Article 15(1)-(2), Article 16 and Article 17 of the Law on Tourism of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as under the Government resolution on the conferral of powers for the implementation of the Law on Tourism. Article 12(1) of the Law on Tourism requires that the performance of obligations by a travel organiser established in Lithuania be secured by surety insurance and/or a guarantee issued by a financial institution. Under Article 12(2) of the Law on Tourism, the travel organiser must submit to the Government-authorised institution an insurance contract or financial guarantee under which the insurer or financial institution pays a justified amount to compensate tourists’ losses. The Government resolution authorises the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority to perform the functions of the Government-authorised institution specified in the Law on Tourism; accordingly, the SCRPA is not a commentator here, but an authority with supervisory functions and the role of beneficiary
Legal assessment. If Novaturas is currently organising and operating trips in the ordinary course, financial difficulties alone do not yet activate the payout mechanism provided for in Article 15(2) of the Law on Tourism. That mechanism arises upon at least one of the statutory circumstances: the travel organiser’s insolvency, the opening of bankruptcy proceedings, an out-of-court bankruptcy process, liquidation proceedings, or revocation of the travel organiser’s certificate on the basis of Article 15(2) of the Law on Tourism. Until such an event occurs, the travel organiser’s obligation is to maintain valid security for the performance of its obligations and to submit it to the SCRPA pursuant to Article 12(1)-(2) of the Law on Tourism. The sources state that, from 29 May 2026, Novaturas increased the insured amount from EUR 9 million to EUR 12.5 million, and that, according to the latest data, the SCRPA considers the total security amount sufficient to cover existing obligations to travellers. Legally, this means that passenger protection is assessed not by reference to the company’s loss or the risks of a share issue, but by whether the security for performance of obligations in fact covers the situations specified in Article 15(1) of the Law on Tourism. If the trip has already begun, Article 15(1)(1) of the Law on Tourism covers the traveller’s repatriation, the necessary accommodation provided for in the contract until repatriation, and reimbursement of the part of the money paid corresponding to the price of services not provided. If the trip has not yet begun, Article 15(1)(2) of the Law on Tourism covers reimbursement of money paid by or on behalf of the traveller. Article 16 of the Law on Tourism extends this protection to all tourists who have purchased a package travel contract, irrespective of their place of residence, place of departure or place of purchase of the trip. The travel organiser also has an independent obligation under Article 17(1) of the Law on Tourism to provide assistance without undue delay to a traveller in difficulty during the trip, including information on healthcare services, local authorities, consular assistance, means of communication and alternative services
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is continuation of operations: as long as trips are being performed and the data held by the SCRPA indicate sufficient security, the traveller’s principal legal position does not change. The second scenario would be more active supervision by the SCRPA under the powers conferred on it and under the procedure for security for the performance of obligations provided for in Article 12(4) of the Law on Tourism. The third scenario would arise if the circumstances specified in Article 15(2) of the Law on Tourism occurred: in that case, the SCRPA, as beneficiary, could claim the security amount to compensate travellers’ losses. In such a case, travellers who have already departed would be the legally most important group, because Article 15(1)(1) of the Law on Tourism covers not only reimbursement for services not provided, but also repatriation and necessary accommodation until repatriation. For travellers who have not yet departed, the essential protection would be reimbursement of the money paid under Article 15(1)(2) of the Law on Tourism. The share issues, contractual financial obligations and potential insolvency risks mentioned in the report are relevant to investors and creditors, but in the legal regime governing traveller protection, what is decisive is not the economic origin of those risks, but the sufficiency of the security provided for in Articles 12 and 15 of the Law on Tourism and the conditions for its use. Therefore, for passengers, this information is practically relevant as a signal to monitor announcements by the SCRPA and the travel organiser, but, according to the sources provided, their principal rights arise and are exercised specifically through the security mechanism for the performance of obligations established in Article 15 of the Law on Tourism
If the Minister of the Interior does not attend a Government meeting because of an official mission, may the Chancellor lawfully “deputise” for him, or can such deputising be understood only as technical attendance without ministerial powers?
Article 26(2) of the Law on the Government establishes a strict rule: a minister may be temporarily deputised only by another member of the Government appointed by the Prime Minister. This means that the Chancellor, even if a political appointee or a senior ministry official, cannot assume the minister’s status at a Government meeting. Article 31 of the Law on the Government allows vice-ministers, on the minister’s instruction, to represent the minister at Government meetings and consultations, but the provision expressly confers that right on vice-ministers, not on the ministry Chancellor.
The stronger argument, therefore, is that “the Chancellor deputises” cannot mean legal deputising for the minister within the meaning of Article 26.
The practical risk is not the minister’s absence as such, but accuracy in the minutes and in institutional competence: if the Chancellor merely attended, conveyed information or represented the ministry administratively, that should not be equated with deputising for the minister. However, if decisions were to be taken at the meeting requiring the minister’s political will, a vote, or the exercise of ministerial functions, the legally safer course would be for another member of the Government to be appointed by the Prime Minister. A professional should cite Article 26(2) of the Law on the Government as the key provision, because it precludes grounding deputising solely in the internal administrative hierarchy.
In the context of preparing the implementation plan for the Government Programme, ministers’ responsibility under Article 26(3)(1) also remains personal in respect of the areas of governance assigned to them; therefore, team formation or the Chancellor’s participation does not replace the minister’s responsibility for implementing the programme measures.
Core issue. The legal issue is how the Government’s initial work is organized after approval of the Government Programme, who is responsible for the implementation plan of that Programme, and whether the Government Chancellor may substitute for a minister who is absent from a sitting. Under Article 1 of the Law on the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, the Government consists of the Prime Minister and ministers; accordingly, the political cabinet with decision-making authority is composed precisely of those persons. The Prime Minister’s status is assessed under Article 24(1) of the Law on the Government, which provides that the Prime Minister represents the Government and directs its activities. Further implementation of the Government Programme is based on Article 22(3) of the Law on the Government: the Government implements the Government Programme, approves the plan for implementing the provisions of the Government Programme, and coordinates the activities of ministries and other Government agencies. The basis for ministerial responsibility is Article 26(3)(1) of the Law on the Government, under which a minister heads the ministry and is directly responsible for implementing the Government Programme and the tasks in the implementation plan of its provisions within the areas of governance assigned to that minister
Legal assessment. M. Sinkevičius’s instruction to ministers to arrange their legislative initiatives by the 2026 autumn session is consistent with the Prime Minister’s general function of directing the activities of the Government under Article 24(1) of the Law on the Government. Such an instruction is also connected with Article 22(6) of the Law on the Government, since the Government prepares and submits draft laws and other legal acts to the Seimas for consideration. The implementation plan of the Programme is not merely a political work list: under Article 22(3) of the Law on the Government, it is approved by the Government, and under Article 26(3)(1), ministers become directly responsible for implementing the tasks assigned to them. When ministers speak about forming teams, sectoral issues, and immediate steps, they act within the limits of their areas of governance, since Article 26(1) of the Law on the Government establishes their responsibility for the areas of governance assigned to them. Legislative initiatives at ministry level must be submitted to the Government in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Government Rules of Procedure pursuant to Article 26(3)(3) of the Law on the Government. From the perspective of the sitting agenda, Article 40 of the Law on the Government is important: the Chancellor submits proposals to the Prime Minister regarding the agenda, while the Prime Minister may propose at the sitting that new items be included. Therefore, the working character of the first sitting depends legally not only on the Prime Minister’s political expectations, but also on the regulated procedure for preparing, coordinating, considering, and adopting drafts under Article 40(1) of the Law on the Government. The role of the Government Chancellor in this situation is auxiliary and coordinative: under Article 45(2)(1), (2), and (5) of the Law on the Government, the Chancellor assists the Prime Minister in implementing the Programme provisions, organizes the analysis of draft legal acts, and helps coordinate the activities of ministries. Under Article 44¹(1) of the Law on the Government, the Office of the Government is an institution that assists in performing the functions of the Government and the Prime Minister, not the political head of a ministry. Accordingly, the statement used in the news item that the Minister of the Interior is being “substituted by the Chancellor” can, in legal terms, be understood only as participation or organizational representation at the sitting, because actual temporary substitution of a minister is regulated differently. Article 26(2) of the Law on the Government clearly provides that a minister may be temporarily substituted only by another member of the Government appointed by the Prime Minister. Since, under Article 1 of the Law on the Government, the members of the Government are the Prime Minister and ministers, the Government Chancellor cannot be a member of the Government substituting for a minister. This limitation is also confirmed by the provisions included in the amendments to the regulations of the Ministries of the Economy, Economy and Innovation, and Agriculture, which reiterate that a minister is temporarily substituted only by another member of the Government appointed by the Prime Minister
Consequences. In practical terms, the next legal stage is the preparation and approval by the Government of the plan for implementing the provisions of the Government Programme under Article 22(3) of the Law on the Government. By the 2026 autumn session, ministries will have to translate political priorities into concrete drafts, since under Article 26(3)(3) of the Law on the Government, ministers submit draft legal acts to the Government in the prescribed procedure. If drafts have not been coordinated with interested institutions, the Government Chancellor may, under Article 45(2)(2) of the Law on the Government, organize their coordination in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Government Rules of Procedure. The absence of the Minister of the Interior during a business trip does not in itself mean that the minister’s functions may be taken over by the Chancellor; this would require another member of the Government appointed by the Prime Minister under Article 26(2) of the Law on the Government. This is important for the legality of Government decisions, because the political responsibility of a minister and the competence of a substituting minister cannot be replaced by administrative participation of the Office of the Government. For ministers, this situation entails direct responsibility for the Programme plan tasks within their areas of governance; for the Prime Minister, the duty to direct and coordinate the Government’s overall activities; and for the Chancellor, an organizational and coordinative function in preparing agendas, coordinating drafts, and assisting in the implementation of the Programme